



PREM R. UPRETY

NEPAL

DS495.3
U67
1984

**a small nation
in the vortex of**

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

**NEPAL :
A SMALL NATION
IN THE VORTEX
OF
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
1900-1950**

**NEPAL : A SMALL NATION IN THE VORTEX
OF
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS, 1900-1950**

Prem R. Uprety

Professor of History

TRIBHUVAN UNIVERSITY

Kathmandu

Kathmandu
Pugo Mi

Copyright 1984 by Prem R. Uprety
All rights reserved. No part of this work
may be reproduced or transmitted in
any form or by any means, electronic
or mechanical, including photocopying
and recording, or by any information
storage or retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the author.

Nepal : A Small Nation in the Vortex of International Conflicts

Published by Pugo Mi
Kathmandu, Nepal

Printed in Nepal by
Gorkhapatra Sansthan
Dharmapath, Kathmandu

**This Study Is Dedicated to the Thousands of Nepalese
Who Were Killed or Wounded or Had Their Lives
Dislocated during the International Conflicts
in the First Half of the Twentieth Century**

In all the varied theatres of Indian politics there is nothing which surpasses in interest than the ultimate destiny of Nepal. Inevitably, she will become of greater and greater importance if we persist in our present policy of lessening British influence in India. It is not impossible that Nepal may even be called to control the destiny of India.

Perceval Landon. *Nepal*, Vol. II, p. 363

Preface

This is a study of Nepalese diplomacy during the first half of the twentieth century—a problematic period in the history of Nepal and that of the world civilization. The dawn of the twentieth century caught Nepal by surprise. She quickly discovered that the European civilization was in crisis and the hitherto status quo oriented South Asian polity was going through a process of hectic change and transformation. The changes in the subcontinent were, however, more distinctly visible. Three elements helped to sharpen this visibility before her eyes. First, the opening of the Phari route via Kalimpong, India, served to destroy the existing Trans-Himalayan trade structure in which Nepal had enjoyed her premiership. Secondly, the increasing growth of militant nationalism in South Asia had questioned the viability of imperial and arbitrary governments; and thirdly, as the Tibetan plateau had become a theater of Anglo-Russian rivalry, Nepal which had a contiguous border with Tibet could not afford to remain indifferent. In summary, the world crisis did have its cataclysmic effects in the history of the subcontinent. It is within this broad framework that political awakening in Nepal and her role in international conflicts has to be analyzed, though the former falls outside the purview of this study.

Two factors provided the stimulus for my study in this direction. First, the decision of Tribhuvan University to write the national history of Nepal in ten volumes under the aegis of Nepal and Asian Studies* did poke my zeal and spirit to pen this volume in a

* This study is, however, not in any way connected with the national history that is being hopefully written by the “scholars” of the Research Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies and the History Department of Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur.

relatively short period. Secondly, the sight of a countless number of crippled, maimed and wounded war-veterans during my travels of the mountain districts of Nepal, did push me into this arena of research.

In a study like this a large number of Sanskrit, Nepalese, Arabic and Urdu words is inevitable. This may sound strange, unfamiliar and often even exotic to the general reader; but is necessary due to the lack of English equivalents. However, when such words occur I have either explained them within parentheses or with the aid of footnotes. The reader must also excuse my transliteration of South Asian words without diacritical marks, which is today being more of a norm than an exception. In transliterating words I have generally adopted the transliteration followed by the Government of India in the catalogues and manuscripts. I have, thus, retained the term "Nepalese" instead of "Nepali", which is also being increasingly used by South Asian scholars. The spelling of South Asian words also presented yet another formidable problem for they not only have many equivalents but are also spelled differently.

A study of this dimension, however, cannot be the work of one individual. Many institutions and friends have made this research fruitful and rewarding. I would first of all like to thank the Cultural Department of the Soviet Embassy in Kathmandu and the Geography Department of Tribhuvan University in Kirtipur; in particular, Shri D. B. Rayamajhi, Professor Mangal S. Manandhar and Shri Bhim P. Subedi for providing me the photographs and maps, without which this study would have been incomplete. To my esteemed colleagues Shri Tej Ram Poudel and Dr. Krishna Bahadur Thapa I owe a major sense of gratitude for sparing their time and learning so generously. While working in the National Archives, India, the Foreign Ministry, Kathmandu, the India Office Library, London, and the Army Headquarters, Tundikhel, the help rendered by Shri K. Hamal, Miss. R. Wilkie and Shri M. Sapkota was extremely valuable. My grateful thanks are also due to Shri Tul Bahadur Pun for providing me not only

his photograph but also a firsthand account of the Allied campaign in the Assam-Burma front. In this connection let me extend my sincere thanks to Shri Mahendra Singh Thapa and Shri Dil Bahadur Baruwal without whose help I would not have been able to receive this information. I am also indebted to Dr. D. R. Regmi, Major General Brahma Shumsher, Shri Ram Babu Dhakal, Shri G. P. Adhikari (better known as Hansen) and the late *Sardar* Fate Bahadur Pandey for providing me the valuable information of the intricacies of the period.

This is not all. There are names of my colleagues in Tribhuvan University who in turn deserve credit and commendation: Shri Kedar Bhakta Mathema and Shri Mukunda Raj Aryal for their useful suggestions and comments; Shri Anand (Aditya) and Dr. Pitamber Sharma for keeping my flagging zeal alive when I was about to give up this research altogether and Dr. Gajanand Agrawal for his continuing and stimulating encouragement. My grateful thanks also go to Shri Bharat Dutta Koirala and Shri Ramesh Baskota for their utmost zeal in all the stages of the printing of the book and to Birendra Pratap Singh for the jacket design. Then finally I owe much to my wife Susma Devi Uprety, whose counsel and companionship sustained me throughout this research endeavor.

While these persons may detect their influences in the following pages, I suspect that they will frequently see my stubbornness too. However, the incorporation of their suggestions ought in no way shift to them any errors and inaccuracies: they lie with me alone.

Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu
January 1, 1984

P. R. U.

CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i>		<i>ix-xi</i>
<i>Introduction</i>		1-4
Part I	Turmoil in Trans-Himalayan Politics and Nepal : 1900-1913	
	1. Anglo-Tibetan Conflict	8-19
	2. Tibet-China Conflict	19-37
Part II : A	Small Nepal Goes Big in World War I : War Efforts Abroad	
	1. Preface	41-47
	2. Preparation for war	47-56
	3. Problems of Adjustment	57-65
	4. Nepalese Troops in Combat Operations	65-86
	5. Homecoming of the Nepalese Contingent	86-88
	6. Impact of the War	88-110
Part II : B	Small Nepal Goes Big in World War I : War Efforts at Home	
	1. Preface	113-126
	2. Anatomy of Recruitment	126-150
	3. Liberal Donations	150-157
	4. The Intrigues of War	157-164
Part III	Third Anglo-Afghan War : Nepalese Reaction and British Response	
	1. Preface	167-169
	2. Nepalese Reaction and the British Grateful Response	169-180

Part IV: A	Anglo-Nepalese Cooperation in World War II: War Efforts Abroad	
	1. Preface	183-199
	2. Problems of Adjustment	199-207
	3. Combat Operations	207-232
	4. The Happy Arrival of Peace	232-236
	5. The Impact of War	236-251
Part IV: B	Anglo-Nepalese Cooperation in World War II: War Efforts at Home	
	1. Problems at Home	255-268
	2. Munificent Donations	269-274
	3. The Intrigues of War	274-279
Part V	Crisis in South Asia and Nepal: 1948-49	
	1. Preface	283-291
	2. Terms and Conditions	291-296
	3. Nepalese Contingent in India	297-298
	Conclusions	299-302
	Appendixes	303-331
	Selected Bibliography	332-338
	Index	339-344

ABBREVIATIONS

FMAN	Foreign Ministry Archives, Kathmandu, Nepal
GI	Government of India
GN	Government of Nepal
GOC	General-Officer-in-Command
IOL	India Office Library, London (now Commonwealth Relations Library)
MAN	Military Archives, Kathmandu, Nepal
NAI	National Archives, New Delhi, India
QC	Officer-in-Command

INTRODUCTION

The Politics of Size

The twin revolutions of the eighteenth century, namely, the Industrial and the French Revolution, gave birth to the notion of size a new dimension through expressions like "mass-democracy" and "mass-production". The masses had, thus, become a new word for the mob, who were seen concentrated in the industrial towns and factories. Both "mass-production" and "mass-thinking" did contribute to the glorification of size, which ultimately led to the establishment of the "mass-rule" or the majority-rule in many parts of the earth. The word mass when identified with the majority became a symbol of power.¹ The twentieth century has been distinguished by the politics of size: big democracy, big factories, big bureaucracy and in short, big business and big governments. In a sense, we are today being plagued by an almost "universal idolatry" of giantism. This has colored our perception and the very fabric of socio-political systems. When we turn our radio sets on or look at the morning papers we love to hear about the role of the two super-powers in world politics, when people talk of the mountains the Himalayas come before our mind and when there is a talk about rivers the river Amazon comes to our vision.² There is nothing wrong with this sort of thinking in itself, but an obsession resulting from the notion of size has often detracted us from the appreciation of things that are small and beautiful. At the present stage it has therefore become necessary to insist upon the virtue of smallness-at least where it applies.

-
1. More on "mass civilization" see Raymond William, *Culture and Society*, 1780-1950 (New York : Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 295-339; also, W. Warren Wagar. *Science, Faith and Man* (New York : Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 236-319.
 2. For more on the concept of size see E.F. Schumacher, *Small is Beautiful : A Study of Economics as if People Mattered* (London : Blond & Briggs, 1975), pp. 1-281.

Mankind is so obsessed by the notion of size that the worship of size has become almost an order of our day. It is, thus, natural for historians, journalists and political analysts to devote their columns to the role of big powers in world diplomacy and international conflicts. This type of thinking, despite its value, has also led to a benign neglect of the role of small nations in world affairs. The role of big powers in the international conflicts like the two world wars has always been and continues to be a theme of profound interest to scholars of this century; but the role of small nations in these conflicts has been the most neglected aspect of international diplomacy. This theme has always fascinated me and the present work is the logical outcome of this frame of mind. Nepal is taken up as a case study to analyze the role of a small nation in international conflicts in the first half of the twentieth century. This study shows how a small nation can play a big role in times of emergency like the two world wars.

The Nepalese experience in the first half of the twentieth century still awaits encapsulation for her experiences were so varied and complex and even kaleidoscopic that it has refused its secrets to any pen. This study is an attempt to explore the unknown in this direction. Two other factors have further contributed in making this period more challenging to researchers. First, the recent origin of these events still rouses so much passion that it is difficult to pen them in an impartial way with objectivity; and secondly, the way these conflicts blended into militant, revolutionary domestic politics is an unexplored dimension of Nepalese history.

The impact of the two world wars on the path and momentum of Nepalese political awakening in the first half of the twentieth century is a very important aspect of the two world wars. It was not, however, possible within the limited scope of this study to go into the impact of the war in the politicization process of the Nepalese society. It was also not possible to go into the role of the Nepalese in the different theatres of the war, though even

the treatment of the minor ones could shed an extremely valuable light in assessing Nepalese contribution in the search of permanent peace and justice in the world. This is, thus, not a definitive study for it raises more questions and problems than perhaps it attempts to solve.

During my research I have almost exclusively relied on the demi - official records, secret registers, abstract translations of conversations and radio broadcasts preserved in the Foreign Ministry, Kathmandu, National Archives, New Delhi, the Military Archives, Kathmandu and India Office Library, London. The vernacular and the Western newspapers have often been used. Among the latter the *Birmingham Post*, the *Daily Telegraph* the *Evening Standard*, the *Glasgow Herald*, the *Scotsman* and the *Manchester Guardian* have been frequently cited. Much information has also been collected from the contemporary vernacular newspapers like the *Gorkhapatra Keshari* and *Aja*, together with the *Pioneer*, the *Times of India* and the *Civil and Military Gazettee*.

Scope and Limitations

It is true that the Nepalese history of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries have been the subject of extensive study, yet, the history of Nepal in the first half of the twentieth century has drawn little attention of scholars. The reasons are not far to seek. Most of the documents of this period fall in the restricted period in the archives of both India and Nepal. Besides this, as many historical documents of this period are in the personal collections of Individuals, they have not been brought to light for researchers. I am, however, extremely grateful to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kathmandu, for giving me the permission to scan through the documents of this restricted period, without which this study would not have been possible.

Asad Husain has given a brief account of Nepal's role in the First World War and the Afghan War. However, a short space of 15 pages is hardly sufficient to do justice to

this critical period in Nepalese history.³ Again Leo E. Rose makes a short appraisal of Nepal's role in the two world wars but it is too sketchy to be of any meaningful significance.⁴

This study attempts to focus on Nepal's role in five major international conflicts in the first half of twentieth century. Nepal's role in the two world wars has been dealt at length while her role in Trans-Himalayan conflicts, the Afghan War and the Hyderabad episode have been given less space not because of their lesser importance but due to the unavailability of the records.

Organization of Study

The introduction sets the tone for the entire study and discusses the scope and limitations of this study. The first part surveys Nepal's mediatory efforts in the settlement of the Anglo-Tibetan and the Sino-Tibetan conflicts. The second part analyzes Nepal's role in the Great War under various sub-titles like war preparation, problems of recruitment and adjustment to war situation, Nepalese in combat operations and the impact of the war on the social, economic and political institutions in Nepal. The third part, which is, in fact, a tailpiece of the Great War, deals with the unfortunate Afghan episode, in which the Nepalese involvement was at its minimum. The fourth part examines Nepal's monumental role in the World war II under the same headings as the Great War. The fifth part, which concludes this study, is a survey of Nepal's assistance to independent India in her efforts to maintain her territorial integrity immediately in the post-independence era. Each part takes the theme a step further and highlights the magnitude of Nepal's role in the international conflicts in the first half of the twentieth century.

3. Asad Husain, *British India's Relations with the Kingdom of Nepal* (London : George Allen and Unwin, 1970), 183-197.

4. Leo E. Rose. *Nepal Strategy for Survival* (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 170-174.

PART I

**TURMOIL IN TRANS-HIMALAYAN POLITICS & NEPAL
1900-1913**

Anglo-Tibetan and Sino-Tibetan Conflicts and Nepal: 1900-1913

Even before the world was preparing to step into the shoes of twentieth century, the European colonial movement had already reached its crest. A movement that was born in the sixteenth century had come to its logical conclusion. Great Britain and Russia, two comrades in this movement, were still desperate in their attempts to bring into their fold a few pockets of resistance in Asia that had defied the wave of European colonization. Tibet, a land of wealth,¹ myth and mysticism, was one of such regions. In addition, her central position in this continent, had turned her into a theater of Anglo-Russian rivalries by the turn of this century. Three factors helped to disturb the status quo in the Trans-Himalayan region in the first quarter of the twentieth century. First, the opening of the Phari route,² which besides providing the direct link between India and Tibet also made obsolete the traditional trade routes of Kuti and Kerong³ via central Nepal. Secondly, the

-
1. The wealth of Tibet was known in the form of *buki* gold. The term *buki* denotes gold in the form of dust that comes from the river beds.
 2. The Phari route was a new route opened by the British via Kalimpong district of Darjeeling through the southern corner of Sikkim to Tibet; and its extension through the length of Chumbi Valley to Phari and Gyantse. For more on this route see, Prem R. Uprety, *Nepal-Tibet Relations, 1850-1930 : Years of Hopes, Challenges and Frustrations* (Kathmandu : Puga Nara, 1980), pp. 165-68.
 3. The historic Kuti and Kerong Passes were located at Kodari and Rasuwa respectively. They had controlled the Indo-Tibetan trade from time immemorial. However, the opening of the Phari route through India and Sikkim had radically altered this picture.

sweeping erasing of Chinese influence in Tibet had converted her traditional suzerainty over Tibet into a constitutional myth. The attempt by Tibet to reassert her total independence from China paved the way for an open confrontation with China during the second decade of this century.

A. Angle-Tibetan Conflict and the Nepalese Reaction in the First Decade of This Century

Britain was very much disturbed by Russia's increasing political influence over Tibet in this century. As Britain was not represented in Tibet, the British felt that the presence of the Russians in the Himalayas would be a definite setback to her prestige in the orient. Further, the British, haunted by the memories of the Indian revolt of 1857, looked upon the presence of the Russians in the Himalays as a potential and a constant source of provocation for the Indians to revolt.

The dawn of this century saw the Russians coming into the Tibetan scene. The first breakthrough in Russo-Tibetan relations was announced by the Foreign Office Column of *Journal de Saint Petersburg* of October 2 (15) 1900, which publicized the schedule of reception of Declaimer Dorjjeff, ⁴ the first Trasnit Hamba to the Dalai Lama of Tibet. Then again, an excerpt from *Odessa Novosti* stated that Odessa would welcome that day (June 25, 1901) an extraordinary mission from the Dalai Lama of Tibet proceeding towards St. Petersburg with diplomatic instructions of high importance. The Tibetan envoy was styled an Envoy Extraordinary and received in the Grand

4. Dorjjeff (Dorzhiiev) was formerly a Russian subject of Eastern Siberia, but had settled in Tibet for the last twenty years. His Russian origin tempted the Dalai Lama to use him in His diplomatic mission to Russia. It is to be noted that he had also for a very long time, enjoyed the confidence in the office of the Dalai Lama. For more on the Tibetan Envoy see the article on *Novae Vremya*, quoted by Francis Younghusband in *India and Tibet* (London : John Murry, 1910), p. 68.

Palace of Peterhof. However, the *Messenger Official* of June 8, 1901 pointed out in a very carefully worded sentence that the Tibetan mission was not political or diplomatic in nature, but rather was to be placed on the same level as the one sent by the Holy Pope to the faithful in the foreign land. The Czar sincerely believed that a friendly and controlled Tibet was necessary to protect the Russian paramountcy in Singkiang and the Pamirs.⁵ In 1902 Khedechhega, an attendant of Dalai Lama, was sent to St. Petersburg. A secret treaty was apparently concluded between Russia and Tibet in which the Czar promised to prevent the English from entering Tibet. This rumor is also corroborated by the British Minister in Peking on August 2, 1902. He quotes a rumor in China and concludes that China was making a secret arrangement with Russia which would uphold the integrity of China in return for the establishment of Russian offices in Lhasa to control Tibetan affairs.⁶ This message from China is also confirmed by the circumstantial evidence which points to a similar arrangement between Russia and Tibet.⁷ It is within this framework that Russo-Chinese collaboration in Tibetan affairs began to take shape.

The British Resident in Kathmandu, Colonel T.C. Pears quoting a conversation between the Tibetan Lama, Chhyalosing Chhyodoen,⁸ and the *Maharaja* of Nepal, reports on a much wider alliance between China, Bhutan, Ladkha and Tibet to form a defensive alliance and even seek Russia's

5. Francis Younghusband, *India and Tibet. op. cit.*, pp. 68-70.

6. An information supplied by a gardener of the garden attached to Norpulinka Palace and a *vaidya* (physician) of Chharong Palace, to the Nepalese *vakil*, Lhasa. This is contained in a correspondence between the *Maharaja* of Nepal and the British Resident C.W. Ravenshaw. See the *Proceedings of the Foreign Department*, No. 115-125, April 12, 1902. The original letter sent by the Nepalese *vakil* in Lhasa is dated Baishakh 3, 1949 (April 2, 1902).

7. Francis Younghusband, *India and Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 223.

8. The Tibetan Lama, Chhyalsong, of Chara Ghyang (monastery) arrived in Kathmandu in January 1902, through India, to repair three Buddhist monasteries in Nepal at Budha, Simboo and Nama-boodha. According to the Tibetan sacred canon a great merit was in store for a person who repaired or whitewashed the Buddhist monuments in Nepal.

aid in case of a British attack.⁹ As a gesture of moral support the Russian Government had sent three engineers to Tibet to construct an armament factory.¹⁰ The principal objective of the Lama's mission was to bring Nepal within the defensive pact; and thus negate the British thirst of expansion across the Himalayas. As a reward for joining the Trans-Himalayan Defensive Pact the Lama promised the *Maharaja* his help in extending his kingdom up to the Bay of Bengal. The Nepalese Premier, far from being allured by this bait, posed a sincere question, namely, "can the four country (sic) crush a power like the British?"¹¹ Though the Lama argued positively, Chandra Shumsher, the, then, *Maharaja*, found it difficult to swallow his arguments.

The Tibetan mission to St. Petersburg was also followed by a mission of a high Russian official, Pan Po or Popu. His arrival in the nation's capital; however, was kept a top secret even in Lhasa known only to the inner circle of nobles.¹² The Tibetan mission to Russia and vice versa was a matter of grave concern to both Nepal and British India. The concern became more real in the view of the fact that Russia was at the crest of imperialistic expansion in 1902. She had not, yet, been checked by Japan. Thus, she had spread over Manchuria and Western Turkestan, annexed Pamirs, and was likely to absorb Chinese Turkestan and Mongolia.¹³ Though the Nepalese and the

9. *Proceedings* No. 115-125 of March 1902. A detailed record of the conversation between the *Maharaja* and the Lama is found in the correspondence between the Nepalese Premier and the Resident T.C. Pears, Jan. 3, 1902, pp. 3-5, NAI.

10. *Foreign Office*, 17-1745. Col. Pears to India, Jan. 13, 1902, India Foreign Office, Feb. 24, 1902, IOL.

11. See conversation between the *Maharaja* and the Lama, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

12. *Proceedings of the Foreign Department* on Tibetan Affairs No. 115-125 of 1902. *Maharaja* Chandra to Offg. Resident, Kathmandu, April 12, 1902, NAI.

13. For more on the expansion of Russia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries see Sergei Pushkarev, *The Emergence of Modern Russia, 1801-1917*, trans. R.H. McNeal, Tova Yedlin (London : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), pp. 337-365; Basil Dmytryshyn (ed.) *Imperial Russia : A Source Book, 1700-1917* (New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), pp. 402-408.

British never dreamed of a full scale Russian invasion of the subcontinent, yet they were aware of the fact that the presence of the Russian army in Tibet could complicate matters in South Asia.

Two methods were available to the British to deal with the Tibetan problem. One was the indirect method known as the "Lee Warner Plan." Its principal objective was to use Nepal, whose relations with Tibet were not a happy one, as a "cat's paw". Accordingly, Nepal would be encouraged to attack Tibet. But Lord Curzon, the then Viceroy of India, was opposed to such a plan. The second was the "Curzon Scheme." Curzon was convinced that the presence of Russia in Tibet demanded a new approach to the problem. Thus, he was in favor of keeping Russia outside Tibet by exercising a direct pressure on Tibet. This direct pressure was the only alternative in the view of the fact that the Dalai Lama refused even to open a dialogue with British India. Curzon therefore decided to enter into an agreement with China as early as 1903 according to which a permanent British mission with a military escort would be stationed in Lhasa.¹⁴ Trade would be discussed with Tibet but it would take a secondary place. The main problem would be to eliminate the Russian presence in Lhasa. The then British Premier took the Viceroy's views with a large grain of salt for he felt that the British mission to Lhasa would be viewed by the rest of the world as "a blatant infringement" of the integrity of China. Curzon, however, proposed that the negotiations with China and Tibet would take place at Khamba Dzong close to the border of Sikkim. London consented to this proposal, but at the same time forbade the British advance beyond that point. The Governor General chose Francis Younghusband to accomplish the delicate task.

The Tibetan and the Chinese dragged these talks to a stalemate, for about six months by sending officials of low rank. The cause of the delay was the prediction of the

14. *India Foreign Letter*, Fo. 171743, Jan. 8, 1903, IOL.

Oracle Lama (State Magician). His role was very crucial in the British military expedition to Tibet. When the British began building strategic roads in the Sikkim-Tibet border, the Tibetan Government observed the situation with concern and consulted the State Oracle. The Oracle Lama suggested that a certain mountain situated at a short distance within the Sikkimese territory should be occupied by the Tibetan troops for the mountain, which possessed magical qualities, would stop the further advance of the British. This move, however, was not successful for the Tibetan troops were easily defeated. He also predicted that since 1904 was the Wood Dragon year of the Tibetan calendar, a great calamity would fall upon the Tibetans. He then continued to point out that the hostile force coming from the South would penetrate into the heart of the "Land of the Snow". However, he, apparently, still held the opinion that the Tibetan army would be victorious. The last part of the prophecy seemed to have played a major part in delaying the Anglo-Tibetan negotiations for a long time. Tibet, thus, reversed her policy only when Lhasa itself had been captured.*

Francis Younghusband then came to the conclusion that the talks could take place only at Lhasa. To end the stalemate Younghusband wanted the Viceroy to encourage Nepal to exert a direct pressure on Tibet. He believed that

* The oracle-lamas, who were supposed to be the mouth-pieces of the minor Tibetan divinities, usually demons, occupy the highest esteem among the Tibetans. The best known among the oracle-lamas was the State Magician of the Tibetan Government. In the course of Tibetan history many important events were directed or largely influenced by the prophecies of the State Magician. His office was stabilized, as the Tibetan chronicles go, during the reign of the Fifth Dalai Lama, who appointed the Chief Oracle of the Samye monastery to this position. It is said that the reason for creating this post was the discovery of the plot made by the Nepalese merchants in Tibet to poison the whole population of the holy city. For more information see Nebesky De Wojkowitz, "State Oracle in Tibet", *The Modern Review*, December 1950, pp. 479-80.

the evidence that Nepal was on the British side would have a great impact on the Tibetans. He proposed that the Nepalese Government should be specially requested to furnish the mission with yaks and its drivers. This, he presumed, would be taken by the Tibetan Government as an indication of Nepal's alliance with the British.¹⁵ Younghusband was correct in his anticipation of the Nepalese assistance, for Nepal was no less apprehensive of the Russian intrigues in Tibet than the British. It is true that Nepal was bound by the treaty of 1856 to assist Tibet if she was invaded; but the times were such that Nepal had to weigh this in relation to her national well-being. National interest and national security were two overriding factors that compelled *Maharaja* Chandra Shumsher to assure Curzon of his country's support of India's Tibetan Mission.¹⁶ The *Maharaja* sincerely felt that the Russian presence in Lhasa, besides adversely affecting Nepal's extra-territorial rights in Tibet, would also help to perpetuate insecurity in the border regions. The persistent help rendered by Nepal to Younghusband's mission to Tibet during 1903-1904 has to be explained within this broad framework. The Nepalese assistance was both on the physical and diplomatic front. On the physical side, *Maharaja* promised to give to the British 500 yaks immediately and 8000 within one year;¹⁷ and was willing to go ahead with the British plan of

15. Francis Younghusband, *India and Tibet, op. cit.*, 309-317.

16. When the *Maharaja* introduced his proposal of helping the British during Younghusband's Mission before his Council of Nobility many nobles did pass adverse comments. In summary, they pointed out that such a step would, besides jeopardizing Nepal's traditional political and commercial rights in Tibet, would also pave the way for another war with Tibet. But the proposal of the *Maharaja* carried the day. In retrospect, the Nepalese Premier, in a letter to the British Resident, is seen labeling his nobles who had opposed his plans "Little Nepalanders" as compared to the "Little Englanders" of Britain whose ideas were narrow and limited to the personal experience of their country. See *Secret External B Proceedings* No. 188 of Feb. 1904. Form *Maharaja* Chandra to C.W. Ravenshaw, Jan. 25. 1905, NAI.

17. *Foreign Secret E, Proceeding No. 197* of 1903, "Nepal-Tibet Negotiations". Undersecretary GI, Foreign Affairs, to the Military Department, Sept. 26, 1903, P. 25; *Proceedings* No. 130 of 1903. From Resident, Kathmandu to Foreign Secretary, Simla, GI, August 31, 1903, p. 59, NAI.

helping Colonel Younghusband to occupy Khamba Jong.¹⁸ By the end of October 1903 Nepal had handed over 3,500 yaks to the British at Falte. The collection of Yaks was, however, not an easy task, for yaks had to be collected from Solukhumbu to Wallanchung Gola.¹⁹ The other problems were the search for strong and sturdy animals and furnishing them with saddles and *gothals* (drivers).²⁰ As early as September 1903 Nepal had made ready 500 of her best troops armed with Martin Henry rifles to help Younghusband to occupy the Tibetan region of Khamba Jong or even occupy Khamba Jong when the British colonel moved with his three hundred men to the area. Harka Jang Thapa, the Governor of Ilam had even instructions from Kathmandu authorizing him to take his 500 men via Darjeeling to Khamba Jong.²¹ The records of the Military Archives, Kathmandu, indicate that plans for a major offensive against Tibet were also made by Nepal in 1903. An instruction manual was prepared for the army for this expedition, which covered a wide range of subjects like the geographical terrain between Kathmandu and Lhasa, the nature of fighting units, the construction of roads and bridges and the description of other aides for the army. However, this offensive was never launched.²² On the other hand, the British records also indicate that the Government of India did not avail itself of Nepal's military assistance.

-
18. *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings No. 186 of 1903* W. C. Macpherson, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal to Secretary of State, GI., Foreign Department, Sept. 18, 1903, NAI.
 19. *Cha Poka No. 104. Maharaja Chandra to Col. Harka Jang Thapa. Bada Hakim (Governor), Ilam, Kartik 14, 1906 (Oct. 1903).*
 20. *Cha Poka No. 104. A conversation between Col. Harka Jang Thapa and Col. Younghusband at Ghoom, three miles from Darjeeling, undated; Major Tek Bahadur Khatri to Maharaja Chandra, Kartik 4, 1961 (Oct. 1904); Harka Jang Thapa to Maharaja Chandra Kartik 1, 6,8,9, 1960 (Oct. 1903); Telegram from Harka Thapa to Maharaja Chandra, Oct. 26, 1903.*
 21. *Foreign Secret E., Proceeding, No. 186 of 1903, W.C. Macpherson, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal to Secretary of state GI, Foreign Department, Sept., 18, 1903 NAI.*
 22. *Book No. 82, 1960 V.E. (1903 A.D.), pp. 1-23, MAN.*

On the diplomatic front, Nepal rather bluntly told Tibet that as the political crisis was Tibet's own creation, Nepal was in no position to come to her aid in case of the British invasion. Her best bet would, thus, be to make peace with the British. The Nepalese views were contained in a long eight-paragraphed letter of the Nepalese Premier to the *Kazis of Kasyal*. This letter, in short, was a defense of the British actions and blamed Tibet for the violation of the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1890 and 1893. This letter also assured Tibet that the British did not have evil designs over their country for the British were not only tolerant in their religious beliefs but also in their diplomatic policies. Thus, if the Nepalese experience since 1816 is taken as a measuring rod, Tibet would immensely benefit by signing of a treaty with the British. The letter concluded with a characteristic remark, which in the form of an advice and warning cautioned the Tibetans that to run into an unnecessary complication with the British "is like producing a headache by twisting a rope round one's own head when it is not aching". He further asserted "If you disregard my advice a serious calamity is likely to overtake you."²³ Tibet then asked Nepal to follow a strict neutrality in Indo-Tibetan dispute, or to be more precise, Nepal was asked not to assist the British with troops and transport carriers. The reply of the *Maharaja* was that he would remain neutral in the sense that he would not supply soldiers to the British but he would not prevent the British from buying animals and hiring their drivers in Nepal.²⁴ Nepal's diplomatic initiative to solve the Indo-Tibetan dispute continued during the crucial years of 1903 to 1905. As early as August 1904 Nepal warned Tibet of the approaching British troops, which could ruin their

23. *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 147 of 1903, "Tibet Negotiations". *Maharaja Chandra* to the four *Kazis of Kasyal*, 1960 V.E. (day and month ?). The English trans. is contained in a despatch from C.W. Ravensaw, to Sec. of State of GI, Foreign Dept., Sept. 4, 1903 NAI. See also *Pioneer*, December 10, 1903, pp. 4-5.

24. *Ibid.*, *Foreign Secret E.*

capital. Nepal's advice to Tibet in such an eventuality was total surrender to the British. The advice, in part, ran

The safety of your capital depends upon your peacefully and submissively approaching the British with an open heart upon the settlement of the pending question. Move at once on the matter otherwise any negligence on your part would cost you your capital.²⁵

The whole Tibetan question assumed a new dimension with the entry of the British troops in Lhasa in the month of August 1904. The role of Nepal as a mediator between the Tibetans and the British became more important than ever before. The *Vakil* Jit Bahadur K. C. in Lhasa and *Maharaja* Chandra in Kathmandu played a crucial role in Lhasa negotiations and helped shape the British attitude towards Tibet, specially on the indemnity issue. A convention was finally concluded between Tibet and Great Britain on September 7, 1904. The object of the Convention was to remove the difficulties that had crept up as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1870 and Indo-Tibetan trade regulations of 1893. However, its indirect effects were more significant for both Britain and Nepal. Above all, the Russian presence in Tibet was removed once and forever. Tibet promised not to station any foreign representatives in Lhasa; not to cede, sell or mortgage her land or give concessions to build roads, railways, telegraphs or mining rights to a foreign power. Tibet was a loser on the domestic front also. She not only had to pay a war indemnity of Rs. 500,000 but also had to permit the British to build trade-marts in Gyantse, Gartok and Yalung.²⁶

25. *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 470 of August 1904. Trans. of a letter containing the conversation between the Nepalese *Vakil*, Lhasa and the four Kazis of Kasyal, Shrawn 18, 1961 (August 8, 1903), p. 4; *The Englishman*, "Nepal's Advice to Tibet", November 19, 1903, p. 3; *Englishman* "The Thibetan Question", November 8, 1903, p. 4.

26. For more information on Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904, see *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 396 of February, 1905. NAI.

The signing of the Convention brought a sigh of relief to both Nepalese and British bureaucracy. The *Maharaja* of Nepal took this occasion to express his happiness to the Kasyal Office in Lhasa at the peaceful and amicable solution of the crisis in the Indo-Tibet relations. The *Maharaja's* communication, in part, ran

I congratulate you for the successful conclusion of the difficult business..... The national honour and your prosperity are involved at the faithful observance of the terms of the treaty.... Let me tell you here again what I have told you in the past a friendly understanding and the maintenance of amicable relations with the British Government be nothing but beneficial to you.²⁷

A friend in peace, Nepal was an ally in British semi-military mission to Tibet in 1903. The *Maharaja* of Nepal offered substantial help in the matter of transport, while his *Vakil* Captain Jit Bahadur placed his valuable services during the negotiations at the disposal of the British in areas collecting information and supplies.²⁸ The letter of appreciation of the Viceroy to the *Maharaja* speaks highly of the timely help rendered by the Nepal *Durbar* throughout the Tibetan negotiations both on the diplomatic and the physical front. Above all, the Governor General's attribution of the peaceful settlement of the Anglo-Tibetan crisis to the sound advice and exhortations of the *Maharaja* to the Lhasa Kazis is indicative of the crucial role played by Nepal in the peace efforts.²⁹

The signing of the convention, however, left Tibet sad and dismayed, for the Tibetan leaders looked upon it as

27. *Foreign Secret E. Proceedings* 490 of 1905, "Tibet Negotiations", pp. 31-32; enclosed in a despatch of C.W. Ravenshaw to Sec. of State, GI, Foreign Dept., December 26, 1904, NAI.

28. Thanks by the Government of India to Native States of Bhutan, and Nepal, *Foreign External A, Proceedings* No. 57 of 1905. Brigadier General, J.R. MacDonald, Commander, Tibetan Mission Force to Adjutant General, India, undated, p. 8, NAI.

29. *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 999 of Feb. 1905, Asst. Sec. GI. Foreign Dept., to Lt. Colonel C.W. Ravenshaw Oct., 20, 1904, p. 35. NAI.

being forced upon them. Above all, they resented the Article II of the Convention, which permitted the British to establish trade-marts and station British officers there. The Tibetans sincerely felt that that would be a source of serious friction between the two governments in the future. The *Maharaja* was, thus, asked by the Kazis to seek, on the behalf of the Tibetan Government, modifications of the terms of the Convention for there was on it "not a single item" to which they had agreed.³⁰ The Nepalese Premier, who had been so instrumental in the signing of the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904, regretted very much at the Tibetan mood which was prevalent even after two months since the signing of the Convention. His letter to the Kasyal Office, thus, played a warning note whose tone may be best illustrated in these words

I must impress upon you that a treaty is a solemn and sacred business which one should try to religiously carry out when once it has been made and should on no account be thought of being evaded or nullified on the pain of serious consequences.³¹

His warning was, however, diluted by a statement that he had forwarded the Tibetan letter to the Viceroy of India and that he was confident that the British Government would find out means to redress the grievances of the Tibetans for they had no intention to deal with them harshly. He, too, promised to put the Tibetan case before the Government of India.

The efforts of the *Maharaja* was rewarded with some success, for, by January 1905, the Government of India decided to reduce the Tibetan indemnity from 75 *lakhs* to 25 *lakhs* and the period of the occupation of the Chumbi

30. Trans. of a letter from the Kazis of Kasyal to *Maharaja Chandra Shumsher*, Sept. 30, 1904, *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 474 of March 1905. See despatch from Resident of Nepal to Sec. GI Foreign Dept., Nov. 4, 1904, p. 18, NAI.

31. Trans. of a letter from *Maharaja Chandra* to the Kazis of Kasyal, Marga 6, 1961 (Nov. 28, 1904), *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 475 of 1905, NAI.

Valley for three years only. This alteration in the Convention was, however, contingent on the punctual payment of three instalments of indemnity. He then advised the Tibetan Government that the provisions of the Convention, far from being a liability, would serve as an asset to them in the long run. An excerpt from the letter made this point vividly clear.

If you act upon your promise, scrupulously carry out the provisions of the Convention, have a proper regard for the power and resources of the British Government, help them in a friendly and neighbourly way and gently try to promote mutual well-being, I am sure that you will prosper greatly and the present struggle instead of being a curse will be a blessing in disguise.³²

Nepal, thus, played a dual role during the Young husband Mission of 1903. If on the one hand she placed her transport carriers (yaks and drivers) and even 500 of her best troops at the disposal of the British, on the other, she also carefully represented the Tibetan case before Fort William, Calcutta, and helped soften the terms of the Convention. Her mixed role has to be explained within the broad geo-political framework.

B. Tibet-China Conflict and Nepal's Mediatory Efforts

The Convention between Russia and Britain on Tibet in 1907 together with the earlier Convention between Tibet and Great Britain in 1904 did help to seal the Russian presence in Tibet. However, the Russian presence on Tibetan manners and customs was to remain a more lasting feature. The Russian impact was distinctly visible in the Tibetan Court life as well as in the caps and uniform of the Tibetan army.³³ Above all, it was amply manifested

32. Trans. of letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to the four Kazis of Kasyal Magh 15, 1961 (Jan. 27, 1905), *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 350 of 1905, p. 1, NAI.

33. For more information on the Russian influence, see the conversation between the Nepalese *Vakil*, Lhasa and Pochha Thirring Lama of Tibet, contained in a letter of Nepalese Representative in Lhasa to *Maharaja*, Marga 21, 1966 (Dec. 6, 1904), Forwarded to Resident *Manners Smith*, June 2, 1910, E, 10, *Poka* No. 3, p. 7.

in the moral support Russia extended to Tibet in her attempt to assume total independence from China during the first decades of the twentieth century. This new Tibetan mood emerged above the surface in two ways. First, private orders were given to replace the issuing of the coins bearing Chinese dates and names of the Chinese Emperor. The coins were henceforth to bear Tibetan dates and names. Secondly, Tibet sent an emissary to Russia for further consultation.

The result was that relations between the Chinese Amban in Lhasa and the Kasyal Office became increasingly strained. The feeling of insecurity that took possession of the Chinese mind in Tibet compelled the Ambans to ask the Nepalese Government to permit 300 Nepalese *Khachcharas* (Nepalese of mixed parentage) to be enlisted in the Chinese troops. The Government of Nepal, however, asked the *Vakil* to reject and even discourage the voluntary enlistment of the Nepalese *Khachcharas* into the Chinese service. Accordingly, the *Vakil* told the Chinese Amban that the *Khachcharas* were unsuited for military services. He, however, suggested that the Durbar might be willing to send to Lhasa 5,000 to 6,000 of her trained troops to maintain law and order in the capital city. The Nepalese Premier, in the beginning, welcomed the suggestion of his *Vakil*; but later on under the influence of the British Resident in Kathmandu asked his representative to drop the idea.³⁴ The Chinese then asked the Nepalese Government to sell to them 500 magazine rifles to arm the new Chinese soldiers raised by the command of the Emperor,³⁵ but Nepal rejected this move too. China had thus no option except to bring troops from China itself.

34. Memorandum of papers forwarded to India Office with *Foreign Secret Weekly Letters*. Letter No. 43 M, Oct. 21, 1904. *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 83 of Jan. 1910, p. 4, NAI.

35. A letter from Nepalese *Vakil*, Lhasa, *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 83 of Jan. 1910, see correspondence between J. Manners Smith and S.H. Butler, Sec. of State G1, Foreign Dept., August 22, 1909 p. 2. Contents of the letter also found in Foreign Department. Notes on Chinese Action in Tibet, by C. Laitmer. *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 72 of Jan. 1910, NAI.

It was, however, not till 1908 that China began to follow a policy of effective control of Tibet. The physical indication of this move is seen in the military action of the Chinese garrison and the addition made to the Tibetan army of those trained by the Chinese instructors.³⁶ It was at this point the Tibetans began to feel that the Chinese intended to deprive them of their power. The Tibetan Government next sought the help of Nepal in reforming civil and military services and ultimately the training of the Tibetans by the Gurkha officers. But Nepal politely rejected all these moves. China to counteract the Tibetan moves, despatched a thousand Chinese soldiers for the purpose of protecting the Chinese trade-marts and the frontier posts.

The Tibetan Government naturally panicked and sought Nepalese good-office to prevent the arrival of the thousand Chinese troops in Lhasa. For a little more than two weeks from January 22, 1910 to February 9, Nepal played a hectic role in trying to dissuade the Chinese from bringing the 1,000 troops to Lhasa. On January 22, 1910 Nepalese Vakil met Utrain Amban and asked the Chinese to adopt a conciliatory line of actions with the Tibetans for they as a race were very ignorant. He also suggested to them that it might be wiser to bring 200 to 300 soldiers in Lhasa while keeping the option of increasing the strength whenever it was necessary. The Amban, however, laid stress on the absolute necessity of 1,000 troops for the purpose of protection and patrolling of the frontier. However, he assured the Vakil the Chinese soldiers would never injure the Tibetans.³⁷

The next day the Nepalese Vakil had an interview with the Kazis of Kasyal and argued on the urgent necessity of arriving at an immediate amicable settlement with the Chinese. The Vakil successfully brought both the Chinese and the Tibetans to a conference table at Labrang

36. *Ibid.*, *Proceedings No.* 83

37. *Foreign Secret E., Consultation No.* 114 of Sept, 1908, NAI.

Office on January 24, 1910. Jit Bahadur K.C., the Nepalese representative, was highly delighted for he was specially invited by both the Chinese and the Tibetans to attend. The conference, was represented by two officers Jhiakunchhe and Qualin and the Tibetan side by Chipon Kusio of Lhasa and a few others. The conference, in spite of good gestures shown by both the parties, ended in a stalemate for both side found no room for compromise. If on the one hand, Lhasa looked upon the arrival of the 1,000 Chinese troops in their capital city as an infringement upon their authority in the country; the Chinese, on the other hand, saw the absolute necessity of 1,000 troops in Lhasa for security reasons.

Jit Bahadur, however, still continued his diplomatic efforts and hoped that the Ambans would only bring a small body of soldiers into the city of Lhasa. But the six point memorandum he received from the two Chinese Ambans on January 26, 1910 showed how futile his efforts had become. The memorandum, in summary, is as follows.

1. The troops were ordered by the Emperor to come to Lhasa hence they could not be stopped on the way by the Ambans.
2. The troops had already passed Chhamdo and were at 13 marches distance from Lhasa.
3. The Ambans have given very strict orders to the commanders of the troops not to fight the Tibetans. But if the Tibetans attacked the Chinese first they would strike back.
4. Chow Ta-Yen was now with the main forces in Chhamdo. If the Tibetans attacked and beat the Chinese then he would come to Tibet for assistance.
5. When the Chinese troops come to Lhasa, they would not be allowed to create any disturbance.
6. If the Tibetans opposed and fought against the Chinese troops they would be doing a great harm to themselves for it would invite more Chinese troops.³⁸

38. See an undated purport of a letter from the Nepalese *Vakil*, Lhasa, before the flight of the Dalai Lama. E, No. 10, *Poka* No. 3.

The Chinese troops, having arrived at Lharingo and Nakehewkh at a distance of 13 to 8 days journey from Lhasa respectively, divided into two routes. The Tibetans, on the other hand, could think of no better plan than to send Kazi Chharong to oppose the advancing Chinese army. In the mean time, a report came to Lhasa that some Tibetan soldiers had taken possession of a Chinese storehouse and killed four Chinese. The action of the Chinese also left much to be desired. The Tibetan action was apparently in retaliation to the desecration and destruction of the Tibetan monasteries and the Lamas.³⁹ The Nepalese *Vakil* then sent for Kuseo of Lhasa and warned the Tibetan Government of the serious consequences of the event. He then suggested a meeting of the Potala Lama and Lyang Tarin Amban to avert the impending crisis between Tibet and China. The conference never took place but the tireless efforts of the Nepalese *Vakil* did bring about a compromise. Both the parties decided to stop fighting. The crux of the compromise was that Lhasa agreed to permit the Chinese troops into Lhasa and send orders to the Tibetan troops in Chhamdo to stop fighting. The Chinese on the other hand had promised to inform the Tibetans of the day in which the Tibetan troops were to enter Lhasa. In the mean time, 200 Chinese soldiers and 50 cavalry men entered Lhasa without even the knowledge of the Chinese Amban in Lhasa. A clash between the Chinese and Tibetan troops took place in the holy city of Lhasa itself. The casualties of the day were 17 Tibetans, who were wounded and taken prisoner by the Chinese. While this brief episode had intensified the hostile political atmosphere in the capital, the 1,000 Chinese troops entered Lhasa and sent orders to capture the Tibetan ministers. The Dalai Lama, finding himself virtually nailed to the wall, fled to India with some of his trusted aides.⁴⁰ By the third week of Fe-

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-10; see also *Foreign Secret Consultations*, No. 354 of June 1910 which contains the correspondence between J. Manners Smith to S. H. Butler, Sec. GI, Foreign Dept., March 4, 1910 NAI.

40. *London Times*, "Serious Chinese Differences", January 7, 14, 1910, P. 8.

bruary 1910 the Tibetan Spiritual Leader and his ministers were already in Darjeeling, India.

The arrival of the Chinese troops in Lhasa coupled with the flight of the Dalai Lama from Tibet threw Lhasa into a panic. The Kalons of Lhasa, however, did ask Nepal to help Tibet fight the Chinese aggressor with men and materials as well as by sending a high-level diplomat to take part in Sino-Tibetan negotiations. The Nepalese Premier, however, pointed out that the least thing Nepal could do under the then circumstances was only to render sincere advice, the reason being simply that Tibet herself was largely responsible for the crisis. But as regards the sending of a Nepalese envoy well versed in the art of negotiations, the *Maharaja* pointed out that the Nepalese Vakil in Lhasa, Jit Bahadur K. C., coming from a good and ancient lineage and conversant with the issues and the spirit of the times, was competent for the task.⁴¹ The Dalai Lama also being unable to muster any support of the British for his cause during his six month stay in India wrote to the *Maharaja* of Nepal for help either peaceful or armed. He too proposed to send an envoy, who enjoyed his full confidence, to negotiate with the *Maharaja*.⁴² Earlier, one may recall that Nepal had turned down the request of Lhasa to train the Tibetan soldiers by the Nepalese officers in Tibet and Nepal.⁴³

The position of Nepal was precarious. If on the one hand Tibet wanted Nepalese help to hold her own against China. China also wanted her help to subjugate the "recalcitrant

41. Report from Darjeeling on the flight of Dalai Lama. *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 277 of June 1910, F.W. Duke Chief Sec. to the Government of Bengal to Sec. GI. Foreign Dept., Feb. 28, 1910, NAI.

42. *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 160 of August 1910. An undated letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Sarba-Pama-Joge-Swraswartha Sri the 4 Kalons of Lhasa, NAI.

43. *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 566 of Dec. 1901. Dalai Lama to *Maharaja* Chandra, 6th, day of the 7th. month of the Iron Dog Year (August 1910), pp. 65-66, NAI.

state" so as to bring her under her direct administration. Though both Nepal and British India could not militarily intervene in Tibetan affairs, they could not remain indifferent to the Tibetan situation after the flight of the Dalai Lama. Nepal very well knew that the supremacy of China in Lhasa would also lead to the decline of her extra-territorial rights in Tibet. Moreover, Britain wanted Tibet to be a buffer between China and India, and was committed in not allowing the rights and interests of Nepal to be prejudiced by the administrative changes in Tibet.⁴⁴

By April 1910 Lhasa was under full control of the Chinese. A Chinese Police Department was created to mark this change fully and complete. The Chief Commissioner of Police in Lhasa, Tin, and his associate Yui-Chen issued a ten-point proclamation, which, above all, was related to the Tibetan violation of the Chinese laws on sanitation, safety of children and noise pollution. Another proclamation issued by Len Amban, the Great Resident Minister of China, regulated arms in the country.⁴⁵ The establishment of the Police Department, by the order of the Emperor of China for the general security and the maintenance of peace and justice in Tibet, however, paradoxically came into conflict with the Nepalese extraterritorial rights in Tibet. Instances, thus, began to multiply which symbolized the direct violations of Nepalese rights and privileges. A Nepalese *bande* (gold-smith), Ratna Man, was arrested by the Chinese for having sold opium, kept in confinement and released only after a strong protest by the Nepalese *Vakil*, Jit Bahadur. One Mongrel Khekya, a Nepalese subject, was beaten and released for having passed urine outside a latrine. Again, the quarrel between

44. Conversation between Kazi Bhairab Bahadur and Chharong Kazi, Lhasa, *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 412 of March 1910, Trans. of a letter from the Nepalese *Vakil*, Lhasa, Kartik 30, 1966 (Nov. 15. 1909), NAI.

45. *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 216 of July 1910. Governor General and His Council to Viscount Morley, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, July 21, 1910, NAI.

Foofoo Keba, the daughter of Pemba Bhotini of Wallan-chung and Puna Khambini was decided by the Chinese police without informing the Nepalese representative. Finally, two other Nepalese subjects Mimi Mongrel and Kesang Bhote were arrested by the Chinese for stealing sheep. Both were given twenty bamboo lashes and kept in custody. To add to this, the Chinese were also trying to impose a tax on Nepalese liquor shops; and lastly, Nepalese were also required to take license from the Chinese to carry guns in different parts of the country.⁴⁶

The Nepalese *Vakil* protested on each of the occasions reminding the Chinese Resident Minister of the violation of the Nepalese rights and privileges provided by the Nepal-Tibet Treaty of 1856. The Amban, however, refuted Nepalese arguments in two ways: first he argued that the treaties between Nepal and Tibet were not binding upon China, and secondly, the Nepalese rights should not be mixed up with the imperial police arrangements.⁴⁷ He also told the *Vakil* Captain, Jit Bahadur, that the whole problem would be solved if he would only tell the Nepalese subjects in Tibet that they should refrain from doing anything for which they could be arrested by the Chinese Police.⁴⁸ Mindful of the futility of the efforts of His representative the Nepalese monarch wrote a personal letter to the Chinese Amban expressing satisfaction over the establishment of the Police Department by the Chinese in Tibet, but at the same time took this opportu-

46. For Proclamation issued by Tin, Commissioner of Police Lhasa, and also of Len Amban, see, E, 10, *Poka* No. 3.

47. E. 10 *Poka* No. 3. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Lt. Colonel, J. Manners Smith, Nov. 8, 1911; Trans. of a letter from Lyang Tarin Amban, Lhasa, to *Vakil* Jit Bahadur, 29th. day of the 9th. month of Syathong year; a copy of the statement made by Nepalese Mongrel before the *Vakil*, Lhasa, Ashad 9, 1967 (June 22, 1910); "Arrest of Nepalese Subject", *Vakil* to *Maharaja*, Jestha 28, 1967 (June 10, 1910).

48. E. 10, *Poka* No. 3. Trans. of a letter from Lyang Tarin Amban to the Nepalese *Vakil*, Lhasa, 14th. day of the 7th. month of the Third year of Syanthong.

nity to point out that the new arrangement should not interfere with the treaty rights of Nepal in Tibet, which too were "inviolable" and "sacred".⁴⁹ The Chinese reacted to the Nepalese "obstinacy" in two ways. First, Len Tarin Amban in his reply to the *Maharaja* pointed out that the Nepalese and the Tibetans, being the children of the Emperor, should stop making "vexatious representations according to their sweet will" and should rather submit to his justice, by observing His rules and customs.⁵⁰ Secondly, the Chinese Officer, Lau Dharin went to the *Vakil's* office and took ample pains to convince the Nepalese *Vakil* that it was an internationally accepted convention that all foreigners were subject to the rules of the countries they reside in. The Nepalese should observe the rules of Tibet while living there.⁵¹

The troubled state of Tibet brought serious consequences to Nepal for she not only had a contiguous border with Tibet but her trade relations were fortified by extra-territorial rights. As the twentieth century unfolded Nepal's privileged position was not only questioned by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 but also by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. However, Nepal's peace efforts to bring about a compromise between the Chinese and the Tibetans continued. On March 23, 1912, the Nepalese *Vakil* in Lhasa went to the Potala palace amidst volleys of fire between the Chinese and the Tibetans. The Tibetan officials at the Potala palace, while appreciating the Nepalese efforts in bringing about a peaceful end to China-Tibet conflict, did persistently point out that Tibet was not going to listen to any new proposals unless the Chinese soldiers were sent back to their home country. A precondition set by Tibet for the next round

49. E. 10, *Poka* No. 3. A letter from Nepalese Representative, Lhasa, to *Maharaja* Chandra, Ashad 9, 1967 (June 1910).

50. E. 10 *Poka* No. 3. An undated letter from *Maharajadhiraja* of Nepal to Chinese Amban, received in Tibet on the 17th. day of the 7th month of the Third Syanthng Year.

51. *Ibid.*

of talks between Tibet and China was the exit of 1,000 Chinese troops from Tibet within a fortnight. But Nepal insisted that the first prerequisite was to stop fighting, which would then pave the way for talks and compromise. Finally, it was agreed that on March 24, 1912 fighting would be stopped for two days in Lhasa and three other monasteries in Tibet. Captain Jit Bahadur and Kazi Guva of Ladakh were to serve as intermediaries to bring about a meeting of the Chinese and Tibetans. However, the cease fire was too fragile, and on March 27, 1912 fighting again broke out between the two.⁵²

Two years had passed since the Chinese occupation of Lhasa. The Dalai Lama of Lhasa had failed to muster up the British support for the Tibetan cause. All this while in Lhasa and other parts of Tibet the Tibetan resistance to the Chinese occupation continued. Fighting was also reported from Digarche where the Tibetan Khambas armed with Russian rifles were offering a stiff resistance to the Chinese. The actual turning of the tide was seen on March 29, 1912, when the Tibetans successfully recaptured Thong from the Chinese and placed their flag there. This was a significant victory for the Tibetans and it did have far reaching consequences. On April 19, 1912, both the Chinese and the Tibetans, sought mediation from the Nepalese and the British officers for a peaceful solution of Tibet-China crisis. The meeting was held in the British Trading Agency at Gyantse. Those present were: Chitung Lopsu and Hisi Gnawing from Tibet, D. Macdonell, Captain Jit Bahadur K. C., and the Chinese officials. The negotiations were finally concluded with an agreement between Tibet and China on April 2, 1912. This important agreement had five features:

1. First, the Chinese soldiers promised to give up all their rifles to the Tibetans.

52. E. 10, *Poka* No. 3. See conversation between the Nepalese *Vakil* and the Chinese Officer Lau Dharin in the Nepalese Legation in Lhasa on Ashad 4, 1964 (June 17, 1910).

2. Secondly, the Chinese soldiers agreed to leave Tibet unarmed.
3. Thirdly, Tibet decided to pay for the Chinese rifles.
4. Fourthly, Tibet decided to offer necessary convenient transport and safe passage of the Chinese soldiers en route to China via India.
5. Fifthly, the Tibetans agreed not to punish the Tibetans who had co-operated with the Chinese during the Chinese occupation.⁵³

On April 1, 1912, the Chinese handed over 144 rifles and 11,600 round of ammunitions in return for the payment of 9,250 Chinese currency.⁵⁴ The arms according to the understanding was kept under the custody of the Nepalese officers. Although the agreement worked as a safety valve to remove the steam out of China-Tibet hostilities, yet, even disputes and exchange of fire continued for some time. A strong difference arose between the Chinese and the Tibetans when the Kasyal Office refused to accept the accredited envoy of the Chinese Emperor as the Chinese Amban in Lhasa. The Chinese Amban Tung Thong Lin, however decided to stick to his post until recalled by his Master. In a telegraphic message to the Nepalese *Maharaja* he also asked him to communicate his stand to the Dalai Lama. The Nepalese Premier took this occasion to write to the Tibetan Spiritual Leader. Two delicate themes were conveyed by his letter. First, the *Maharaja* advised the Dalai Lama to fully recognize the duly accredited envoy of the Chinese Emperor; and secondly, the *Maharaja* advised the Tibetans to fulfil the provisions of the Tibet-China Agreement of April 2, 1912.⁵⁵

53. E, 10, *Poka* No. 3. The terms of the Tibet-China Agreement of April 2, 1912, received by the *Maharaja* of Nepal from his *Vakil* in Lhasa.

54. *Ibid.* See also, Confidential No. 1389. H.L. Showers to *Maharaja* Chandra, August 12, 1912, in E. 10. *Poka* No. 3.

55. *Poka* No. 3. A Telegram Letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to the Dalai Lama, undated. See also a letter from Chandra to Resident H.L. Showers, October 5, 1912.

Nepal's extra-cautious and sincere effort in bringing about peaceful accord between China and Tibet was dictated more by self interest than other reasons. Two factors specially motivated her peace efforts. First, Nepal knew fully well that if Tibet would be absorbed into the Chinese dominion then her extra-territorial rights in Tibet would pale into insignificance. Secondly, further escalation of Tibet-China armed conflict would also lead to further destruction of Nepalese life and property. Already thirty eight Nepalese *kothis* (shops) had been looted and burnt, and five Nepalese had lost their lives, which included a Muslim, a *Banda*, a *Thakali* and two *Khachcharas*. The saddest part was that some of them were killed when they were sound asleep.⁵⁶ Nepal thus had been compelled to move her property and her subjects to safer zones. At one time Nepal even prepared a contingency plan to move the Nepalese Legation and her subjects from the occupied Chinese sector to some safer regions outside Lhasa. The Tibetan Government also insisted that Nepal should remove her Legation from the Chinese occupied section. By May 30, 1912 the Nepalese *Vakil* Lal Bahadur Basnyat had taken up his residence in the house of Lhahul Kazi, that was provided by the Tibetan Government.⁵⁷ The *Vakil* waited every day hoping that the tensions between the Tibetans and the Chinese in Lhasa would subside. But, apparently, no end was in sight. As conflict soared up the Tibetans did not even hesitate to open fire at the Chinese quarter when the Nepalese *Vakil* was conferring with the Chinese *Amban* at the request of the *Kasyal* office.⁵⁸

56. E. 10. *Poka* No. 3. Trans. of a letter from Astit. Ditha Kula Prasad to *Vakil*, Jit Bahadur K.C. Lhasa, Baishak 3, 1969 (April, 1912); Trans. of a letter from Nepalese *Vakil*, Lhasa, Chaitra 21, 1968 (April 2, 1912).

57. E. 10. *Poka* No.3. Jit Bahadur to *Maharaja* Chandra, Jestha 18, 1961 (May 30, 1912); *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident Col. H. Showers, June 27, 1912; Telegram from *Vakil* Jit Bahadur to *Maharaja* Chandra, June 9, 1912.

58. E. 10. *Poka* No. 3. *Maharaja* of Nepal to Dalai Lama's Camp June 10, 1912; See also purport of a telegram, Lal Bahadur Basnyat to *Maharaja* Chandra, Sept. 25, 1912.

The Nepalese premier, very much disturbed by the escalated hostilities between the Chinese and the Tibetans instructed his *Vakil* in Lhasa to remove the Nepalese Legation to safer quarters and tell the Tibeto-Chinese officials very candidly that Nepal would not take any part in future negotiations between the two countries. The *Maharaja* in an earlier letter, while replying to *Vakil's* telegram of September 1912, told the Nepalese representative to issue private orders to the Nepalese soldiers guarding the Chinese arms that they were not to offer any resistance, should any party disregard their advice, and in case of disturbance they should withdraw and keep aloof.⁵⁹ The *Maharaja* in an effort to make the Tibetans realize the graveness of the situation, wrote a letter to the Dalai Lama, which in part ran

It will be seen how useless it is any longer for our representative to persist in his endeavour to settle differences between the two parties so self-opinionated and I have instructed him rather to turn his attention to what can best be done to safeguard the life and property of our people there and keep aloof from the insensate quarrel between the Tibetans and Chinese.⁶⁰

On October 1912 the Chinese did attack the place where the Chinese arms had been kept under the protection of Gurkha soldiers. The situation was, however, saved only by the protest of the Nepalese guards.⁶¹

As the year 1912 came to a close two factors appeared to have helped a further escalation of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. The first was the withdrawal of Nepal from the theater of peace negotiations, and the second was the adamant attitude of the Chinese Amban Tung Thong Lin, who decided to stick to his post in Lhasa even at the cost

59. E. 10, *Poka* No. 3. An undated rough draft of a telegram from *Maharaja* Chandra to *Vakil*, Lal Bahadur Basnyat.

60. E. 10, *Poka* No. 3. Telegram from *Maharaja* Chandra to Dalai Lama, October 6, 1912.

61. E. 10, *Poka* No. 3. *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident Showers, Nov. 1, 1912.

of his life. In the first week of October 1912 (Aswin 9, 1969) the Tibetan soldiers in an effort to kill the Chinese Amban opened fire at the Chinese mission. The object was, however, not realized though it did bring about a few Chinese casualties.⁶² In another dual the Tibetans managed to capture the Chinese General Ching. The Tibetans were about to kill him but the timely intervention of the Dalai Lama succeeded in saving his life. The story of Tibetan success also came from other parts of Tibet. The Chinese troops in Sigatse were routed by the Tibetans in November 1912. The Chinese, having lost a few lives, surrendered 130 rifles and 10,300 rounds of ammunition, and left Sigatse via India to China.⁶³

As fighting intensified in Lhasa and the border regions of Nepal, Nepal as early as July 1912 put the whole nation on military alert, and called for the mobilization of national resources for the protection of life and property of Nepalese in Tibet. As a part of the mobilization process the Nepalese Government took a series of hectic measures, which began in 1912 and continued till 1917. First letters were addressed to the *Bada Hakims* (Governors) of different districts for voluntary contribution of grains from the land owners to meet the emergency that had risen due to the armed conflict between the Chinese and Tibetans.⁶⁴ The amount of grain contribution, however, as in the Third Nepal-Tibet War, varied according to the fertility of the soil. Orders were also given for the purchase of grains from the Terai regions. As an illustration, a letter to the revenue office of Birganj had instructed the officer in charge to purchase 35,000 *maunds* of rice, 6,000 *maunds* of *Chana*

62. E. 10. *Poka* No. 3. Telegram from Lal Bahadur Basnayt to *Maharaja Chandra*, Aswin 12, 1969 (Oct. 1912); See also a letter from *Maharaja Chandra* to Col. H. L. Showers, October 13, 1912 and Oct. 8, 1912.

63. E. 10. *Poka* No. 3. Telegram P. British Trading Agent, Gyantse to Sec. GI. Foreign Dept., Simla, Nov. 4, 1912.

64. Book No. 159, 1969 V.E. or 1912 A.D. Letters from Kathmandu to *Bada Hakims/Karindas* of *Kot Khanas*, Ashad 18, 1969 (July, 1912).

(gram) and 200 *maunds* of tobacco.⁶⁵ The order for the purchase of 35,000 *maunds* of rice was also given to the revenue officer of Jaleshwar.⁶⁶ Orders were despatched to the Terai for the prohibition of the export of the new rice. A similar order for the collection of grains was also given to the officers of East No. 1 and 2. Associated with this move, was the construction of storehouses in places like Mahottari, Dhulikhel and Rasuwa.⁶⁶ Secondly, the cost-estimate for the troops moving towards Kuti and Kerong as well as Walanchung was also prepared. This came approximately to 14 *lakhs* of rupees.⁶⁷ Thirdly, the Nepalese armament factories in Sundarijal and Chhauwni were put into full operation to manufacture gunpowder, muskets and other materials of war like leather boxes, horse's hoof saddles, and carpenter's tools.⁶⁸ Finally, orders were given for the manufacture of warm clothes for soldiers and porters.⁶⁹

While Nepal was fully mobilized to face the potential war situation in the Trans-Himalayan regions, on the diplomatic front Nepal continued her good-office for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Tibetan crisis. The Nepalese *Vakil* was successful in arranging a meeting between the Tibetans and Chinese in his own house. This negotiation between the Chinese and the Tibetans was rewarded with success. Accordingly, an agreement in triplicate was signed by the Tibetans and the Chinese with the Nepalese

65. Book No. 159, 1969 V. E. or 1912. Letter from Kathmandu to Hakim (Officer) Birganj Mal (revenue office), Ashad 11, 1969 (July 1912), p. 4. MAN.

66. Book No. 159, 1969 V.E. or 1912 A.D. Letter from Kathmandu to *Hakim/Karinda* Mohottari-Sarlahi Goshwara, Ashad 18, 1969 (July, 1912) p. 7. For more on the collection of grains see also Book No. 170, 1970. V.E. (1913 A.D.) MAN.

67. Book No. 158, 1969 V.E. or 1912 A.D. Files related to the collection of grains, construction of storehouses and the production of armaments. See also request letters to the different offices in district and merchants. These letters do not have specific dates, pp. 1-12. For more information on collection of grains see Book No. 193, 1973 V.E. or 1916 A.D., MAN.

68. Book No. 160, 1969 V.E. or 1912 A.D. An Estimated Expenditure for the Army Moving Towards Kuti Kerong and Wallanchung, p. 2, MAN.

69. Book No. 156, 1969 V.E. or 1912 A.D. Manufactures of artifacts of 7, 9, and 12 pounder canons, pp. 1-5; See too Book No. 162, 1969 V.E. or 1912 A.D.; and book No. 155, 1969 V.E. or 1912 A.D. MAN

representative as the witness.⁷⁰ This agreement which was a breakthrough in the Sino-Tibetan crisis had the following eight features.

1. First, both sides (Chinese and Tibetans) agreed to check the number of arms kept under Nepalese custody.
2. Secondly, the store-room was to be sealed by the Tibetans, Nepalese and the Chinese and was to be guarded by the Nepalese until the Chinese had crossed the frontier of Tibet. The list of arms was to be kept under three keys and until the three parties were present neither the door was to be opened nor the arms used.
3. Thirdly, once the Chinese had crossed the Tibetan border the Nepalese guards were to hand over the keys of the store-room to the Tibetans.
4. Fourthly, the Tibetans promised to send the Tibetan traders to sell supplies sufficient for each day for the period they (Chinese troops) remained in Lhasa; but the Chinese who wished to go to the Tibetan quarter could do so only with a pass.
5. Fifthly, the Tibetans also agreed to arrange supplies and riding animals for the road upon full payment.
6. Sixthly, the Chinese promised not to loot or molest the Tibetans on their return home.
7. Seventhly, the Chinese agreed to the confiscation of arms in their possession by the Tibetans.
8. Finally, the Tibetans promised to protect the lives and property of the Chinese military and civil officials.⁷¹

70. Book No. 191, 1973 V.E. or 1916 A.D. MAN.

71. The signatories to this agreement from the Tibetan side were : Teji Timan, Ken Trung, Professor and Chief Secretary, Kenchung, the interpreter and the representatives of Sera, Drepung and Gan-den monasteries. The Chinese side was represented by Jara-Chi, Su Yon, Tekhun, Li-si-Kwna-Li-Cha-del., Desi-Kawn and Haro-Khun. The Nepalese side, who signed as witnesses to the agreement were : Lal Bahadur Basnyat, offg. Representative Lhasa (30-8-69), *Ditha* Kula Prasad Upadhyaya and Rana Gamvir Singh Gharti Chbetri.

This treaty is highly significant for it did provide the framework for the peaceful exit of the Chinese soldiers from Tibet. However, the withdrawal of the Chinese soldiers was not easy for it ran into a snag a little before the withdrawal began. The cause for the snag was that the Chinese claimed their right to retain General Chung Yi, while the Tibetans maintained that his retention was contrary to the agreement. But the position of the Chinese was getting desperate as they were ill-fed and ill-clad. Their last show of strength was seen on September 1913 when they attacked the guards of the monastery of Teng Yelin. However, in the end they had no alternative but to appeal to Nepal and Britain for their good-office to act as mediators, so that they could gracefully carry out the total evacuation from Lhasa. The British Government refused to intervene. But Nepal was induced to act as a mediator. Nepal successfully fulfilled her role as an intermediary and effected the transfer of arms and ammunition from Chung Yi. These arms were placed again under the Nepalese custody and the Chinese General Chung Yi left for China via India with his 800 men on December 19, 1913.⁷²

The peaceful exit of Chung Yi closed the last chapter of the Chinese-Tibetan adventure. The possibility of total absorption of Tibet within the Chinese dominion a year ago was brought to a sudden end. The Chinese by their rash move lost their moral authority in Tibet, which they were able to exercise prior to Chao-Ehrfeng's Campaign. The withdrawal of the Chinese in 1913 also helped to give Tibet a definite independence from the Chinese. The Dalai Lama took an official move on February 13, 1913, when he issued a proclamation that terminated all ties with China. Tibet's craving for complete freedom from China had already been expressed in a treaty concluded between Tibet and Mongolia in January 1913. This treaty was

72. A Copy of the Tibetan-Chinese Agreement dated 6th day of the 11th. month of the Water Mouse Year (December 14, 1912). See, E. 10, *Poka* No. 3. The treaty is enclosed in the trans. of Tibetan papers received from the Nepalese *Vakil* with a cover letter of March 22, 1913.

significant in the sense that both the states being free and independent, were declared outside the pale of influence of the Manchu dynasty.⁷³ The Republic of China, however, refused to accept the independent status of Tibet.

The new development in the Trans-Himalayan politics led to the tripartite Simla Conference in October 1913. As expected, the bone of contention in this Convention was Tibet's assertive role in her proclamation of her independence from China. A compromise was finally evolved, as the Simla Convention took its final shape. Accordingly, Tibet was divided into two zones, inner and outer Tibet, namely, Central Tibet would enjoy complete autonomy, while the Inner Tibet, that is, the areas east of Upper Yangtze would be under continued Chinese administration, and recognize the Chinese suzerainty.⁷⁴ The Simla Convention, being a compromise, satisfied neither party. Tibet was highly dissatisfied with the new proposal but went along, for it was the best deal she could strike. But China refused to accept it. The provisions dealing with India and Tibet, however, went into effect immediately. The Simla Convention of 1913, even without the Chinese ratification served its purpose. Tibet became an accepted buffer between India, Russia and China. Another major outcome was that Russia's designs over Tibet was permanently checked. Above all, a period of relative peace and tranquility reigned over Sino-Tibet relations from 1913 to 1950.

With the exit of the Chinese soldiers from Tibet and the beginning of the Simla Convention Nepal breathed a sigh of relief, and turned her attention to the economic aspect of the Tibet-China conflict. On October 1913, *Maharaja* Chandra Shumsher wrote a letter to the Dalai Lama

73. E. 10. *Poka* No. 3. A letter from Charge'd Affaires of His Majesty's Government in Peking, Sept. 9, 1913 to Deputy Sec. GI. Confidential
R. No. 69 C

28X- 12, No. 2450, E.B.

74. H.E. Richardson, *A Short History of Tibet* (New York : E.P. Dutton & Co., 1962) pp. 265-66.

demanding a compensation of 134,894 Tibetan *kala mohars* for the Nepalese losses of property during the Sino-Tibetan conflict.⁷⁵ The Tibetan Spiritual Leader, besides placing the blame for the losses of the Nepalese entirely on the Chinese, advised the *Maharaja* to send a representative at the Simla Convention with a list of property lost for the true and fair judgment of the British. He further asserted that he was sending to the Convention his own Prime Minister Sethia Kazi, with a list of losses of the Tibetan property, due to the Chinese intrusion in Lhasa, Digarche and the Khasa region.⁷⁶ The *Maharaja* however pointed out that Tibet, which had failed to give protection, was really responsible for the loss of Nepalese lives and property. Thus it was her obligation to compensate for the Nepalese losses. He also totally rejected Dalai Lama's idea of sending a Nepalese representative to the Simla Convention to claim compensation for the Nepalese losses in few emotionally worded sentences.

I wonder how you could have made such a strange proposal as that of sending a begging-mission to the Conference at Simla to press our claim on a body which has nothing to do with the matter which concerns us two only . . . which has been convened under the wise guidance of the fair-minded British Government for deliberating the question of the differences between China and Tibet. A little common sense would show the impropriety nay the loss of self respect, involved in the acceptance of your absurd Suggestion.⁷⁷

75. See Simla Convention of October 1913, *op. cit.* footnote No. 26.

76. E. 10, *Poka* No. 3. A letter from *Maharaja* to the Dalai Lama, *Aswin Sudi* 5, 1970 (October 1913) p. 23.

77. E. 10, *Poka* No. 3. An undated letter from *Maharaja* Chandra which was a reply to the letter of the Dalai Lama dated 30th. day of the 7th. month, p. 2.

PART II : A
SMALL NEPAL GOES BIG IN
WORLD WAR I : WAR EFFORTS ABROAD

Nepal & the Great War: A Frightful Experience of Suffering Solace & Satisfaction

Preface

The European civilization was already in crisis by the turn of this century. It was this crisis that politically exploded in the form of World War I in the year 1914. It has been customary among historians and political analysts to trace the origins of the First World War to the solely self-centered political and diplomatic entanglement of the period. No doubt that the evolution of alliances, production of armaments, growth of nationalism, the conferences and confrontations constituted the remote and immediate causes of the war. The specific causes for the war ranged from the simplistic statements like "the German king had been rude to the British king"¹ to the deep crisis in values rooted in the European civilization. But it would be too naïve to think that political forces can work in a vacuum. In fact, it is the decadence of cultural values that leads to the collapse of any political system, however, powerful or arbitrary it might be.² There was a strong reaction in

-
1. *Evening Standard*, "The Innocent Remark of a Gurkha in the Front", July 5, 1915, p. 6. This remark is an extract of conversation between Ian Hamilton and a Gurkha soldier.
 2. For an excellent account on the role of cultural values in the rise and fall of civilizations see the following works of Arnold Toynbee : *A Study of History* Vols. II-X, abridged by D.C. Somerville (London : Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 350-393; *Civilization on Trial* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 150-51; *Surviving the Future* (London : Oxford University Press, 1971); pp. 37-167; *War and Civilization* (ed.) Albert V. Fowler (London : Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 143-165.

Europe against the loss of human values due to the rapid growth of machine technology. The haste with which many people of Europe plunged into the turmoil and fury of 1914 was motivated by the desire to build a new Europe governed by a new set of values that placed humanism above the abrupt growth of machine technology. Thus when the war began it was popular both among the masses and the intellectuals. Alfred Weber, Henry Bergson and H.G. Wells were among those who hailed the war as a blessed crusade. The war did provide a safety valve to the popular masses and the elites to divert their frustrated idealism into the popular slogan of the time: "war to end wars." *

The war, however, did not invoke such enthusiasm in South Asia. The reason is obvious: South Asian civilization was not in crisis. Yet, the subcontinent could not remain aloof from this continental war that soon rolled on into North Africa and West Asia. Indeed, it was a cause of alarm and concern for the burden of providing the greater bulk of manpower was to fall upon them. Even a small Himalayan state like Nepal could not remain indifferent. She provided over 200,000 recruits for the British Gurkha regiments and 8,000 of her regular troops for general service in India, though at the time her population did not exceed 5600,000.³

As the wheels of the continental war rolled on all the big powers and their colonies in Asia, Africa and South America were involved. And before the end of the war was

* It was H.G. Wells who coined the phrase "war to end wars". See also Ronald N. Stomberg, *European Intellectual History, Since 1789* (Meridith Cooperation, 1968), pp. 191-232.

3. *London Times*, January 25, 1918, p. 7. The census of Nepal taken in 1911 and published in 1912 showed the total figure of Nepalese population as 56, 39, 012 of whom 28, 54, 727 were males and 27, 84, 365 were females. See a letter from Maharaja Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, E, No. 1 Poka No. 30. Ga; For a comparative analysis of Nepalese Census see Central Bureau of Statistics, *The Analysis of Population of Nepal* (Kathmandu : CBS ,1977).

in sight the United States and Japan were seen fighting in the air, land and water. Apparently, the world had gone mad and the laymen, soldiers and civilians, including the intellectuals, of all races—the black, the brown, the white and the yellow—were seen devoted in the realization and the fulfilment of their passion of conquering and destroying in an hitherto unprecedented scale. The voices of the advocates of liberty, fraternity and equality were not only choked by gas-warfare but were buried along with the bomb shells in the craters and trenches of the war.

Nepal, though far removed from the actual theaters of the conflict became actively involved because of two reasons. First, she possessed an abiding faith in the principles of peace and justice, which sprang partly from her Buddhist principles of peace and justice, and partly from the sacred canons of the Hindu *dharmasastras*. Secondly, her geographical proximity with British India and the recruitment of the Gurkhas in the British army dragged her into the vortex of international conflicts. Friends in peace, Nepal and Britain became allies in war. As the bugles began to play their war notes in Europe, Nepal came forward to help her ally as she had done in 1857. Thus, even before the year 1914 came to a close the Gurkhas were deep inside their trenches in Neuve Chapelle, France, with snow above them.⁴

In fact, Nepal's offer of help to Britain came even before the outbreak of the European hostilities. Nepal, even from a remote distance could sense, Europe verging into a continental war as early as July 1914. She was also fully aware of the fact that Britain being a major world

4. The village of Nauve Chapelle, four miles from La Basesee, was a scene of repeated combats. It was first occupied by the British in the first week of October 1914; and was captured by the British again in October 16. It was taken by the Germans in October 26 and 27. It was again recaptured by the British in March 1915. For more on the campaigns of Nauve Chapelle see *The Times*, *The Times History of the War* Vol. III (London : The Times, 1915), pp. 379-400.

power could not remain aloof from the conflict. It was within this background *Maharaja Chandra Shumsher* took pains to visit Resident J. Manners Smith on the morning of the third August 1914. In the conversation the two spokesmen for their respective countries discussed the possibility of Britain being dragged into the vortex of the continental war. In such an event the Nepalese Premier expressed his willingness to send a Nepalese contingent of 8,000 troops to join the British army in India.⁵ Towards the close of the conversation he handed over an important memo, which in part ran.

The whole resources of Nepal is at His Majesty's disposal. We are proud if we can be of any service, however, little that may be. Though far from the scene of actual conflict we yield to none in devotion and friendship to His Majesty's person and empire. We have spoken our friendship on many occasions and should time allow we speak in deeds.⁶

In an effort to impart more life and color to the memo the *Maharaja* astutely remarked that he was speaking in double capacity: first, as the Marshal of the Gurkhas and secondly, as the Major General of His Majesty's army. In the same evening before he retired he quickly ordered his Commander-in-Chief, General Bhim Shumsher, to make ready a contingent of 14,000 troops for use in case of necessity.⁷

5. See the abstract of conversation between *Maharaja Chandra* and Resident J. Manners Smith, August 3, 1914, E. No. 2. *Poka* No. 63, File No. *Ka* 1971/1915. Earlier, while speaking before the deputation that came on the behalf of the All Gurkha Regiments of the Indian Army to congratulate him on his appointment of honorary Colonel of the Indian Gurkhas he made a similar statement which ran
We are now enjoying the blessings of peace but there is no knowing what future has in store for us. Sinister clouds at times fly across the horizon; and could at any time materialize into dark clouds of war... and we at home, if approached by the British Government for help in case of emergency, will not be slow in coming forward for the defence of India as we have done in the past.

See. E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 35 entitled "Miscellaneous Collection" pp. 1-2

6. *Ibid.* Memo handed by the *Maharaja* to the Resident.

7. A note of Foreign Department, August 3, 1914, *Ibid.*

Nepal's wholehearted cooperation with the British in the Great War was not dictated by any treaty obligation or any secret military understanding, rather it was the outcome of the goodwill and cooperation between the two countries for a century. Both Nepal and Britain have clarified this point on many occasions. To be illustrative, as early as May 1915, the British Premier H. H. Asquith made it abundantly clear that Nepal's cooperation in the conflict "was founded on no obligation but upon goodwill and sympathy."⁸ Later on during the victory celebrations in Kathmandu, *Maharaja Chandra* stressed on the entire voluntary nature of Nepal's assistance to Britain in the Great War. He elaborated, in more than one way, that it was friendship and friendship alone that compelled him to place his nation's resources with the British during the war. To quote.

One and one only consideration made me decide to share the fortune of Our friend in the Great War to sink or swim with them and that was the cause of friendship, a friendship century old, to promote which has been my aim and intention. The vital interest of the country, the lofty teachings of our *Shastras* and Our pride in Kshatriya race, all to my humble judgement demanded we should make whatever sacrifices as possible at such a time and at such a war.⁹

The Government of India was taken by surprise at Nepal's unusual expression of fidelity and took some time to reply. The reason for the delay was that the Viceroy of India deemed it necessary to seek the opinion of the military authorities in the matter. The military opinion was, however, "cautiously positive."¹⁰ In short, they felt that though the presence of the Nepalese contingent at the time was premature, yet, it would only be too foolish to reject such a valuable offer at such a critical juncture

8. See Guild Hall Address by the British Premier, May 19, 1915. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 10, 1975/1918.

9. See the speech of the *Maharaja* during victory celebrations, Kathmandu Nov. 14, 1918, *Ibid*.

10. The opinion of the military authority in India is contained in a confidential despatch from J. Manners Smith to the *Maharaja Chandra*, August 22, 1914, *Basta* No. 63, File No. 1 *Ka*, 1970/1914

of history.¹¹ Accordingly, the Viceroy requested her to keep a force of 8,000 troops ready to march into India when the green signal was given. But was careful enough to discourage the troops from being armed for such an extensive preparation could cause unnecessary alarm both in the public and the press.¹² The Resident J. Manners Smith further suggested that another 6,000 men should also be trained in the use of Le Metford rifles.¹³

The Nepalese Premier noted with satisfaction that his offer of cooperation had not been vain, rather it was to be accepted by the Government of India in a "short time". This "short time" the *Maharaja* had envisioned fell upon him swiftly and suddenly as the forces of war received an unprecedented momentum in the year 1914. A letter from the Buckingham palace of September 18, 1914 thanked the *Maharaja* for his country's help at such difficult times. King George V was further gratified by the personal offer of machine-guns and the field equipments for the Gurkha regiments, specially for the Fourth Gurkha Rifles of which the Premier was honorary colonel. The letter from the Emperor in summary ran.

Little did I think, when I was enjoying your company and hospitality in Nepal that within less than three years an occasion would arise from your friendly assurances of assis-

-
11. The time certainly was one of crisis, when the internal situation in India was plagued with underground activities of the terrorist societies. The terrorist societies were organized in almost every province in India although they were strongest in the Punjab, Bengal and Bombay. In Bengal alone the terrorist societies were responsible for the killing of 82 and wounding 121 persons between 1900-1917. Cries of war could also be heard in the European horizon. For more on the nature of the work of the terrorist organizations and the cries of war see, Government of India, *Sedition Committee : 1918 Report* (Calcutta : Government of India, 1919), pp. 15-21, 31-34; Fay Sidney Brsdshaw, *The Origins of the World War* (New Delhi : Eurasia Publishing House, 1965), pp. 1-557.
 12. The opinion of the Viceroy was quoted by Resident J. Manners Smith, in his letter to the *Maharaja*, August 8, and September 29, 1914, *Basta* No. 63. File No. 1 *Ka*, 1970/1914.
 13. A letter from J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja* Chandra, August, 22, 1914, *Ibid*.

tance to me and my Empire in time of need to be so nobly fulfilled. I know quite well, my dear *Maharaja*, that I could always count upon you and your people as my truest friend. I do thank you from the depth of my heart for placing the military resources of your state at my disposal. . . . I can assure you, my dear *Maharaja* that your magnificent response to the call to arms for the maintenance of the integrity and the honour of the Empire in the hour of trial will never be forgotten by me and my people, and I shall always pray that the blessings of peace, prosperity and happiness may be bestowed upon you and the gallant Nepalese.¹⁴

The *Maharaja* was greatly touched by the grateful words of appreciation of the British Monarch and assured him that the Gurkhas always regarded the cause of Britain as their own; and was confident that they would display the same gallantry they have exhibited while fighting for their own hearth and homes. He then, finally, concluded that since magnificent support had been rallied around the British flag he was confident that it would end in a triumphant victory.¹⁵

Preparation for War

To mobilize a country for a modern warfare was not easy, for it involved a series of operations like the training of the contingent, purchase of armaments on the physical side; while on the diplomatic front the terms and conditions of the loan of the Nepalese contingent to the British had to be drafted. Both these manoeuvres had to be completed with skill and dexterity.

a. Rapid Training Program

Having cast her lot along with the side of the British, Nepal began to mobilize her people to fight one of the greatest wars in history. The Nepalese Premier fully realized that his contingents would be of little value in the

14. See the letter from King George V to the *Maharaja*, September 18, 1914 *Basta* No. 63, File No. 1 *Ka*, 1970/1914.

15. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to King George V October, 24, 1914 *Ibid*.

actual theater of modern warfare, thus, confined her role to liberal donations, supply of recruits to the British army in the international front; and in the South Asian region limited the role of the Nepalese contingent for garrison duties and to suppress local rebellions like the Mashuds in Waziristan in 1917. But even a modest role of the Nepalese contingent in India demanded a minimum training in Lee-Enfield rifles, Martini Henry and Metford rifles. Nepal decided to achieve this objective in two ways. First, she sought permission to purchase 617, 20,000 rounds of 303 ball ammunition. The Government of India promptly responded to the request and ordered the Assistant Director of the ordinance store in Allahabad arsenal to permit the above purchase upon the payment of 38,500 rupees.¹⁶ A little later, Nepal also desired a permit to purchase 440,000 rounds of Lee-Enfield ball ammunition from Allahabad arsenal for the purpose of having 8,000 soldiers practise 55 rounds of Lee-Enfield each. Secondly, Nepal also requested the Government of India for the supply of spare parts and tools to be used in Lee-Enfield, Lee-Metford and Martini Henry rifles.¹⁷ It is true that war did give to Nepal an excellent opportunity to fill her armory to a modest height, yet, she had to pay for every bit of scrap through her nose.

The soldiers were given a full course of rapid training in Kathmandu Valley, according to the Nepalese Manual on Rapid Training. In short, the rapid training program organized for the troops consisted of five different manoeuvres like, the setting of drill, physical exercises, process of extending order, route march and musketry.¹⁸

16. A letter from Resident J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja Chandra*, September 10, 1914, *Ibid*.

17. A letter from *Maharaja Chandra* to Resident J. Manners Smith, Sept. 19, 1919, *Ibid*.

18. See conversation between Captain Austa Man, the Nepalese Officer Attached to the British Residency, Kathmandu, and the British Resident, October 6, 1917. In the conversation the Resident noted with a deep satisfaction that the men of the Nepalese contingent were receiving training according to the Manual on Rapid Training and kept a copy of the book for his study; also a letter from *Maharaja Chandra* to GI, Nov. 3, 1915, *Basta* No. 63, File No. 1, 1970/1914,

The musketry training was a full training in 2000 Lee-Enfield rifles, Lee-Metford and Martini Henry rifles in target practise.¹⁹ Thus within a month the first batch of 700 had already left for India.²⁰

b. Diplomatic Negotiations

Another aspect of the war preparation was the drafting the terms and conditions²¹ of the loan of the Nepalese contingent to the British during the Great War. The terms and conditions agreed by the two Governments in summary ran

1. The contingent will be for general service in India or the North West Frontier Province and will not be sent overseas.²²
2. The troops would retain their ordinary *jagirs* or salaries during their term of service in India.

19. A letter from Chandra to the Viceroy of India, Nov. 3, 1915, *Ibid.* This letter can be taken as a perfect illustration of *Maharaja's* complimentary expression to the Viceroy of India. To quote
May I crave a friend's indulgence to send these lines to your Lordship. I am afraid that it will mean an encroachment on your valuable time.

20. See an abstract of translation recorded in Nepali between *Maharaja* Chandra and the Resident J. Manners Smith, October 7, 1917. *Ibid.*

21. No full text of the terms and conditions relating to the offer of the Nepalese contingent for garrison duty in India is available for scrutiny and analysis either in the Foreign Ministry, Kathmandu, or the National Archives, New Delhi. But it can be more or less reconstructed from the scattered correspondences between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal and the private and the demi-official conversations between the *Maharaja* and the Resident. Among others, one thing emerges clear in these terms and conditions, namely, though Nepal permitted the Gurkhas of the British army to serve overseas, yet, adamantly refused the repeated requests from the Government of India to allow the Nepalese contingent to serve overseas.

22. The *Maharaja* gave three reasons for placing the restriction on the Nepalese contingents to serve overseas. First, the sending of the contingent overseas, being an infringement upon the religious scruples of the nation, would be extremely unpopular among all sections

3. The Nepalese troops was to consist of four contingents consisting of a total of 14,000.
4. The Government of India would give to them the *batta* (allowances) that was equivalent to their salaries at home. However, to negate the bite of inflation since 1857 an amendment was to be made on allowances given by the Government of India to the troops.
5. As regards the family pensions, honors and awards as well as the grants to the injured the same procedure was to be followed as in 1857; and the Nepal Government was to be consulted in each case.
6. Men of the contingent were to be provided with two suits of clothes and a pair of foot wear by Nepal and the renewals were to be made by the Government of India.
7. Tentage and other house and field equipments were to be supplied by the Government of India.
8. Men of the contingent would take with them Martini Henry rifles and ten rounds of cartridge for each rifle. The other arms and ammunition were to be supplied by the Government of India.²³

of the Nepalese community : the people, priests and nobles. He further adds that this would throw the country into a state of panic and the people would blame him for having taken the step for the fulfilment of his personal ends. Secondly, the Nepalese troops being unfamiliar with the methods and techniques of a highly sophisticated modern warfare would be of little utility in the actual theaters of the conflict. Finally, it was once fully accepted that the colonial troops could not be used against white troops by an European power. It is true that this principle no longer prevailed, yet its psychological impact was still strong enough to make the British Government unpopular in the European subcontinent. See a despatch titled "Nepalese Troops to be Used only in India and not Overseas", from *Maharaja Chandra* to Resident J. Manners Smith, Jan. 26, 1915, E, No. 2. *Poka* No. 63, File No. 2, *Ka*, 1971/1915.

23. For a detailed list of arms and equipments taken by the Nepalese contingent to India see Book No. 194 1971/1914, Subtitled as "Jangi Bandobasta Granth Ratna Mala", No. 11. MAN

9. Each battalion was to be provided with a *vaidya* (native physician).
10. The officers and men of the Nepalese contingent committing military offences were to be tried by their own code and by their own officers in the regiment and in the cases the latter did not have their jurisdiction (eg. those involving capital punishment) they would be sent back for trial in Nepal. But in the case of offences committed against persons not being the members of the contingent they may be tried under the Indian penal code; and if convicted would be extradicted to Nepal for disposal.²⁴

An extremely sore point in the negotiation of the terms of the loan of the Nepalese contingent was the question of the jurisdiction of the Indian military code over the Nepalese troops while in service in India for it brought the issue of national prestige and status in the diplomatic map of the world. The Government of India for the sake of discipline and the exigencies of the time wanted the Nepalese contingent be subjected to the Indian Manual of Military Law of 1911.²⁵ The *Maharaja* only wished that he could have given a positive signal to the proposal of the Government of India; but regretted that he could not for the following reasons:

1. First, the ends of justice require that both those who try and those who are tried for the offences committed must be familiar with the laws and rules of procedure and evidence followed to ensure confidence in the justice of the awards. Our officers cannot be reasonably expected to able to grasp and administer the laws and rules of the British legal system; and were they called upon to administer such laws and rules the result will surely defeat the object in view.

24. Maharaja Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith Feb (?) 1915, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63.

25. See the *Manual of the India Military Law*, 1911, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63.

2. Secondly, as Nepalese legal system, grounded on the religious and social customs that are so deeply embeded into the very fabric and texture of the society they must be adhered to under all conditions and circumstances.
3. Finally, the extention or application of the Indian military law to men and officers of the Nepalese contingent by preliminary order or notification as proposed, besides being unprecedented, will be viewed by the Nepalese as a measure seriously affecting the prestige and status of Nepal in the world. In fact, it could even be interpreted as leading the contingent on equal footing with the imperial troops.²⁶

The *Maharaja* concluded his letter with the following polite note of firmness and emphasis.

I am sure that nothing can be further from thought or intention of the Government of India, which has with consistent kindness maintained and respected our autonomy and hope that the military authorities in India will appreciate our position when we say with regret that the proposal could not be accepted by us..... Our existing military law, supplimented with necessary addition and even alterations suited for active service conditions..... would work smoothly and satisfactory to all concerned meeting at the same time the ends of justice as well as discipline. I may add here that in case of the offences against the British Government by any member of the contingent, the offender will be dealt in the same way by us or our officers as the offences committed against this Government. The necessary authority for trial of such cases will be delegated to the General Officer commanding the contingent. Our officers I am confident will not yield to a wrong feeling of delicacy and hesitate to exchange views with those officers on matters relating to offences against discipline, and particularly usages of active service to fecilitate things going on smoothly and satisfactorily.²⁷

26. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to J. Manners Smith, July 20, 1915, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 2, *Ga*, 1971/1915, pp. 1-3.

27. *Ibid.* pp. 2-3.

Besides such a delicate issue, other minor points like rate of rations for the combat or non-combat troops and the forage ration for the horses and ponies had to be meticulously devised.²⁸ With reference to the supply of clothing Nepal and the Government of India struck upon a neat formula mutually acceptable to each other. Accordingly, as regards certain items like boots *khaki* suits the Nepalese Government was to provide the first pair and the Government of India was to provide the renewals. Again, there were certain items like the war-coats, *jersey* (warm-waistcoats) *khaki putties*, fannel shirts and slouch hats to be issued by the Government of India at the expense of the Government of Nepal.²⁹

Towards the close of February 1915, the last details of the Agreement between the two Governments regarding the loan of the Nepalese contingent were finalized and the training of the soldiers complete. Thus, on March 1, 1915 the first batch of the Nepalese troops assembled in the Tundikhel (the parade ground) of Kathmandu for a ritualistic farewell ceremony. The *Maharaja* decorated the officers with garlands and blessed the soldiers with vermilion-mixed rice. The Premier Chandra took this occasion to convince them with the reason why he was sending them for their extraordinary duty in India. The reasons he placed before them were two in number. First, the intimate nature of her friendship with Britain had made Nepal a friend in peace and an ally in war. Secondly, the friendship with

28. The allotment of rations was divided into five categories : seinor officers, juinor officers, non-commisioned officers, technicians and the rank and file members. For details see E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 2, *Ka*, 1971/1915. See also the *Terij* (summary) extracted from papers from the Jangi Bandobasta Adda (Army Head Quarters) by the Foreign Department of Nepal. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66, *Kah*. The above categories are, however, not watertight and did have overlappings.

29. A letter from Resident J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja* Chandra, Jan. 30, 1915, Feb. 3, and Feb. 26, 1915; also from Resident to the *Maharaja* Jan. 30, 1915 and October 28, 1915.

Britain had always been to Nepal's advantage. Thus, in the past she had received from Britain 21,000 Martini Henry rifles, 2,000 Lee-Enfield rifles and was promised 3,000 Lee-Enfield rifles after the war.

The speech of the *Maharaja* was also significant in another way. His down-to-earth advise to the soldiers can be categorised into a list of dos and don'ts. If on the positive side he urged them to display virtues like cleanliness, toleration, obedience, courage and valor; while on the negative he advised them to refrain from vices like gambling, flirting, drinking and amorous living.³⁰ A week before their departure, that is April 22/23, an ordinance issued by the Government of Nepal was read loudly before the soldiers. The aim of the decree was to protect the families of soldiers from encroachment during their absence.³¹

By the third and the fourth March a contingent of 7,501 men was on the move towards India under General Baber Shumsher. General Baber, the second son of the *Maharaja*, was appointed the Inspector General of the Contingent; and was attached to the Army Head Quarters, India. Two other nephews of the Premier, General Padma Shumsher and General Tej Shumsher, were appointed as the General-Officer-in-Command of the regiments in the North West Frontier and the United Provinces, respectively. The 7,501 men of the first contingent were divided

30. Speech of the *Maharaja*, March 1, 1915, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, 1971/1915.

31. The ordinance declared that the elopement of the wives of officers and soldiers during their absence was a criminal offence. Accordingly, the offender would be kept in confinement, and upon return the soldier or officer would be given the option either to kill the offender or confiscate all his property. Again, those who tampered or destroyed their property would have to pay a fine of four times. In short non were permitted to cause trouble to the families of the soldiers. Thus, when the encroachment was reported justice would be delivered promptly and efficiently. See the ordinance issued by the NG and read to the soldiers on April 22/23, 1915, E. No. 2 *Poka* No. 63, File No. 2, 1971/1915

into two provinces to take up garison duties in India, so as to release the additional men of the Indian army to conduct combat operations in Europe, Africa and the Middle East.³² A second contingent consisting of 4,000 troops left for India in December 1915. Among them the four regiment (Sri Nath, Ram Dal, Sher and Singha Nath) totaling 2,340 were to stay in Hasan Abdal; and two other regiments (Mahindra Dal and Naya Gorakh) with the strength of 1,170 move towards Bareilly.³³ When compared with the first contingent the men of the second contingent were better trained. They costituted a more sturdy lot and a good deal younger than the first contingent. Evidently they had gone through a much more rigorous medical examination at home.³⁴ This opinion of Captain H. A. Tuck has been further corrobored by the impressions of General Woodyatt a little later. While speaking about the men of the second contingent on June 1916 Genreal Woodyatt of Abbotabad gives a very pathetic picture of the progress of the Nepalese first contingent. To quote:

I am very much disappointed with the progress of the First Contingent since last August. They have not progressed nearly as much as I had expected and non of the batallions have fired a trained soldier's course. There is much slackness in Johnson's Method, when Baber comes I have to seek his help.³⁵

-
32. See letter No. 32 from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith Feb. 26, 1915, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63 *Kha*, 1971/1915; also free tans. of the *Kharita* from King Tribhuvan to Viceroy Charles Baron of Peshurst, March 27, 1915; from Viceroy to *Maharaja* April 29, 1915; from *Maharaja* to Viceroy, March 1, 1915; also *sadhak* (a circular) issued by NG relating to the despatch of the six battalions, Fagun 20,21, 1971 (March 1915). E.No. 2, *Poka* No. 63 A characteristic feature of all these correspondences is the giant stride taken by Nepal to help a friend in need contrasted with an equal depth of her humility.
33. See the list of the men of the second contingent going to India; also an extract of conversation between *Maharaja* Chandra and the British Resident, October 7, 1915. A letter from *Maharaja* to the Resident, December 5/6, 1915; from Resident to *Maharaja*, Dec. 4, 1915. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 4, 1971/1915.
34. A private correspondence between Captain H.A. Tuck and Resident J. Manners Smith, January 13, 1916. *Ibid*.
35. See a private letter from General Woodyatt of Abbotabad to Resident J. Manners Smith, June 6, 1910, *Ibid*.

The terms and conditions applicable to the second contingent was the same as that of the first. They were out for general service in India with the same pay conditions as that of the first. As a part of regular Nepalese army they would be getting their pay from the Nepalese Government, while the extra allowances during their stay in India would be taken care of by the Government of India. The contingent was trained in the Martini Henry rifles and was equipped with them.³⁶ It was on the same month the *Maharaja* sent a force of 658 men to keep the first contingent in full strength.³⁷ The Commander-in-Chief of India, Beauchamp Duff took this occasion to tell the *Maharaja* that the battalions of the second contingent would be a valuable addition to the Nepalese troops in India.³⁸

A third contingent was sent under the command of Lieutenant General Kaiser Shumsher, the son of the Premier; while the fourth contingent left for India under the half-brother of the *Maharaja*, Major General Shere Shumsher. All these contingents were fully armed and equipped. To sum up, a total strength of 4,257 was sent to India in four groups between 1916 to 1918. The first regiment with 658 men left for India in December 1916, the second with 658 men in 1917 and the third with 779 men in February 1918. A fourth contingent with 1800 were also ready to go to India, but fortunately the war was over and its service was not required.³⁹

36. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, Dec. 15, 1915; also Resident to *Maharaja* Nov. 12, 1915. *Ibid.*

37. A letter from *Maharaja* to the Resident Dec. 15, 1915; also from Resident to the *Maharaja*, Nov. 20, 1915, *Ibid.*, from *Maharaja* to S. F. Bayley, Nov. 28, 1916. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63; also "Nepal and to Great War", E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 11, 1918.

38. A letter from C-N-C., India, to *Maharaja* Chandra, Jan. 4, 1916, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 4, 1911/1915.

39. A copy of letter from Resident J. Manners Smith to the Secretary GI May (?) 1918. E. No. 2. *Poka* No. 63.

Problems of Adjustment for the Nepalese contingent in India

The Nepalese contingent went through a more elaborate training in mountain-warfare in India-either in Dehradun, Abbotabad or Bareilly. The assessment of the British Commander-in-Chief, Beauchamp Duff, towards the progress of the Nepalese contingent was impressive. To quote a letter of General Duff of May 1916 would not be out of place.

Reports I have received from the Nepalese contingent are most satisfactory. Nepalese troops are working with keenness and efficiency and steadily improving. The new battalions Your Highness has sent are proving themselves keen and efficient. The service of General Baber Shumsher is extremely valuable, specially on Nepalese matters.⁴⁰

However, the Nepalese contingent could not escape the problems of adjustment in an alien country with different languages, customs and manners. In addition, the prevalence of the semi-European laws multiplied the confusion in the Nepalese mind. The problems sprang from a number of factors like the hostile environment, the crude nature of Nepalese goods and artifacts and the presence of a centralized, single monolithic bureaucratic system in Nepal. To be illustrative, the stormy weather in the North West Frontier did cause severe damage to the Nepalese tents. The British did promise to provide new tents; but it was late in coming. General Padma Shumsher, thus, allocated a sum of 1,200 rupees to stitch the tents and referred the matter to the consent of the *Maharaja*.⁴¹ The Nepalese Premier told his nephew that he had done the right thing and if the circumstances necessitated he should even go ahead and buy tents. In times of exigency he should even break a diamond. But never tell the British officers that he need his approval in this matter.⁴²

40. A letter from Commander-in-Chief, India, to *Maharaja*, May 12, 1916, pp. 1-2, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 4, 1971/1915.

41. A letter from General Padma Shumsher to *Maharaja* Chandra, *Jestha* 1, 1972 (May 1915) Book No. 195, [subtitled "Jangi Bando-basta Grantha Ratna Mala", pp. 1-13, MAN.

42. From *Maharaja* Chandra to General Padma Shumsher, *Bhadra* 10, 1972, (August 1915) *Ibid.*, p. 3. MAN.

Hardly six months had passed since the arrival of the Nepalese contingent in India the epidemic of cholera swept through the troops in Dehra Dun. It is not clear from the records the death toll it caused, yet, it was severe enough to draw the care and attention of the Nepalese Inspector General Babar Shumsher. The constant attendance of the General in the hospital of the cholera inflicted patients did have immense psychological impact upon them. To quote the Indian Commander-in-Chief

These visits cheered up the patients, who otherwise would have been down-hearted while suffering from greavous malady, so far from their own homes and relations. The remainder of men seeing their general visiting their patients in this way were inspired with confidence and the benefits of their visits were wide spread.⁴³

Further the spread of the bubonic plague at Hasan Abdal just half a mile from the Nepalese camp was the cause of much alarm and discomfort among the Nepalese troops. But all the necessary precautions taken by the Government of India was successful in keeping the deadly plague away from the Nepalese camp. It was the intense labour of the Lieutenant General George Kirkpatrick that was responsible for sealing the army camp from the village.⁴⁴

Perhaps no single individual suffered more from the hostility of the environment than General Padma Shumsher himself, the General-Officer-in-Command of the Nepalese contingent in the North West Frontier. He not only suffered from the chronic case of malaria and jaundice; but also from acute constipation which developed into piles. As the Western medicine proved ineffective the *Maharaja* himself took his personal initiative to furnish

43. From Commander-in-Chief, India to *Maharaja*, May 5, 1915; also from *Maharaja* to Commander-in-Chief, May 12, 1916, pp. 1-2, E, No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 4, 1971/1915.

44. A letter from Baber Shumsher to Lieutenant General George Kirkpatrick Nov. 27, 1917, Book No. 190, subtitled "Jangi Bandobasta Grantha Ratna Mala", No. 12, MAN.

him with indigenous medicine, like *udakmanjari* and granted him periodic vacations.⁴⁵ Again, two other sepoys Sunman Gurung and Jag Bir Rana, according to the advice of the doctors, had to be sent back home from their field of operations in the North West Frontier.⁴⁶

Many Nepalese soldiers suffered from the swollen faces for they had to sleep without cots in the mid of winter.⁴⁷ Another cause for inconvenience sprang not only from the delay brought about by the attempt to bring everything including paper from Nepal but also from their inferior quality. To be illustrative, it took quite sometime for the arrival of the Nepalese uniform from Kathmandu to the North West Frontier Province. To complicate matters, while the weather in the North West demanded half-pants, breeches arrived from Nepal, which could either be used as half-pants or trousers. Furthermore, the ill-tailoring made the Nepalese officers awkward, stiff and heavy when compared with the smart, agile British officers in *khaki* uniforms.⁴⁸ The attempt of the Nepalese officers to convert breeches into half-pants was met with little success so new shorts and had to be ordered in India.⁴⁹

45. The book No. 196 of the Army Head Quarters subtitled "Jangi Bando-Basta Grantha Ratna Mala" No. 14 contains the correspondences relating to the illness of General Padma Shumsher.

46. A letter from General Padma Shumsher to Lieutenant George Kirkpatrick, Nov, 27, 1917, Book No. 190, subtitled "Jangi-Bandobasta Grantha Ratna Mala No. 12. MAN.

47. A letter from Colonel Prakash Shumsher to *Maharaja*, Shrawn 19, 1971 (August 1914) ; also from Baber Shumsher to *Maharaja*, Chaitra 19, 1971 (April 1915) Book No. 195. "Jangi Bandobasta Ratna Grantha Mala No. 13, MAN.

48. General Padma in his letter of Ashad 6, 1972 (June 1915) narated the following problem with the arrival of new uniforms from Kathmandu. First, the clothes did not fit in many cases and had to be retailored. Secondly, the uniform of one company was delivered another thus it had to be rediverted to its proper destination. Thirdly, the flare of the breedches was so tight that they were not only uncomfortable but tore due to pressure when the soldiers sat down to rest. See correspondence between Gereneral Padma and *Maharaja* Chandra Ashad 6, 1972 (June 1915); also conversation between General Padma and General Kitsen (?) in the North West Frontier, Jestha 4, 1972 (May 1915). Book No. 190, subtitled Jangi Bando-basta Grantha Ratna Mala No. 12, MAN.

49. *Ibid.*; Also a letter from General Padma to General Baber Chaitra 12, 1971 (March 1915) Jestha 3, 1972 (May 1915) Book No. 190.

The approach of winter made Nepal worried. She tried to minimize the economic drain in the national treasury in two ways. First, the *Maharaja*, upon the advise of General Padma recommended an amount not exceeding seventy to eighty rupees to the non-commissioned officers and followers in the form of loans, which was to be deducted from their salary at home.⁵⁰ Second, as the expense of the clothing for the soldiers began to mount,⁵¹ Nepal remembered the terms of the contract with the British according to which Nepal would provide the first two pairs of clothes and the British Government would provide the renewals. The decision of the Government of India to abide by the contract was a great relief for Nepal.⁵² Accordingly, Major General W. E. Bunbury recommended warm coats, fannel shirts and blankets for the Nepalese soldiers in the camp; while in the field they were to be provided in addition: one blanket, a balaclona cap, a waterproof sheet, mittens and a pair of warm *pyjamas*. The Government of India also ordered the renewal of the followig clothing of the Nepalese contingent: a pair boots and socks and a *khaki* suit.⁵³

-
50. A letter from General Padma to *Maharaja* Chandra, Kartik 18, 1971 (November 1914), *Maharaja* to Padma and Tej Shumsher, Kartik 24, 1971 (November 1914) Book No. 190 MAN.
51. The cost for the supply of the *khaki* uniforms to the second contingent amounted to rupees 14, 343, exclusive of the package and transport charges. See a letter from the *Maharaja* to Resident S.F. Bayley, Sept. 17, 1916. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 54. This *Poka* contains a collection letters from September 17, 1916 to June 30, 1917.
52. See a letter from the GI to the GN Jan. 30, 1915; also from *Maharaja* Chandra to General Baber Shumsher, Bhadra 24, 1972 (September 1915); From W.E. Bunbury, Quarter Master General, India to General Baber Sept. 8, 1915. Book No. 190 MAN.
53. A letter from W.E. Bunbury to General Baber, Sept. 8, 9, 19, 1915. The letter which ended with a note saying "does the Nepalese General had some more suggestions to make ?" is significant. Book No. 190. The British promised to replace the boots and socks once every four months and pallets once every three months. See also an undated letter from Padma Shumsher to Mahila Guruju Book No. 194, 1971/1914, subtitled Jangi Bandobasta Grantha Ratna Mala No. 11 MAN.

The footwears brought by the Nepalese contingent proved to be ill-suited for the wet weather of Dehra Dun and Abbotabad for it became extremely heavy due to water and mud the soles easily accumulated. The British officers were, thus, candid enough to advise their replacement by the ammunition boots.⁵⁴

It did not take long for the Nepalese contingent to find out that the bronze water bottles they had brought from home, though unbeatable in their strength, yet, their heaviness had made them practically useless. They, thus, had to be immediately replaced by light water bottles. Besides waterbottles their belts and clocks together with the heliographs were either damaged or of such inferior quality that immediate replacement had to be made.⁵⁵ By the close of 1917 the British Government thought it more prudent to sanction a free issue of all clothing of the Nepalese contingent and renewals made upon the recommendation of the commanding officer.⁵⁶

In addition to the oddity in clothing, water bottles, and footwears, the arms brought by the Nepalese contingent were quite obsolete, thus, had to be replaced by the latest stock in the armory of the Government of India. The

54. See Memo for persual of J. Manners Smith July 22, 1915, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 64. *Meshil* No. 9, File No. *Hi*, 23.

55. See letters from General Padma Shumsher to *Maharaja* Chandra, Ashad 4, Poush 14, 1972 (September, December 1915); General Tej Shumsher to *Maharaja*, Magh 10, 1972 (January 1916); also from Tej to *Maharaja* Ashad 9, 30, 1973 (June 1916). Book No. 194, 195, 1971/1976 or 1914/1916, subtitled "Jangi Bandobasta Ratna Grantha Mala" No. 13, 14, MAN,

56. The scale of clothing authorized for the Nepalese contingent were two pair of blankets, *Khaki* shirts, socks, a pair of ankle boots, *Khaki puggri* (hats), putties blouse and waist coats. See a letter from George M. Kirkpatrick, General Staff of India, to General Baber Nov. 27, 1917; Lieutenant General to George Kirkpatrick, Sept. 24, Nov. 27, 1917, Book No. 190; also, S.F. Bayley, Resident, Kathmandu to *Maharaja* Chandra, Jan. 10, 1918 and a printed Memo titled "Scale of clothing and other necessaries to the men of the Nepalese Contingent", E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 64.

Government of India in the beginning thought of renting arms to the Nepalese contingent but later abandoned this idea and supplied the arms free of cost.⁵⁷ Again, the lack of identification symbols among the regiments and officers of the Nepalese contingent brought the problem of identification in the minds of the British officers. Thus, the General Officer-in-Command was advised to provide the regiments and officers with indentifying symbols. Accordingly, Nepal Government had to go through the cumbersome process of manufacturing symbols for the regiments, officers and non-commissioned officers and despatching them to the Nepalese contingent in India.⁵⁸

Another difficulty faced by the Nepalese platoons in India was an acute shortage of English speaking Accountants and Munshis (Interpreters). Nepalese were not available to fulfil this function so Indians had to be recruited for such services.⁵⁹ Nepalese also felt a little uncomfortable with the rigorous discipline of the British, which they were not accustomed to. The lack of discipline among the Nepalese soldiers became more apparent during the field operations in Waziristan. The Sher Regiment at Kakool, in the eyes of Major A.L. Molesworth looked more

57. A letter from *Maharaja* to Baber Shumsher, Poush 8, 1975; also from Baber to *Maharaja*, Poush 15, 1975, Book No. 194 subtitled "Jangi Bandobasta Grantha Ratna Mala", No. 11.

58. The badges manufactured in Nepal consisted of the sun, the moon, the star and the Khukuri symbols, and letters like "J" and "S" to notified ranks like Subdedar and Jamdar. For details see a letter from General Padma to *Maharaja* Chandra, Chaitra 24, 27, 1971 (April 1910); From *Maharaja* to Padma Shumsher, Baisahak 27, 1972 (May 1915); from Mahila Guruju to Tej Shumsher, Baishak 10, 1972 (April 1915); From Tej to Mahila Guruju, Baishak 1, 1972 (April 1915) Book No. 195, subtitled, "Jangi Bandobasta Ratna Grantha Mala" No. 13. MAN.

59. For more on "Accounting and Modern Book keeping in the Nepalese Contingent" see letters from General Padma to *Maharaja* Chandra Baishak 15, 1971 (April 1914), Chaitra 14, 1972 (March 1916), Shrawan 8, 1972 (July 1915); also from General Shere Shumsher to *Maharaja*, Magh 4, 1971 (January 1915) Book No, 192, 1971/1914; also Book No. 193, pp. 1-29. MAN.

like an indisciplined mob than the excellent Gurkha fighters. He narrated cases of men sleeping in sentry duty, rifles being fired due to carelessness, company commanders answering back in parade and leaving the camp without loading their guns in dangerous areas, in complete defiance of the orders and the safety of the whole camp. He argued that men committing such offences in the native regiments would be punished by death. He also blamed the Nepalese officers for giving the orders in a halfhearted way and not seeing that they were obeyed. His important letter to General Shere Shumsher in part ran

I know that this is a very serious charge for me to make about the regiment but is very necessary one and unless something is done it will lead to a serious disaster. I am writing to you quite privately about the matter and with your help things can I am sure improve. And now I write to you the reason for all this. It is only the want of discipline. What I would like you to kindly do is to write to the officers, through the colonel in a serious manner. Every officer with a few exception have been slack and week with his men. An order is given in a halfhearted sort of way and its obedience is never enforced. There has been nothing new for them to do, but they have carried their ordinary everyday work in careless and slack way; and at present I am very much ashamed of them all. Something very drastic is necessary or the name of the Nepalese contingent will suffer.⁶⁰

Further, the men of the regiment went around carelessly in complete defiance of the orders of the British Major. The overall result was that the regiment fared very poorly when compared with the other regiments. In addition, the quarrels between the Nepalese officers made the situation worse by giving to it political overtones.⁶¹ The British officers wanted the guilty to be court-martialed, but the Nepalese counterparts were very reluctant. The reason for this

60. A letter from A.L. Molesworth to Major General Shere Shumsher June 15, 21, 1917, Book No. 196 1971/72 or 1914/15, subtitled "Jangi Bandobasta Grantha Ratna Mala" No. 4, pp. 95-97, MAN.

61. See a letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to General Shere, Aswin 6, 1974 (Sept. 1917) Book No. 196, subtitled "Jangi Bandobasta Grantha Ratna Mala" No. 4. MAN,

was the wide gap between the British concept of military discipline and to what the Nepalese troops were accustomed at home. Major General Shere Shumsher, thus, could do nothing than to ask Colonel Bhairab to wake the men up without hesitating to teach them the lessons of stern discipline.⁶²

The news of indiscipline in the Shere regiment made the *Maharaja* very unhappy not only because of the nature of the offence but also attempts were made by Colonel Bhairab to hush up the June episode. Neither the Colonel or General Shere had reported the matter and the Premier came to know about it only from the the telegram of July 27, which contained two letters from A.L. Molesworth.⁶³ The issue of discipline finally climaxed into a conference⁶⁴ in Merasa Camp, as suggested by General Woodyatt. The Nepalese side was represented by Major General Shere Shumsher and Captain Grihamardan, while the British counterparts were: General Bruce and Lieutenant Scott. The Nepalese General in his opening speech made it clear that he had come to enforce discipline among the soldiers. The central theme of the discussion was the proposal that came from the British relating to the application of the Indian Army Act to the men of the Nepalese contingent mobilized for active service. General Shere was quick to realize the long term diplomatic implications of the proposal. Thus, while appreciating the advantages of such a pro-

62. From Major General Shere Shumsher to Major A.L., Molesworth, June 6, 1917, pp. 97-98. *Ibid.*

63. See a letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to General Shere, Shrawan 4, 1974 (July 1917), *Ibid.*

64. The Nepalese Prime Minister was very much disturbed to find that a conference was being held to discuss the issue of indiscipline among the men of the Sher Regiment. He was convinced from the letters from Molesworth that there was something wrong with the Regiment. But if the conference is to discuss the cases of indiscipline with the other regiments then the matter would certainly take a grave character. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to General Shere Shumsher, Ashad 22 1974 (July 1917), Book No. 196, subtitled "Jangi Bandobasta Grantha Ratna Mala, No. 4, MAN.

posal, the General gave the reasons why Nepal was politically averse to such actions. He, thus, stood firm over the original terms of contract regarding the punishment of the offenders in the Nepalese contingent.⁶⁵ So the British attempt to change the most sensitive portion of the terms of the contract was thwarted. The conference ended; but without fulfilling the British objectives. The only comfort to the British, if there was any, was that Nepal agreed to pay due regards to the advise and suggestions of the British officers as regards adequate punishment of the offenders and prompt execution of the sentences.⁶⁶ The conference did, however, highlight the need for absolute discipline among the troops that were assigned for active field service. With this particular objective in view, the Government of Nepal gave the prerogative of promoting a sepoy up to subedar and a lieutenant to captain for extraordinary acts of bravery, to the General-Officer-in-Command upon the recommendation of the Officer-in-Command.⁶⁷

Nepalese Contingent and Gurkha Troops in Combat Operations

The above framework, hopefully, provides an adequate setting for the Nepalese contingent and the Gurkha troops in action round the world in the Great War. It is an irony of history that exactly 100 years after a bitter and a protracted physical conflict with the British the Gurkha troops were again in action. But this time as an ally of the British in the European conflict.

65. See the Proceedings of the Conference Relating to the Indiscipline Among the Men of the Sher Regiment, July 16 Book No. 196, *Ibid.*

66. See a copy of letter from the GN to the General-Officer-in-Command in Waziristan Field Force Tandoto, August 6, 1917, Book No. 196. *Ibid.*, pp. 111-12.

67. The *Maharaja* asked General Shere to communicate the new promotion criteria devised so as to ensure discipline in the Nepalese contingent to A.L. Molesworth. A letter from *Maharaja* to General Shere Shrawan 4, 1974 (July 1917). *Op. cit.*, footnote 65.

A. Nepalese Troops in Combat Operations: The Waziristan Frontier

The Nepalese troops did very well adjust to the psychology of distance and hostile physical and social environment. Thus, by May 1917 two of its regiments, the First Rifles and Mahindra Dal were attached to the Forty Third and the Forty Fifth Brigade respectively, to be mobilized towards the operations against Mashuds in Waziristan. This operation was placed under the leadership of Major General Arthur Barrett. It was Major General G.W.L. Beynon who, however, commanded the South Waziristan Field Force. The *Maharaja* was happy to instruct his own son, General Baber, to join General Beynon to assist the Nepalese operations.⁶⁸

The Mashuds constituted one of the tribes in Southern Waziristan that had always defied the authority of the British Government. The system of authority that prevailed among the Mashuds was virtually close to anarchy. As early as 1895, R. I. Bruce went to Waziristan as a British Commissioner with a brigade of troops, to demarcate the British boundaries and that of the Mashuds. His camp was attacked at night and heavy losses were inflicted upon the English troops by the Waziri tribesmen. Thus, the Bruce experiment in Waziristan was a failure. It was Lord Curzon who formed the North West Frontier Province, consisting of the six frontier districts of the Punjab and the six tribal areas including the Mashuds. The new province was placed directly under the Government of India and was administered by the Political Department. This was Lord Curzon's organization. But the tribesmen including the Mashuds did not recognize it, rather armed themselves with breech-loading rifles instead of the matchlock. The rebellious and turbulent spirit of the

68. The contemporary Indian newspapers report that three of the Nepalese regiments were involved in the operations. However, the official sources from both Nepal and India mention only two. See *The Statesmen*, May 5, 1918. p. 9.

Mashuds found full expression in their revolt against the British authority in India during the Great War.⁶⁹

The operations against the Mashuds lasted for six months from March to August 1917. The picture of the war against the Mashuds unfolds very dramatically in the frequent despatches of Lieutenant General Arthur Barrett, who commanded the Northern army in the operations. On May 6, 1917 the British force in Derajat was constituted into a field force with Major General W.G.L. Beynon being appointed to the command and Sir John Donald as his chief political officer. On May 12, the Bannu Brigade, under the command of Brigadier General, C.G. Bruke, was also placed under Beynon's order. Thus, the troops in Derajat and Bannu Brigades were designated as Waziristan Field Force. While these reinforcements were moving towards Derajat, an action was seen on May 10, 1917 in the vicinity of Sarwakai. The officer commanding the post, Major L.P. Collins of the One Fourth Gurkha Rifles, hearing that the enemy was retiring from the vicinity of Tormendu, moved during the night on May 9, with a force of 450 rifles. His force comprised of One Fourth Gurkha Rifles, the Eleventh Rajputs and the South Waziristan militia. The whole objective of the British was to intercept the enemy's retreat. The dawn took the Mashuds by surprise; but due to a large enemy's reinforcement a hand-to-hand combat followed. As there was the danger of being surrounded the officer-in-command of the detachment judiciously decided to withdraw to Sarwakai. Although the British losses were heavy, the losses inflicted upon the enemy was equally severe, and it included the death of the leader of Lashar. On June 16, the Forty Fifth Brigade joined the main body of force at Haidari Kach. The British used the next three days to consolidate their position by advocating

69. For more on the Mashuds see Philip Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled India : The Guardians*, Vol. II (New York : Schocken Books, 1964), pp. 146-47, 150-52, 292-297; Perceval London, *Nepal*, Vol. II (Kathmandu : Ratna Pustak, 1976 (reprint) pp. 138-139; Francis Tucker, *The Story of the Gurkhas of Nepal* (London : Constable and Co., 1957) pp. 193-94.

punitive measures like improving the roads in the vicinity and reconnoitring the route to Berwand. Reports were then received that the Mashuds intended to oppose strongly the advance of Major General Beynon's force. Thus when the force moved on June 19, it was met with considerable opposition. During the whole of the ensuing night several hundred of the enemy soldiers made a determined bid to capture a piquet of the Fifty Fourth Sikhs under the command of an Indian officer. The piquet, although sustained heavy losses, did successfully maintain its position.

On June 20 a search for water supply compelled the force to move a short distance to Ispana Raghza. The enemy, however, made a determined bid to check the advance. But the Forty Third Brigade overcame this opposition. The work of One Fourth Gurkha Regiment, the Mahindra Dal of the Nepalese contingent and One Twenty Fifth London Regiment was specially significant. Next day, on the 21st. Major General Beynon ordered the Forty Fifth Brigade to destroy the village of Nanu at the head of Splitoi Valley; while the Forty Third Brigade attacked the Mashud settlements in the vicinity of Ispana Raghza. At any rate the enemy had made up its mind to stand by its guns also on this occasion. The British reconnaissance plane also reported a heavy enemy buildup in the ridge dividing the Splitoi and Shabur Valleys through which ran the pass of Nanu. The Forty Fifth Brigade attacked the pass with a great spirit and a bold dash: the Two Sixth Sussex Regiment moved against the pass itself, while the Two First King George's Own Gurkha Rifles and the Mahindra Dal Regiment of the Nepalese contingent seized the heights South and North of the pass respectively. The result was that the enemy was driven off. The Nanu village was destroyed and the retirement of the troops to the camp was affected with only slight molestation. Major General Beynon brought to notice the most creditable manner in which the Mahindra Dal conquered the heights, thus achieving its principal objective; and also the valuable work performed

by the aeroplane of the Thirty First Squadron of the Royal Flying Corps, both in reconnaissance and bombing the enemy positions.

The defeat of the Mashuds made two things very clear. First, the futility of the efforts of frontier tribes before the fire-power of the industrialized West and the invincibility of the Nepalese in the hand-to-hand combat. On June 22 the Forty Third Brigade destroyed a large village in Shah Salim Mela in the Waspa Valley. The part played by the First Rifle of the Nepalese contingent was very commendable. The enemy had made a very careful preparation to oppose the advance, but owing to the good disposition of Lieutenant Colonel C.O. Tanner, the Brigade Commander, the enemy's defence turned down and the British casualties were light. By this time sufficient supplies had been collected to enable the advance to be resumed. The striking force, thus, moved the Twenty Third Brigade to Narai Razhza. A very difficult defile had to be crossed in face of opposition, which was cleared by the Forty Fifth Brigade. During the night that followed the camp was heavily sniped and several piquets were attacked. The Fourteenth Gurkha Rifles was their particular target. The hurling of the bombs helped greatly in defense of the piquets. On June 24 Major General Beynon directed the Forty Third Brigade to capture the Shrawani Pass. In short this was carrying out punitive measures in the Khaisar. The heights leading to the pass were seized by the First Rifle of the Nepalese contingent, One Fourth Gurkha Rifles and the Fifty Fourth Sikh. The enemy was, thus, forestalled and the Forty Fifth Brigade was rapidly pushed through it to the Khaisara Valley under the cover of the right flank guard, which was continuously engaged with the enemy. The objective was to destroy all the villages within the roads and in the process the villages in Nana Khelghazi and the Khot areas. The Manihi settlements were also blown up in this drive against the enemy. Retirement order then followed. The Mashuds in a desperate mood vigorously attacked the piquets of the Fifty Fifth

Cooke's Rifle, but the enemy was driven back with heavy casualties. At this critical juncture messengers arrived from Kaniguram asking for the term of peace, and the Chief Political Officer thought that the damage inflicted was sufficient.

This saw the turning of the tide. Accordingly, on the 25 of June, after destroying a village in the vicinity of the camp the force returned with slight molestation to Ispana Raghza. While these operations were taking place several raids were carried out by aeroplanes of the Thirty First Squadron. Thus, several village in Takbi Zam and the neighboring areas were bombed. These raids were, however, carried with considerable risk. The engines were liable to failure in the high temperature prevailing; the distance from the base at Tank was long and the altitude of 8,000 feet had to be crossed. These were, however, rewarded by the results obtained, which undoubtedly contributed to the general desire for peace displayed by all sections of the tribe. When these operations were taking place the troops under Brigadier General Bruce in the Bannu area were not called upon to take any offensive measure. The presence of strong forces at Bannu and Miramshah deterred the Mashuds from raiding into the Bannu districts and Tonihi Valley, and kept them in a state of uncertainty as to whether an advance from Miramshah might not be contemplated.⁷⁰

Three factors were primarily responsible for the success in the British operations against the Mashuds in Waziristan: the daring feat displayed by the Mahindra Dal

70. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to S.F. Bayley, May 14, 1917; From *Maharaja* to W.G.L. Beynon, May 21, 1917; From General Beynon to *Maharaja* June 1, 1917; A *bintipatra* (petition) from Gajraj Jung Thapa, Jestha 27, 1974 (June 1917); also extracts from despatches from Lieutenant General Arthur Barrett, the Commander of the Northern Army in operations against Mashuds from March to August 1917. See E. No. 2 *Poka* No. 63, File No. 6. 1974/1917; also *Statesman*, "The Waziristan Operations : How the Mashuds were Quelled", May 5, 1918, p. 4.

and the First Gurkha Rifles of the Nepalese contingent, the heroic support of One Fourth Gurkha Rifles and Two First King George's Own Gurkha Rifles as well as the superior fire arms of the British. The Mashuds had launched a revolt against the British at a very opportune moment, when the British force was largely depleted by Great War that was rolling in its fourth year. But the hopes of the frontier tribe withered away as it had to face the combined strength of the Nepalese contingent and the British Gurkhas. Thus, by the second week of July 1917 the operations against the Mashuds were virtually completed. General Baber Shumsher was then called back to resume his duties of Inspector General in Simla.⁷¹ It was, however, only in August the Mashuds were fully compelled to sue for terms of peace with the British Government. The Government responded to her appeal immediately. Thus, the Mahindra Dal and the First Rifle of the Nepalese contingent were ordered to proceed to their respective stations.⁷²

The Nepalese contingent did win her laurels but not without a price. The casualties on the Nepalese side were heavy. Though few deaths were reported, yet, the number of maimed, wounded and crippled for life were numerous. An official report ran. "The Rawalpindi hospital was filled with the wounded and the sick".⁷³ Among those killed in action the names of Lieutenant Nardip Sahi of Mahindra Dal, Subedar Sanak Singh Thapa and Sepoy Shumsher

71. A letter from Major General Beynon to *Maharaja* Chandra, July 11, 1917; also from *Maharaja* to the General, July 15, 1917, *Ibid.*

72. From Major General Beynon to *Maharaja* Chandra. August 12, 1917, *Ibid.*

73. From the Mahindra Dal alone 120 wounded were kept in the hospital. These included : 10 riflemen, 7 amaldars, 58 sepoy, 3 subedars, 18 havaldars and 24 *piuths*. The sick from the noncombatant units of the Nepalese contingent were : 6 cooks, and 4 *pipas* (porters). See Book No. 192 "List of the Wounded and the Sick in the Hospital of Rawalpindi in Shrawan 8, 1974 (July 1917); also a letter from General Padma Shumsher to *Maharaja* Chandra, Shrawan 18, 1974 (July 1917).

Gurung were significant.⁷⁴ The trauma of suffering was, however, diluted by the joy of victory that was in store for them. There was rejoicing both in Kathmandu and New Delhi. The president of Gurkha Association, J.W. Lowrie took this occasion to congratulate the *Maharaja* on the return of the Nepalese contingent after displaying its heroism and valor in the Mashud operations in the North West Frontier Province.⁷⁵ A letter of congratulation also arrived from the India Office, London, on January 14, 1918. James, Dunlop Smith, the political A.D.C. of the Secretary of state for India, took this occasion to thank the *Maharaja* for the splendid work of the Nepalese regiments in the recent campaign against the Mashuds.⁷⁶ But on the whole the duties of the Nepalese contingent in India were merely the duties of peace. Their presence in India helped more to relieve the Indian troops for combat operations in the European and the Afro-Asian theatre of war.

B. Gurkha Troops in the European and Afro-Asian Front

The heroic performances of the Nepalese regiments in the North West Frontier Province did climax the role of the Nepalese contingent in South Asia. But this was to constitute only a fringe in the long scroll of honor Nepal was to inscribe for herself during the Great War. The

74. A letter from C.C. Munro, Commander-in-Chief of India to *Maharaja* Chandra July 29, 1917; from *Maharaja* Chandra to C.C. Munro, August 3, 1917. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 6, 1974/1917; also Book No. 198. It contains ten condolence letters from the *Maharaja* to the families of those who died in the Waziristan conflict. MAN.

75. A letter from J.W. Lowrie, President of Gurkha Association to Major Gambir Jang Thapa, Military Secretary to General Baber Shumsher, July 27, 1917, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 6. 1974/1917

76. A letter from James D. Smith to *Maharaja*, January 4, 1918, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 1 *Kha*, 1970/1914; see also a letter from Viceroy Frederick John Napier Chelmsford to His Majesty Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah, Feb. 19, 1919, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 8, 1976/1919; also text of speech by the Commander-in-Chief of India to Mahindra Dal, November 14, 1919, Book No. 196 subtitled "Jangi Bandobasta Grantha Ratna Mala" No. 4, MAN.

superb gallantry of the Gurkha troops and their extraordinary devotion to duty in action constituted one of the most glorious chapters in the war. Their valor was exhibited from the shores of the Arabian Sea to that of Mediterranean, from the lowlands of Egypt to the heights of the Alps and the Dardanelles. From France to Flanders and from China to the Caspian Sea they defended in the best way they knew how, the modern technocratic civilization that was crumbling to pieces under the impact of blind nationalism and arbitrary power.

By the close of August 1914, Britain, the greatest naval power of the time came to be dramatically involved in the continental war, that turned out to be one of the greatest wars in history. In no time it took a global character and South Asia with its teeming population supplied the first imperial contribution to the Empire in the field.⁷⁷ Nepal, which commanded the heights of the Himalayas, made her contribution in two directions. First, one could discern the sincere wave of goodwill, prayers and good wishes culminate into a sincere hope of the British triumphant victory in the righteous cause. Secondly, Nepal permitted the seven regiments of Gurkhas of the British army to form a part of the British Expeditionary Force for active service in Europe.⁷⁸

The important significance of the permission granted can be only properly assessed and understood within the

77. The Times, *The Times History of the war* Vol. II. (London : The Times, 1915, pp. 317-18.

78. The Nepalese regiments of the British army that was called for active service abroad included :

First Battalion	First Gurkha Rifles
Second Battalion	Second Gurkha Rifles
Second Battalion	Third Gurkha Rifles
First Battalion	Fourth Gurkha Rifles
Second Battalion	Eighth Gurkha Rifles
First Battalion	Ninth Gurkha Rifles
Second Battalion	Tenth Gurkha Rifles

general framework of the institution of the *panipatya*⁷⁹ The age old institution of *panipatya* is associated with the ancient Hindu practise that prohibited the Hindus from crossing the seven seas or the *kalapani* (black waters). The *Shuddhi* ceremony known as *panipatya* become all the more important when tens of thousands of Gurkha troops were being employed across the seven seas. The *Maharaja*, therefore, decided to relax the *panipatya* process by making a special arrangement with the *Raj Guru* (Royal Preceptor). Accordingly, it was formally agreed that *patya* (*shuddhi*) would be automatically given to every Gurkha soldier who had proceeded under orders with the consent of the Government. However, this permission was not a license to do everything abroad. Two conditions were hinged to it. First, no Gurkha soldier was permitted to prolongue his presence abroad beyond the period of absolute necessity. Second, each Gurkha, upon his arrival, was to produce a certificate given by the British officer, which attested that he had observed the caste-rules during his stay abroad.⁸⁰

For a while there was suspense all over Europe as to whether the troops from the subcontinent was to be used in the European soil against the white man. But it was the statement of Marques Crew in the House of Lords on September 9, 1914 that cut the ice once and for all. He

79. No scholarly work on the institution of the *panipatya* is available. Thus, one has to rely on the scattered references in the correspondences between the Nepalese Premier and the British Resident in Kathmandu and the extracts from the opinion expressed by the *Raj Guru* from time to time during the Great War.

80. For a detailed account on *panipatya* see *Basta* No. 75; also Superintendent Government Printing Press, *Measures Taken to Ensure the Keeping of Caste of the Gurkha Soldiers in the War, 1914-15* (Delhi : Superintendent Government Printing Press, 1915. A detailed account on the *Shuddhi* movement is also found in Prem Raman Uprety, *Religion and Politics in the Punjab in the 1920's* (New Delhi : Sterling Publishers, 1980), pp. 71-75; Gene Thursby, "Aspects of Hindu Muslim Relations in British India 1923-1928" (Dissertation, Duke University, 1972), pp. 31-68.

made it abundantly clear that the South Asian troops was to form a part of the Indian Expeditionary force for combat duties in Europe; and revealed amidst loud cheers that the Government of Nepal had permitted the seven Gurkha battalions to be a part of it.⁸¹ It is not possible or even desirable to go into the details of the Gurkha operations in Europe and in other Afro-Asian theaters as the war rolled on with increasing fury and intensity during the early years of the conflict. Suffice to say that a few battles have been taken as most illustrative: and even in them the finest details in many cases are lacking due the want of documentation. Hope that the reader will fill in the details and patch up the holes of imperfections with the delicate sense of his historical imagination.

1. Gurkhas in the Front in France

The British force that went to France was so small and the casualties so great in 1914 that Britain relied exclusively on the South Asian army reinforcement in France. The leading echelon of the South Asian contingent, which primarily consisted of the Gurkha battalions, landed in Mersailles on October 1, 1914; and was given "a warm splendid reception" by the French people.⁸² The Gurkhas were the first among the South Asian contingent to set their foot in Europe; and settled down cheerfully in a very highly uncongenial climate worsened by the devastating conditions of modern warfare. They arrived in time to relieve the German pressure South of Lys in France. The British comrades could thus, retire to rest which they so urgently needed. The Gurkhas, thrown into snow-covered trenches of France, ill-clad, lacking in machine-guns, ill-equipped, without even mortars, had to depend upon "worthless homemade-jam-tin-bombs."⁸³ The result was

81. *Tribune*. "Imperial Parliament : House of Lords; India's Princely Support", October 7, 1914, p. 10.

82. See "Summary of News Affecting Gurkha Battalions", *Basta* No. 63, File No. Ka, 1970/1914.

83. Francis Tucker, *The Story of the Gurkhas of Nepal*, op. cit., p. 194.

obvious: they suffered heavy losses. However, despite this misfortune they fulfilled their primary objective of preventing the German South of Lys from sending troops to assist their effort North of the river. The smart defeat they administered upon the enemy in Giuency in October 1914 is also noteworthy.⁸⁴

But when clothing, equipments and weapons finally arrived they gave a severe blow upon the enemy at Nauve Chapelle. For the first time in the war, at Nauve Chapelle, the German line was broken. Here Ghane Gurung outstip-ed his comrades—assailed a German outpost at his own discretion and took seven Germans as prisoners. Tucker has immortalized this episode in these graphic words. “there he marched out—a small man with seven large ones, hand’s raised—to be greeted as he emerged with loud cheers from the British Rifle Brigade advancing into position”.⁸⁵

In late April 1915 the Gurkhas attacked Ypres with their extra-ordinary courage. A young soldier Beni Dhoj Rai took command of two platoons and led them through eventually capturing a German position. Moti Lal Thapa, with his shattered arm, hanging by a piece of skin, was brought to a place of comparative safety by a British officer. But unfortunately he died a few hours later muttering the sacred *Mantra* (formulaic expression) “Ayeo Gorkhali”. A little latter at Festubert, Sen Bir Gurung was hit by a bomb but dragged himself to a position to direct his men in highly successful raid. The Germans, however, took the first initiative in a vigorous counterattack with not only fire but also poisonous gas on the Ypres salient.⁸⁶

84. See the war despatches from Sir John French, despatch No. 20, 1914 in the *Pioneer*, March 11, 1915, p. 1.

85. Francis Tucker, *The Story of the Gurkhas. op. cit.*, p. 194.

86. *Ibid.*, p. 195; also The Times, *The Times History of the War. Vol. IV. op. cit.*, pp. 379-400.

The Gurkhas of the Third Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles took part in the unbelievable daring assault of September 1915, when the Rifleman Kulbir Thapa emerged as a sole survivor of a party fighting his way from a German trench. Kulbir was badly wounded on September 25, 1915; but he slipped through the German wire and leapt across the enemy's trenches south of Mauquissart. Here he found a badly wounded soldier of the Second Leicester Regiment behind the first line of the German trench, and though urged by the British soldier to save himself, he remained with him all day and night. In the early morning of September 26 in a misty weather he brought him out through the German wire, and leaving him in a place of comparative safety returned and brought two wounded Gurkhas, carrying them most of the way, and being at most point under enemy's fire.⁸⁷ On October 13, Lieutenant Jodh Jang Bahadur of Thirty Ninth Garhwal Rifles, the grand son of the Maharaja, took charge of two companies during the feint attack north of La Basse Canal. He displayed with great ability conspicuous gallantry in the face of severe fire from rifles machine-guns grenades and bombs. He was decorated with Military Cross for his conspicuous bravery in the Western Front. While ailing in London hospital he lamented over the fact that he could not kill the Germans with his *khukuri*. To quote, "I take my men into action with *khukuri* as well as rifles but we do not get a chance to use them. When we get near the enemy they always surrender they have heard of our *khukuris*"⁸⁸ Jemdar Harka Bahadur Thapa of the Second Battalion was one of

87. London Gazette, Nov, 18, 1915, "Pertaining to the Award of Victoria Cross to No. 2129 Rifleman Kulbir Thapa" also "Second Battalion Eighth Gurkha Rifles", E. No. 4, *Poka* No. 155, File No. 615, 1916; The Times, *The Times History of the War* Vol. IX, *op. cit.*, p. 19, 40; from Resident J. Manners Smith to Maharaja Chandra, Nov. 20, 1915, *Basta* No. 63, File No. *Ka*, 1970/1914.

88. A letter from Her Majesty Queen Alexandra to General H. D. Hutchinson, Colonel of the Third Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles, Dec. 29, 1915, *Basta* No. 63, *Ibid*.

the first to land in France. He was inflicted a mortal wound and died in Netby.⁸⁹

On another front Subedar Sarabjit Gurung was bravely fighting against all great odds. He and his party died to the last man. Again, Ratna Barna Gurung lying wounded on a field ambulance clung to the remains of a German machine-gun he had captured. Out of five hundred or more, who went to battle with him that day one British officer and forty nine Gurkhas survived. In her letter to General Hutchinson Her Majesty Queen Alexandra lamented over the heavy loss of her regiment. She, however, praised the extraordinary services of the regiment since the commencement of the great and terrible war, but at the same time went to note

The record is indeed wonderful one and while I most sincerely deplore the loss of so many officers, noncommissioned officers and men I feel intensely proud of the Regiment which bears my name and I trust that you will convey to all ranks my high appreciation of their devoted and splendid services to the King and the Empire.⁹⁰

A British war correspondent in the Third Line of the Germans immortalized the fame of the Third Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles in these words: "the

89. The *Nottingham Guardian* writes about the death rituals of Harka Bahadur who died in the hospital. Accordingly it notes "that all death rituals of a Hindu is preformed by a river. But in Netby there are no rivers. Thus water by score of gallons was carted up from South Hampton, a shallow trench was dug and when the ceremony was about to commence the water was allowed to flow down in a stream. The body of Harka Bahadur Thapa was bathed, anointed and clothed in new garments. It was then carried in a stretcher to the place of cremation prepared by the Indian students." The paper notes "for the first time outside the subcontinent the ceremony was performed in entirety." *Nottingham Guardian*, "The Funeral Pyre of a Gurkha Soldier in England", Feb. 24, 1915, p. 6.

90. A letter from Queen Alexandra to General H. D. Hutchinson, Colonel of Third Queen Alexandra's own Gurkha Rifles, Dec. 29, 1915, *Basta* 63, File No. *Ka*. 1970/1914.

regiment had acquired a magnificent reputation among those who know the beauty of existence."⁹¹

Neuve Chapelle has since become a legend in the battles in history and earned for the Gurkhas the title "the bravest of the brave".⁹² General James Willcocks, who commanded the Indian troops in France also arrived at the same conclusion. To quote, "I have now come to the conclusion that the best of my troops in France were the Gurkhas".⁹³ On the Western Front the prefatorial success of the Gurkhas at Nauve Chapelle raised the optimism of the Allied powers. It was generally believed that a breakthrough in the war had been definitely achieved. But this hope was duped as the Germans launched a vigorous counterattack.

2. Dardanelles Campaign

One of the romantic campaigns of the Great War was the Battle of the "Great Landing" fought at Dardanells under the cover of darkness and under the protection of a fleet. A big army was conveyed towards the rocky desolate shores of Gallipoli peninsula on April 25, 1915. By the dim light of dawn the landing was accomplished at half a dozen points. This was a feat that shook the imagination of the Turks and the Germans, for what had been thought to be impossible had been accomplished. It is true that the foothold was scanty, its peril still was great and the losses had been heavy, yet, a landing had been made which was prelude to the close of one of the most eulogized campaigns in history.⁹⁴

In the mountain warfare of the Dardanells the Gurkhas, again, became indispensable. At about 10 p.m.

91. *The Times*, October 23, 1915; also *New Castle Journal*, October 25, 1915, p. 3.

92. Speech of Sir John French at Nauve Chapelle, *Civil and Military Gazette*, June 3, 1915, p. 11; *Adrill and Boot Bridge Advertiser*, October 23, 1915, p. 7.

93. *Civil and Military Gazette*, *Ibid.*, p. 20.

94. For more on the "Great Landing" see *The Times*. *The Times History of the War*, Vol. V, *op. cit.*, pp. 441-480.

the Turks attacked the Gurkha battalions with bombs. The result was that a Gurkha British officer was wounded. Seeing this the Gurkhas hurled all their bombs at the enemy and leaping out of their trenches charged shouting the slogan "Ayeo Gorkhali" with *khukuri* in their hands using them with maximum effect. A war correspondent narrates this episode in this vivid maner

When the stocks of grenades were exhausted the famous curved knives of the Gurkhas flashed from the belts of the worthy warriors as they charged towards their foe. In the enemy's trench the knives were used with "excellent effect" and a terrible vengeance excabeted for the wound inflicted upon a Britisher.⁹⁵

During the five days of fighting the casulties inflicted by the Gurkhas and the supporting contingent upon the Turks was heavy. A total of 5,150 Turks were killed and 15,000 were wounded, besides a considerable amount of ammunition was captured.⁹⁶ However, despite these heavy losses Turkey gained nothing-not a trench was taken and not a yard gained. All this had so much adverse effect upon the Ottoman ranks that Turkey had to adopt a defensive strategy and the disposition to hold on to their possessions was prevalent everywhere. The result was the military authority in Turkey issued orders to shoot any one who showed any inclination to retire.

The Turkish defences of the Western beach were heavily defended and the Turks considered them to be impregnable. But the storming of the stretches from the boats was an exceptional feat of arms. The battles of June 4 to June 6 saw the Gurkhas in action gaining an inch by inch along the cliff by the sea. It was a gallant attempt which was enough to unnerve the Turks. In the difficult and

95. *The People*, July 7, 1915, p. 12; also *The Daily Express*, July 6, 1915, p. 8.

96. Since June 29, 1915 the total amount of Turkish arms and ammunition captured were : 516 rifles, 51 bayonets, 2000 sets of equipments, 126,400 rounds of ammunition and 100 bombs. See *Sussex News*, July 6, 1915, p. 1.

arduous task they conquered one cliff after another. In their appetite for victory against all odds the Gurkhas were able to give the name "the Gurkha bulff" to one of the cliffs in the Dardanelles, which has still been retained by the cartographers in the romance of the maps.⁹⁷ In the first week of July one of the grimmest encounters took place. The Gurkha machine-guns supported by the men of the Indian contingent moved down where the Turks stood with their machine-guns. The heaviest fighting took place in the Gallipoli peninsula. The war witnessed ghastly targets and heaved sighs. The Allies, in facts, drove the Turks back seven times. The death toll on the German side was estimated to be 7,000 and the number of the wounded ran 15,000.⁹⁸

The next strategy of the British was to conquer the cliff. This task was assigned to the indomitable Gurkhas. The Gurkhas pressing under the cliff captured an important knoll west of Bithia. This they fortified and held it making a total gain of 1,000 yards.⁹⁹ By August 1915, the Gurkhas along with the Indian troops had forced their way 5,000 yards from the landing place at the point of the peninsula. Throughout the campaign the Gurkhas got an opportunity to test their inborn skill in the use of their *khukuris*. A countless number of headless Turks stand as mute testimony to this fact.¹⁰⁰

At Bait Aiess the Gurkhas surprised and overwhelmed the enemy by killing and capturing 400 enemies and

97. *Birmingham Post*, July 6, 1915, p. 1; See a letter from a British Gurkha officer in the Front in Gallipoli, *Morning Post*, July 2, 1915, p. 3; *Yorkshire Observer*, June 7, 1915, p. 1; *Liverpool Council* "The Romance of Maps", July 8, 1915, p. 1.

98. *Liverpool Post*, July 13, 1915, p. 1.

99. *Civil and Military Gazettee*, "War News on Gallipoli Peninsula", pp. 10-12.

100. *The Scotman*, August 19, 1915, p. 1; *The Daily Telegraph*, September 21, 1915, p. 1; see also *The Times*, *The Times History of the War*, Vol. VI, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-120, 121-160.

took from them two guns and several machine-guns. Another Gurkha battalion killed 150, took some prisoners and captured three machine-guns. Then at Khdairi Bend the Gurkhas killed 100 Turks within a short space of 300 yards. A Gurkha survivor from France, with a bucket of bombs, charged at the enemy leaving a trail of Turks dead. His body was also discovered mutilated by a bomb with six or seven dead Turks in front of him. The decisive battle took place in late February 1917 when the British regiment along with two Gurkha battalions crossed the Tigris one early morning. The despatch from General Maude's reads

By nightfall as a result of a day's operation our force with unconquerable valour and determination forced a passage across the river 300 yards wide in the face of heavy opposition and had secured a position 1,000 yards in depth covering over bridgehead. But fortification fell to the British and the Turks went North.¹⁰¹

Thus, the Dardanelles Campaign despite subsequent tragic episodes after the "Great Landing" was one of the most glorious chapters in the history of the British Empire. Even after the campaign was victoriously concluded, men asked the question how was it possible to carry the campaign of the Dardanelles to a successful conclusion? It is, however, needless to say that the role of the Gurkha battalions was not only instrumental in carrying out the "Great Landing" but also indispensable in taking the campaign to a successful conclusion.

THE SWEET ARRIVAL OF PEACE

The year 1917 began with the talk of peace by Germany, which was a promising sign; but like 1915 it ended with a premature hope. It brought no end to the war but only trials and sufferings beyond the stretch of imagination. However, a futurist could detect the loss of the vitality of the previous years. The Central Powers were sha-

101. Francis Tucker, *The Story of the Gurkhas*, *op. cit.*, p. 196; also *The Times*, *The Times History of the War*, Vol. VI., Chapter XCVIII, pp. 81-120 also "The Spirit of Anzac" of the same Vol. pp. 121-160.

ken: Austria-Hungary was weakening as the nationalities within its territories were agitating for more power and Germany, in her last effort to keep the fuel of war burning, had drafted all men between the age of 15 to 65 for the combat duties. The year 1918 saw the war entering into its fourth and final year. With the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March and that of Bukharest in May, Russia and Romania both withdraw from the war.¹⁰² However, it was on November 11, 1918 the Germans surrendered to the Allies on the condition that peace would be concluded on the basis of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. But, infact, "the armistice" was an unconditional surrender by the Germans.

The armistice brought a mixed reaction round the world. Tears of joy, chaos and confusion and hopes for law and order were its basic traits. To most of mankind the end of the war brought more a sigh of relief than happiness. Not only in duration but also in the devastation it caused, both in terms of men, money and resources, it was unprecedented.¹⁰³ On November 12, 1918 thanksgiving was held in the cathedral in London and was attended by George V himself. The news of surrender of Germany reached Kathmandu three days later. The day was November 14, 1918; and was held with the greatest delight. The city wore a gay aspect that day and in the evening there was a general illumination followed by big bonfires till the next night on the four heights of Kathmandu Valley-Phulchoki, Chanda Giri, Shivapuri and Nagarkot-to proclaim to the people far and wide that a complete victory

102. William H. Chamberlain, *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1918 : From The Overthrow of the Czar to the Assumption of the Power by the Bolsheviks* Vol. I (New York : The Universal Library, 1965), pp. 389-427; C.D.M. Kettleby, *A History of Modern Times, From 1789* (London : George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1961), pp. 436-37.

103. The duration of the war was unprecedented. It is to be noted that the past European wars like the Franco-German War lasted a little more than six weeks. See C. Delisle Burns, *1918-1928 : A History of the World* (London : Victor Gollanez, 1928), pp. 13-14.

had been achieved. To commemorate the happy occasion a Victory Salute of 10 guns were fired from all the artillery stations throughout the country. All the Government offices of the state were also closed to rejoice on the occasion.¹⁰⁴

A week later a parade of two brigade of troops was held in the Tundikhel and the British Resident S. F. Bayley and his wife were present to honor the occasion. In his speech *Maharaja* Chandra expressed his happiness over the fact that the gigantic war that had been raging in full fury over the past four years had been happily concluded in complete victory for the Allied cause. He was, however, candid enough to admit that his unflinching devotion to the Allied cause did bring adverse criticisms in the country. But the sacred cause of peace proved to be potent enough to overcome all obstacles and prejudices.¹⁰⁵ *Maharaja* took this occasion to announce his five point concession to the soldiers of the Nepalese contingent returning home.

1. Accumulated leave of the soldiers during the past four and a half years would be combined with the next leave and given to all the units of the Nepalese contingent.

104. See a letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to S.F. Bayley, Nov. 15, 1918; *Maharaja* to the Viceroy of India and the C-in-C of India, Nov. 15, 1918; from *Maharaja* to George V, King of England, Nov. 15, 1918. E. No. 2, *Basta* No. 61, File No U 14, 1975/1919.

105. *The Glasgow Herald* of January 16, 1919 commenting on "A Fair off Victory Echo" makes a very pertinent remark, which runs. "To an Oriental mind, however, matter of simple sentiments often appeal with an uncommon force. That an entirely independent state, which once fought tooth and nail, should in the last few years of stress has come out eagerly and manfully to our aid is an incident which in the West might perhaps be construed in one or two different ways. But in the East the motive of Nepal will generally be comprehended and the British prestige will suffer no detriment-- further the reverse--by accepting the reality proffered and substantial assistance."

2. Permission would be given to those, who due to the pressing necessity at home, seek a premature retirement.
3. Remission of sentences would be given to all those undergoing punishment for misconduct in connection with recruiting work undertaken by the local people or the supply of troops to the British army or through the Gurkha recruiter.
4. Free pardons would be given to deserters of the Nepalese contingent, and release those undergoing punishment for desertion, and also those who had received an advance sum to join the recruiting station but failed to do so or are yet absconding including the release from obligation to return the advanced sum.
5. Instructions had been sent to all the local officials to take care of the families of those who had been killed, disabled or rendered destitute without means of subsistence.¹⁰⁶

A *feu-de-joi* was then fired by the troops and amidst a boom of salutes the Nepalese and the English national anthems were sung. With this the victory celebration ended—an occasion, which in the words of the *Maharaja*, “Nepal had never experienced”.¹⁰⁷

This, however, served only as a prelude to the carnival atmosphere that enveloped this Himalayan state when the Treaty of Peace was signed between the Entente and the Central Powers on June 28, 1919.¹⁰⁸ Nepal declared July 19

106. See the speech of the *Maharaja* during the Victory Celebrations in Nepal, Nov. 21, 1918. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 10 1975/1918, also *Glasgow Herald* January 16, 1919, p. 4, *Englishman* November 30, 1918, p. 1.

107. Speech of the *Maharaja*, Nov. 21, 1918 *op. cit.*, p. 6.

108. The British Resident W.F.T.O.’ Connor rushed to communicate the news of the signing of the Treaty to the *Maharaja* and in a fit of emotions asserted “As I have no guns I cannot fire a salute but I think that it might interest you to know what is being done elsewhere.” Soon the frenzy that had seized his mind faded away and he made this prophetic remark “well ! the war is over. It remains to be seen how long the peace will last !!” See a letter from W.F. T.O’ Connor to *Maharaja* June 30, 1919, E. No. 2, *Basta* No. 6, File No. U 14, 1975/1919.

as a public holiday for feasting and merrymaking. The *Maharaja* and the Nepalese dignitaries also attended the garden party held within the premises of the Residency on nineteenth.¹⁰⁹

Homecoming of the Nepalese Contingent

The talk of the return of the Nepalese contingent was on the air as early as the beginning of 1918; thus the Nepalese Commander-in-Chief, General Bhim Shumsher, asked the *Raj Guru* to make arrangements so that the soldiers returning home would be given their pay and home leave within a few days of their arrival.¹¹⁰ By the close of December 1918 details of the proposal relating to the conditions of the return of the men of the Nepalese contingent were drafted by the Government of Nepal and sent to General Baber in India.¹¹¹ Then by August 1919 all arrangements for the return of the Nepalese contingent were completed.¹¹² While these preparations for the departure of the Nepalese contingent were taking place a farewell review of the Nepalese contingent was organized

109. From the Resident to the *Maharaja* July 11, 1919; from *Maharaja* to the Resident July 11, 1919; Viceroy of India to *Maharaja*, Nov. 15, 1920. *Ibid.*

110. See a the model of procedure to be followed when the Nepalese contingent arrives. A letter from Bhim Shumsher to Pandit Hem Raj Pandey Magh 20, 1975 (Feb. 1919), Book No. 191, p. 34; also a proposal relating to the arrival of the Nepalese troops contained in a letter from Pandit Hem Raj Pandey to Baber Shumsher, Marga, 18, 1975, (Dec. 1918); from Baber to Pandit Hem Raj Aug. 20, 1919 Book No. 191, MAN. See also a letter from W.F.T.O' Connor to *Maharaja*, August 28, 1919; From *Maharaja* to Resident, August 23, 1919; From Lord Chelmsford to King Tribhuvan, Feb. 19, 1919; trans. of a *Kharita* from King Tribhuvan to Viceroy, Feb. 19, 1919; from W.F.T.O' Connor to *Maharaja*, August 23, 1919, E. N.o 2, *Poka* No. 63, *Kha*, File No. 8, 1976/1919.

111. A letter from Pandit Hem Raj Pandey to Baber Shumsher, Marga 18, 1975 (Dec. 1918), Book No. 191, MAN.

112. It included the provision of a special train, accompanied by a British officer, with their meals, resting places and transport carriers enroute from India to Nepal.

in India on February 5, 1918. The Viceroy in his farewell speech besides announcing honors went ahead to shower his praise upon the Gurkha battalions of the Nepalese contingent. His speech in part ran

Of her share in this triumph India may be well proud and no section of the Indian army has contributed to it in greater measure than the Gurkh battalions. In France, in Mesopotamia, in Egypt, in Palestine and Salonika your fellow countrymen have covered themselves with glory and worthily maintained the high fighting tradition of their race. During this time your contingent has filled an useful role in forming a part of the garrison, which it has been necessary to maintain for the security of India and has also had the opportunity..... of being detailed in the operations in Waziristan on the North West Frontier in 1917.¹¹³

Earlier on January 18, 1919 an interesting ceremony took place in the Robert Pavilion of Umballa, where the Indian residents gave a farewell to General Tej Shumsher. It was in this ceremony Major General G. E. Hendly gave to the Nepalese General a handsome silver cup on behalf of the Indian residents.¹¹⁴

It was by February 1919, the regiments of the Nepalese contingent began to arrive in Kathmandu. The capital city took a festive color. As arches and national flags greeted them from Thankot to Tundikhel, the people also poured in thousands to welcome their brave war heroes. On Falgun 22, 1975 (March 1919) a welcome ceremony was held in Tundikhel to honor the contingent that had arrived. By 1 p.m. all the three brigades and the three generals who accompanied them had assembled in the parade ground.¹¹⁵ The Maharaja in his welcome speech recalled that during

113. Farewell speech of Lord Chelmsford, Viceroy of India, Feb. 7, 1919, pp. 5-6; also a letter from the Viceroy to the Maharaja, Feb. 19, 1919, E. No. 2, Poka No. 63, File No. 8, 1970/1919.

114. *Pioneer*, February 6, 1919, p. 5.

115. See Book No. 201, 1975/1918, MAN. For more on the schedule of the arrival of the Nepalese contingent see a letter from Baber Shumsher to the Maharaja, Magh 10, 1975 (January 1919).

the past four years the Nepalese contingent had won "golden opinions" at home and abroad. His speech in part ran

The regiments fought like true heroes and immortalized the name 'Gurkha' at various theatres of war. The tales of their glorious deeds finds a sympathetic echo in our hearts..... Generals, officers and men, I congratulate you on the successful termination of your arduous duties and thank you for the loyalty and perseverance with which you have discharged them. It is not possible to thank you all individually, I therefore say to you 'bravo, welldone !' we are proud of you. 116

IMPACT OF WAR ON NEPAL

The Great war that was initially popular and even blessed by writers gave rise to bitter disillusionment and despair. Apart from the colossal destruction of men and materials, it knocked the basic foundation of international economy and questioned the very nucleus of the Western political values. In fact, from economic and political perspective nothing remained the same after the war. The economic sphere: the market economy, on which the nineteenth century civilization rested, gave way to planning, regulations and controls both in "socialist" and "capitalist" societies. In the capitalist world the Keynesian School emerged which advocated "statism" not socialism. The Western political framework also met a severe blow with the collapse of liberal beliefs in secular progress and reaction against democracy. The breakdown was further accentuated by the immediate death of the old society which the Bolsheviki, the Nazis and the Facists loved to talk about. While viewed in this perspective their was little that was beautiful or useful about the victory celebrations, that rang in the capitals round the world. The best one can say about them is that if they were interesting, amusing and relatively harmless on one side

116. Welcome speech of the *Maharaja*, Falgun 22, 1975 (March 1919). E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 8, 1976/1919; also *Pioneer* March 19, 1919, p. 4. The Premier in his speech decided to recognize their services through a scheme of promotions, increase in pay and distribution of 200, 5000 rupees among them according to their rank.

then on the other they were even hollow, gaudy, irritating and superflous.

It is true that the Great War did certify the collapse of the old order in countries like Russia.¹¹⁷ However, the changes in Nepal were not so profound, yet, the post-war Nepal was not the same as the prewar Nepal. In fact, Nepal also could not remain indifferent to the vast changes that were taking place in the social, political and administrative structures of South Asia. The Great War did help to break the veil of Nepalese conservatism in more than one way. The *Maharaja* later recalled how difficult it was to take the country into the international conflict in these words

The strain in our country has been great : many difficulties had to be overcome, sceptics to be convinced, falterers to be disheartened, bias and prejudices to be satisfied and customs and organization upheld. ¹¹⁸

However, the decision to enter into the Great War did give birth to a nucleus of opposition within the Royal Court. This group, though small, was important enough to receive the attention of the *Maharaja* at the victory celebration. Bowing to the strength of the opposition the Premier remarked

To those who happened to differ from my views in some of my works, as I hope were few, I take this opportunity to say that in all these I have been accentuated by the highest motive of the ultimate and lasting good to the country. ¹¹⁹

117. More on the impact of the World War I on the European society and intellect see Karl Polani, *The Great Transformation : The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times* (Boston : Beacon Press, 1957), pp. 130-249; Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society, 1750-1950* (New York : Harper and Row, 1958), pp. 265-355; Ronald Stomberg, *European Intellectual History Since 1789* (New York Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 192-223; W. Warren Wagar, *Science Faith and Man* (New York : Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 109-222.

118. Speech of the *Maharaja*, Nov 21, 1918, *op. cit.*, footnote No. 106.

119. *Ibid.*

War and the Nepalese Society

The Nepalese society, the very bastion of social conservatism, had to yield to more liberal principles when 200,000 Gurkhas (one fourth of her fighting population) had to be mobilized for combat operations overseas. It was, thus, imperative to relax the caste rules so the age old institution of *panipaty* went through a process of change and transformation. The very decision to permit the Gurkhas to fight overseas was a violation of the Hindu concept of casteism and purity. The ancient Hindu concept of pollution had prohibited the Hindus from traveling overseas. However, in case of urgent necessity a person who went abroad had to go through a special *shuddhi* ceremony—the *panipatya*. The *shuddhi* ceremony became all the more important when tens of thousands of Gurkha troops had to go abroad for active service.¹²⁰ In consultation with Their Holiness the *Raj Guru* (Royal Preceptor) and the Chief Priest and the other learned pandits, the Government of Nepal took two steps to facilitate the mobility of the Nepalese troops overseas. First, the Government of India was asked to make arrangements so that the Gurkha troops could observe their caste rules during their stay overseas: whether in hospitals, convalescent home, transport depot or in prison camps.¹²¹ Accordingly, each Gurkha was to bring with him a document of *patia* from the Adjutant General of India, which certified that he had observed the regulation of caste during his time of

120. Nepal was very particular in defining the term "active service". Thus, the Nepalese Premier refused to grant *panipatya* for Man Bahadur Gurung and his attendants who wanted to go to England for the treatment of his wounded jaw in the North West Frontier. In short, from the Nepalese perspective the act of going to England did not constitute "active service". See a letter from Secretary of the Government of India to Resident Colonel Kennion May 11, 1920; from *Maharaja* to Colonel Kennion, May 23, 1920. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65 *Kha*.

121. A letter from Resident J. Manners Smith to *Maharjaa* Chandra April 12, 1915; from *Maharaja* to the Resident, April 13, 1915, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65 *Ka*, File No. 1, 1971/1915.

service abroad.¹²² The *patia* was to be given immediately upon arrival otherwise men would be ostracized by their fellow countrymen. Originally Bombay was selected to be the ideal site for the granting of *patia*; but later on due to problems associated with accommodation Dehra Dun was chosen instead.¹²³ Secondly, a *pandit* was to be stationed by His Holiness the *Raj Guru* to perform the *praischit* ceremony.¹²⁴ However, the contents of the *patia* show that it served only as a face saving device for the soldiers. The British Resident J. Manners Smith did not hide this fact even in the initial stages of the war. To quote

Regarding the certificate asked for, it is quite impossible to certify that no man had broken his caste but will have a certificate to the effect that every facility has been given during the voyage, at the front and in the hospital. ¹²⁵

-
122. The certificate of *Patia* issued by the Adjutant General of India
ran

This is to certify that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of India has satisfied himself that the information available from every conceivable source, that every precaution is being and will be taken by all concerned so as to enable the Gurkha soldiers of the Indian army, who having been or who are at present or who may be in future on active service beyond the sea in connection with the present war, whenever situated to keep their caste rules and religious observation.

See the certificate of *Patia*, Superintendent Government Printing Press. *Measures Taken to Ensure the Keeping of Castes of Gurkha Soldiers on the Active Service in the War of 1914-15, op. cit., footnote No. 80, p. 1.*

123. See abstract of conversation between *Maharaja* Chandra and the Resident J. Manners Smith, recorded in Nepali, Jan. 20, 1915, trans. mine; from *Maharaja* to the Resident, Feb. 12, 1915; also from Resident to *Maharaja*, Feb. 22, 1915, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65, *Ka* File No. 1, 1971/1915.
124. *Praischit* is an act of self-redemption from sins either by the ritualistic ceremony of *gaudan* (gift of a cow to a learned Brahman) or some form of self-torture, the degree of which was to be determined by the gravity of their sins. For more on *praischit* and *shuddhi* see Prem Raman Uprety, *Religion and Politics in the Punjab in the 1920's* (New Delhi : Sterling Publishers, 1980), pp. 72-82.
125. From Resident J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja* Chandra , Feb. 22, 1915, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65, *Ka*, File No. 1, 1971/1915.

Thus, the elaborate arrangements made by the *Maharaja* in collaboration with the *Raj Guru* and the British Government on the issue of *patia* proved to be of doubtful utility. As early as October 1914 the British and the Indian press made comments on the laxity of the Gurkha food habits and caste observances in the front. To be more specific, the *Western Morning News* did not hesitate to point out that the popularity of the Gurkha soldiers in the front with Tommy Atkins was not only due to their jovial manners but also in their laxity of caste and religious customs.¹²⁶ The Government of India did take pains to convince the public both in India and Britain that such press statements were false.¹²⁷ However, the fact remained that the Gurkhas were compelled by the environment to relax their caste rules and religious ethics during their combat duties in the West. So adverse were the conditions in the West the *Raja Guru* had himself permitted the Gurkha soldiers the eating of the flesh of the long-tailed sheep, which was a prohibited item in Nepal.¹²⁸

Therefore the Gurkha soldier, who returned home after his active service abroad could not be same in thought, opinion and intellect. Whether he lived among his friends and relatives in Kathmandu or the countryside he was bound to be a spark for the liberalization of the social ethos and values. Ofcourse, the Gurkha association of India was more vocal in the liberalization of Nepalese society. It also vocied for the proper recognition of the Nepalese contingent who were returning with laurels after the Waziristan campaign.¹²⁹ The return of 200,000 of Gurkha

126. *Western Morning News*, February 11, 1915, p. 6; also a letter from J. Manners Smith, to *Maharaja* Chandra, October 23, 1914, *Basta* No. 63, File No. *Ka*.

127. From Resident to *Maharaja*, *Ibid*.

128. A letter titled "Supply of the Mutton to the Gurkhas", from *Maharaja* Chandra, to Resident J. Manners Smith, October 26, 1915; also conversation between *Maharaja* Chandra and Resident Smith Jan. 20, 1915, *op. cit.*, footnote No. 123

129. From J.W. Lowrie, President, Gurkha Association, to Marichi Man Singh, Private Secretary to the *Maharaja*, March 14, 1917, E. No. 2 *Poka* No. 82, File No. *Go*, 25 *Ka*; also from J.W. Lowrie to Major Gambir Jung Thapa, Military Secretary to General Baber Shumsher, July 27, 1917, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 6, 1974/1917.

soldiers from their active service in the West, after the termination of the Great War served as a catalyst for the liberalization of the Nepalese social order.

It was the liberal environment generated by the return of the soldiers that encouraged *Maharaja* Chandra to end two major social evils prevalent in the Nepalese society, namely, the slavery and the *sati* system. The first evil to be ended was the *sati* system. It was difficult to legislate against it for it had religious sanctions. Burning of the widows alive was widespread; and it belonged to higher castes of the Nepalese society. It was passionately believed to be a way to heavenly beatitude. It was on July 8, 1920 (Ashad 25, 1977) the *sati* system was declared to be illegal in Nepal.¹³⁰ The ending of this evil paved the way for the legislation against slavery on April 13, 1925.¹³¹ The Gurkhas in India made further attempts to simplify and even morally prohibit the unhealthy customs in Nepal. Accordingly, one of the resolutions passed by the Gorkha League in December 1927 prohibited the serving of alcoholic beverages during socio-religious ceremonies like *annaprasana* (rice-feeding ceremony), *barkhi* (mourning ceremony), *tehrwin* (thirteenth day of bereavement), *yajnapavita* (sacred thread-wearing symbolizing the entry into the world of social and religious responsibility) and *bibaha* (marriage.) Any one breaking the rule was to be deemed liable to social punishment, which could lead to ostracization of the defaulter from the community.¹³²

130. Government of Nepal, *Jyanmaroko Muluki Ain* (Laws Relating to Murder) (Kathmandu : Naxal Bhagavati Press, 1927), pp. 50-52.

131. *Gorkhapatra*, "Dasatwa Mochan" (Emancipation of Slaves) August 20, 1926 p. 3; *Pioneer* "The Nepalese Slaves Emancipated", August 29, 1926 p. 8; *Indian Social Reformer*, September 4, 1926, p. 4; *The Times of India* August 30, 1926, p. 1.

132. See the Resolutions of the Gorkha League passed on the Third Anniversary on December 26/27, 1927 in Dehradun. The resolution is attached to the letter of the editor of the *Gorkha Sansar* to Marichi Man Singh the Private Secretary of the *Maharaja*, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 45, File No. *Ka*.

The War and Nepalese Economy

The war demanded the greatest sacrifice from the peasant population of the hills for Nepal then and still is predominantly an agricultural country. The Government took from them 200,000 sons which was equivalent to one fourth of her fighting population.¹³³ The figure, however, does not include the recruits Nepal supplied for non-combatant roles in the Indian police force and private companies. As the pressure on recruitment mounted the Government of Nepal was compelled to ban the recruitment of the Nepalese in other sectors except the Indian military and the police. As the war dragged on, the peasants found difficult to show their increased fields due to the acute shortage of manpower. By the end of 1915 even the middle class peasants began to experience the stress and strain in agriculture. As the war rolled on with relentless fury and intensity, about one fourth of her adult population either perished, crippled or maimed for life. The result was that during the war years many acres of land lay fallow due to the want of hands.¹³⁴ Though the exact statistics are not available, yet, frequent references show that agriculture declined during the war years. But the peasants did produce enough food to keep the nation going. It is, thus, easy to imagine why the unprecedented human drain made the

133. See a letter from General M.N. Birdwood, Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Imperial Force to *Maharaja Chandra*, Feb. 3, 1919. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 1, *Kha*, 1970/1914; Speech of W. F. T. O' Connor during the signing ceremony of the Treaty Between Britain and Nepal, *Gorkhapatra*, Poush 9, 1980 (December 1923); *The Prince and The Press*, April 6, 1919, p. 6.

134. An undated memorandum of the Annual Presents, E. No. 1, *Basta* No. 2, 1978/1922; see also a copy of memorandum on recruitment handed by Marichi Man to Resident, May 10, 1918, E. No. 2 *Poka* No. 66, *Kha*. File No. 6, 1974/1919, from *Maharaja* to Resident J. Manners Smith May 15, 1916, *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*, File No. 4; Also a report from Col. Bhuvan Bikram Rana to *Maharaja*, Shrawan 10, *roj* 7. 1971 (July 1915).

whole process of recruitment unpopular inspite of inducements like gratuity and concessions.¹³⁵

The loss of manpower due to the process of excessive recruitment led to a decline of the labor force thereby leading to the inflation of wages which in some cases shot up to 50%. The *Maharaja* lamented over the undecided fate of the national economy and the extreme hardship of the people.¹³⁶ The inflationary wages had a direct proportionate impact on the prices of the commodities. In the pre-war period it was possible to make a living with three to five rupees a month. But after the war as prices of cereals and other commodities soared up it was not possible to do so. Thus, the Nepalese Premier was compelled to revise pay scale of the army and the civilian staff of the Government. To cope with inflation of commodities in Kathmandu Valley and the adjoining regions, the Nepalese Premier decided to link Kathmandu with the Nepalese Terai with a ropeway and a train route. By the close of 1920's both these means of transport were completed with the technical cooperation of the Government of India.¹³⁷

The decline of the agricultural production had an inversely proportionate effect on the customary trade between Nepal and India. It was reported that the trade in cloth, which Julahas of Tanda in Fyzabad district of the United Provinces, conducted with the Bhotias of Nepal, had fallen considerably. The report explicitly pointed out that the Bhotias, who came in large numbers to purchase colored and plain cloth were not seen.¹³⁸

135. From *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, May 15, 1916. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66, *Kha* File No. 4.

136. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to S.F. Bayley, Nov. 13, 1917. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66, *Kha*, File No. 5, 1973/1916.

137. More on the Railway and the Ropeway see letters from Resident W.F.T.O Connor to *Maharaja* Chandra, Jan. 5, 1918; from *Maharaja* to the Resident June 9, 1929; from R.S. Under Hill to *Maharaja*, Jan. 3, 1928. E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 40, *Kha*, File No. 141.

138. A letter from Resident to *Maharaja*, Dec. 4, 1915, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66, *Kha*, File No. 4.

It is true that the bestowing of 15,141 British War Medals, 2,979¹³⁹ Victory Medals and 1,475 Afghan Medals together with the bestowing of three K. C. I. E. and one K .C. I. S. may have brought some consolation. Yet the joy that accompanied it was too shortlived to overcome the tears and sufferings the war-veterans brought with them to their peaceful hamlets for more than a generation.¹⁴⁰

The War and Political Awakening in Nepal

The Great War did have twofold effect in the political development in Nepal. This is discernable both in the domestic and the diplomatic front. In the domestic front the Rana oligarchy was able to roll its engine of proscription with such vigour and intensity that even the faintest hope of the secularization of the Nepalese polity was buried. But the secularization of the Nepalese society received a definite breakthrough with the establishment of higher institutions of learning and the ending of the social evils like the *sati* and the slavery, during the post-war decade. While in the international arena Nepal's status was elevated in the community of nations. The result being Britain recognized her full independence and the League of Nations asked her to attend the international conference to be held on slavery.

1. The Politics of Proscription Versus Secularism

Nepal, though a stronghold of conservatism could not remain isolated from the political developments in South Asia during the postwar period, which was characterized by "mass-politicization" and terrorist agita-

139. See E. No 2, *Poka* No 68, File No 11,1921

140. See a letter from Resident W.F.T.O'Connor to *Maharaja* Chandra, January 8, 1919, January 8, 1920; also from *Maharaja* to the Resident January 18, 1919, November 23, 1920, E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 40, File No. 191; also Book No. 189 subtitled "Jangi Bandobasta Grantha Ratna Mala" No. 30, pp. 41-43; *The Times of India*, February 7, 1919, p. 5; *The Pioneer*, January 18, 1919, p. 1.

tions.¹⁴¹ It is true that the *Maharaja* as early as 1919 expressed in his letter to the Viceroy of India that his country had no faith in Bolshevism, communism and civil disobedience for they only brought chaos and confusion.¹⁴² Yet, as the fear of these movements crossing the border into Nepal always haunted his mind, the Nepalese Premier took every precaution to seal his country from such "subversive movements." He took a number of steps to check the impact of such movements in Nepal.

He first of all rolled the ruthless engine of proscription on all the English and vernacular newspapers coming from India to the Nepalese subscribers. As early as 1915 the Government of Nepal had already censured 14 vernacular newspapers at the Residency post office at Kathmandu. All this was done in full cooperation with the Director General of the post office of India and the British Residency in Kathmandu.¹⁴³ J. Manners Smith in consultation with the Director General of

141. More on political agitation in South Asia during the war period see *Sedition Committee : 1918, Report* (Calcutta : Government of India, 1919, pp. 15-21, 31-34; also John R. McLane, *The Political Awakening in India* (New Jersey ; Prentice Hall, 1970), pp. 51-97.

142. A letter from *Maharaja Chandra* to the Viceroy of India, quoted by L.E. Hunt "The Road to Kathmandu", *Statesman* (Nepal Supplement). April 4, 1937, p. 3.

143. The English newspapers that were proscribed by the Government of Nepal were : *The Pioneer* (Allahabad), *The Englishman* (Calcutta), *The Statesman* (Calcutta), *The Indian Daily News* (Calcutta), *The Amrit Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), *The Morning Post* (Delhi), *The Indian Messenger* (Calcutta), *The Leader* (Allahabad), The vernacular newspapers which felt the sythe of proscription were; *Bharat Mitra* (Calcutta), *Calcutta Samachar* (Calcutta), *Sajibani* (Calcutta), *Bhangabasi* (Calcutta), *Beukateswari* (Bombay), *Jai Mitra* (Bombay), *Narad* (Chapru), *Gorkha Khabar* (Darjeeling), *Karuna Kshetri Hitaise* (Chaur), *Chitra Maya Jagat* (Poona), *Oudh Akhabar* (Lucknow), *Zamindar* (Lucknow), *The Vakil* (Amritsar), and *Hamdard* (Delhi).

The politics of proscription brought a total eclipse or "a blackout" of news in Kathmandu for the *Gorkhapatra* the weekly organ of the Government gave only that information which the rulers wanted the people to hear. However, in spite of the intensity of the use of the engine of proscription some newspapers like *Hamdard*, *The Vakil*, *The Zamindar* and the *Amritbazar Patrika* did find their way to the Nepalese subscribers, through undetected channels. See File No. 3, 1971/1915 entitled "Newspapers censored by Nepal Government in 1915", E. No. 2, Poka No. 65 Ka, 1971/1915.

India cooperated in the censorship of news coming to Nepal, either in the form of letters or in the shape of newsprints to non-Residency members, by handing them over to the Government of Nepal.¹⁴⁴ The mechanism devised, though complicated, was interesting and flexible enough to be implemented in a workable manner. The fourfold instructions issued by the British Resident to the Residency sub-post master on March 20, 1915, gives a glimpse of the procedure involved in the implementation of the engine of proscription. To quote

- a. With effect from March 25, 1915 you will cease to distribute through the postmen or to deliver direct to persons who are not members of the Residency establishment living within the Residency limits, with the exception of letters sent to *Kharidar Bijayaman Singh*.
- b. All such letters and papers after being sorted out should be handed over to the Nepalese state officials who will be nominated for the purpose. You should obtain a receipt daily for the letters and papers handed to such officials.
- c. All registered and insured cover-parcels addressed to Nepalese public should be examined by you as at present; but you should personally examine such cases and if they contain newspapers, books, pamphlets and press cuttings you should bring them to my notice before delivering them to the addressee.
- d. The object of the above is to establish censorship in regards to news from extraneous sources reaching Nepalese public.¹⁴⁵ However, despite the above instructions many Indian newspapers did find their way in the hands of the Nepalese public. The *Maharaja*, thus, had

144. A letter from J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja Chandra*, March 22, 1915, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65 *Ka*, File No. 3, 1971/1915.

145. See a copy of instruction issued by the Resident J. Manners Smith to the Sub-post Master, British Residency Post Office, March 25, 1915. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65. *Ka*.

no option but to issue a notice to the subscribers of the papers to cease acquiring such papers; and ask the Residency post office to be more alert in the use of the censorship. The official letter of the *Maharaja*, besides revealing how ineffective were his efforts to clamp down the flow of news into the nation's capital, is interesting and amusing in its nature, style and content. This important letter in part ran

I understand that copies of *Citra Maya Jagat* and other papers are sent to many people even without asking and they are being continued although the men to whom these are being sent do not like to have them. So it seems that the best course to be followed is to refuse the copies as soon as they arrive in Residency Post Office. As regards *The Anurit Bazar Patrika* I do not have a list of Nepalese subscribers. Please inform me from the Post office the men who get this paper. 146

Secondly, on the diplomatic front the *Maharaja* promised to come forward with all his might if the internal peace of India was threatened by militant subversive mobs like the Bolsheviks, Communists and the so-called "nonviolent agitators".¹⁴⁷ The *Maharaja's* calculations were simple, sure and down-to-earth, namely, the peaceful and tranquil British India was in the best interest of the Rana oligarchy in Nepal.

Though the politics of proscription was more or less effective in sealing the state of Nepal from liberal views and seditious literature from India, yet, the Nepalese Premier was compelled to face a problem from another direction. He feared, and perhaps rightly so, that a dozen of Nepalese students studying in Calcutta could imbibe the spirit of the time and turn out to be staunch Communists, Bolsheviks and Gandhites. The *Maharaja* attempted to tackle this problem in four different ways. First, a Bengali

146. From *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith June 4, 1915. See the Register of Letters titled "Envoy", March 14, 1915 to September 1916.

147. Letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to the Viceroy of India, *op. cit.*, Footnote No. 142.

named Birendra Nath Ghosh¹⁴⁸ was employed by the Nepalese Premier to study the movements of the Nepalese studying in Calcutta. Second, since Calcutta was the very hub of political agitation and seditious propoganda, the *Maharaja* in a memo asked the Resident to find through the Criminal Investigation Department of Calcutta the extent to which the Nepalese students in Calcutta had drunk from the cup of "mischievous doctrines".¹⁴⁹ However, Federick Halliday, the Chief Commissioner of Police in Calcutta, could not detect anything against the Nepalese students. But on December 16, 1920 Federick Halliday did send to the Government of Nepal a list of 26 newspapers which advocated seditious views, and in consequence the official support of the Government of India was withdrawn.¹⁵⁰ Third, in 1918 the Nepalese Premier inaugurated

-
148. Shri Birendra Nath Ghosh, a liberian-clerk by proeffsion in Bengal, was also on the payrole of the Nepalese Commander-in-Chief, Bhim Shumsher. See a letter from Federick Halliday, Chief Commisioner of Police, Calcutta, to J. Manners Smith, June 27, 1914, in a file titled "Purana Meshil haru". FMAN.
149. The names of the eleven students listed by the *Maharaja* in his Official memo were : Keshar Jung Thapa (Medical College). Jit Nar Singh Rana (Bangabasi College), P.M. Sarvota, B.Sc. (Law Student in Metropolitan College), Shiva Pratap Thapa, Nain Bahadur Karki, Raif Prasad Shai, Yog Man Vaidya, Devi Prasad Adhikari, Bishnu Man Dikshit Acharya, Narahari Man Singh. See the memo for persual for J. Manners Smith, Resident, Nepal, April 6, 1914; also from J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja*, July 2, 1914. *Ibid*.
150. The 26 newspapres that were listed by Halliday were; *Amrit Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), *Hindustan* (Calcutta), *Hindustan* (Bomaby), *Muhamedi* (Calcutta), *Bombay Chronicles* (Bombay), *Hindu* (Madras), *Praja Mitra* and *Parasi* (Bombay), *Nayak* (Calcutta), *Viswamitra* (Calcutta), *Sanji Bartaman* (Bombay), *Sainik Basumati* (Calcutta), *Hatavadi* (Calcutta), *Swadeshi Mitram* (Madras), *The Independent* (Allahbad), *The Search Light* (Patna), *Young India* (Ahmedabad), *Maharatta* (Poona), *The Democrat*, (Allahabad,) *The Zamindrar* (Lahore). *The Desh* (Lahore) *Bande Mataram* (Lahore), *Abhaya Daya* (Allahabad), *The Vakil* (Amritsar), *The Haquiquat* (Lucknow), *The Hindustani* (Lucknow). See a letter from Chief Commisioner, of Police, Delhi to Resident W.F.T.O'Connor, December 11, 1920. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65, *Ka*, File No. 3, 1919.

a liberal Arts College in Kathmandu, with the basic objective to check the exposer of the Nepalese youths from the seditious ideas that flowed so freely in the centers of learning of India.¹⁵¹, and lastly restrictions were imposed upon the Nepalese on foreign travels to receive higher education, for medical treatment and even for the purposes of trade and commerce. The resolution passed by the Gorkha League in its Third Anniversary held on December 26/27, 1927 has very well publicized the detrimental impact of such gross restrictions in the life of Nepalese society and polity. The resolution of the Gorkha League pertaining to the advocacy of self improvement through foreign travels, including overseas, in part ran

The League is of the opinion that the restrictions imposed on the freedom of the Gurkhas in connection with foreign travels for the purpose of education, discharge of duty, commerce and trade, medical treatment, as well as for the sake of change and travel in general is detrimental to the progress of the community and is merely a ramification of medieval narrow minded dogmatism ¹⁵².

The resolution of the League, though social in its nature did have political overtones for it directly challenged the policies of the Nepalese Premier, which persistently aimed in keeping the Nepalese mute and dumb or in other words the League felt that the denial of their exposer to the outside world did compell the Nepalese to live in their little tortoise-shell of traditional conservatism. The foundation of the Gorkha League in December 1924 in Darjeeling can, thus, be taken as a positive step in the growth of political awakening among the Nepalese at home and abroad. The extent to which the Government of Nepal feared the

151. For more on the inauguration of Tri-Chandra College in Kathmandu see Political Secret Letter from India Vol. 87, Reg. No. 293; also *External Collection*, 21-18. Reg. 855/1930, NAI.

152. See the resolutions of *The Gorkha League* passed on the Third Anniversary of All India Gorkha League held on December 26/27, 1927 held in Dehra Dun, Contained in a letter from editor *Gurkha Sansar* to Marichi Man, Private Secretary to the *Maharaja*, June 4, 1928. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 45, *Ka*.

contamination of the Nepalese society and polity by foreign exposer is perhaps nowhere better manifested than in the refusal of Nepal to participate in the International Convention on Slavery organized by the League of Nations in February 1926. The reasons given by the *Maharaja* for not attending the Convention, though odd and irritating is at the same time interesting and amusing. In summary, his logic ran as follows

It is with no small satisfaction that my Government took these achievements (that is the abolition of slavery with compensation) and considers that under these circumstances there appears to be no necessity for Nepal for joining the conference of these nations among whom these hated institutions and abominable practises still linger. 153

2. The Elevation of Nepal's Political Status

The war years proved in more than one way very conducive to the elevation of Nepal's status in the international arena. Germany in an effort to woo Nepal's cooperation on the side of the Central Powers gave to the King of Nepal the *badsahi* title of His Majesty (*Maharajadhiraja*).¹⁵⁴ The unexpected imperial title of His Majesty from the German Chancellor during the Great War served as a catalyst for Nepal to claim such recognition from the

153. From the British Minister H. Wilkinson to *Maharaja* Chandra, February 10, 1926; From *Maharaja* to Minister February 10, 1926. See the *Poka* entitled "Membership in the United Nations", 1948; also *Tribune*, February 20, 1926. p. 6.

154. Previously the Prime Minister of Nepal was addressed by the British as High Highness and the King as the *Maharaja*. The new German title of His Majesty (*Maharajadhiraja*) was, indeed, a breakthrough in the recognition of her independent status among the nations of the world. See the English trans. of a letter from the German Chancellor, Bethmann Holweg to *Maharajadhiraja*, Prithvi Bir Bikram Shah. It is undated but was delivered to the British Resident in Kathmandu by *Maharaja* Chandra on Jan. 1, 1917. The letter was handed to the *Maharaja* by Teja Singh, an emissary of *Raja* Mahindra Pratap, the famous Indian Revolutionary. See also an undated letter (1916) from *Raja* Mahindra Pratap to *Maharajadhiraja*, Prithivi Bir Bikram Shah E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 55.

British. The Nepalese Premier in September 1920 asked the British Government in India to address the King of Nepal as His Majesty and the Premier as His Highness in all official communications.¹⁵⁵ The British Government could do nothing than to accept the proposition of the Nepalese for these titles were already in vogue in the official communications between Nepal and Germany.¹⁵⁶

Another interesting development during the early war years was the request by the Government of Nepal to the British Government of India to stop the use of the expression "Durbar" for Government in official communication between the two Governments. The reason was that the term "Durbar" was used to denote the Government of the Native States and Nepal was by no means a native state.¹⁵⁷ The *Maharaja* did not hesitate to give his reasons at length, which in part ran

I had to introduce this matter because the idea which is gaining ground here that this country may gradually lose its distinctive character from the said Native States and the *Bhardars* and the people here press it persistently on me. That it is better to avoid the use of expressions which might cast reflection on the position of the country. ¹⁵⁸

155. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to British Envoy R.L. Kennion September 6, 1920, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 68, File No. 4 *Ka*, 1973/1916.

156. A letter from N. Cater, Foreign Political Department to Envoy R. L. Kennion, October 26, 1920; also an extract from a diary of Austa Man Singh, Sept. 29, 1920, *Ibid*.

157. The Imperial Gazetteers of 1907 apparently mistakenly listed Nepal as a Native State. Though the Government of India regretted over the inclusion of Nepal, yet, the damage was done and the wound, it inflicted in the minds of the Nepalese was difficult to heal. See His Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council, *The Imperial Gazetteers of India* Vol. IV (Administrative) (Oxford : Henry Frowde, 1907), pp. 58-103; *Foreign Secret E. Proceedings* No. 693 of July 1911 "Status of Nepal in Relation with British Government", p. 2, NAI.

158. See an official Memo *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith August 7, 1916; also an abstract of conversation between the *Maharaja* and the Resident, Sept. 6, 1916. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 68 File No. 4 *Ka*, 1973/1916.

The British Government was, however, reluctant to make any changes in the status of Nepal during the war years, nor was Nepal in any position to push forth her claim before Britain. But in the post-war decade Britain was compelled to revise the Treaty of 1816 by a more publicized Treaty of Friendship between Nepal and Britain of 1923.¹⁵⁹ The Treaty, which was signed on December 21, 1923, gave the "unequivocal" British recognition of Nepal's independence. The treaty on the negative side was marked by a conspicuous absence of the humiliating clauses (six and seven) of the Treaty of 1816 between Nepal and the East India Company. This new image Nepal was able to project to the world was undoubtedly a positive impact of the war in Nepal. Britain, which was unable to give any territorial reward to Nepal for her services in the war like in 1857 decided to elevate her status in the international community of nations by recognizing her as a sovereign independent country.

Physical Impact of the War

The physical scars of the war were not only the most visible but most shocking and gruesome aspect of the war. The war exercised a heavy toll on Nepal. Among 2,00,000 Gurkhas who were mobilized for war services during the Great War more than 24,000 were killed, wounded or missing in action.¹⁶⁰ As early as October 1914 the Gurkhas were already grounded in their trenches in France to relieve the last British survivors at Lys. Here the casualties for the

159. For more on the Treaty of Sagauli of 1816 and the Treaty of Friendship of 1923 see Parliamentary Papers Relating to East Indian Affairs No. 6 of 1917 XI (Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on Jan. 31 1817), IOL. For a full text of the Treaty of 1923 as well as the speeches made by W.F.T.O'Connor during the signing ceremony in Kathmandu see E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 1; also *Gorkhapatra*, Poush 9, 1980 (December 24, 1923) pp. 3-7

160. Speech of Colonel W.F.T.O'Connor during the signing ceremony of the Treaty of Friendship between Nepal and Great Britain in December 1923. *Gorkhapatra*, Poush 9, 1980 (December 24, 1923), p.5.

Gurkhas were extremely high. Many platoons completely disappeared and many regiments were left with only few survivors. The reason is not far to perceive. The Gurkhas were hopelessly outnumbered in numerical strength and weapons. Instances were very frequent when a Gurkha platoon with two machine-guns had to engage the German counterpart with thirty two machine-guns supplemented with poisonous bomb shells.¹⁶¹ In a little more than a month after assuming combat roles in Europe, the *Naval and Military Gazettee* of January 1915 asserts that 457 Gurkhas were killed in action.¹⁶² The figure of the wounded ran much higher. Soon the Gurkha soldiers began to fill the hospitals of the United Kingdom, France and India. The general procedure followed in the case of the wounded was as follows.¹⁶³ Those who were slightly wounded were kept in the Netby hospital in England or those in France. While those who could not resume their combat operations after recovery were sent to the hospitals in India and ultimately despatched to Nepal. Thus, the first batch of the invalidated Gurkhas began to arrive in Nepal by the middle of January 1916 to tell the tales of utter devastation of a modern warfare.¹⁶⁴ The sight of Gurkha patients in hospitals of India was almost a nightmare. The report of General Baber Shumsher to his father written after inspecting a military hospital in India where the

161. This is a statement made by an invalidated Gurkha soldier during the inspection tour of General Baber at a military hospital in India. Major Nickle, who accompanied the General, accepted the statement with a blush and went on to say "now we have raised the number of machine-guns. See a report of General Baber to *Maharaja Chandra*, Chaitra 12, 1971 (March 1915), Book No. 200, subtitled "Jangi Bandobasta Granth Ratna Mala" No. 33. MAN.

162. The first 47 Gurkhas who perished in the European front belonged to Second Gurkha Rifles (34), Third Gurkha Rifles (5), Eighth Gurkha Rifles (4), Ninth Gurkha Rifles (4). This was the figure up to Nov. 25, 1915. See *Broad Arrow : The Naval and Military Gazettee*, Jan. 29, 1915.

163. *Ibid.*

164. From W.E. Bunbury, Quarter Master General, India, to General Baber Shumsher Jan. 15, 1916, *Ibid.*

wounded Gurkhas were kept may be taken as illustrative. In his inspection tour General Baber talked with 117 wounded Gurkhas. The frost-bite had claimed toes and fingers of many. The faces of many more were disfigured due the losses of noses and eyeballs. In one case the bullet had entered the mouth and escaped through the chin; while another had his forehead so badly demaged that both the eyeballs were protruding out like that of an unearthly creature. The most pathetic sight was probably that of one Gurkha who was moaning with incessant pain resulting from a broken back. He had been buried in a trench and dug up only after five days. After the tour General Baber was almost petrified and wrote "how could life linger on such desperate souls?"¹⁶⁵ The possible impact of the sight of such horrors on young recruits was carefully scrutinized. Thus, the original plan of sending the invalidated Gurkhas to the Gurkha training camp of Dehra Dun was abandoned.¹⁶⁶ General Baber was the first to make this important suggestion.

I would not like the idea of bringing together a good number of maimed, incapacitated men at a place like Dehra Dun, where new recruits may be always coming in. I am quite afraid that the sights of such horrors of war soon after their arrival in India might create an undesirable impression in the mind of the raw men. First impressions are said to be lasting impression .¹⁶⁷

The transportation of the incapacitated Gurkhas posed a problem to the Government of Nepal for they could not be despatched between March 7 to November 25 due to the malaria season in the Terai.¹⁶⁸ However, as early as October 1915 the *Maharaja* issued a five point instruction to his son

165. A Report from General Baber to *Maharaja*, Chaitra 12, 1971 (March 1915). *Ibid.*

166. See Memorandum prepared by the Army Head Quarters, India, March 11, 1916. *Ibid.*

167. From General Baber to General C. Roe. May 14, 1916. *Ibid.*

168. A letter from General W.E. Bunbury to General Baber Shumsher Jan. 15, 1916; also from Bunbury to Baber, Feb. 3, 1916. *Ibid.*

General Baber Shumsher so as to facilitate the movement of the arrival of the Gurkha invalids in Nepal.

1. A list containing specific information about the nearest relative of the incapacitated soldier, railway station nearest to Nepal border they would be handed over was to be sent, a month in advance so as to permit the Government of Nepal to send Nepalese officials to make arrangements for their conveyance.
2. The Government of Nepal was prepared to send a conveyance to railway stations within two miles of the Nepalese border. But if the distance was more than two miles the conveyance for transportation of the wounded Gurkhas should be made by the Government of India.
3. It is desirable for the sake of convenience to send them in small batches.
4. The state would bear the entire cost of travels and per diem expenses—their daily allowance of ¼ rupees they could use as their pocket money.
5. The men should be sent before the malaria season, that is, March 7, 1916.¹⁶⁹

As soon as the frost-bitten soldiers arrived in Kathmandu, the *Maharaja* in an effort to alleviate the sufferings of the Gurkha soldiers in the European front sent 5,000 maunds of cardamoms, 43,280 pounds of tea and 8,122 *pakhis* mountain blankets and 200 jackets.¹⁷⁰ Besides so as to cheer up the wounded soldiers in the hospitals of Europe he sent to each patient one pound of sweets, tea and a box

169. The instructions issued by the *Maharaja* is contained in a letter from General Baber to the Quarter Master General in India. October 26, 1915. *Ibid.*

170. See a letter from *Maharaja* to Resident J. Manners Smith, Dec. 10, 1915; from Resident to *Maharaja* Jan. 11, 1915, *Basta* No. 64, *Mesheil* No. 213, File No. A 62, 1914-1915; also from Chandra to J. Manners Smith, Dec. 13, 1914; from *Maharaja* to Resident, Dec. 12, 1914, *Basta* No. 64.

of cigarettes and his own potrait with the following message.

The Gurkhas now in the field are very dear to me. I am touched to the inner most depth of my heart, when I read about their cheerfulness triumphing over suffering and their undying spirit of courage and devotion. I with all their countrymen am proud of them for the devotion with which they are serving the Empire of which their country is an ally. ¹⁷¹

The Aftermath

Nepal without any obligation offered her services "from the last man to the last mohar",¹⁷² thus, setting forth a perfect model of friendship between the adherents of different religious and cultural traditions. The British Government decided to honor and perpetuate the memory of those who were killed in action or maimed for life in two ways: creating war memorials and offering gratuity to solidiers of the Gurkha regiment as well as those of the Nepalese contingent.

a. Creation of Memorials

As early as 1917 the War Cabinet had approved the construction of a National Memorial of the war in London. Among other, it decided to establish a museum to commemorate the war in London. The Government of India also announced the creation of a war memorial on April 10, 1918.¹⁷³ A special committee was formed under General Woodyatt, with the commanding officers of the Gurkha stations in the Punjab, Dehra Dun, Abbotabad, Burma, England and the United Provinces, to set up fitting memorials for the Gurkha.¹⁷⁴ It

171. See "War Notes", *Pioneer* June 3, 1915, p. 13; also a 21 page document compiled under the title "Nepal and the Great War", p. 15, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 10, 1918.

172. Perceval Landon, *Nepal* Vol. II. *op. cit.*, footnote No. 69 p. 145.

173. Government of India, *The India War Memorial* (Simla : Government Central Press, 1918), pp. 1-5.

174. *Morning Post*, September 1, 1920, p. 12, *Pioneer*, September 4, 1920, p. 8.

was in January 1928 a memorial for the Gurkhas who died with bravery and courage in France, India and North Africa was opened in Gorakhpore, the major recruiting center for the Gurkhas during the war.¹⁷⁵ Two years before, that is in September 1926, King Tribhuvan inaugurated a military hospital in Kathmandu as a memorial for those who had sacrificed their lives in the Great War.¹⁷⁶ The Nepalese Premier extolled in his speech the services of those brave Nepalese patriots who went out on their own accord to uphold the principles of right and justice. He was further confident that the edifice would remain a visible lasting monument to those departed brave souls; yet, at the same time cautioned his fellow countrymen of its inadequacy in these inspiring lines:

Such men do not stand in need of memorials : they raised their own monuments in their own lifetime and with their own hands even in the scene of their heroic martyrdom. The truest and noblest memorial to them would be to raise temples in their honour in the depths of our hearts and to dedicate our lives in the worship of those ideals that are found in them and shone out so brilliantly in their most glorious hour. ¹⁷⁷

b. Awarding of War Gratuity

The Government of India in an effort to reward the services of the Nepalese troops decided to award the war

175. The Commander-in-Chief of India, while inaugurating the memorial asserted that this stood as a glowing tribute to the principle that "it is better to die than to be a coward". See E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 35, File No. 92, 1927.

176. The military hospital in Kathmandu was constructed with a sum of three hundred thousands. It had 69 beds among which 12 were cabins for officers and the rest were beds for the rank and file members. On the top of the mansion could be distinctly seen a statue of a Gurkha soldier executed in the bronze, which symbolized the very spirit of the edifice. See *The Times of India*, September 17, 1926; p. 1; *Amritbazar Patrika*, September 18, 1926, p. 1; *Leader*, September 19, 1926, p. 1; also Perceval Landon, *Nepal*, Vol. II. *op. cit.*, p. 184.

177. For the speech of the Maharaja, see *Pioneer* September 17, 1926 pp. 1, 13-14; *Amritbazar Patrika*, September 17, 1926, p. 1.

gratuity to the officers and followers of the Nepalese contingent in the same way as in 1857. The Government of India in the beginning decided to divide the Nepalese contingent into three categories for the purposes of disbursing the war gratuity: Class I, Class II, and Class III consisting of senior officers, junior officers and followers respectively.¹⁷⁸ The Government of Nepal rejected the above proposal for it offered a gratuity of 50 to 60 rupees to high officers like the commanding colonel of the Nepalese army. This trifling sum of war gratuity was the same as that given to the Risalla Subedar of the Indian army. Since this would create a very unfavorable feeling in the Nepalese army the *Maharaja* asked the senior officers of the Nepalese army to be excluded from the list of the recipients of the war gratuity.¹⁷⁹ The Government of India, aware of such complexities decided to offer a sum of four hundred thousand rupees for the distribution among the troops of the Nepalese army. Nepal Government was more than happy to accept such an arrangement.¹⁸⁰

The question of war gratuity to the officials and the followers of the Nepalese army became a very touchy affair, thus, became a subject of endless correspondences between the two Governments for three years. The reason is obvious. Nepal, which was prepared to make any sacrifice at the altar of friendship, could be very stubborn and uncompromising when her national honor was at a stake. It was the Army Instruction of India No. 689 of 1919 that was responsible for this hitch. The British Government soon realized what had been pricking the Nepalese mind, thus, backed away from previous position to terms most favourable for Nepal.

178. A letter from Resident O'Connor to the *Maharaja*, Dec. 11, 1919; From Asst. Envoy to *Maharaja*, Dec. 7, 1926, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 11. 1976/1919.

179. From *Maharaja* to Envoy W.F.T.O'Connor, May 29, 1922, *Ibid.* For the Army Instruction No. 689 of 1919 of August 12, 1919 see E. No. 2. *Poka* No. 63, 1976/1919

180. From Envoy O'Connor to *Maharaja*, August 1, 1922; also *Maharaja* to Envoy August 20, 1922. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63. *Ibid.*

PART II : B
SMALL NEPAL GOES BIG IN
WORLD WAR I : WAR EFFORTS AT HOME

Nepal & the Great War: A National Mobilization In Difficult Times

Preface

It would be proper to open this section with Nepal's war aims. It is difficult to determine with an element of precision the specific war aims of Nepal for they are not spelled out in any documents. However, they can be reconstructed from the scattered references, interpretations of, themes and issues that shaped and guided the path and momentum of Anglo-Nepalese relations during the war and the post-war periods. Her war aims can be neatly categorized into two parts: immediate and remote.

1. Immediate War Aims

The immediate war aims of Nepal were simple, honest and precise. Nepal, being outside the pale of the Native States of the subcontinent and being so far removed from the actual theater of the conflict could have remained aloof from it if she had really wanted. But she was there in the very hub of the conflict from the first hour to the last. Thus, contributed every bit of her resource from the last man to the last *mohar*.¹ It is impossible to fathom into the reason why Nepal was so deeply committed to this imperial cause. A contemporary local chronicler observes that it was the "deliberate disregard of the principles of justice and freedom by Germany" that compelled Nepal to join in the

1. A *mohar* is a Nepalese monetary unit denoting fifty *Paisa* or half a rupee.

conflict.² But what sustained her zeal and energy throughout the conflict was the code of Hindu chivalry, namely, to pull a friend out of a deep mire is the greatest *dharma* (righteousness). In short, the twin principles of peace and justice as well as the fulfilment of the duties associated with friendship were the immediate war aims of Nepal in the Great War. The *Maharaja* took the opportunity to highlight the latter aspect of the war aims in his farewell speech to the first batch of the Nepalese contingent going out for general service in India. His speech in part ran

The reason why we are sending you to India is that our friend England, with whom we have been associated for so long, has asked for our help in distress (*har guhar*) in this Great War that is blowing with relentless fury and intensity over the European continent. If we cannot extend our hands of friendship at this hour the English will say that Nepal only gave lipservice to the friendship with Britain. When we needed their help they only stared at us or in other words they were least useful when we needed them most.³

2. Remote War Aims

Though the immediate war aims of Nepal in the Great War were simple and easily understandable; yet, the remote ones were more difficult to perceive or panned down for discussion. However, a careful scrutiny of the Nepalese documents reveals that Nepal was moved by two specific factors in her generous, wholehearted cooperation with Britain in the Great War.

a. Territorial Reward

The loss of one third of her territory during the nineteenth century came as a rude shock to Nepal, from which

2. Perceval Landon, *Nepal* Vol. II. (Kathmandu : Ratna Pustak, 1976 (reprint), p. 139.

3. See the Nepalese text of the speech of the *Maharaja* of Nepal before the first batch of the Nepalese contingent about to leave for India for garrison duty, March 1, 1915 (Falgun 18, *roj* 2, 1971). E. No. 2 *Poka* No. 63 File No. 3, 1971/1915. The trans. from Nepali to English is mine.

she never fully recovered. Since then Nepal adopted the peaceful strategy of cultivating an intimate bond of friendship with Britain with the hope of recovering the territories she had ceded during the unfortunate conflict with the East India Company. The peaceful strategy did manifest itself in manifold features like provision of a permanent source of Gurkha recruits for the British army in India and unconditional assistance in the form of men, material and other resources during moments of war and internal crisis in the subcontinent. In 1857 when the Indians revolted against the *Raj*, Nepal was the only ally in South Asia which came to aid the British. Britain was happy to honor the Nepalese cooperation during the Indian Revolt of 1857 by giving back a portion of territory she had ceded during the Anglo-Nepal war. This territorial cession by the British on November 1, 1860 had roused the expectations of the Nepalese for further territorial rewards by continuing the spirit of friendship and cooperation with the British. The idea of territorial reward was working fully in the mind of *Maharaja* Chandra when he decided to cast his lot on the side of the British during the Great War. It was this hope that was responsible for her unstinted cooperation for the Allied cause during the four traumatic years of the war. Even before the din of the battle had ceased to play its warnotes in Europe and the Afro-Asian fronts the talks were already set in motion on the type and nature of honors and rewards Britain was to bestow upon Nepal for her services in the war. As early as August 1917 the British Government sought Nepal's opinion on the way she would like to be rewarded for the cooperation during the war.⁴ The Nepalese Premier, though delighted by this offer, felt that the question of rewards involved issues of such national importance that he could not give an offhand reply. The issue had to be discussed with military and civilian

4. From *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident S.F. Bayley, August 1, 1916, also August 16, 1917 p. 2, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 68, File No. 5, 1974/1915.

officials of the state. The matter was of such national concern the *Maharaja* decided to summon the *Bhardari Sahba* (Council of Nobility). It is difficult to pinpoint the day of the meeting of the Council; but by August 16, 1917 the *Maharaja* was in a position to communicate the views of the *Sahba* to the Government of India. The *Maharaja* summed up the gist of the proceedings in these words:

They express their uneasiness at the bestowing of honours, which they fear might more or less usurp the place for material benefits of the country. That being so, the present proposal as intimated by you to confer fresh honours in recognition of services of the Nepalese troops in India and Waziristan would if accepted surely go to largely increase their doubts and apprehensions; and thus still enhance the delicacy of my position because of my inability to ally with their misgivings..... Under these circumstances and in these admittedly hard times it would be neither wise or prudent to ignore such pronounced views. I regret very much to what I have to say that I am compelled to adopt the only course left to me, namely, of asking your goodself to kindly represent to the Government of India what has made it inadvisable to accept the very kind proposal.⁵

A distinctive feature of the proceedings of this council is that it met in absolute secrecy. Each participant before he entered the hall was compelled to take an oath that he would not reveal the discussions of the council without the command of the Premier. The penalty for violating the oath was a severe one. The punishment on the physical side was that the defaulter would be inflicted with the *pancha mahapatak* (five incurable diseases). Besides his entire family wou'd loose the grace of his family diety (*istadevata*). The questions posed to the council were also sent to General Baber Shumsher, attached to the Army Head Quarters in India and two other Generals in the front-Tej Shumsher and Padma Shumsher-with similar instructions of absolute secrecy. To be more specific, they were asked not to keep

5. From *Maharaja Chandra* to Resident S.F. Bayley, August 16, 1917.
Ibid.

the copies of the answer and tear the letter as soon as they receive it.⁶

Even towards the close of 1918 Nepal had not come openly in favor with the concept of territorial rewards in official communications though it was the central theme of discussion during the private conversations between the Resident and the *Maharaja*. She, however, made it known to the Government of India that Nepal would like to focus the British attention in two fronts. First, Nepal was always keen in maintaining a very close working relationship with the British. The second was the difficulty Nepal faced in spelling out in a tangible way the nature of British appreciation for her services in the Great War. The Nepalese Premier further went on to say that as regards the type of tangible reward "it is for the giver to say and not for the receiver to ask."⁷ He delicately posed the dilemma he was palced in these words.

It is possible that if I were to say something, I may happen to ask what the British Government may not find convenient to give. On the other hand, I might as well happen to be asking for what may appear too little in the eyes of the public here. So that I shall run the risk of displeasing either one or perhaps both.⁸

By 1920, the question of territorial reward of Nepal came up for discussion between the Government of India and Nepal. In substance the talks centered on the cession of Semey-sur range from the boundary pillar to the Great Gandak river. This move, in fact, consisted of moving the boundary pillar to Champaran, which constituted the possessions of

6. See a letter in Nepali from *Maharaja* Chandra to his son General Baber Shumsher, Simla, Bhadra 16, 1974 (September 1917), E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66, File No. 5, 1974.1917. The letter was, however, not destroyed but preserved by the General for the future posterity.

7 See a note of a talk between *Maharaja* Chandra and Resident W.F.T.O' Connor, Dec. 15, 1918, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 68, File No. 7, 1975/1918.

8. *Ibid.*

the *Raja* of Bettiah and Ram Nagar.⁹ The Indian press, however, raised a hue and cry over the question of territorial reward to Nepal as after the Indian Revolt of 1857. It was the *Englishman* that took the lead in this direction. It advised the Government of India not to take a rash decision without consulting the military opinion, for to cede territory would be surrendering a fortress that now safeguards the British frontier. Besides it questioned the propriety of the territorial cession to Nepal after 1857. The paper further reminded the Government that instead of taking steps to undo its past mistakes it is rather moving ahead to make the same mistake again.¹⁰

The impact of the press in the minds of the Indian intelligentsia was significant enough for the British Government in India to come forward with a prompt denial. The Government of India went ahead to point out that "there is no truth whatsoever in the report that have appeared in the press that any cession of territory to Nepal is contemplated for discussion."¹¹ The public opinion that climaxed in 1920 helped the British Government to replace the concept of territorial reward by the principle of the annual present. A letter from the Viceroy of India to the *Maharaja* of August 1920 did help to break the ice by revealing the unconditional offer of the annual present of 10,000,000 rupees in perpetuity for her services in the Great War. However, in the letter Lord Chelmsford took pains to soothe the Nepalese sentiments by making a note of the fact that

In making this offer the Government of India have not been unmindful of the precedent set on the conclusion of the Mutiny Campaign, when full lands were restored

-
9. *The Englishman*, "Gurkha Reward- Large Grant of Territory", January 9, 1920, p. 1.
10. It further argues that "had there been a telegraph between India and London (in 1857) the treaty would not have been ratified, but in the end the matter had gone too far for interference." *Englishman* January 9, 1920, p. 1.
11. The denial of the Government of India came on January 10, 1920. See *Englishman* January 12, 13, 1920, p. 1.

to Nepal. In the present instance, however, it is clearly impossible that reward should take the form of restoration of territory previously ceded and the Government of India are therefore offering monetary present as the best available substitute in the circumstances.¹²

The letter of the Viceroy came as a bombshell to unnerve the psychology of the Nepalese administration; yet she was left with no options but to accept the unconditional offer of the annual present. But she did pull herself together and asked for the ammendment of certain phrases, words and lines in the text of the annual present. For example "loyal cooperation" was to be replaced by "spontaneous valuable cooperation" "the prosperity of the state of Nepal" by "prosperity of the Kingdom of Nepal", and finally the paragraph relating to the subsistence of the friendly relations between the two Governments was superflous, for it had he appearance of conditions attached to it.¹³ The Government of India went along with the changes in the phrases suggested by Nepal except the omission of the above paragraph. It was the exchange of a letter between the Viceroy and King Tribhuvan of Nepal that made the British offer of the annual present a fact in the life of the two countries and Nepal, though reluctant, went along with it.¹⁴

The annual present became a subject of endless correspondence between the two Governments for three decades. Throughout this period of controversy Nepal's stand was clear and consistent. Her energy in this period was directed in two directions.

12. A letter form Lord Chelmsford to *Maharaja Chandra*, August (?) 1920. E. No. 1, *Basta* No. 2, 1976/1919.

13. Nepal's views on the letter were contained in a letter from *Maharaja* to W.F.T.O' Connor, September 8, 1920, E. No. 1, *Basta* No. 2, 1976/1919.

14. A letter from Resident O'Connor to *Maharaja Chandra*, October 16, 1920; a letter from Viceroy Lord Chelmsford to King Tribhuvan Dec. 22, 1920. E. No. 1, *Basta* No. 2, 1976/1919.

i. Continued Quest for Territory: A Hope Against Hopes

Though the decade of the 1920's came to a close a hope still lingered in the Nepalese mind that the quest for territory was a valid proposition. An undated memorandum on the subject of the annual present of 1927 talks about the "indefensible" nature of the land grant and goes ahead to point out that "the hope of land grant has not left us yet."¹⁵ The same spirit is seen in a note of November 1928 that was handed over to the British Resident by the *Maharaja*. The note in short ran

The public opinion here still hold that on the border marching for more than 600 miles with the British territory enough land territory, forest or otherwise to represent the the approximate value of the money present can be picked up in one or more places. Whatever criticism there might be on it that would be once only and could be met with an answer that is only in keeping with the precedent.¹⁶

If in Kathmandu the *Maharaja* continued to pressure the British Envoy with the concept of territorial reward, while in India the *Maharaja* was using the services of Perceval Landon to present the Nepalese view point in the matter. But the Viceroy made it clear that he was not in a position to entertain the idea of the cession of territory for "the time had passed."¹⁷

ii. Capitalization of the Annual Present

It did not take long for Nepal to realize that the quest for territory was only a little more than a pious aspiration, thus, devoted all her remaining energy in the capitalization of the annual present. Nepal had accepted the

15. See an undated "Memorandum on the Subject Relating to the Subject of the Annual Present in Nepal". It was prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs. E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 35. File No. 92, 1927.

16. See "A Note on Capitalization" handed over to the British Envoy by the *Maharaja*, Nov. 5 1928, E. No. 1, *Basta* No. 2, 1978/1922.

17. See Conversation between the Viceroy Reading and Perceval Landon narrated by Landon in his letter to the *Maharaja* from London of July 14, 1924. *Ibid.*

concept of the annual present with extreme reluctance but with the lapse of time the principle became increasingly vulnerable. Less than a month after the announcement of the concept of the annual present the Indian press had already begun to attack the premise of the thesis. A Mukherjee argued that the annual subsidy besides being a "perpetual drain" to the Indian treasury also led to the "mortgaging of the interests of the future generation." He further argued that if Nepal sent her troops to India it was for her own self-preservation; and since they were paid well the question of giving them an annual subsidy at the cost of the starving millions does not arise. Thus, the question of subsidy must be knocked down once and for all.¹⁸ Bipin Chandra Pal, the Indian revolutionary, while commenting on the question of the annual present calls the Nepalese the "uncivilized Kafirs" brought for the purpose of terrorizing the Indian people.¹⁹

The concept of the annual present also became a subject of heated debate in the Public Accounts Committee in the Legislative Assembly, so much so that the Finance Member was put into an embarrassing position.²⁰ The comments in the legislature, the press and the pulpit confirmed the Nepalese apprehension that the annual present would one day be mistaken for the annual subsidy. Her apprehension proved true for even the Government of India in an official communication referred to the annual present

18. The Indians were also cautioned by the speaker "to be aware of Nepalese Hengist and the Afghan Horsa", See A. Mukherjee, "Subsidy Policy", *Englishman*, Feb. 10, 1920, p. 6.

19. See the speech of Bipin Chandra Pal, *The Englishman*, August 19, 1920, p. 6; *Statsman*, August 19, 1920, p. 8.

20. When Colonel Gidncy raised the question of the propriety of the annual present of 10,00,000 to Nepal the Finance Member shelved the whole issue by asserting that the Public Committee should devote its precious time only in the irregularity brought to notice by the Auditor General and the Accountant General. Despite, this official appeal the House did debate the issue of the Annual Present in full camera. See *Legislative Asembly Debate*, August 24, 1928, NAI; Also *Pioneer*, August 25, 1928, p. 1.

as subsidy.²¹ It is true that the British Government was compelled to expunge the word subsidy from the official records of the Foreign and Political Department, yet, it did reveal, at least from the Nepalese perspective, how fragile was the whole structure of the annual present that had been meticulously devised by the British.²² Nepal, thus, in an effort to avoid future controversy and criticism profounded the hypothesis of the capitalization of the annual present.

In short the capitalization of the annual present consisted of the holding of the amount in the form of securities endorsed to the Government of Nepal yielding an interest of rupees 10,00,000, every year clear of tax in the present or the future. These securities could be held as stocks with a certificate granted in the usual way, and in the interest efaced for payment to Kathmandu treasury or elsewhere as may be convenient. The procedure envisioned, in all probability, was taking it out either in the form of paper currency reserve or from the Government balances of 3½% G. P. notes or enough face value yielding by the way of interest the sum of 10,00,000 rupees.²³ The *Maharaja* sincerely hoped that "the capitalized sum would be as sacred as the transfer of an equivalent territory."²⁴ He therefore decided to use the formal and informal channels of communication to represent Nepalese views to the Government of India. The *Maharaja* chose Perceval Landon to form the informal channel of communication between him and the Viceroy of India. Landon placed before the Viceroy with faithful fidelity and sincerity the Nepalese

21. See a telegram quoted by Resident O'Connor in his letter to *Maharaja* Chandra, Dec. 31, 1921, *Basta* No. 1. *Meshil* No. 2, 1978/1921.

22. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident O'Connor, Jan. 2, 1922; also from Resident to the *Maharaja* Jan, 4. 1922, Feb. 25, 1922. *Ibid.*

23. See a Memorandum handed to the British Envoy at Singha Durbar by the Nepalese Premier, August 3, 1922, E. No. 1. *Basta*, No. 2, 1978/1922.

24. See a letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Perceval Landon, July 24, 1924 E. No. 1 *Basta* No. 2, 1978/1922.

hypothesis on the capitalization of the annual present. The Viceroy though did listen to the Nepalese logic with interest and curiosity, yet, could not swallow the Nepalese argument that capitalization provided greater security than the annual present. With India in the British Empire, the Governor General argued that the concept of the annual present was sound and secure. He further pointed out that even Independent India had to live by the commitment, thus, repudiation of the annual present was unthinkable.²⁵ The *Maharaja* also used the official channel of communication through the British envoy H. Wilkinson to represent the issue of capitalization before the Viceroy. The envoy was quick to respond and his note to the Viceroy of India of August 1924 is significant. The note in part ran

I would be most grateful if the British Government would reconsider the possibility of capitalization of the annual present; and should the proposal be unfortunately negatived devise some means of making the payment without discussion or dispute despite the change in the constitution of the Government of India.²⁶

However, all efforts of Nepal both through the official and unofficial channels bore no fruit. The Government of India communicated her decision with regrets. The principle reason behind such a stand was that the capitalized value of the annual payment would have to be shown as an item of expenditure to the Legislative Assembly, while the annual present fell outside the preview of the national legislature of India. This decision was crucial and the question of the capitalization of the annual present was shelved for more than two decades. The *Maharaja* found this to be a bitter pill to swallow and in his hope against

25. A record of verbatim conversation between Perceval Landon and Lord Reading, the Viceroy of India, contained in a letter from Landon to the *Maharaja*, July 4, 1922. E. No. 1, *Basta* No. 2, 1978/1922.

26. A confidential note prepared by the Envoy to be submitted to the Viceroy of India on August 2, 1924. E. No. 2 *Basta* No. 2, 1978/1922.

hopes tried to find some comfort by asserting that he "would not let the topic rest until it is fairly and fully considered."²⁷ He then handed a note with this content to the British Envoy. But the Envoy to this dismay and disgust noted

The question has been thoroughly discussed before. I do not think that it is hopeful, I will however send it to the Government of India.²⁸

However, by the close of the year 1928 the Government of India agreed to take an amount of 3½% paper from paper currency reserve or holding an account balance sufficient to produce an income of 10,00,000 a year. This paper was to be replaced in the paper currency reserve by ad hoc Treasury Bill, that is paid in advance from the Government of India's resources. The course proposed would increase the expenditure of the Government of India for 15 years by 11,00,000.²⁹ But this proposal was never carried out, for it did not receive the approval of the Secretary for State for India in London.

The issue of capitalization again entered into a rejuvenated phase after the World War II. The question how Nepal was to be rewarded for her 5½ years of service in the war again took a live character. On this occasion the British Government decided to raise annual present of Nepal from 10,00,000 to 20,00,000 and capitalized 50% of the enhanced annual present for hydro-electricity and the industrialization of Nepal.³⁰ In order to achieve this objective the Government of India was prepared to make

27. From the Government of India Foreign Political Department to the British Envoy, June 13, 1924; also from W.F.T.O'Connor to the *Maharaja* Feb. 26, 1925, E. No. 2, *Basta* No. 2, 1978/1922; also from Chandra to O'Connor, Feb., 26, 1925.

28. See a note handed over by the *Maharaja* during a conversation with the British Envoy on Dec. 15, 1927 and also the extracts of conversation. E. No. 1, *Basta* No. 2, 1978/1922.

29. A note handed over to Suba Austa Man by the British Envoy, October 29, 1928. E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 2.

30. A letter from G.A. Falconer to *Maharaja* Joodha, Nov. 12, 1945, E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 2, File No. 821, 2003/1946; also a letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Lord Patrick Lawrence, October 8, 1945, E. No. 4, *Poka* No. 162, File No. 766, 2002/1945.

an immediate annual gift of rupees 2½ crores³¹ as the capitalized value of 10,00,000.³² Nepal in the beginning objected to the condition that the capitalized sum was to be used for the development of industrialization and water-power. The reason given by the *Maharaja* was that the Nepalese people being as sentimental as the French would "howl at us".³³ However, later Nepal went along by the British proposition of the use of the capitalized amount in industrialization; and by July 25, 1946 the Accountant General of Bengal had remitted to the Imperial Bank of Calcutta that capitalized sum of 2½ crores.³⁴ The Independent India also did honor the payment of the present of 10,00,000 rupees to Nepal. A study of the primary sources indicate that Nepal was a recipient of the annual present of 10,00,000 rupees from the Republic of India till 1959.³⁵

b. A Search for a Place in the World

Her second war aim was to obtain a wider recognition of her independent sovereign status in the world. It is true that Nepal's quest for territorial award after World War I was dashed to the ground, yet, she did come to occupy a more elevated status in the international community of nations. Britain, which had not hesitated to categorize Nepal as one of the Native States in the Gazetters of India of 1907, was prepared to sign the Treaty of

31. A crore is a Nepalese monetary unit denoting 10 million rupees.

32. A letter from G.A. Falconer to *Maharaja* Joodha, April 27, 1946 E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 2, File No. 821, 2003/1946.

33. See the abstract of conversation between the British Minister G.A. Falconer and *Maharaja* Padma Shumsher, accompanied by General Krishna Shumsher, April 19, 1946. *Ibid.*

34. From Minister G.A. Falconer to *Maharaja* Padma July 25, 1946; More on capitalization see "Notes on Second World War", E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 2, File No. *do* entitled "Dosro Ladai ma dieko Maddat Haru" (The Help Nepal Gave During the Second World War), 1946.

35. A letter from Nepalese Ambassador Daman Shumsher to GI, Jan. 5, 1959; also from Indian Ambassador B.K. Gokhale to D.R. Regmi, Foreign Minister, March 9, 1959; from D.R. Regmi to B.K. Gokhale *Mach* 10, 1959

Friendship with Nepal in 1923 on equal footing. Accordingly, both the countries agreed to acknowledge and respect each other's independence, both internal and external.³⁶ Britain also decided to address the King of Nepal as His Majesty and placed a Minister at the Court of Nepal. It was, in fact, her services in the war that enabled her to project the new image in the world. Thus, the League of Nations asked her to join the International Convention on Slavery.

The analysis of the war aims, both immediate and remote, hopefully constitutes a favorable backdrop for the scrutiny of Nepal's war efforts at home, which were as important as the Nepalese war efforts abroad. This will be discussed under three headings: Supply of Recruits, Liberal Donations, and the Frustration of the German Intrigues in Nepal.

Anatomy of Recruitment: 1914-1918

Nepal always had a surplus of manpower, which she funneled into two directions throughout history. The greater bulk of manpower was used for the purpose of transportation of goods across the Himalayas in the Trans-Himalayan trade, while a part of it found its outlet in the army both at home and abroad.³⁷ The story of the Nepalese joining as mercenaries in foreign armies goes back to the nineteenth century when the Nepalese hill

36. See the Article 1 of the Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and Nepal on Dec. 21, 1923. *Gorkhapatra*, Poush 9, 1980 (Dec. 24, 1923); The Nepalese version of the treaty is contained in E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 1.

37. More on the concept of surplus manpower in Nepal see *Proceedings of the Select Committee*, Jan. 16, to Feb. 28, 1775 in George W. Forrest (ed.) *Selection of Letters Despatches and Others State Papers Preserved in the Foreign Department of the Government of India, 1772-1785* Vol. 1, (Calcutta : Superintendent Government Printing, 1892), pp. 251-53, 1073-74; Also Prem R. Uprety, *Nepal-Tibet Relations, 1850-1930 : Years of Hopes, Challenges and Frustrations* (Kathmandu : Puga Nara, 1980), pp. 23-24.

men took the military services of the Punjabi Monarch Rajit Singh, in Lahore.³⁸ Recruitment, however, became a building block in the foreign policy of Nepal after the termination of the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1816. It is true that the Nepalese were defeated by the British by their superiority in firearms and numbers; yet, it was the absolute courage and heroism of the adversary that conquered the British hearts. Since then it became the official policy of the Government of India to recruit the Gurkhas in the British army. The formulation of the Second and the Third Gurkha Rifles dates to this period. The other Gurkha battalions including the Second Battalion were raised later on. In fact, the Second Battalion was raised in 1887 and in the process of metamorphosis became the Thirty Ninth Regiment of the Bengal Infantry in 1890 only to turn into the Thirty Ninth Gurkha Rifles in 1901. By 1914 there were twenty Gurkha Battalions (10 Regiments) in the Indian army. Each Gurkha Battalion consisted of 16 British officers, eight Gurkha officers and 800 riflemen. The total combatant and non-combatant troops in the British army towards the outbreak of the Great War was 26,000.³⁹

The imperial policy of the Gurkha recruitment stems from the British policy of recruiting men from "historically antagonistic races", who "could be pitied

38. The name *Lauhre* has since then become a household word in Nepal. Even today the name *Lauhre* is reserved for one who leaves his home and goes abroad for services, whether military or civil. Their earnings were and still is a boon to the mountain-economy, which can in way be characterized as the "Lauhre Economy". In 1935 the British Envoy in Kathmandu reported that every year 50,00,000 was paid to the Gurkhas in Nepal as pensions and about 125,00,000 to the Gurkhas soldiers in India in the form of salary of which a large amount was remitted to their relations at home. *Political External Collections* 10-21, Reg. No. 6337/1935. NAI.

39. See Demetrius Boulger, "Our Gurkha Allies", *The Daily Graphic*, January 21, 1918, p. 8-9; also *The Board Arrow : The Naval and Military Gazettee*, December 25, 1941, pp. 11-12; *Western Morning News* February 4, 1915, p. 4.

one against the other", such as the Sikhs, Pathans, Gurkhas and the Punjabi Muhammadans.⁴⁰ Brian Hodgson, the Resident of Nepal (1833-43), and one of the staunch guardian of the Company *Raj* vigorously advocated the policy of Gurkha recruitment for the following reasons: first, it would weaken Nepal by draining off her military potentials; second, the surplus soldiery of Nepal would provide the British with the "best materials in Asia" for making soldiers, and thirdly it would be a means of wearing Nepalese distrust against the British.⁴¹ The supply of recruits for the British army had always been a source of irritant in the Anglo-Nepalese relations right from the early days of contact. Yet, it is the irony of history that it continued with an increasing momentum with the passage of time. It was the utility factor that outlived the inherent evil associated with it. Nepal, in the course of time, began to look upon the principle of recruitment as "a necessary evil" both from economic and diplomatic perspective, while the British looked upon the Gurkhas as a convenient tool which could be used both against internal uprisings and the imperial wars. Thus, the apparent drain in the British Exchequer and the strong sentiments of political uneasiness among the Nepalese elites was amply checked and balanced by the utilitarian factor.

Nepal, which had a male population of 28,54,727⁴² supplied 200,000 of recruits or one fourth of her fighting population for the British army during the Great War. By October 1914, as Britain was deeply involved in the war, the Nepalese war bugles began to echo into the hills with

40. Perceval Landon, *Nepal*. Vol. II. *op. cit.*, p. 141. See also White Papers Vol. 24, "Minutes and Notes" June 1893. IOL.

41. See Brian Hodgson, "Memorandum Relative to the Gurkha Army", *Foreign Miscellaneous Collection*, Series Vol. 125. NAI. At the time of compiling the document Hodgson was the Assistant to the Resident Edward Gardner.

42. Census Report of Nepal taken in 1911, see the correspondence between *Maharaja* Chandra and the British Resident, March 17, 1912, E. No. 1. *Poka* No. 30, *Ga*.

an increasing pitch; the hill-men also responded to the call of emergency in an unprecedented manner. Thus, by the close of January 1915, Nepal had contributed 6,000 recruits for the British Gurkha. Even small principalities like Palpa, Pokhara, Dhankuta and Ilam had despatched 300,152,138 and 128 recruits by mid October 1914, which was very encouraging. However, by the close of 1916 Nepal had already supplied 33,000 recruits.⁴³

However, the early objectives of recruitment was a modest one, namely, to collect recruits to train 500 men every month in order to maintain the six Gurkha battalions in full force. But in September 1914, the British Government specified the immediate need to collect 2,200 recruits broken into the following categories Magars and Gurungs (1,715), Thakurs and th Khasa (350), and the Limbus and Rias (100).⁴⁴ The specification prescribed for the recruits were: age (17-25), height (5 feet) and chest (32 inches). The *Maharaja*, however, made an immediate offer of 1,250 Magars and 250 Thakuris and Chetris. This was to be in addition to the ordinary recruitment in India by the military authorities in depots like Almora, Segouli, Darjeeling, Laheria Sahari, Darbanga and Gorkhapore.⁴⁵ To facilitate the process of recruitment each Nepalese

43. See a Report entitled "Nepal and the Great War", *Basta* No 63, File No *Ka*, 1970/1914; *Pioneer*, February 27, 1915. p. 13; A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, October 18, 1914. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*, also a statement by Lieutenant Governor, Punjab, in the Punjab Legislative Council, April 1, 1916, *Englishman*, April 2, 1919, p. 8.

* The objective in the early phase was to collect a total of 8, 491 recruits from the 28 different parts of Nepal. For more on the estimate made by the British for the need of the Gurkhas see the statement made by Major Sur Bir Karki of the one Ninth Gurkha Rifles E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65 *Kha*.

44. A letter from J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja* Chandra, Sept. 4, 1914. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66, *Kha*, File No. 1, 1971/1914.

45. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, Sept. 5. 1914, *Ibid*.

officer was to be assisted by two or three Gurkha recruiters, who gave a cursory examination of the recruits in the field. By mid-October 1914 the Nepalese Premier promised to give 14,000 recruits for the year.⁴⁶

The *Maharaja* knew fully well that the heavy demand for the Gurung and the Magar recruits could bring disastrous effects upon the communities so had to expand the list of the fighting forces to include the Duras, Sunwars and Ranabhants. The recruits collected would be ready for examination by the Gurkha Recruiting Officer by October 4, 1914. He was hopeful that he would be able to put together some 3,000 men immediately, provided there were no rejections. Another major step taken by the *Maharaja* to smooth the process of recruitment was the division of the country for the purpose of recruitment into six zones. Among them the three were for the Eastern hill and three for the West; and each zone was placed under a responsible officer. The recruits that were, to be collected from Dhankuta and Ilam, Palpa and Pokhara, Salyan and Doti were to be despatched to Darjeeling, Nautanwa Bazar, Nepalgunj Road and Pithoragarh respectively.⁴⁷ Gorkhpore, Almora and Laheri Sahari were outrightly rejected for they were so inconvenient for the recruits. The recruits coming to Kathmandu were first of all

46. See an abstract of conversation between *Maharaja* Chandra and the British Resident J. Manners Smith, October 17, 1914, *Basta* No. 63, File No. *Ka*.

47. The six recruiting zones and the six Nepalese officials associated with recruiting work were : Ilam (Captain Bhogya Shumsher Shah), Dhankuta (Lieutenant Colonel Bhuvan Bikram Rana), Pokhara (Captain Balabhadra Basynat), Palpa (Major General Sher Shumsher Rana), Doti (Lieutenant Colonel Pratap Jung Rana). The recruiting British Gurkha Officers, who assisted the Nepalese officials were: Doti (Subedar Wazir Gurung, Havaljar Ahmad Thapa, Chetra Bir Gurung), Pokhara (Havaljar Aiman Rana, Rifleman Damar Singh Darung), Salyan (Rifleman Kalu Gurung) Palpa (Havildar Kharsing Khatri and Rifleman Sher Bahadur Shah). See a letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith Sept. 24, 1914; from *Maharaja* to Resident, Sept. 22, 1914. *Ibid.*

to be examined by the Residency Surgeon Colonel Carr-White and then sent to Baxaul. The recruits were to be sent to the Residency for examination in small batches of fifty; and the Colonel was to be assisted by Nepalese doctor in his work. Arrangements were also made by the Government of India to send any rejected recruit to the border station and hand him over to the Nepalese official.⁴⁸ However, to fulfil the need for massive recruitment more recruiting centers for examination were added: Kathmandu Okhaldhunga, Piuthan and Dailekh.⁴⁹

A. Incentives to Wartime Recruitment

Nepal and the Government of India left no stone unturned to promote the process of wartime recruitment. Two types of incentives of both direct and indirect nature were devised.

a. Direct Incentives

The *Maharaja* in an effort to make the process of recruitment more attractive and viable announced a sum of five rupees (British-Indian coins) to each recruit to cover up his expenses for his trip to India, once he had passed the medical examination. But, when finally accepted as a recruit in India he was given twenty four rupees, which he could send to his family at home. The total amount, namely twenty nine rupees was to be reimbursed to Government of Nepal by the British Government, which was in keeping with the precedent of 1886. To keep the records straight, the British recruiting parties were required to give receipts for the number of recruits taken; and keep a register of their address, castes and father's name.⁵⁰ As a form of direct incentive, a prize

48. *Ibid.* p. 2; See also a letter from *Maharaja Chandra* to Resident J. Manners Smith, Sept. 8, 1914. *Ibid.*

49. See A letter from Resident to *Maharaja*, July 28, 1915, *Ibid.*

50. *Op. cit.*, Footnote No. 22; also a letter from Resident J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja Chandra*, Nov. 8, 1914, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66, File No. *Kha* 1973/1916.

of a gun was announced to a recruiter who could collect twenty recruits, and an extension of their home leave.⁵¹

In the middle of the year 1915 a suggestion was made by Major Ridgeway, the Recruiting Officer at Gorakhpore, to open up a recruiting depot at Kathmandu.⁵² The *Maharaja*, however, rejected this move on the ground that the step would be very "unpopular" and "risky" for it would readily give the impression that he was neglecting the interests of his country to please the British Government.⁵³ The Premier, however, conceded to the idea of bringing a few Gurkha officers and men, say 15 to 20 in number, to the Residency for the purpose of recruitment.⁵⁴

A distinguishing feature of Nepalese recruitment was the absence of draft. An *istihar* (notification) issued by the Government of Nepal of the year 1915 made it clear that only those who expressed their willingness should be conscripted for military services.⁵⁵ The Premier made this point clear to the British Resident in Kathmandu on many occasions. The comment of the *Maharaja* on the work of the three Gurkha officers and during the selection of the 100 non-commissioned Gurkha officers can be taken as most illustrative.

51. A letter from *Raja* Shumsher Bahadur, Jestha 30, *roj* 6, 1973 (May 1916), E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 60 *Kha*, File No. 4, 1973/1916.

52. It is to be remembered that the proposal to open a recruiting center in Kathmandu was turned down by previous Nepalese Premiers like Ranaudip Singh and Bir Shumsher.

53. A letter from Resident J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja* Chandra, March 27, 1915; from *Maharaja* to the Resident March 24, 1915, pp. 1-2. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66, *Kha*, 1971/1914.

54. From *Maharaja* to the Resident, March 24, 1915, *Ibid.*

55. The *istihar* has been quoted at length in a report to the *Maharaja* prepared by *Raja* Shumsher Bahadur on Jestha 30, *roj* 6, 1973 (May 1916). See also the report prepared by Dip Bahadur Shah, Jestha 18, 1973 (May 1916), *Ibid.*

I would ask them that they may be strictly warned against doing anything objectionable or enticing men particularly those in Government services or those serving in the household of the Nepalese army or British Gurkha regiments or those who generally have to depend upon their servants to look after the cultivation of land and other domestic business. ⁵⁶

The voluntary nature of the military service in Nepal necessitated more inducements for the purpose of recruitment. Accordingly, the Nepalese Government gave inducements in the form of gratuity and concessions to village headmen, independent recruiters and the recruits themselves.⁵⁷ By the middle of 1917 the Government of India decided to issue a circular printed in *Parbatia* that was to be carried by the Gurkha recruiter. The circular, besides promising many rewards and honors to a person who helped the Government by joining the army, went ahead to make a specific mention of three inducements to the recruits and the recruiters. First, every recruit upon enlistment would get a bonus of fifty rupees, that is, ten rupees from the Recruiting officer at the time of enrolment and finally a certain number of appointments in the arrived in the regiment. Secondly, every soldier was to receive an active service allowance (*batta*) of rupees five; and finally a certain number of appointments in the infantry battalions of *jamadars*, *naikas* and *havildars* would be given to recruiters, both civilians or soldiers, who brought hundred, fifty and thirty recruits respectively.⁵⁸ In addition, Nepal Government also decided to give further inducements to the recruits and the recruiters either in cash or in the form of rent-free lands in the hills. To be

56. A letter from *Maharaja* to the Resident July 5, 1915, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66, *Kha*, File No. 2, 1971/1914.

57. From *Maharaja* Chandra to the Resident J. Manners Smith, May 16, 1916. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66, *Kha*, File No. 4, 1973/1916.

58. The Government of Nepal accepted the circular sent by Major Harcourt, the Recruiting Officer for the Gurkhas in Gorakhpore. See a letter from Resident S.F. Bayley to *Maharaja* Chandra, July 27, 1917; also a letter from *Muharaja* to Resident August 23, 1917. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*, File No. 5, 1973/1916.

more specific, a sum of rupees three was given to a recruiter who came to be recruited out of his own sweet will, a sum of four to a recruiter who collected 10 to 25 recruits and a sum of rupees five to one who collected twenty five or more recruits. A person who collected 25 or more recruits was also given the option of taking a rent free land in the section of his high-land, on the calculation of the 50% of the amount due.⁵⁹

b. Indirect Inducements

The Government of Nepal in an effort to maintain a continuous flow of recruits for war took a number of steps to help the families of the Gurkhas fighting abroad. To achieve this objective orders were issued, during the early phase of the war, to the following effect

i. that no legal disposition or ejectment from the Government holdings and tenements in their occupation shall be enforced against them under the revenue laws of the country for the non-payment of Government rent-dues in the items *Serma* and *Sawane Phagoo* for a period extending for six months to India from the seat of war, and in case of those who are "detailed" with their regiments under war conditions to six months after the termination of the war.

ii. that no civil and criminal suit in which any of the men mentioned above shall be parties and in which they do not appear by the lawfully constituted attorneys or agents shall be proceeded or decided during the period mentioned above; and the case in which judgements have to be pronounced but no appeal could be filed within the statutory period, provided the same had not expired before August 1914, the period of limitation of such appeal, if any, shall be extended to the time mentioned above, as also for all rights to such.

59. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, October 7, 1915. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*, File 1971/1914.

iii. that it is also intended to take some precautionary steps so as to supply food stuffs to such nearest members of the families and the immediate dependents as their wives, minor children and aged parents living jointly with them of such amongst those of the front, who may be in need of the same. Instructions will be issued to the Nepalese officials to take special care for the families of those listed men as far as possible.

iv. that the above consideration shall apply to the reservists of the British Gurkha regiments.⁶⁰

Another indirect incentive to the Gurkha recruits fighting abroad was the mailing privileges granted to them. Accordingly, the British Government had permitted the Gurkha soldiers in active service to send their mail to their relatives free of postal service charge. The Government of Nepal was happy with this arrangement and took special care to deliver the letters promptly to their families in the interior.⁶¹

B. Problems Associated With Recruitment

The institution of recruitment, in spite of all the incentives, inducements and moral persuasions from the Nepalese officials, village-headmen did meet with stiff resistance from the local populace. The common scenes of weeping and wailing mothers of the proposed recruits in front of the British Residency in Kathmandu can be taken as a mark of a "docile protest" by the Nepalese women

60. See the "Steps Taken by the *Maharaja* of Nepal to Help the Families of the Gurkhas Fighting Abroad", contained in a letter from Premier Chandra to the Resident J. Manners Smith, October 26, 1914; see also the conversation between the Resident and the *Maharaja*, Nov. 13, 1914. *Basta* No. 63, File No. *Ka*, 1970/1914; See also Appendix B.

61. See a *Yaddashat* from Resident J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja* Chandra, Jan. 28, 1915; from the Resident to the *Maharaja*, Feb. 16, 1915. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 14, 1970/1914; also see the abstract of conversation between *Maharaja* and the Resident, Jan. 20, 1914, *Basta* No. 63, File No. 1, *Ka*, 1970/1914.

folks to the institution of recruitment in Nepal.⁶² The growing protest of the Nepalese people to wartime recruitment stems partly from the human factor and partly from the social stigma attached to the recruitment in the service of a foreign power.⁶³ The psychological problem associated with recruitment was aggravated by three factors, namely, heavy desertions, recruitment in non-military professions and large scale rejections.

i. Heavy Desertions:

A list of a large number of deserters from among the recruits sent to India was a cause of grave concern to Nepalese bureaucracy and the Indian leadership. It is true that there were few cases of desertions within the Nepalese territory; but once the proposed recruits crossed the Nepalese frontier the wheels of desertions were actually set in motion.⁶⁴ During the early days of the war a large number of recruits sent from Western Nepal refused to be enlisted in the Indian army. There were many who came as far as Almora, and having refused to move forward had to be sent back. But a large number of proposed recruits from Doti refused to move at all.⁶⁵ Again, the sight of recruits running away from the recruiting depots like Ghoom and Darjeeling after being handed over to the British authorities was very common.⁶⁶ It is significant to note that most desertions took place once the recruits

62. See the abstract of the conversation between Captain Austa Man Singh and the Resident J. Manners Smith, December 11, 1915. E. No. 2, *Poka No. 66 Kha*, (No. 2), 1972/1914.

63. Ganga Bahadur Basnyat, writing to the *Maharaja* on Jestha 11, *roj* 3, 1973 (May 1916) points out that "the people like to be recruited for their own country but not for a foreign power." E. No. 2, *Poka No. 66 Kha*, File No. 4, 1973/1916.

64. See a letter from Resident J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja* Chandra, October 25, 1915, E. No. 2, *Poka No. 66 Kha*, 1972/1914.

65. A letter from Resident J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja* Chandra, December 15, 1914, E. No. 2, *Poka No. 66 Kha*, 1971/1914.

66. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, October 27, 1914, *Ibid.*

crossed the border of Nepal or when they were handed over. The rumor that Britain was loosing the war against Germany was definitely a setback in determining the psychology of the recruits. The official figure of the Nepalese recruits who deserted in the year 1916 was put as 1,132.⁶⁷ The real figure for the year was certainly much higher.

As desertions became more of a normality the British Government devised a fourteen point enrolment questionnaire that was to be signed by the recruit before his enrolment. The principal objective behind signing the combat enrolment form was to empower the Government of India to punish the recruit for his desertion in India. Nepal however, raised serious objections to the question 11 of the Combatant's Enrolment Form No. 1. The reason is obvious for it interfered with the traditional custom and usage relating to caste and food habits.⁶⁸ The Nepalese Officer attached to the British Residency Captain Austa Man Singh, took pains to convince the Resident why the Premier had rejected the Enrolment Form No. C of the recruits. His arguments in short can be summed up as follows:

If such a question is asked here then the people will blame the *Maharaja* for not only supplying recruits for the British but also for asking them to abandon their caste and religion. This would make the *Maharaja* very unpopular. Thus he has rejected the proposal ⁶⁹

The question of desertion became a serious issue throughout the war-period. As the hateful war gathered momentum, it was reported from the major cities of India

67. See a private letter from H. Hudgson, Adjutant General, India, to Major General Baber Shumsher, August 3, 1917, *Ibid*.

68. The question No. 11 of the Form No. 1 was "Are you willing to go wherever ordered by land or sea and allow no caste usages to interfere with your military duty?" E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*, File No. 2.

69. See the conversation between Austa Man Singh and the British Resident J. Manners Smith, recorded in Nepali Dec. 11, 1915. Trans. is mine. *Ibid*!

(Calcutta, Patna and Baneras) that the Nepalese deserters were flocking in thousands in the household of the private individuals.⁷⁰ Another issue that is closely related to desertion was the overstaying or not returning to their combat duties by the Gorkha soldiers after their schedule home leave was over. In order to prevent desertions and the overstaying in leave the Government of Nepal and India began a massive search of the offenders and punish them according to the laws of the Nepalese army.⁷¹ The Government of Nepal used every means at her disposal ranging from physical punishment, confiscation of property or the appeal to the "better part of reason". But it was physically not possible for the Government of Nepal to get hold of all the deserters or all absentees mentioned in the British list for a number of reasons. First, some may have died after coming home. Second, others for some ulterior motives, may not have given the correct name or address, thereby making it impossible to trace them. Thirdly, to avoid being captured some may not have returned home at all.⁷² The Nepalese Preimer did, however, ask his local officials to make a thorough search of all the deserters and the absentees of the list supplied by the Gurkha Officer; and bring them to the book. He also assured them that they would not be punished if they joined their ranks immediately. In addition, they would be receiving their pay for the period of abstention, and the

70. A letter from Resident S.F. Bayley to *Maharaja Chandra*, July 30, 1917. E. No. 2, *Poka No. 66 Kha*, File No. 6, 1974/1917.

71. See a private letter from H. Hudgson, Adjutant General, India, to Major General Baber Shumsher August 3, 1917; Baber Shumsher to H. Hudgson August 4, 1917. E. No. 2, *Poka No. 65 Kha*; also S.F. Bayley to *Maharaja Chandra*, August 15, 1918, E. No. 2, *Poka No. 66 Kha*, File No. 10, 1975/1918. More on desertions see a letter from Commandant Tanaggiyi, M.P. Battalion Burma to Recruiting Officer Darjeeling, June 6, 1918; also S.F. Bayley to Recruiting Officer Darjeeling, Sept. 14, 1918; A telegram from Army Dept. Simla to the Resident Kathmandu, Sept. 10, 1918; also A.C.B. MacKinnon Lieutenant Commander Commanding 3/9th. Gurkha Rifles to Resident Nepal., Sept. 3, 1918, *Ibid*.

72. A letter from *Maharaja* to Resident August 23, 1918. pp. 1-3. *Ibid*.

period would also be counted for pension. The *Maharaja* was, however, cautious to note

I should again mention here to avoid any possible misconception, that the steps as mentioned above which are being taken on your letter under reply are only special for the occasion and are not to be taken as a precedent. In many of these I have to stretch my authority sometimes overstepping prudent limits, not always a safe thing to do in this country. ⁷³

The Government of India not only thanked the *Maharaja* for his sincere efforts but also assured it would appreciate any step taken by him that would promote the return of the absentees and deserters. But that would not be taken as a precedent after the war.⁷⁴

ii. Large Scale Rejections

The collection of the recruits for the British Gurkhas was further aggravated by the fact that they had to be collected from hilly and remote areas. The other problems included the search for strong smart youths and the difficulty in convincing them that they were out for a noble cause. A heavy rejection was a recurrent phenomenon right from the very start. To be illustrative, during the early months of the war out of 1,211 recruits collected by the local officials in Doti only 389 were passed by the Gurkha Recruiting Officer.⁷⁵ Likewise a report from Salyan indicates that out of 139 recruits collected by the local officials only 37 were declared to be fit by the recruiting officer.⁷⁶ The same story of rejection persists during the middle phase of the war. The records of the recruiting centers of Ghoom and Darjeeling indicate that out of 1,010

73. *Ibid.* p. 5.

74. A letter from Resident S.F. Bayley, to *Maharaja* Chandra, Nov. 16, 1918, *Ibid.*

75. See a memo of Captain Austa Man Singh, countersigned by Marichi Man Singh, Nov. 20, 1914. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*, File No. 1, 1971/1914.

76. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, October 18, 1914. *Ibid.*

recruits that arrived in Darjeeling for the year 1916 up to April only 324 were accepted.⁷⁷

There were also sizable rejections from those recruits that were passed by the British Residency surgeon in Kathmandu as well as the Nepalese counterpart. Out of 107 recruits that went from Kathmandu 37 were declared to be unfit by the medical authorities in Gorkhpore.⁷⁸ The same rate of attrition due to rejections continued till the very end of the war. The statistics from the Gorakhpore Recruiting Center shows that out of 76 recruits that came to be recruited from August 3 to August 29, 1918 44 were rejected.⁷⁹ A very selective sample survey of the rejected recruits carried for the year 1914 by the Gurkha Recruiting Officer of Gorkhpore, Major Ridgeway, indicates that the rejected recruits almost exclusively came from the Chettri caste.⁸⁰

It was customary to send the rejected recruits that came from Nepal under escort and hand them over to the Nepalese officials in the border. The Nepalese authorities on other hand were required to give a proper receipt to the British officials indicating the safe return of the rejected recruits. Both Nepal and the Government of India insisted upon this meticulous procedure for they did not want to let the rejected recruits to fall in the hands of the non-military recruiters.⁸¹ To prevent such a mischief

77. To be more illustrative out of 1,101 recruits that arrived in Ghoom, Darjeeling, 324 were accepted, 420 were rejected 75 showed their reluctance and 95 deserted or absconded. See a letter from Maharaja to the Resident J. Manners Smith, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*, File No. 2, 1972/1915.

78. From *Maharaja* to Resident, September 26, 1914, October 16, 1914, *Ibid.*

79. See the statement showing the number of rejected recruits from Gorakhpore to the Nepalese frontier from the Recruiting Gurkha Officer to the Resident, Kathmandu, August 4, 1918. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66, *Kha*, File No. 69, 1975/1918.

80. A letter from J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja* Chandra, October 24, 1914, *Ibid.*

81. A letter from Resident S.F Bayley to *Maharaja* Chandra July 31, 1918; also E. Owen Thurston to Bhim Shumsher, Commander-in-Chief, Nepal, Feb. 4, 1919, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65 *Kha*.

the Nepalese Government had to fine the junior officers a sum of rupee one and reprimand them for their unethical behavior.⁸²

Among others, two factors were primarily responsible for the high rate of rejection of the recruits sent from Nepal to the recruiting centers of India. First, in their zeal to obtain perfect recruits, the recruiters in the beginning set a very high standard for the recruits. As an illustration, Havildar Khar Gambir Thapa accepted recruits only under 20 years of age and belonging to only special classes, though the general instruction was to collect recruits between the ages of 18 to 25.⁸³ Other Gurkha recruiters refused to take recruits below 5 feet 7 inches, and those above the age of 20.⁸⁴ Thus, one can imagine the heavy rejections right from the initial stage. Secondly, as the war took a heavy toll on the Gurkha soldiers the percentage of suitable recruits naturally declined to a point difficult to conceive.

iii. Recruitment of Nepalese in Non-military Professions in India

The recruitment of the Nepalese hill-folks in the non-military services in India was always a disturbing element in Anglo-Nepalese relations, specially in moments of war. The roaming Indian recruiters to take Nepalese in civilian jobs was a common sight in the hills during periods of war and peace. As early as 1906 the Government of Nepal reacted very strongly to the news carried by the *Pioneer* of July 8, 1906, which permitted the Gurkha pensioners of the British army the facility to hold civilian jobs.⁸⁵

82. From Resident S.F. Bayley to *Maharaja* Chandra "On Problems Associated with the Handing Over of the Recruits by the British", not dated. From *Maharaja* to Tula Shumsher, Marga 20, *roj* 4, 1975 (D:c 1918). E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*, File No. 9, 1975/1918.

83. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to J. Manners Smith, October 18, 1914. *Ibid*.

84. Memo of Captain Austa Man Singh, No. 20, 1914, *op. cit.*, footnote No. 75.

85. *Pioneer*, "Military Notes", July 8, 1906 p. 8.

Nepal's reason for not accepting the offer were two in number. First, the psychological temperment of the Gurkhas was not suitable for civilian vocations. Secondly, the retired Gurkha soldiers were needed to take up the profession of agriculture so as to set free the younger generation to military service. The Nepalese Premier while realizing the humanitarian value of the scheme, yet, did not hesitate to point out that

I need not tell you that fighting classes of this country do not constitute a very large portion of the population. They do not appear to have increased proportionately with the non-fighting classes and the Government of this country has for some years past is finding it rather difficult to get the necessary number of recruits required annually for supplying its regular demand. Once the ex-Gurkha stay in civilian work the supply of good recruits will fall.⁸⁵

As the Great war swept across the three continents in full sound and fury Nepal Government had to bring further restrictions on the recruitment of the Nepalese menial classes: *kamis* (blacksmiths), *damis* (tailors) and *sarkis* (cobblers) in the army bearer corps or in other civilian works. The impact resulting from the thinning of the menial classes, the indispensable adjunct of the hill-community, was severely felt by the local population as the war reached its climax in 1917.⁸⁷

Nepal had always tried to check the drain of the Gurkhas of the fighting race into undesirable channels in two ways: first, she had prohibited the recruiters for labour force within her boundaries: and secondly, asked the Government of India to issue orders prohibiting the recruitment of the Nepalese of the martial classes in civilian jobs.⁸⁸ The British Government did respond to the request

86. A letter from *Maharaja Chandra* to Resident J. Manners Smith, July 30, 1906, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Ka* File No. 182, 1963/1906.

87. From *Maharaja Chandra* to Resident S.F. Bayley, Nov. 30, 1917, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*, File No. 5. 1973/1916.

88. A letter from *Maharaja Chandra* to Resident J. Manners Smith, Dec. 11 1913, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Ka*, File No. 182. 1963/1906.

of the Nepalese Government even in peace time. As early as 1914, the Government of India commenced issuing bonafied certificates to military recruiters so as to remove any doubt of their identity. Orders were also issued to the district officers in the Assam district to use their influence to dissuade private employees, as far as possible, from employing Gurkhas of the military classes.⁸⁹ However, as the Great War broke out the issue was taken up with added importance by the two Governments.

The Great War did give an increasing momentum to the recruitment of the Nepalese in civilian jobs. The tea plantations, the Assam Railway and Trading Company and the individual households formed a haven for the Nepalese of the hills in search for employment. The terms and conditions of the tea estates and the trading companies were often more attractive, which was responsible for alluring many Nepalese into them.⁹⁰ Material gain and relative security were certainly key factors that were responsible for this phenomenon. But the Nepalese Premier, while attempting to explain this behavior, attributed it to the simplicity of the Nepalese people. His arguments were

Our unsophisticated hill people dazzled more for the time being with tempting offer and high hopes held out to them by recruiting agents are enticed away by them without giving the least idea as to where and what work they are being taken.....So simple are they, they cannot even calculate their material gains, in as much as it ought to have struck them that if sent they would have been better

89. A letter from Resident J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja Chandra*, May 21, 1914, *Ibid*.

90. See the terms and conditions for the service of the Assam Railway and Trading Company, 1913, E. No. 2 *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*. See also a letter from the GN to Banke Bardia Goshwara, Poush 2, *roj* 3, 1970 (Dec.1914); A report submitted by Lieutenant Colonel Bhuvan Bikram Rana to *Maharaja Chandra*(letter No. 27)and another letter of Shrawan 10, *roj* 7, 1970 (July 1914);from Lieutenant Colonel Bahadur Shumsher to local officials, not dated, In summary, these letters restricted the recruitment for plantations, factories and railway companies. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*.

off if they had remained here and gone drawing their regimental pay here and their allowances there, which together was more than they even hoped to earn if they got enlisted in any work even in the army of India. This shows how the recruiters are turning the heads of the simple-minded people and to what difficulty that places us. ⁹¹

The two Governments devised several measures to check the flow of the Nepalese being recruited in non-military professions in India. First, every precaution was taken to check the entry of the India recruiters in Nepal for civilian jobs. To achieve this objective the British Government in India issued a bonafied certificate to the military recruiters, with a large easily distinguishable stamp to remove any doubt of their identity.⁹² A model of the recruiting certificate was also sent to the local officials in Nepal in an effort to check the unauthorised recruiters. Further orders were also given to keep in custody the unauthorised recruiters and report the case to the center for the type of punishment to be inflicted.⁹³ Secondly, the Government of India having realized the fact that unrestricted recruitment was prejudicial to the system of recruitment, prohibited all recruitment from Nepal except strictly the combatants. It

91. A letter from Maharaja Chandra to S. F. Bayley Nov. 30, 1917, E. No.2 *Poka* No. 66 *Kha* File No 5, 1973/1916.

92. A letter from Resident J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja Chandra*, May 21, 1913. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Ka*, File No. 182.

93. See a report submitted by Captain Upendra Bikram Rana, the *Bada Hakim* (Governor) of *Julma Gauda*, Shrawan 19, 1971 (August 1915); From GN to *Ilam Gauda Goshwara*, Poush 11, *roj* 5, 1970 (December 1914); A letter from Lieutenant Colonel Tirtha Bikram Bahadur to *Maharaja Chandra* Poush 22, *roj* 2, 1970 (January 1915); From *Maharaja* to *Bada Hakim* Bethori, Birgang, Mahottari, Banke, Kailali, Kanchanpur, Darchula, Ilam and Dhankuta, Ashad 25, *roj* 4, 1971 (July 1915). *Ibid.* Also letters from the GN to Karnali Post Office, and the other post offices of Surkhet, Ram Ghat, Suba Ghat, Saj Ghat, Cugay Ghat, Poush 2, 1970 (December 1914). E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*, File No. *Pa* 27 1970/1914. These letters carried instructions to prohibit recruiting for the other purposes except military and the police; and even that was to be done by the authorized recruiters.

also prohibited the recruitment of the Nepalese in the state forces or any branch of the Indian army like the Labor and Porter Corps and in the non-fighting combatant units;⁹⁴ and finally all the rejected recruits in India were sent under escort and handed over to Nepalese officials in the receiving stations like Raxaul, Nepalganj and Jainagar.⁹⁵

However, in spite of the elaborate precaution taken by the Government of Nepal and the Government of India it was impossible to prevent the recruitment of the Nepalese subjects by the private agencies in civilian jobs. To make matters worse the rejected recruits even when they were seen off in the train by the Indian escort fell easy prey to the recruiting *Sirdars* recruiting for the tea plantations and the local mines. Major J. S. M. Harcourt, the Recruiting Officer for the Gurkhas in Gorakhpore, lamented over this reality in these words

We do our best to see them (rejected recruits) get back but it is impossible for us to put a stop to this sort of thing and should be checked as soon as possible as apart from being opposed to the wishes of the *Maharaja* the money spent by the Government on their return journey is thrown into the fire.⁹⁶

The problem of the immigration of the Nepalese nationals in search for civil employment continued to trouble the two Governments in the post-war decades. Throughout this period the British Government in India did place two restrictions, on the employment of Nepalese in non-military professions. In short, these restrictions were as follows:

94. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to S.F. Bayley Jan. 27, 1918; from Resident to *Maharaja*, March 28, 1918; also letters from the Foreign Political Dept. of G to the Resident, March 18, 1918. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65 *Kha*, File No. 6, 1974/1917. *Englishman*, April 22, 1918, p. 9.

95. See demi-official letter from Major J.S. Harcourt, to Resident S.F. Bayley, Kathmandu, Nov. 14, 1917; from *Maharaja* Chandra to S.F. Bayley, Dec. 17, 1917. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66, File No. 5, 1973/1916.

96. See a letter from Major J.S.M. Harcourt to Resident S.F. Bayley Nov. 19, 1917, *Ibid*.

a. The Nepalese laborers were not to be recruited by organizations working within the Nepalese territory or in other words only voluntary immigrants, who came out of their own accord were to be given employment.

b. Even among them only those who fell outside the military age bracket were to be employed.⁹⁷

The whole issue hinged over the fact that if there was a strong demand for the recruitment of the Nepalese for civilian jobs there was also a corresponding willingness on the part of the Nepalese hill-folks to seize such opportunities for their material advancement and their emotional satisfaction.⁹⁸

iv. War Publicity

The war publicity did have its adverse effects in the process of recruitment in Nepal. The first batch of the Gurkha regiments who landed in France during the early months of the war fell easy prey to the German superiority in numerical strength as well as in modern weapons. Thus, these early Gurkha battles in France left few Gurkha survivors. The news of the dead and the wounded did contribute in detracting the recruits for the British army in the Great War. A letter from General Pratap Shumsher from Western Nepal in 1916 points out that the news of the deceased in the front coupled with the arrival of the amputated, sick war veterans did have a frightening effect upon the young and the old alike. The Nepalese, in an effort to prevent such a war-phobia in the minds of the Nepalese, asked the Government of India not to convey the news of the wounded Gurkhas to their relatives. The *Maharaja*

97. A letter from Deputy Secretary GI Foreign and Political Dept. to Resident W.F.T.O'Connor, Dec. 26, 1918, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65, *Kha* 1919.

98. For more on the demand for the Nepalese nationals for civil employment in India see Commissioner and Political Agent in Ambala to Resident W.F.T.O'Conner, July 2, 1917; also a Memorandum from *Bada Kaji* Marichi Man Singh to the Resident, May 10, 1918, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*, File No. 6, 1974/1914.

sincerely felt that such notices were very likely to have "the undesirable effect of creating and spreading of unnecessary general alarm by those to whom the notices would be given.....talks like that, which will go on increasing with the increase of the receipt such notices, are not at all conducive to recruiting business. They would be helping to scareaway recruits which otherwise would have been available for the army."⁹⁹ The Government of India agreed to the Nepalese request and henceforth decided to report only the authenticated cases of death casualties in the form of notices to their relatives at home.¹⁰⁰

The logic of the *Maharaja* in not communicating the news of the wounded of the relatives of the Gurkha soldiers is very strange but at the same time interesting.¹⁰¹ His argument in part ran

Our people do not generally do much by the way of correspondence and the general satisfaction in which they are living with idea that no news is good news will be amply disturbed by the bare information conveyed by the notices.¹⁰²

The Government of Nepal and that of India did go a long way in solving the problems associated with the wartime recruitment through a process of incentives, inducements and rewards. Yet, the issue of recruitment

99. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, July 6, 1915, *Basta* No. 83, File No. 1 *Ka*, 1970/1914.

100. A letter from Resident J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja* Chandra, July 4, 1915. *Ibid*; also trans. of an abstract conversation recorded in Nepali between the *Maharaja* and the Resident, October 23, 1914; a note from J. Manners Smith to the *Maharaja* October 25, 1914, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66, *Kha*, 1973/1916.

101. The news of the dead on many occasions came in the form of *Yadastas*.

102. From *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, July 6, 1915, *Basta* No. 63, File No. 1 *Ka*, 1970/1914.

did pose a grave challenge to the Nepalese and the British bureaucracy. As the Gurkha recruits dwindled down both in number and physical fitness the British Government at one stage decided to resort to a "Parbate Posture Media" as a means of propoganda in Nepal. The multicolored posture gave pictographic analysis of a Gurkha before recruitment and after. Nepal Government, however, rejected the circulation of the recruiting posture in the country.¹⁰³

But something drastic had to be done to promote recruitment for the Great War had a duration of half a decade. The Nepalese Premier, being pushed to the wall, could not think of any better plan than to release the prisoners and the men of the non-martial races to fight the war. It must be noted in this connection that earlier Nepal had rejected the enlistment of the Newars, Tamangs and the Bhotes in the British army because they lacked the martial spirit. In other words, so little was their aptitude for a military profession even the offer of their own weight of gold

103. The recruiting posture printed by the Government of India for circulation in Nepal contained two graphic pictures. The first picture was a caricature of a Gurkha soldier prior to recruitment. He was depicted in a *mailposh surwal* with a *patuka* (girdle) as his belt. He stood before a cottage in the background with bare feet, folded arms revealing a poverty-stricken, melancholic face. The second picture was that of a Gurkha soldier, who had returned home in triumph from the battle field with an army coat, half-pant, a hat and boot-straps reaching up to his knees and a smart leather belt. He was wearing eight war medals and was potrayed in the background of four beautiful bungalows. Below the posture ran the eightfold arguments inducing the Nepalese to join the British army in India. Nepal objected to the general thematic content of the poster as well as the point number eight of propoganda, which reminded the Nepalese that it was better to face death than to be a coward at home. This very message was an anathema to the "proud and brave" Nepalese. For more on the posture see the posture attached with the letter from S.F. Bayley to *Maharaja* Chandra, Jan. 8, 1917, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*, File No. 5, 1973/1916.

to them would not induce a Tamang for enlistment.¹⁰⁴ However, in September 1916, the first trial batch of 40 Newars were sent for enlistment in the British army.¹⁰⁵ Slowly, as the theaters of war expanded the Tamangs, the Sherpas, the Nagarkotis, Sunwars, Lamas and the Bhotiyas could not escape the jaws of enlistment.¹⁰⁶ But as the war dragged on in its fifth year Nepal came forward with the proposal of sending prisoners for recruitments; and the British Government which was desperately in need of conscripts was happy to avail the generous offer.¹⁰⁷ The first batch of the prisoner recruits consisting of 194 men arrived in Gorakhpore in July 1918 out of which only six were rejected on medical grounds.¹⁰⁸ In total Nepal had sent 464 prisoners to Gorakhpore out of which only 178 were rejected after medical examination. Their age ranged from 19 to 40.

104. The *Maharaja* further elaborated this idea by saying that a Newar as a race possesses a sanguine personality and is devoted to peaceful living and civil avocations. See conversation between *Maharaja* Chandra and the Resident J. Manners Smith, on the theme of the recruitment of the Newars in the British army recorded in the Memo of Captain Austa Man Singh, September 15, 1915; also conversation between S.F. Bayley and Captain Austa Man Singh, April 24, 1918; a letter from Resident S.F. Bayley to *Maharaja* Chandra, June 27, 1918; from *Maharaja* to the Resident July 9, 1918; from Recruiting Officer, Gorakhpore to Adjutant General India, May 27, 1918. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*, 1971/1914. Also a note prepared by the *Maharaja* in 1914.
105. See the Register containing Copies of letters to the British "Envoy" from March 4, 1915 to September 7, 1916. A letter from Captain Austa Man Singh to the British Resident, Sept. 1, 1916.
106. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, Sept. 12, 1915. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*.
107. Conversation between Austa Man and S.F. Bayley recorded in Nepali April 24, 1918. Trans is mine. *op. cit.*, footnote 104.
108. The six prisoner recruits who were rejected on medical ground were; Samar Boglay, Santa Bahadur Bhoté, Bankbir Gharti, Kancha Kuse, Man Bahadur Kuse and Chabi Lal Kami. One of them (number 45) was rejected on the ground that he looked like a *Pukka Chor* (a thief) and a murderer. See a letter from S.F. Bayley to *Maharaja* Chandra, July 9, 1918. E. No. 2. *Poka* No. 66 *Kha*, File No. 7, 1974/1918.

The story of Nepalese contribution in the field of recruitment in the Great War is second to none for she, in fact, went out of her way to offer two hundred thousand Gurkhas, that is one fourth of her fighting population. A contemporary observer has graphically remarked:

I wonder how many Englishmen have realized the extent of sacrifice this mountain principality made for Britain in the cause of freedom. I doubt if any beleaguered power directly involved lost so big a portion of its fighting men. When the call of war came the remote valleys of Nepal poured forth their sons and soon the dwellers of the peaceful hamlets were seen in action in the mud of Flanders, deserts of Mesopotamia, rocky slopes of Gallipoli and the forests of Gilan.¹⁰⁹

LIBERAL DONATIONS

Besides providing the manpower, namely the sinews of war, Nepal spared no trouble and zeal in offering liberal donations in the form of cash, kind and armaments as well the service of technical manpower. Her monetary, material and technical help was very significant both in timing and content.

1. Financial Assistance in Cash

The first Nepalese contribution in cash came on August 31, 1914, when the *Maharaja* made a personal donation from his private purse a sum of Rs. 2,25,000. This fund was distributed in the following way: Rs. 75,000 to the Prince of Wales Fund, Rs. 100,000 to the Imperial Fund inaugurated by the Viceroy and the balance of Rs. 50,000 to be used in the best way as deemed fit by the Government of India. In addition, a further sum of 30,000 was presented to the Fourth Gurkha Rifles of which the Premier was the honorary Colonel.¹¹⁰ The Nepalese offer, in fact, came at the wake of a request made by the Resident, namely, the

109. Perceval Landon, *Nepal*, Vol. II. *op. cit.*, p. 145.

110. The *Maharaja* was carried by his emotions, while showing a special favour to the regiment he belonged, and perhaps, it was only humane. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, August 31, 1914. *Basta* No. 64, *Meshil* No. 1, File No. 1, p. 4.

the Premier and the Government of Nepal could contribute to the Viceroy's Imperial Relief Fund that was dedicated to mitigate the sufferings of those directly or indirectly affected by the war.¹¹¹

A second contribution of 300,000 was made in September 1914 by the Government of Nepal for the purpose of buying machine-guns, for the Gurkha regiments.¹¹² The Viceroy in the beginning, however, hesitated to use the fund partly because it was difficult to get machine-guns in such a short period but primarily due to the fact that the Gurkhas in the front were already equipped with machine-guns. But later on accepted when the *Maharaja* placed the sum in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief to be used in the best way he thought to be most prudent.¹¹³ While making the offer of machine-guns the *Maharaja* displayed more wisdom than the Viceroy for that opening of the battles in France showed that the British battalions were not only heavily outnumbered by the Germans in their physical strength but also in machine-guns.

Again in May 1916, the Nepalese Premier donated a sum of rupees 500 in currency notes to the "Great War

111. A letter from Resident J. Manners Smith, to *Maharaja* Chandra, August 30, 1914; from *Bada Kazi* Marichi Man Singh to Head Master Durbar School, August 30, 1914. *Ibid.*

112. From *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, Sept. 1, 1914. *Basta* No. 64, *Meshil* No. 1, File No. 1, p. 4; from *Maharaja* to Viceroy Charles Hardinge, December 24, 1915; from *Maharaja* to General Baber Shumsher, Poush 9, 1972 (December 1915). *Basta* No. 63, File No. 1 *Ka*, 1970/1914; from Viceroy to *Maharaja*, Jan. 10, 1916; Resident to *Maharaja* Jan. 13, 1916. *Basta* No. 64, File No. *Ne* 53, 1915/16. See also Parliamentary Papers No. 3, Relating to the Support Afforded by the Princes and Peoples of India to His Majesty in Connection with the War, House of Commons, Sept. 9, 1914. IOL; *The Gazette of India Extraordinary* "Nepal's War Donations", November 12, 1914.

113. From Resident J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja* Chandra, Sept. 10, 1914; from *Maharaja* to Major General H.W. Wylie Oct. 3, 1914; also from the Commander-in-Chief, Beauchamp Duff to *Maharaja* Chandra, October 7, 1914. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63 *Kha*, 1970/1914.

Sale" that was being held by Lady Wellington in the aid of "Women's War Fund". The money was to be disposed in the following way: rupees 400 to be used in cash contribution to the fund and rupees 100 was to be used to purchase Monster Lucky Bag tickets; and if any one of those tickets happened to draw any prize or prizes they were to be sold and contributed to the Women's War Fund.¹¹⁴ Then on the New Year's Day of 1916 and 1917 the *Maharaja* presented a sum of Rs. 300,000 on occasion for any use in connection with the war.¹¹⁵ Nepal also chose the auspicious occasion of the Silver Wedding of the King Emperor and the Queen Empress of India in 1918 to present a sum of Rs. 200,000.¹¹⁶

These were some major donations. But the *Maharaja* also made some minor donations like 1,000 pounds for "Officer's Family's Fund"¹¹⁷ rupees 1500 each to King George's Fund For Sailors and Lord Robert's Memorial Workshop Fund¹¹⁸, rupees 5,100 to Lady Chelmsford "Our day's Fund"¹¹⁹ and rupees 1,000 to british Red Cross Society's Fund.¹²⁰

114. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Lady Wellington, Government House, Bombay, May (?) 1916. *Basta* No. 64, *Meshil* No. 8, File No. 1, 1973/1916.

115. See the Document titled "Nepal and the Great War", E. No. 2 *Poka* No. 63, File No. 10, 1918; a letter from Austa Man Singh attached to the Residency to Marichi Man Singh, Private Secretary to the *Maharaja*, Jan .6, 1917; from Lord Chelmsford, Viceroy of India to *Maharaja* Chandra, Jan. 21, '1917; *Glasgow Recorder*, "War Fund", October 11, 1916, p. 8.

116. From *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident S.F. Bayley, June 11, 1918; *Maharaja* Chandra to Lord Chelmsford, October 3, 1918. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 64, *Meshil* No. 15, File No. *Bay* 41, 1975/1918.

117. From *Maharaja* Chandra to Maud Lansdowne, March 13, 1918; from Maud Lansdowne to *Maharaja*, May 13, 1918. *Ibid*.

118. From *Maharaja* to Military Secretary to the Viceroy, April 5, 1918; from Military Secretary to the Viceroy to the *Maharaja*, May 6, 1918. *Statesman*, May 6, 1918, p. 7; also from *Maharaja* to Viceroy May 17, 1917; Major Comptroller to *Maharaja*, June 28, 1917. *Basta* No. 64, *Meshil* No. 11, File No. *Le* 2, 1974/1917.

119. From Resident S.F. Bayley to *Maharaja* Nov. 30, 1917. *Ibid*.

120. From *Maharaja* to Drake Brockman, September 1, 1917. *Basta* No. 64 *Meshil* No. 16, File No. *Re*-14, 1974/1917

ii. Donations in Kind

The products of the country like tea, cardamoms and timber formed a major portion of the munificent offer of Nepal during the Great War. Tea being a favorite drink of the Gurkha soldiers the *Maharaja* did send tea to them on three occasions. The opening of the year 1915, when 43,280 pounds of tea were despatched to the Gurkhas in the European front, provided the first occasion.¹²¹ The virtual close of the war provided the second occasion. The *Maharaja* had collected 40,526 pounds of tea from the Saktim and Ilam tea plantations to be delivered to the Gurkhas in the front in the Egyptian and the Mesopotamian front.¹²² A third occasion was seen in the early months of 1915 when the Nepalese Premier despatched one pound of tea along with one pound of sweets and a box of cigarettes to the 893 Gurkha soldiers ailing in the hospitals of Europe.¹²³ Equally significant was the offer of 5,000 maunds of cardamoms (40,000 pounds) from Ilam to serve as a recipe for tea and a "mouth-wash" for the Gurkha soldiers fighting in the front.¹²⁴

The Gurkha soldiers had to fight against two enemies in Europe: the Germans and the hostile European winter. The *Maharaja*, therefore, decided to send woollen blankets and jackets to the Gurkha soldiers fighting in Europe. The first offer of blankets by Nepal came in December 1914; but

121. From *Maharaja* to Resident J. Manners Smith, Dec. 10, 1914, Jan. 16, 1915; from Resident to *Maharaja*, Jan. 11, 1915. *Basta* No. 64, *Meshil* No. 213, File No. A 62, 1914/1915.

122. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident S.F. Bayley, Jan. 27, March 25, 1918; Major E.D. Thurston, Ast. Resident in Nepal to *Maharaja* March 23, 1918. *Basta* No. 64. *Meshil* No. 14, File No. La 22. 1974/1918.

123. See *Pioneer*, "War Notes", June 3, 1915, p. 13; also the document titled "Nepal and the Great War", p. 15, *op. cit.*, footnote No. 115.

124. From *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, Dec. 10, 1914, Jan. 16, 1915; also from Resident to *Maharaja*, Jan. 11, 1915 *Basta* 64, *Meshil* No. 2, 3, File No. A62, 1914/1915.

it was incidental. Several newspapers carried the story of the Nepalese Premier donating Tibeto-Nepalese blankets to the British Gurkha regiments in the front; and it was gratefully accepted by the Viceroy. It is true that the Nepalese Premier did take this occasion to contradict the report, yet, was kind enough to send 2,000 pieces of Tibeto-Nepalese blankets.¹²⁵ immediately and 2,000 pieces in the course of a month.¹²⁶ As the war drew to a close Nepal had already sent 8,122 blankets and 200 jackets.¹²⁷ It is interesting to note that in 1915 alone Nepal had sent 4,720 blankets to the front.¹²⁸

Another valuable contribution made by Nepal was the supply of timber for railway sleepers. It was the request by the Government of India for the timber of Sarda Valley of Nepal to overcome the shortage for railway sleepers that compelled Nepal to fulfil the demand.¹²⁹ Accordingly, the Government of Nepal offered 200,000 railway sleepers to serve for broad gauge and meter gauge railways as sleepers and bed legs.¹³⁰

125. The Tibetans call the blankets *pakhis* while the Nepalese prefer to call them *jhum radis*.

126. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, Dec. 13, 1914; from Resident to *Maharaja*, Dec. 13, 1914. *Basta* No. 64, *Meshil* No. 4, File No. 2, *Go, Kha*.

127. See a letter titled "Estimate of Monetary Value of the Assistance Rendered by Nepal in the Great War". E, No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 10, 1974/1918.

128. A letter from Resident J. Manners Smith to *Maharaja*, Jan. 8, 29, 1915; from *Maharaja* to the Resident, Dec. 8, 1916, Jan. 26, 1917; from Resident to *Maharaja*, Jan. 16, 1917, Jan. 26, 1917. *Basta* No. 64, *Meshil* No. 7, File No. Y 8, 2 *Go, Kha*.

129. See a Memorandum from the GI Foreign Political Dept. April 1918 contained in a letter from S.F. Bayley to *Maharaja* Chandra, April 6, 1918, *Ibid*.

130. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident S.F. Bayley, April 17, 1918; also a report from the extraction of sleepers and other materials from Sarda Valley Forests of Nepal 1919-1920. *Basta* No. 64, *Meshil* No. 17, File No. U, 10, 1975/1918. The royalty Nepal took for the timber was twelve anas per cubic feet or Rs. 2.4 anas per sleeper. Though the royalty was a little high the Government of India did accept it.

When India was hit by a shortage of silver for coining purpose the Government of Nepal as well as the Nepalese nobles helped to solve the crisis in 1917 and 1918. Nepal on these occasions managed to send one crore and one lakhs (\$200,000) of British India rupees and 25,00,000 of Nepalese coins direct from the Government's treasury.¹³¹ This was a very timely assistance for the war scare had driven the affluent section of the Indian society into a craze for buying silver and gold in exchange for paper currency. This was not all, the Nepalese Premier was also able to collect 28 binoculars, which was sent very promptly to the Mathematical Instrument Office of Calcutta.¹³² This, in fact, came in response to the appeal of the Commander-in-Chief of India carried in the newspapers.

iii. Offer of Machine-Guns and Mechanics

It was in April 1915 the Nepalese Premier, besides praying for the glory and victory of the British arms offered a complete battery of 31 Vicker's Maxim machine-guns with tripods for the gracious acceptance of the King and Emperor to be used in war.¹³³ Incidentally, the figure corresponded to the number of machine-guns Nepal wanted to buy during Premier Chandra's visit of England in 1908; but Britain had withheld her permission. George V inspected the machine-guns sent by Nepal on June 28, 1915 amidst a brief ceremony in the Buckingham palace. The ceremony took place at 2:20 p.m. on April 22, 1915. It was James Dunlop Smith, the political A.D.C. to the Secretary of State for India, who presented the guns to the Emperor.

131. *Op.cit.*, footnote No. 127; also a document compiled by the Foreign Department of Nepal, *op. cit.*, footnote No. 115; Perceval Landon, *Nepal*, Vol. II. *op. cit.*, p. 134.

132. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident S.F. Bayley, August 28, Nov. 10, 1917; also Resident to *Maharaja*, August 27, 1917, Sept. 14, 1917, *Basta* No. 64, *Meshil* No. 18, File No. U 9, 1974/1917.

133. A letter from *Maharaja* to Lord Stamfordham, Buckingham palace, April (?) 1915; *Daily Telegraph*, "Nepal's Fine Gift", April 28, 1915, p. 1; *The Indian*, April 30, 1915, p. 1.

Each machine-gun had a name plate inscribed which ran: "Presented by *Maharaja Chandra Shumsher Jung*". The British Monarch expressing his appreciation at the generosity of the doner ordered the guns to be handed to the Gurkha army serving in France and Flanders.¹³⁴ One of the machine-guns presented by the Premier was knocked by the enemy's shell after fifteen months of operation, with only the name plate remaining with the Fourth Battalion of East Yorkshire regiment, to perpetuate the memory of the generous offer. The *Maharaja* was deeply touched by the communication of the sentimental note.¹³⁵ The last official mention of the constant use of the machine-guns was in the early months of 1917.¹³⁶

The same year the *Maharaja* also offered the services of 340 mechanics to the British Government of India to be used in the manufacture of ammunitions. These mechanics were categorized into four classes: first, second, third and fourth with a composition of 13,51,105,171 respectively.¹³⁷ The Premier, however, at the very outset admitted the humbleness of the offer in a few carefully chosen sentences.

Of course as I have told you that we cannot boast of having got such hands as are really first class mechanics, and the addition of these our men to the vast number of superior qualification available in India may mean a drop in the ocean. ¹³⁸

-
134. Telegram from King George V to the Premier of Nepal, June 28, 1915; from *Maharaja* to George V, May 1, 1915, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 1, *Kha*, 1970/1914. Also *Daily Telegraph* "Nepal's Fine Gift", April 28, 1915, p. 1; *The Graphic*, May 22, 1915, p. 1.
135. A letter from James Dunlop Smith to *Maharaja Chandra*, Dec. 6, 1916; from *Maharaja* to James Dunlop Smith, Jan. 3, 1917. *Ibid.*
136. A letter from James R. Dunlop Smith to *Maharaja Chandra*, Jan. 7, 1917; from *Maharaja* to the Secretary of State for India, Feb. 15, 1917. *Ibid.*
137. See E. No. 2 *Poka* No. 63. *Daily Chronicles*, August 8, 1915, p. 9; *Sussex Mail*, July 28, 1915, p. 11; *Birmingham Post*, May 20, 1915, p. 10; *Scotsman*, May 20, 1915, p. 11.
138. A letter from *Maharaja Chandra* to Resident J. Manners Smith, July 20, 1915. E. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 5, 1970/1915.

The *Maharaja*, thus, envisioned a preliminary training for the mechanics in India.¹³⁹ This offer, like many others the Premier had made during the war, was unconditional. Yet, he hoped that the Government of India would provide them free living quarters near the place of work, for their salary was taken care of by the Government of Nepal.¹⁴⁰

Among the 340 mechanic offered by Nepal the Government of India availed 71 of them. The first batch of Nepalese workmen were already in India under the leadership of Captain Bhakta Bahadur by October 1915; and the Government of India asked thirty to forty more of them to work in the munition factories.¹⁴¹ Nepal was more than happy to send thirty more of her first class mechanics.¹⁴²

Thus, Nepal went out of her way to help an ally in war with men, materials and armaments to an extent which has only a few parallels in history. Nepal's sacrifices in the war is, perhaps, best expressed in these lines of a contemporary observer.

Put in a few words, it means that to the last man and to the last *mohar* this mountain kingdom without necessity or obligation of any kind and knowing fully well the results to herself should the Central Empire win the day, stood by our side from the first day to until the last.¹⁴³

THE INTRIGUES OF WAR

A modern warfare is fought on many fronts and the politics of propoganda coupled with hidden intrigues

139. The *Maharaja* noted that the first, second and third class mechanics would give a fair satisfaction in their work after a little preliminary training; while the fourth calss workmen may require two to three months training before they may be expected to give such satisfaction. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 5, 1970/1915, enclosed with a letter from the *Maharaja* July 20, 1915.

140. *Op. cit.*, footnote No. 138.

141. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to J. Manners Smith, October 26, 1915, *Ibid.*

142. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to J. Manners Smith, October 28, 1915, *Ibid.*

143. Perceval Landon, *Nepal*. Vol. II. *op. cit.*, p. 154. .

constitutes one of its vital aspects. There are moments when the intrigues of war do triumph over the superiority in material and psychological prowess. The German engine of propoganda in Nepal can be thematically categorized into two distinct phases. The first phase may be labeled as "the stick and the carrot" phase. The second was the the "Carrot Phase", when, the stick was removed leaving only the sweet "Carrot" in the palm of the Nepalese.

i. The "Stick and the Carrot" Phase

The sole German objective in this phase was to draw Nepal within the magnetic pull of the Central Powers by the twofold dilectical processes: first brainwashing the Nepalese leadership by the dazzling might of the German power and secondly, holding to her a rich reward of heavy dividents if she was to join the Central Powers. The inauguration of this phase of German diplomacy was a natural outcome of the early success in the war. They resorted to the medium of radio broadcasts and secret letters to achieve their desired objective.

The radio broadcasts for the Gurkha soldiers was an usual feature of the German propoganda. Its chief objective was to depict the superiority of the Germans over the British; and to provoke Nepal to take up arms against their traditional enemy, the English, thus help in the process of uprooting colonial rule from the subcontinent. The following broadcast of the Germans may be taken as the most illustrative:

The English are the enemies of your fore fathers.....
 Save and protect yourself and taking the whole of India under your hands join it with Nepal. If your troops go to fight the Germans they will never be able to return alive. Drive the English out of India.....make your king really understand so that he may not destroy your army. Germany will win and the Feringes will suffer death.¹⁴⁴

144 . An undated German Radio broadcast during the early phase of the war (1914) preserved in *Munshi Khana* (Foreign Department), Nepal E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 1, *Kha*. 1970/1914.

These radio broadcasts were also supplemented by the secret intriguing letters by the Germans. Three such letters are available for scrutiny and analysis. One of them is addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of Nepal and the others to the Nepalese Government in general. All these letters are in Hindi and the contents are virtually identical. Three inter-connected themes run parallel in each of these correspondences. First, the English, who stand contrasted with the Nepalese in their spiritual and social values, are the traditional enemies of Nepal. Thus, when some calamity fell upon her the English would never come to her aid. Second, Nepal should take the lead in overthrowing the yoke of British imperialism from the subcontinent. India, when freed, would be a part of Nepal, thus she would be benefitted with an annual revenue of 30 crores; and finally as the German victory was a foregone conclusion Nepal should not waste her valuable resources in men and materials by championing in vain the British cause. She should rather divert her passionate energy to uproot the English from the Hindu soil. All the three letters in part ran

You must convince your 'mad king' that he should not waste his army for the victory of the Germans is certain and the Ferangi will be defeated¹⁴⁵

ii. The "Carrot" Phase

The "carrot" phase dawned in 1917, when the Germans after meeting severe reverses in the European and the Afro-Asian front were, in fact on the defensive. The

145. A German letter in Hindi addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of Nepal, October, 23, 1914; a German letter in Hindi to the Nepal Government, October 23, 1914; another undated letter in Hindi. All these letters are preserved in the *Munshi Khana*. See E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 1, *Kha*, 1970/1914. The most typical letter is the one addressed to the Commander-in-Chief in Nepal. Every paragraph opens with the traditional Nepalese expression "Shri Pasupate Nama" and appeals to the heroic nature of the Nepalese people in an attempt to make them realize that the English were her traditional enemies— thus Nepalese interests were not secure in their hand.

communication between Germany and Nepal in this phase is marked by the conspicuous absence of the expressions like the "mad king" and the phrases like the Gurkha soldiers will melt before German prowess. It basically consisted of wooing Nepal so as to take her out of the Allied orbit, by even bestowing the *Shahansahi* title of the Emperor of India. This phase was more devoted to the sending of the secret letters by the German Government to the King and the Prime Minister of Nepal through her secret agents in Afganistan. Kabul, thus, became the origin of the German intrigues in Kathmandu. These letters were, infact, despatched through the medium of Prince Nasrullah Khan, the brother of the King of Afganistan. Mahindra Pratap, the reputed Indian revolutionary served as the German agent in South Asia. He chose his close confidant, Captain Teja Singh, to serve as his emissary to deliver the letter from Chancellor Bethmann Hollway, on the behalf of the German Imperial Government, to *Maharajadhiraja* and the Prime Minister of Nepal. He also carried with him the personal letter of Mahindra Pratap to the Neplese Premier. Though the letter from the Imperial German Chancellor is not dated,¹⁴⁶ yet, the other letters carry the date June 1917. Teja Singh arrived in Kathmandu on September 1917 and in an audience with the *Maharaja* delivered the letter from Chancellor Bethmann Hollway. Before delivering the letter the emissary took an oath in the name of the mother earth and heaven attesting its genuiness and in the process also received assurances from the *Maharaja* that no harm would fall upon him.¹⁴⁷

The German letter opened with a glowing tribute to the gallant independent people of Nepal. But at the same time did not hesitate to caution her that the growing British hegemony in South Asia would adversely affect her sovereignty and independence. It further informed the

146. From the circumstantial evidences one can come to a conclusion that the letter was in all probability written in 1917.

147. See the abstract of conversation between *Maharaja* Chandra and the British Resident S.F. Bayley, Sept. 9, 1917. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 55.

Maharajadhiroja that Afghanistan had laid down her sword on the side of Germany, Austro-Hungary and Turkey to free India from the clutches of the British. The letter specifically requested Nepal to assume the required leadership in the struggle of the South Asian people against British imperialism. The letter in part ran

I have come to know the entire Indian population are trying to set up a big free state by destroying the abominable British rule. In this war of independence the Rajas and the people of India look upon you as their leader and it is only through your help that their wishes will be fulfilled. 148

The personal letter of *Raja Mahindra Pratap* to the King of Nepal did set the tone for the imperial letter. It opens with the analogy that the whole world was then being churned; and like in the churning of the ocean in the mythical past both the poison and nectar were freely flowing in the process. The British and their allies have drunk the poison and they are being defeated, while the Germans and the Central powers have drunk the nectar and are "steering the world like the waxing man."¹⁴⁹

It further implores the King of Nepal to join the *dharma yuddha* that is being fought by the Indian *Rajas* to uproot the British from the Hindu soil. The sentiment of the Indian revolutionaries is perhaps best expressed in these lines.

I write it plainly if you wish to keep alive Hindu religion and free the sacred land of Hindustan from the British and protect her from other lions then arm yourself with religion and soon engage in a religious war and unify all

148. A letter from the German Chancellor Bethmann Hollwy to *Maharajadhiraja* Prithivi Bir Bikram Shah. Undated (1917 ?). It was shown by the *Maharaja* to the Resident in Nepal on Sept. 9, 1917. It was then kept as a souvenir in the *Munshi Khana*. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 55.

149. A letter from Mahindra Pratap to *Maharajadhiraja*, Prithivi Bir Bikram Shah. Not dated, but indirect sources show that it was written in June 1917.

India. You should establish a free state there. It is auspicious sign that the whole world considers the Maharajadhiraja as their leader. Germany has given to you the Badsahi title of His Majesty.¹⁵⁰

The object of the imperial letter is clear and simple namely to divert Nepal's energy from fighting against the Central Powers to a religious war against the British in South Asia. In conclusion the letter implored the *Maharajadhiraja* of Nepal to seize the opportunity of leadership without delay for such opportunity seldom came. This spirit permeates in another German letter to the Nepalese Premier. It depicts Nepal as "the crown of India" and as such should cast aside the Allied cause and help free India from the blood sucking teeth of the British—the very foes of the Holy Land and its civilization.¹⁵¹

Teja Singh, who was accompanied by a Muslim attendant also gave an additional information to the Nepalese Premier about Afghanistan, Persia and the surge of militant nationalism in India. The *Maharaja* was asked to follow the Afghan model and steer the wheel of leadership in the Indian War of Independence against the British. He was reminded of the Nepalese proverb "satchya maray ek chhail, jhuthaya yintaya jaya" or "the truthful goes by leaps the liar counts his steps."¹⁵² The tone that Teja Singh displayed during his audience with the Nepalese Premier was characteristic of the German propoganda and the spirit of the Indian militant nationalists of the period. He ridiculed the very fabric of British justice and their so-called English magnanimity in these emotional words:

You will be sinking lower and lower become poorer and poorer and loose your strength by keeping friendship with the British. ¹⁵³

150. *Ibid.*

151. A letter from Mahindra Pratap to the *Maharaja* of Nepal, June 15, 1917. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 55.

152. See a note on additional information supplied by Teja Singh to *Maharaja* Chandra dated Sept. 10, 1917. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 53.

153. *Ibid.*

Though the bait of becoming the ruler of the whole of Indian was exceedingly tempting, yet, the sixth sense of the *Maharaja* fully convinced him that the future of Nepal was secure in the friendship with Britain. The Government of Nepal, far from joining the Central powers, kept the British well informed about the smallest details of the German intrigues in Nepal. The Government of India was very grateful to the *Maharaja* for handing over the original letters from the Imperial German Chancellor and *Raja* Mahindra Pratap. The British Government knew too well that the letters constituted a part of the general intrigues of the Germans to provoke the South Asians to revolt against the *Raj*.¹⁵⁴

The role of Teja Singh was very crucial in these communications. The Government of India believed that the real name of Teja Singh was Kala Singh, an absconder in the Lahore conspiracy case. He would have been arrested if *Maharaja* had extradited him to the Government of India. But the *Maharaja* was true to his words and provided a safe passage to Teja Singh across Nepal. The Indian revolutionary was accompanied with an *athparia* (security officer), Lieutenant Bhatta Man of Birganj. He had clear instructions to take him across the Nepalese border keeping him away from the eyes of the British police and buy him a railway ticket to Muzzufapur or Darbanga or Lucknow or any other place where he desired to go.¹⁵⁵

Earlier when the Great War broke out the Government of Nepal placed restrictions on the movement of H. Reffer, a German national, residing in Nepal, for his home country

154. From Resident S.F. Bayley to Secretary of State for GI, Foreign Department, Sept. 11, 1917; from Sec. of State GI, Foreign dept. to Resident, Sept. 29, 1917; From S.F. Bayley to *Maharaja*, Nov. 29, 1917, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 55.

155. See a top secret letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Lieutenant Bhatta Man (Birganj) Aswin 3, *roj* 3, 1914 (Sept. 1917). Bhatta Man was further instructed to seal the letter in the envelope and send it to the *Maharaja* with a warning that his mission should not be revealed and if he did he would be punished according to his caste.

was at war with Britain. He was asked to abide by the four point instructions given to him by the Secretary of the *Maharaja*.

- a) You will please register yourself with the British Resident in Nepal, and report to him periodically if required.
- b) You should totally refrain from sending any information on naval, military or other matters.
- c) You will please hand over to the said Resident all arms and ammunitions, if any.
- d) You are required to take a license with you while travelling out of British India.¹⁵⁶

In this way *Maharaja* Chandra foiled all traces of German intrigues in Nepal. He took all precautions against intrigues launched either in Kathmandu or Kabul and passed on all information he was able to collect either in German broadcasts or through the German agents or emissaries either from India or Afghanistan. He did not fail to communicate even the slightest trace of the German intrigues in Nepal to the British Resident during several meetings he had with him between 1915 to 1917.

156. A letter from Marichi Man Singh, Private Secretary to the *Maharaja*, to H. Reiffer, German citizen residing in Nepal, August 29, 1914. *Basta* No. 63, File No. 1 *Ka*, 1970/1914.

PART III
THIRD ANGLO - AFGHAN WAR:
NEPAL'S REACTION AND THE BRITISH RESPONSE

Nepal and the Anglo-Afghan War: Test of Friendship Under Fatigue and Distress

Preface

Even before the reverberations of the Great War had ceased and the stitches of the wound had been removed Nepalese contingent was again on the move to stem the rolling tide of the Afghan invasion in India. The month was June and the year: 1919. It is true that the Nepalese troops, skilled in mountain-warfare, were best suited to accomplish this task, yet, from the psychological perspective and physical fitness, they were least prepared. The reasons are not far to seek. The Great War, to say the least, had made the soldiers homesick and war-weary. The soldiers who had just returned from the theaters of War were in the process of soothing their war-weary minds and war-torn limbs, or to use the country expression were busy "licking up their wounds." Many of them, who had just returned from the jaws of death, had even lost their faintest hope to live. If any hope lingered in them it was the hope of never being asked to return to such theaters of war again. Their only wish was to rest! and recollect!! A contemporary observer could see them sitting by their *agenos* (fireplace) with corn meal mush in one hand and vegetable soup in another absorbed in the process of attempting to loose the world.¹ It is within this physical and

1. For a vivid glimpse of Nepalese national mood after the Great War see a letter from *Maharaja Joodha* to G.L. Betham, December 14, 1941 "The Resigter of Letters from the Nepalese Premier to the British Resident from May 14, 1941 to March 22 1942", *FMAN*; also Perceval Landon, *Nepal* Vol. II (Kathmandu : Ratna Pustak. 1976 (reprint), p. xiii, 146.

psychological framework the Nepalese help to the British in the Third Anglo-Afghan war has to be analysed and assessed.

Nepal was always eager to help the British Government of India, when the security of North-West Frontier was threatened by the Afghan invasion. Her first offer of help in this connection was in February 1881, but the Government of India declined the offer.² However, during the second decade of this century events moved so swiftly and suddenly in the subcontinent that the Government of India was more than happy to accept Nepal's military cooperation. Three elements, namely, the growth of militant agitation in India, the depletion of the regular Indian army due to war and the unexpected flow of events in Afghanistan, which culminated into the Afghan invasion of India made Nepal's offer of help more than a boon to the British Government of India.

The Scene

The assassination of Habibullah Khan in the month of February 1919 was followed by a period of intrigues, plots and counter-plots for the throne. A brief span of political unrest that was discernable saw the emergence of two Amirs in Afghanistan: Nasrulla Khan and Amanullah Khan. The former, who had the support of Jellabad, was the King's own brother, while the latter, the third son of the King was in control of the Kabul region and the national treasury. However, in about a month or to be more specific on March 10, 1919, Nasrulla Khan resigned in favor of his nephew Amanullah. The new Amir upon accession moved in two direction. On the physical side he drew his sword and promised never to seathe it until he had traced his father's assasins,³ while on the political plane he became fully determined to teach the English a lesson.

2. See the Speech of *Maharaja* Ranaudip Singh Rana before the Viceroy of India, February 1, 1881, *Basta* No. 42.

3. A murder in Afghanistan is taken to be a family feud and the members of murdered family were to avenge the dead sooner or later.

To achieve this objective, the help of Russia both in terms of men and materials was indispensable.

The British objective in Afghanistan was the security of India against Russia. With this objective in view the British invaded Afghanistan and this led to Anglo-Afghan Wars of 1839-42 and 1878-1880. It was in this period Russia was expanding southward and in the process occupied Caucasus, the Trans-Caspia, Turkestan (Turkmenia), and Khanates of Central Asia.⁴ With the occupation of Turkestan on the northern border of Afghanistan Russia came within the sphere of British interest.

Anglo-Russian arrangements regarding Afghanistan necessitated a series of agreements to create an Anglo-Russian *detante*. Accordingly, working-sessions were held in London (1855), Khamiate (1886), St. Petersburg (1887), Chehl Duktaran (1893) and Pamirs (1895), all of which culminated into the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.⁵ In summary, the Convention had declared Afghanistan outside Russia's sphere of influence and Great Britain promised not to annex or interfere with the developments in Afghanistan. Amanullah Khan, however, could not fathom into the complexities in the relationship between Russia and Britain.

Nepalese Reaction and the British Grateful Response

The murder of the Afghan Amir Habibullah Khan took Nepal by surprise. But the sixth sense of the *Maharaja* of Nepal was quick to tell him that it was the friendship of the Amir with the British that cost him his life. Further his intuition alluded him that the new Amir would be at best hostile to the British. Accordingly, he even expressed his willingness to put an end to the demobilization process

4. Sergei Pushkarev, *The Emergence of Modern Russia, 1801-1917*, trans. Robert H. MacNeal, Tova Yedlin (New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 337-343.

5. Nake M. Kamrany, "Afghanistan Under the Soviet occupation". *Current History*, Vol. 81, No. 475, May, 1982, pp. 220-21.

of the Nepalese contingent returning home after the Great War, if the Government of India anticipated any trouble from Afghanistan. The, then, British Resident in Kathmandu, Colonel W.F.T. O' Connor, though sincerely felt that the demobilization of the Nepalese contingent could go on as scheduled, yet, thought it more prudent to communicate the sentiments of the *Maharaja* to the Government of India. The opinion of the Government of India only helped to support the firm conviction of the Resident, which in part ran

The Government of India, while appreciating the friendly spirit exhibited by Your Excellency in making the offer of Military aid desires to assure you that there is no political reason why demobilization of the Nepal army should not proceed.⁶

After a lapse of a little more than a month, the Nepalese Premier also wrote a personal letter to the Viceroy of India on June 5, 1919 where he pointed out that the internal peace and security of India was a matter of grave concern to Nepal for she had a contiguous border with India. He further added that whenever peace and security of India is threatened the British could count upon Nepal's "wholehearted assistance."⁷ The Viceroy, while maintaining the Government of India's previous stand, yet prudently thanked the *Maharaja* for the promise of further assistance, which he would be more than happy to avail when necessity arose.⁸

However, the unfolding of future events proved that the *Maharaja* was right for in less than a month the Government of India changed its mind. Accordingly, as early as April 20, 1919, the British Government of India asked whether Nepal was willing to stand by her offer to

6. From W.F.T.O'Connor to *Maharaja* Chandra, March 15, 1919, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65 *Ka*.

7. A letter from Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy of India, June 5 1919, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65 *Ka*, 1919; also *Statesman*, July 11, 1919, p. 4.

8. A letter from Viceroy Lord Chelmsford to the *Maharaja* of Nepal, June 28, 1919, *Ibid*.

help India militarily in case of the Afghan invasion.⁹ It was the incidents like the tragic Amritsar massacre of the Punjab on April 13, 1919 and the need to drop bombs by the airforce on the agitated crowd at Guzranwala that made the British Government desperate for any kind of help that Nepal could possibly offer on the dawn of the Afghan invasion.¹⁰

The reply of the *Maharaja* was, perhaps, more positive than what the British Government of India had expected for the Nepalese placed at the disposal of the Government of India a contingent of 6,000 Nepalese finest troops. As regards timing, he showed his perfect readiness to make 2,000 of his men available within a short span of two weeks and the rest would be sent later.¹¹ The Viceroy of India then requested the *Maharaja* to keep the Nepalese troops on the alert, waiting to cross the Indo-Nepal border when the green signal was given. In such an event the Government of India further outlined the following procedure:

1. that those troops which are at once available as well as the cadres of such units as may be selected for the contingent, should march direct to Raxaul, and should carry with them arms and equipments of men who are on leave.
2. that those on leave should proceed direct to the railway station, which is nearest to their homes and should be railed thence to Raxaul, where they should rejoin the men of their respective units.¹²

9. See the abstract trans. of conversation recorded in Nepali between *Maharaja* Chandra and Resident W.F.T. O'Connor, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65 K, 1919.

10. For more on militant agitation in India see His Majesty's Stationery Service, *From East India* (Disturbances in the Punjab, etc.): *Report of the Committee Appointed by the Government of India to Investigate the Disturbances in the Punjab, etc., the Firing at Jallianwalla Bag* (Parliamentary Papers, c.m.d., 68 of 1920), (London: Her Majesty's Stationery office, 1920), pp. 112-13, 132-33.

11. Abstract trans. of conversation recorded in Nepali between *Maharaja* Chandra and Resident W.F.T.O'Connor, April 20, 1919. *op. cit.*, footnote no. 9.

12. See telegram from the Government of India to the British Resident quoted in a letter of W.F.T.O'Connor to *Maharaja* Chandra April, 28, 1919 E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65 Ka, 1919.

The Government of India hoped to receive a speedy answer to the following questions, namely, the names of units to be selected, the composition of the men, officers and followers and animals; and the program of arrival.¹³

The *Maharaja* at this juncture, however, showed his extreme reluctance to keep his 6,000 troops on the alert in the Indo-Nepal border in a stand by posture as a contingency measure to thwart the emergence of any trouble from the Afghan Amir. He further argued that the exact composition of the units available at a particular time was always uncertain for it was almost exclusively governed by the furlough and the cropping seasons, as well as the nature of the help desired. To sum up, the *Maharaja* pointed out that the Government of Nepal would take up the issue of helping the British only if the situation in the North-West Frontier took a serious turn. In addition, he also asserted that he could at the moment collect 2,000 soldiers to be despatched to India but they could not be kept in suspense for an indefinite period for they had just returned after spending four long years of garrison and combat duties in India.¹⁴

However, on May 6, 1919 the Nepalese Premier received an urgent telegram from the Government of India, which contained a specific request for military help for the situation in the North-West Frontier had taken a turn for the worse due to the belligerent attitude of the Amir of Afghanistan.¹⁵ The Government of India anticipated Nepal's cooperation in two directions. First, it hoped that Nepal would take immediate steps to despatch to India such assistance, as lay within the limits of her power, in the form of troops. Secondly, it expected Nepal's help in speeding the process of the return of the men of the British

13. *Ibid.*

14. See abstract trans. of Conversation between *Maharaja* Chandra and J. Manners Smith, May 1, 1919, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65 *Ka*, 1919.

15. For the details of the telegram see the file titled "Afghan War: 1919"; E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 3, File No. 12, 1919; also E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65 *Ka*, 1919.

Gurkha regiments, who were on leave or furlough, with the exception of those who were on sick leave or demobilization order. To be more specific, the Government of India suggested that the Government of Nepal should issue a proclamation asking them to proceed to the railway stations closest to their homes, where arrangements would be made to rail them to their nearest units.¹⁶

The reponse of the Nepalese Premier to the above telegram was unexpectedly positive. He first of all placed before the Government of India two battalions of his finest troops; and secondly sent a promptly urgent order to all the local officers in the hills with instructions to proclaim by the beat of the drum for a general mobilization of the British Gurkha regiments who were on leave or furlough.¹⁷ The *Maharaja* however, was careful enough to insert a note of caution, namely, the military assistance he promised to render sprang from "special consideration" and should not be taken "to form a precedent."¹⁸

The Nepalese Premier was, very conscious of the fact that the time was against him. First, the soldiers who had just been recovering themselves from the frenzy of the Great War were in no mood to plunge into another; and secondly, it was very inadvisable and even suicidal to march the troops across the *aul* (malaria) infested terai lands in the heat of the summer.¹⁹ Nevertheless, he decided to take this calculated risk hoping that all would be well that ended well.

In spite of the hostile climatic conditions, the Nepalese Premier tried his best to make the journey of his troops

16. *Ibid.*

17. *The Gazettee of India Extraordinary*, June 21, 1919. Notification No. 3008-I.B. (Foreign Pol. Dept.); also *Pioneer*, May 24, 1919, p. 4.

18. A letter from *Maharaja Chandra* to Resident W.F.T.O' Connor, May 8, 1919, E. No. 2, *Poka No. Ka*, 65, 1919; also notification No. 3008-I.B., issued by Foreign Political Dept., in *Poka No. 66 Ka* 1919 in E. No. 2.

19. *Daily Telegraph*, June 7, 1919, p. 8; *Englishman*, September 5, 1919, p. 4.

as comfortable as possible. In an effort to give relief to the troops from the heat while traveling in the train the *Maharaja* had made arrangements for the supply of fruits worth 200 rupees for every battalion²⁰ and one hundred dozen bottles of soda water.²¹ He also was able to obtain small coins for the Nepalese contingent of about 6,000 rupees, from Motihari Treasury Office of India.²²

It was on June 2, 1919 a contingent of two thousand Nepalese troops divided into two battalions left Kathmandu.²³ But before the departure the *Maharaja* gave a traditional farewell in the parade ground of Tundikhel. The Nepalese Premier in his speech took great pains to convince the troops that their stay in India, unlike the previous occasion, would be a short one. He expressed his confidence that the Afghan forces would melt away before the vast inexhaustable resources of the British. Two other strains of thought were discernable in his address. First, he made it clear that it was an ancient Hindu tradition to help a friend who was in trouble; and second, they could leave their motherland with an open and carefree mind to uphold the honor of their country for he would take a

20. See the *Poka* titled "Food for the Nepalese Troops en route to India." A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident O'Connor, May 30, 1919, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65, *Ka*, File No. 9, 1919.

21. The small changes requested by the *Maharaja* from the Motihari Treasury of India consisted of:

one anna pieces	rupees two thousand
two anna pieces	rupees two thousand
four anna pieces	rupees two thousand

For detail see the File titled "Small Coins for the Nepalese soldiers". A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident W.F.T. O'Connor May 22, 1919; from Resident to *Maharaja* Chandra, May 26, 1919. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65, 1919.

22. From *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident O'Connor, June 3, 1919, *Ibid*.

23. See the summary of the Afghan War in the file titled "Afghan War and Nepal", E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 10, 1919; also a letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, May 31, 1919. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65, File No. 9, 1919.

personal care of their hearths and homes. His speech in part ran

Let not the care of your home and family weigh on you, for as in the previous occasion of your departure for India it should be our endeavour and we promise to take care of your near and dear ones in your absence. Our earnest prayer for your wellbeing will constantly attend you... I should always be expecting to welcome you back at no very distant date for with the vast inexhaustable resource and the destructive weapons of these days at the disposal of the British the war cannot but be a sharp, swift and decisive one. In the mean time I shall be thinking of you always as my dear children. May the Almighty speed you happily on your way.²⁴

The units of the Nepalese contingent were to be equipped with Short Lee Enfield Rifles, Bandolie Lier Belts and twenty rounds of Pouch ammunition for rifles. Tents and other auxiliary equipments also followed. Each soldier took him a pair of *khaki* service clothes and a pair of boots. A *Vaidya* (physician) also accompanied each battalion.²⁵ The two thousand Nepalese troops, in fact, belonged to the Second Rifles and the Pasupati Prasad Regiment. Both the battalions were under the seasoned command of General Padma Shumsher; while the *Maharaja's* own trusted son General Baber Shumsher resumed his office as an Inspector General in the Army

24. For a full text of the speech in Nepali see E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65, *Ka*, File No. 9, 1919. The speech is written in long hand with indigenous black ink and a bamboo pen. The English rendering is mine.

25. See a letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident W.F.T. O'Connor, Nov. 9, 1919, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65 *Ka*, File No. 9, 1919; For more on the movement of the Nepalese troops see a printed confidential pamphlet. Superintendent Government Printing, *Program of the Movement of Troops of Nepalese Contingent, June 1919* (Calcutta : Superintendent Government Printing, 1919), pp. 1-20. It consists of three parts. The subtitles are : 1. Part I : Explanation. 2. Part II : Detailed Strength of Battalions and the Train Accomodation Required. 3. Part III : Abstract of Timetable; see also E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, file titled "Afghan War : 1919".

Head Quarters of India to advise in the matters relating to the contingent.²⁶ The Government of India had earlier made a specific request to send two generals: one to stay in Simla and the other to accompany the troops to the North West Frontier Province. The Government of Nepal thus, made arrangements accordingly.²⁷ In addition, the *Maharaja* set afoot the process of mobilization of a larger contingent for India.

As the Nepalese contingent was on its way towards India, the Indian Commander-in-Chief in a note of June 11, 1919 to the Nepalese Premier expressed his supreme delight to have again the Nepalese troops serve along with the Indian troops at the hour crisis. He further thanked the *Maharaja* for his ability to collect two battalions of his finest troops within such a short notice. "This", he continued, "was a reflection of the highest credit to the organization of the Nepalese army."²⁸ He concluded the note by asserting the *Maharaja's* nephew and his son as well as the members of the Nepalese contingent were not strangers to India but would have many friends to welcome them.²⁹ Keeping this in mind, the Governor General-in-Council had made a public arrangement to extend a cordial welcome to the contingent on its arrival

26. Those who accompanied General Padma Shumsher were : Captain Narsingh Bahadur Basnyat (Brigade Major), Captain Narahari Narsingh Rana and Lieutenant Kali Bahadur Chand(A.D.C.); while General Baber Shumsher took with him Lieutenant Colonel Gambir Jung Thapa and Captain Khagendra Bikram Rana (A.D.C.). For more information see a detailed information on the officers and followers in the List C. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65, File No. 9, 1919; also Perceval Landon, *Nepal* Vol. II (Kathmandu : Ratna Pustak : 1976 (reprint), pp. 146-47.

27. See the correspondence from the Government of India to the Government of Nepal contained in a letter from Resident W.F.T.O' Connor to *Maharaja* Chandra, May 18, 1919, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65, *Ka*, File No. 9, 1919.

28. See a note addressed by the Commander-in-Chief, India, to *Maharaja* Chandra, June 11, 1919. *Ibid*,

29. *Ibid*,

in India: and directed that a salute of 13 guns be fired to honor the generals visiting the military instalations in official capacity, in connection with the Nepalese troops.³⁰ This was a serious departure to the procedure of the total abstention of gun salutes to Nepalese generals in the world War II. The inclusion of this provision of the honor to the Nepalese Generals was, perhaps, the expression of total gratification of India for the help rendered by Nepal in moments of extreme stress and strain.

Before the middle of June 1919, the two battalions of the Nepalese contingent were in Albotabad, in India. The Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford took this occasion to thank the *Maharajadhiraja* and the Premier of Nepal for their quick and timely cooperation. His letter of June 28, 1919 in part ran

When the war with Afghanistan threatened I knew that I could rely on the support and cooperation of Nepal Government, and accordingly not hesitate to seek assistance once again. I am deeply grateful to Your Excellency for prompt assistance rendered in making known to the Gurkhas of the British regiment on leave in Nepal that a general mobilization had been ordered..... I am sure that the Nepalese troops will uphold the noble tradition of your race and will again display in whatever duties they are called upon the sterling qualities, which won them so well deserved a reputation on the last occasion they came to India.³¹

The Nepalese troops once again moved towards the North West Frontier Province. The Amir, seeing the advance of the Anglo-Nepalese division into his country, sought desperately to seek the assistance of the Soviet

30. See *the Gazette of India Extraordinary*, June 21, 1919, notification No. 300- I.B. (Foreign Political); also a letter from Lord Chelmsford, to *Maharaja* Chandra, Sept. 19, 1919. E. No. 2. *Poka* No. 65 *Ka*, File No. 9. 1919.

31. See a letter from Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy of India, to *Maharaja* Chandra, June 18, 1919; also from Lord Chelmsford to *Maharajadhiraja*, the King of Nepal June 25, 1919. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65 *Ka*, File No. 1919.

Russia. But the time was against him. Torn by the Civil War between the Reds and the Whites³², the best thing the Bolshevik regime of Lenin could do was to limit Russia's help in the form of "a letter of sympathy" to the Afghan people in their struggle against the British imperialism.³³ The Amir, who had banked upon Russia's material support, rushed to arrange an armistice with the British in a mood of disgust and desperation. This was shortly followed by the signing of the peace treaty with Afghanistan.³⁴

But to move a step back, the Nepalese contingent was given a warm reception in India. The Viceroy went to inspect the Nepalese contingent in Nowshera in the North West Frontier. Here the Governor General was deeply impressed by the martial tradition of the Gurkhas.³⁵ He later recalled his impressions in a brief letter to the Nepalese Premier, which partly ran

I myself had the honour to inspect the Pasupati Prasad Battalion in my visit to the North West Frontier Province of Nowshera and was very much struck by the soldierly

-
32. More on the Civil War in the Soviet Russia see William Henry Chamberlain, *The Russian Revolution, 1918-1921 : From the Civil War to the Consolidation of Power* Vol. II (New York : The Universal Library, 1965 (reprint), pp. 1-267; M.G. Stalin Gorkav, *The History of Civil War* (New York: International Publisher, 1935); also R.W. Petheybride, "The Bolshevik and the Technical Disorder", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 149, No. 116, 1971, pp. 410-24; Robert H. MacDowell, "Russian Revolution and the Civil War in Caucasus", *Russian Review*, Vol. 127, No. 4. p. 452; Stephen Ghram, "The Bolshevik Victory an After", *Contemporary Review* June 1920, No. 117 pp. 791-802; A E. Adams, "The Bolshevik and the Ukarian Front, 1918-1919", *Slavic East European Review*, Vol. 36, No. 87, pp. 396-417.
33. A letter from Moscow to Kabul, August 5, 1919, See *The Englishman*, August 8, 1919; also Nake Kamrany, "Afghanistan Under Soviet Occupation", *Current Htstory*, Vol. 81, No. 475, (May 1982), pp. 220-221.
34. For more on peace treaty with Afghanistan see Philip Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled India : The Guardians*, Vol. II (New York : Schoken Books, 1964 (reprint), pp. 229-30.
35. A more comprehensive account of the martial tradition of the Nepalese people is given in Prem R. Uprety *Nepal-Tibet Relations, 1850-1930 : Years of Hopes Challenges and Frustrations* (Kathmandu : Puga Nara; 1980), pp. 4-7.

appearance of the unit; I was pleased to meet Padma and Baber. I appreciate the sacrifice of Baber Shumsher who came to India shortly after the bereavement of his son.³⁵

Both the battalions were to join the Sixteenth Division of the Indian Army that was placed in the North West Frontier under the command of General William Beynon. This division as well as the Nepalese contingent were waiting for orders from the Head Quarters to advance towards Peshwar and possibly across the Khyber Pass. But at this critical juncture an armistice was arranged. The spirit of the Nepalese contingent, which was all tuned to march into Afghanistan is, perhaps, best expressed in these sentimental lines of General Beynon:

I expected the Division to receive orders to proceed towards Peshwar and possibly to Khyber where your men would have the opportunity for showing the enemy that the Gurkhas are better at hill fighting than any Pathan. Unfortunately the armistice was arranged, shortly to be followed by the signing of the peace treaty with Afghanistan. I trust that your regiment will return immediately to Nepal in time for the festival of Dussehra and they will in their home express disappointment of not having blooded their bayonets in Afghanistan.³⁷

The *Maharaja* in his reply expressed his delight at the news of the armistice with Afghanistan. His happiness sprang from two directions: first, the Amir had finally realized the folly of his move and secondly, he was overjoyous for the Nepalese contingent was returning home before Dussehra festival to enjoy their long needed rest, which they rightly deserved.³⁸ It was, however, only on

36. A letter from Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy of India to *Maharaja Chandra*, Sept, 19, 1919. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65 *Ka*, File No. 9, 1919; also *The Englishman*, September 5, 1919, p. 1.

37. A letter from William Beynon of the Sixteenth Indian Division in North West Frontier to *Maharaja Chandra*, August 25, 1919, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 65, File No. 9, 1919.

38. A letter from *Maharaja Chandra* to General W. Beynon, August 27, 1919. *Ibid.*

September 19, 1919, the Viceroy of India officially communicated to King Tribhuvan that the war with Afghanistan was over and the Nepalese contingent that was placed at the disposal of the Government of India had returned. He further was careful to note that "although the stay of the contingent in India was short I can assure Your Highness that the service they have rendered was invaluable and that they are greatly appreciated."³⁹

The Nepalese contingent returned home after three months stay in the North West Frontier Province. Though the Nepalese contingent did not go into actual combat operations, yet, the Nepalese presence and the denial of Russia's support were certainly important factors that compelled the Amir to sue for peace with Britain.⁴⁰ The King of England was highly impressed by Nepal's untiring zeal to serve the British cause in Afghanistan, thus, honored the Nepalese for their services in the Anglo-Afghan War. It was on December 24, 1919 the King and Emperor made *Maharaja Chandra* the honorary General of the British army,⁴¹ and decorated General Padma Shumsher and General Baber Shumsher with Honorary Knight's Grand Cross of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire.⁴² Then by June 1923, according to the recommendation of the *Maharaja* the British had awarded 970 Afghan War Medals to the Pasupati Prasad Regiment and 947 similar medals to the Second Rifles.⁴³

39. See a letter from Baron Chelmsford, the Viceroy of India, to *Maharajadhiraja*, Tribhuvan, Sep. 19, 1919. *Ibid.*

40. See the file titled "Afghan War", E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 10; Landon, *Nepal*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

41. See *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Morning Post*, *The Daily Mail*, December 24, 1919, p. 1

42. See *The Statesman*, April 24, 1919, p.1. In addition. Lieutenant Colonel, Damber Shumsher Thapa, Lieutenant Colonel Bhairab Shumsher Rana were awarded the Ordinary Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire.

43. See two letters from *Maharaja Chandra* to the British Envoy, March 22, 19123, May 10, 1923, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 68, File No. 11.

PART IV : A

ANGLO - NEPALESE COOPERATION IN
WORLD WAR II : WAR EFFORTS ABROAD

Nepal and the Second World War : A Search for A New Global Culture Anchored on Justice and Righteousness

Preface

The first half of the twentieth century was marked by the breakdown of the nineteenth century civilization that was based upon balance of power international gold standard and the self-regulating market.¹ The European man lost his faith in the ideas of progress and enlightenment,² on which modern civilization was firmly anchored. War, which has always been a potent cause for the breakdown of any civilization that had hitherto existed,³ was hailed as an antidote to bourgeois selfishness and materialism. The year 1914 can be taken as a convenient date for the opening of this crisis, which took its cataclysmic shape as the decade of the 1940's unfolded. If the World War I had helped to break the backbone of the nineteenth century civilization then it was the World War II that provided the thrust to sweep it altogether.⁴ The mood of

-
1. For more on the breakdown of the nineteenth century civilization see Karl Polany, *The Great Transformation : The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times* (Boston : Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 3-111.
 2. The ideas of progress and enlightenment are best treated in Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment : An Interpretation, The Rise and Fall of Modern Paganism* (New York : Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 1-419. Wilson H. Coates, Hyden and J. Schapiro, *The Emergence of Liberal Humanism : An Intellectual History*, Vol. I (New York ; McGraw Hill Book Co., 1966), 177-301.
 3. Arnold Toynbee, *Surviving the Future* (London : Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 150-51.
 4. For an excellent account of the West in trouble from the World war I to World War II see Ronald Stromberg, *European Intellect: a History Since 1789* (New York : Meredith Corporation, 1968), pp. 191-232.

Europe during the two world wars is perhaps best illustrated in these words.

There are many reasons for thinking that the European man is raising his tents off that modern soil where he has encamped for three hundred years and is beginning a new exodus towards another historical ambit, another way of life. ⁵

The fact remains that never before in the history of mankind the world had displayed her warlike passion in greater intensity and magnitude than in the first half of this century. It showed how frail were the instruments of commerce and diplomacy that modern cosmopolitanism had devised. The cries of *egalite* and *fraternite* faded into oblivion, at least temporarily, leaving only the roar of the hostile preparation of war all around. We are so close to World War II that it is difficult for writers and even historians to fully free themselves from their emotions and prejudices while writing on origins of the war and the responsibility of its guilt. Historians have often attributed the pedigree of the World War II to the self-perpetuating ambitious plans and programs of a single individual. Their favorite quote is an excerpt from a speech of Adolf Hilter before his generals in August 1939. This address in part ran.

There will never be a man with such authority or who has the confidence of the German people as I have There is no time to loose. War must come in my time.⁶

Thus, they argue the war of 1938 to 1945 was Hitler's war. In other words, it was the outcome of a deliberate policy of a person who "took time by the forelock" to fulfil his quest of world domination.⁷ However,

5. A statement made by Jose Ortega Y. Gasset. *Ibid*, p. 232.

6. Speech of Adolf Hitler to his Generals at Obersalzburg, August 27, 1939, *The Western Morning News*, August 29, 1939.

7. The chief spokesmen of this school are : C.D.M. Ketelby, *A History of Modern Times, From 1789* (London : George G. Harap & Co., 1961), pp. 470-490; Philip Woodruff, *The Men who Ruled India : The Guardians*, Vol. II (New York : Schocken Books, 1954), pp. 300-337.

it would be too simplistic to boil down the causes of the World war II to personality cult alone. Nor can it be explained by taking refuge to Darwinian concept of struggle and competition* or the analysis of the clash of national interests, the alliances and military plans and the conferences and confrontations. Diplomats and statesmen do not work in a vacuum but weave their network in the cultural values of their time. If the world War I was the outcome of the beginning of the crisis in European civilization then the World War II marked its culmination. Viewed in this broad perspective it is difficult to lay the "war guilt" on a single nation or even a group of nations. No nation or groups were fully innocent nor any fully guilty. The guilt, in fact, lay with the distortions the modern civilization had created or to put it in a broader perspective in the imperfections of the human nature itself.

By October 1938 war clouds had already threatened the European horizon; and the British Premier Neville Chamberlain flew to Munich to see Herr Hitler. His mission was to avoid war. But the Munich Pact signed by the two leaders served little to prevent the overrunning of Czechoslovakia by the latter, in early 1939. In April 1939 Italy wantonly conquered Albania; and by August 1939 it was evident that Germany would attack Poland.⁸ Nepal a small nation within the Himalayan frontier was drawn to the vortex of this international conflict partly because of her faith in justice and righteousness and partly because of her special relations with the British Government.

The story of the Anglo-Nepalese cooperation in the war dates to the pre-war days, when the political horizon of Europe was heavily overcast by the clouds of war. Thus, when the British Premier was negotiating peace terms with Germany in September 1938, the *Maharaja* of Nepal

* More on the Survival of the Fittest see Philip Appleman (ed.), *Darwin* (New York : W.W. Norton and Co, 1970), pp. 119-199.

8. See a note prepared by G.L. Betham, the British Minister in Kathmandu in 1942. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 54, File No. *Do, Kha*, 1942.

had already offered a contingent of 8,000 troops to Britain for garrison duty in India, if Britain joined the war.⁹ But the British Government felt prudent not to avail the offer at the time. The Munich Pact, however, did bring rejoicing in Kathmandu and the Nepalese Premier, Joodha Shumsher, asked his envoy in London to hand over the following message to Neville Chamberlain. The message in part ran

Blessed is the peacemaker. Hearty congratulations for success achieved in the most difficult situation which has averted a second and a more dreadful Armageddon. With a sigh of relief the world will hail the news praying for a happy close.¹⁰

However, a year later the *Maharaja* discovered that the world had been duped by Hitler's promises. Thus, Britain's rescue of the threatened peace proved to be shortlived. It was on August 25, 1939, the Nepalese Minister in London informed the *Maharaja* that the war was very imminent. The *Maharaja*, thus, deputed his son Bahadur Shumsher and the *Bada Kazi*, Marichi Man, to renew his offer of 8,000 troops for the garrison duty of India. Britain was more than happy to accept the offer.

Nepal had made her offer in good faith and was accepted by the British in the same spirit. The exigencies of the time did close the gates of bargaining. Only the big hearts of the two different people opened wide to accommodate and assimilate the feelings of each other. The *Maharaja* made this point vividly clear in his letter to the British Minister in March 1940. The letter contained these lines.

As there was no bargaining spirit, whatsoever, in the help offered and accepted; I would ask you to please note that

-
9. See a copy of telegram from the British Charge de Affaires in Kathmandu, to GI, October 30, 1938, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 54, File No. *Do, Kha*, 1942; also G.L. Betham "In the Land of the Gurkhas", *The Indian Express*, July 28, 1940, p. 8.
 10. A message from *Maharaja* Joodha to the British Premier Neville Chamberlain, October 30, 1938, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 60 File No. *Ka* 1939.

barring military honour no proposal in the nature of the granting of decoration should be made to me.¹¹

It was on September 4, 1939 the *Maharaja* rode to the parade ground of Tundikhel to inspect the first batch of 4,000 Nepalese troops, who were to be sent to India. During his inspection he rejected 250 men for being invalids. If on the one hand the Premier permitted the invalids to stay at home; but also made it clear that any imposter would be immediately dismissed from the army. From the parade ground the Premier rode to the British Legation to inform the British Minister, in person, that he had made all the necessary arrangements for his troops to go abroad. Incidentally, it was that very day the *Maharaja* was officially communicated that Britain had entered the war against Germany.¹²

Then a little after a week, the *Maharaja* wrote to Neville Chamberlain, the Prime Minister of Britain. In his letter he gave reasons for his offer of help and asserted that the name of the Premier would go down in history as "the deliverer of the weak from political sefdom and the hegemony of the strong."¹³ The British Premier and the Viceroy of India gratefully accepted Nepal's generous offer;¹⁴ and the *Maharaja* took this occasion to tell Britain

-
11. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Minister G.L. Betham, March 18, 1940, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 6, *Ga*, 1940.
 12. See a note prepared by G.L. Betham, *op. cit.*, footnote no. 8; also Ishwari Prasad, *The Life and Times of Maharaja Juddha Shumsher Jung Bahadur Rana of Nepal* (New Delhi ; Ashis Publication. 1975), pp. 292-94.
 13. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Neville Chamberlain, the Premier of Britain, Sept. 13, 1939; a letter with almost identical content was also sent to Lord Halifax, Foreign Office, London, Sept. 17, 1939. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. *Ka*, 1939.
 14. A letter from Premier Neville Chamberlain to *Maharaja* Joodha. October 7, 1939; also from Lord Halifax, October 10, 1939; from Viceroy Lord Linlithgow to the *Maharaja* Sept 9. 1939. E. No. 2. *Poka* No. 61, *Ka*. 1940.

how cemented were the traditional relations between the two Governments. He then went on to say

My army will not fail to show the same zeal in the defence of India as when defending its own hearth and home and prove still more firmly by gallant deeds while exerting its utmost to be of such service and help as it is fit and capable of so as to maintain the existing happy and friendly relations with Britain.¹⁵

Diplomatic Negotiations

Even before the Nepalese troops could be sent to India the meticulous details of the terms and conditions associated with the sending of the Nepalese troops had to be worked out. The Government of India on the occasion proposed a scheme of sending a small military mission to work out the details of the agreement relating to the loan of the Nepalese contingent. Nepal in the beginning made an outright rejection to the proposal of receiving a British military mission in Kathmandu;¹⁶ but later went along due to the exigencies of the time. But before the mission arrived the Nepalese Premier decided to hold a preliminary meeting with the the British Minister, including the senior Nepalese officials.¹⁷ This meeting was held in the month of September and was significant in the sense that it drafted a skeleton of the stipulations of the agreement relating to the loan of the Nepalese contingent.¹⁸ These talks ranged from financial matters to training program and from the composition of the army to the equipments to be carried.

15. From *Maharaja Joodha* to Viceroy Lord Linlithgow, Sept. 18, 1939, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. *Ka*, 1940

16. A letter from *Maharaja Joodha* to the British Minister G.L. Betham October 7, 1939, *Ibid.*

17. A letter from *Maharaja Joodha* to G. L. Betham, Sept. 22, 23, 1939. *Ibid.*

18. The preliminary talks were held in September 21, 28, 1939. The British side was represented by G.L. Betham while Bahadur Shumsher and the *Bada Kazi* took part from the side of Nepal. See a letter from Minister Betham to the Secretary of External Affairs of the GI, Sept. 26/29, 1939, *Ibid*

The skeleton devised in these talks may be summarized as follows.

a. The Nepalese troops would take with them 12 Lee Enfield rifles and 20 rounds of ammunition per battalion from Kathmandu and will be supplied with full compliment of rifles required by the Government of India.

b. The conveyance and rations for the troops would be made by the Government of Nepal within the Nepalese territory and by the Government of India from Raxual onwards.

c. All recommendations for honors should be submitted to the senior official of the Nepalese contingent attached to Army Head Quarters, New Delhi.

d. The regular pay of the troops would be born by the Government of Nepal; while allowances would be paid by the Government of India every month at the same rate as in the Great War.

e. The Nepalese soldiers who commit offences in India would be tried by their own military laws and by their own officers.¹⁹

These preliminary talks did pave the way for the working out of the final draft of the general agreement between Nepal and Great Britain. Details were worked out by Major N. Eustance of the Two Sixth Gurkha Rifles on the behalf of the Military Department of the Government of India and General Bahadur Shumsher, the eldest son of the *Maharaja* for Nepal. The utilitarian element and the concept of the national honor of Nepal served as the guiding spirit in formulating the elaborate rules and regulations regarding pay, pension, leave, rewards, arms and

19. See notes prepared by the *Munshi Khana* (Foreign Department) on Sept. 1939 on the conversation between *Maharaja* Joodha and Minister G.L. Betham on Sept. 23 1939; from Minister to Secretary to GI External Affairs Dept., Sept. 26/29, 1939; also a secret letter from G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, Sept. 25, 1939, E. No. 2. *Poka* No. 61, *Kha* 1939; also notes prepared by the GN before drafting the terms of the condition, September 1939; conversation between Minister Betham and *Bada Kazi* and the Northern Commanding General, Sept. 25, 1939; A letter from the Minister to the Foreign Office Simla, September (?) . E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. *Ka*. 1939.

medicare. The final draft of the terms and conditions for the loan of the Nepalese contingent to British India was hammered out by the close of September 1939. The principal features of this document included the following:

1. The contingent will be for service in India or the North West Frontier and will not be sent overseas.
2. The contingent will consist of two brigades each comprising of four battalions of 1,000 men. In addition, each brigade will be accompanied by a band of 30 strong mountain *sowars*.
3. The Nepalese Government will meet the ordinary expenses of the troops at the rate they would cost to be maintained in Nepal; and above these would be born by the Government of India. Good conduct pay would be born by the Government of India.*
4. If the contingent would proceed on "active service" disability and family pension would be paid by the Government of India at the rate applicable to similar ranks of the Indian army. The Government of Nepal would be consulted on each case when the payment is made.
5. Should gratuities be introduced in the Indian army the personnel of the Nepalese contingent would be eligible *pro rata* under the condition applicable to similar ranks in the Indian army. Any pension or gratuity would be paid in the form of a lump sum to the Nepalese Government.
6. The Nepalese Government will be consulted in connection with any award the Government of India decides to make on the personnel of the Nepalese contingent. The venue for such consultation would be the General attached to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of India.

* The clauses relating to the good conduct pay was deleted from the final draft of the agreement as Nepal Government decided to pay the good conduct pay herself.

7. The officers and men will be tried for military offence, whether in peace or active service, under their own code and by their own officers. If the officers have no jurisdiction to deal with the offenders they would then be sent back to Nepal for trial. If an offence is committed against civil and criminal law of India the individual would be tried in the Indian law courts under the Indian codes. But if the offender is sentenced to punishment other than fine he would be sent back to Nepal to undergo the sentence.
8. Rifles and ammuntions, including machine-guns would be issued to the contingent on arrival at their destination in India, and will not be brought by the contingent, except for the armed guard with each battalion.
9. The men should bring their own leather belts, *khukuris*, haversacs and wa'erbottles.
10. Tentage will be supplied by the Government of India.
11. The men of the contingent will bring the following articles: one suit of field service uniform, *khaki* drill cloth for one pair to be tailored in India, one pair of boots and socks, two blankets, two "*chhadders*", one waterproof sheet and one line bedding for combatants only. These items will be replaced as necessary with the exception of "*chhaddars*", which are not issued to the Indian troops.
12. Each battalion was to bring with them entranching tools: 64 picks, 216 shovels, 2 crowbars, 12 axes, 20 (spades, large and small), 2 hammers, 2 chilsels and 1 *kodali* or *mamooti* and one billhook.
13. Each battalion was to be accompanied by a physician, one dresser. Other medical arrangement will be made by the Government of India.²⁰

20. See Appendix F

A careful scrutiny of the above terms and conditions reveals that the agreement not only formed the guideline for Angol-Nepalese relations during the Great War but also during the crisis of the World War II. The most difficult point in the negotiation was the clause that pertained to the application of the Indian Army Act to the men of the Nepalese contingent for offences in India. The Government of India desired to apply the Indian civil code to the military offences committed by the men of the Nepalese contingent in peace time but insisted on the application of the military Act for offences during active service. Accordingly, the original draft of the agreement ran

Men will be tried for military offences..... the Indian Civil Code will apply during peace time. As regards Active Service the Army Act will apply.²¹

Nepal vehemently opposed such an arrangement for it shook the very fabric of her concept of sovereignty and independence. A compromise was finally evolved, which was in keeping with her status and independence. Accordingly, for military offences the offender would be tried by Nepalese military laws and by their own officers. But in case of civil and criminal offences the Indian code would apply and the offenders, if found guilty, would be extradited to Nepal. Two other points which Nepal rejected during the negotiations were the sending of the Nepalese contingent overseas²² and the use of Nepalese troops to crush internal rebellions or against unarmed mobs. The first point was put into writing as indicated by the very first stipulation of the agreement, while the latter constituted

21. For the ammendments to the conditions on garrison duty in India see a letter General Bahadur Shumsher to Minister G.L. Betham. Sept. 26, 1939. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. *Ka*, 1940.

22. Nepal was always opposed to the idea of sending her troops overseas. This oppostion sprang partly from religious perceptions and partly from the fact that the Nepalese troops lagged behind in training and skills required to fight a sophisticated modern war. The reasoning also had political overtones.

a part of the secret understanding between the two Governments. The Viceroy of India commenting upon it asserted in March 1940 that under normal conditions the Nepalese troops would not be called upon to fire on unarmed mobs.²³

The two points, simple as they were, yet were highly significant for they confined the Nepalese troops within the frontier of India and defined their role. In other words they were not to be employed against the Indians, the majority of whom were adherents of Hinduism. The first point evidently is indicative of Nepal's nonbelligerency, though not strict neutrality in the war,²⁴ while the second point reflects that Nepal being a Hindu state preferred not to be hostile to the Hindus of India even indirectly or by implication. Nepalese insistence in the second point, perhaps, stems from the fact that the Nepalese leadership anticipated the surge of internal disturbances in India in direct proportion to the rise of political awakening in the subcontinent. Another sore point throughout the negotiation was the question of gun salutes²⁵ for the generals of the Nepalese contingent in India. Nepal insisted that the provision was in harmony with the precedent of the Afghan War. But the Government of India wanted to discontinue the precedent for two reasons. First, no British or the Allied ge-

23. A letter from *Maharaja Joodha* to G.L. Betham, March 18, 1940. E.No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 6 *Ga*, 1940; also Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy of India, to *Maharaja Joodha*, March 27, 1940. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, *Ka*, 1940.

24. In making the remark one has to distinguish between the Nepalese contingent and the Gurkha battalions in the British army. While the former is under full control of the Nepal Government; the latter is not and can be used by Britain in any way she pleases as long as they are in her service.

25. Nepal proposed the following gun salutes to the generals of the Nepalese contingent in India: Commanding general (15), full general (13), Lieutenant General (11) and Major General (9). See conversation between the British Minister G.L. Betham and the Northern Commanding General and the *Bada Kazi*, Sept. 28, 1939; also from G.L. Betham to Secretary GI External Affairs, Sept, 26/29. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61 File No. *Ka*,

nerals would be receiving gun salutes during the war; and second, since "the contingent.....would be engaged in training for service not in ceremony gun salutes would hardly be suitable". The British minister, however, noted that the *Maharaja* would of course be receiving all the gun salutes when he came to Calcutta.²⁶ With that the matter came to a close and Nepal went along with the British Government on the question of the gun salutes. The question of rations, whose monetary value came to approximately 52,800 rupees also came into discussion. The question was finally solved when the Government of Nepal agreed to pay half of it.²⁷

The final agreement between Nepal and India relating to the loan of the Nepalese contingent to India was signed in Calcutta on December 4, 1939. The signatory from the Indian side was General Lee E. Le Burgh while it was the Commanding General Bahadur Shumsher who signed on the behalf of Nepal Government.²⁸

The whole Nepalese contingent was expected to be in India by the middle of March 1940 in either of the two training camps: Abbotabad and Dehra Dun. But before the departure of the Nepalese contingent could be made other minor issues like the rate of rations for the combatant and the non-combatant troops and the forage for the horses and ponies had to be worked out.²⁹ As regards the supply of items like boots, field service uniforms and

26. A letter from Minister G.L. Betham to General Bahadur Shumsher in Calcutta, Dec. 16, 1939. *Ibid.*

27. More on the contribution to the cost of ration of the Nepalese contingent in India see a letter from Minister G.L. Betham to General Bahadur Shumsher, Nov. 9, 1939; also from *Maharaja* Joodha to the Minister, Nov. 11, 1939; also a conversation between the British Minister and Nepalese Commander-in-Chief. *Ibid.*

28. For the details on the signing ceremony see a letter from G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, Nov. 8, 1939; also conversation between Major Eustance and the Nepalese Northern Commanding General Nov. 7, 1939. *Ibid.*

29. See E. No. 2, *Poko* No. 61, File No. *Ka*, 1939.

khaki clothes the Government of Nepal was to provide the first pair and the renewals were to be provided by the Government of India.³⁰ The Government of India did not renew two types of articles brought by the Nepalese contingent: those which were not used by the Indian battalions and those that were brought in excess. The Government of India, however, asked the Nepalese contingent to bring waterbottles and haversacs to be used in their journey from Raxaul to their destination in India. They would then be replaced by those given by the Government of India.³¹

With the dawn of the year 1940 all preparation for the despatch of the Nepalese contingent to India were complete, and the first party consisting of 24 officers, 120 non-commissioned officers, who were given initial training in Nepal had already arrived in Abbotabad in 1939.³² It was, however, on Tuesday Falgun 22, 1996 (March 1940) the first batch of the Nepalese contingent assembled in Tundikhel for a farewell ceremony. The *Maharaja* decorated the officers with garlands and blessed the soldiers with flowers and vermilion mixed rice. He also gave to each soldier a mango as a *sagun* (auspicious symbol) and rode with them for a short distance in their march to India, at 3:5 p.m. But before the departure the *Maharaja* delivered a sincere educative speech. In short, he gave two reasons for sending them on garrison duty in India. First, Great Britain, which was a friend of Nepal in peace and an ally in war, had requested Nepal for military assistance to protect the freedom of the weaker nations of Europe and

30. A Note in the Foreign Department of Nepal relating to World War II *op. cit.*, footnote No. 28,

31. See a letter from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, Feb. 8, 1940, *Ibid.*

32. See a secret letter from G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, Sept. 25, 1939, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61; see also an unpublished manuscript by Tek Bahadur Hamal for a description of the initial training program for the Nepalese contingent in Kathmandu. The author was a Lieutenant in the army fighting in the Burmese front in the World War II. The manuscript is extremely valuable in the sense that it gives a lot of information that is not available from other sources.

it "is our *dharma* (duty) to help a friend in need". Secondly, to help a big power like Britain was to Nepal's advantage. He further made it clear that the enemy was still far from the border of India but if the European turmoil should spread into India they would not hesitate to display their heroism and valor as shown in the previous occasions in Lucknow in 1857, Waziristan in 1917 and the Indo-Afghan border in 1919.

The speech of the *Maharaja* was significant in the sense that it stressed on the need for efficiency and discipline in the army by advising them what they should do and what they should not. On the positive plane they were advised to maintain virtues like obedience, cleanliness, discipline, toleration, thriftiness and the sterling qualities of courage and valor of their ancestors, while on the negative side they were asked to refrain from alcoholism, gambling, prostitution and *goondaism* or anything that would prejudice the name of their country. Finally, he called upon them to go for their duty with an open heart leaving the cares and protection of their families to the *Maharaja*, himself, who loved them as dear as their own children. His speech in part ran

My beloved ones ! you are now going to foregin lands where you will come across men of different customs and traditions. You should not despise their etiquettes and manners rather learn to be tolerant and accomodating. Look upon extravagance as a sin and prudent economy is the sheet of anchor of a good citizen. To borrow money in foreign lands is to bring your country into disrepute. *Holiganism*, gambling and the use of intoxicating drugs should be avoided. Keep on friendly terms with all. ³³

33. See the speech of *Maharaja Joodha* in the Tundikhel on Falgun 22, 1966 (March 1940). E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. *Kha*, 1940; also *Gorkha Putra*, Falgun 25, 1996 (March 1940); see also an interview with a personal attendant of the *Maharaja*, who was with the Premier, during the farewell caremony of the troops. It was Ram Babu Dhakal who took part in the ceremony of the delivering of the mangos to the soldiers.

Besides, Lekh Nath Poudel, the Nepalese Poet Laureate, had invoked the mother goddess Kali in his verse titled "Jaya Jaya Gorakh Kali" to protect the Nepalese on all occasions of the conflict.³⁴

By January 8, 1940, the first batch of Nepalese officers and 140 non-commissioned Officers (N. O. C.'S) were already in Abbotabad. A second batch followed in a fortnight. In the middle of March two Nepalese brigades were already in India. One was to be posted in the North West Frontier and the other in Dehra Dun. The first brigade under the command of Major General Brahma Shumsher consisted of four regiments: Mahindra Dal, Sree Nath, Samsher Dal and Sher; while the General Officer in command of the Second Brigade was Major General Ekk Raj Shumsher and he took with him the four of the following regiments, namely, Kali Bahadur (50% Gurungs), Purano Gorakh (50% Magars), the Second Rifles and Bhairab Nath.³⁵ On the other hand the nominal roll of British

34. The verse in part ran

Khana khada ra basta,
 Grihabara chadda, dauddha, youddha garda.
 Basta, hidda ra sutda,
 Bikat ban, nadi para garda ra firda.
 Gorkhali bira lai
 Hirdaya bich thulo shakti samartha hali
 Garnne Chhan pura rakshya
 Chanvar nabhuli nitya 'Goraksha-Kali' !
 See *Gorkhapatra*, Falgun 25, 1996 (March 1940).

35. The names of the brigade officers for the first brigade were : Lieutenant Colonel Nara Mardan Thapa (Military Secretary), Major Captain Ref Prasad Shah (Brigade Major) and Captain Chhatra Bikram Rana (A.D.C.); while those of the Second Brigade were : Lieutenant Colonel Narsingh Raya Majhi (Military Secretary), Major Captain Megh Bikram Rana (Brigade Major) and Captain Rup Bikram Rana (A.D.C.). See Annexure II and V of the terms and conditions relating to the offer of the Nepalese contingent, as a loan to GI, From *Maharaja* Joodha to Lord Halifax, Foreign Office, London. Feb. 4, 1940, Jan. 8, 1940, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61 File No. *Ka*, 1940.

officers attached to the first two brigades were fourteen and thirteen respectively.³⁶

Before the close of October 1940, the Nepalese contingent in India had completed the initial training program, thus, were ready to assume their allotted role within the Indian army in their respective places. To complete the training program in a period of about six months was not easy.³⁷ The Commander-in Chief of India, Robert Archibald Cassels, took pains to narrate the hurdles that had to be overcome and many shortcomings that were remedied before the training program could be crowned with success.³⁸ Once the training program was complete the regiments of the First Brigade were assigned to their head quarters in Kakool in the North West Frontier, and distributed accordingly to Malakand, Peshwar, Khot and Nowshera; while the second brigade was sent to the Zhoab Fort.³⁹ Through-

36. The senior British officers in the First brigade were : Lieutenant Colonel M.R. Roberts (Senior Staff Captain), Captain G.M. Forreath (Staff Captain), Lieutenant Colonel T.D.C. Owens (S.O.S.) and Lieutenant I.D. Foot Hill (S.O.S); while the British counterparts in the Second Brigade were : Lieutenant Colonel C.W.F. Scott (S.O.S.), Lieutenant Colonel R.M. Bruce (Senior Officer). E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 60, File No. 507, 1972/1940.

37. It is to be noted that the thirty non-commissioned officers per battalion were given training in rifle bayonet and four weeks training in high machine-gun and anti-aircraft firing. Like wise six non-commissioned Officers per every battalion were trained in vicker's machine-guns and long range tank firing; while eight non-commissioned officers were given training in signalling procedure. See Annexure C of the terms and conditions of the agreement, relating to the offer of the Nepalese troops, E. No. 2, *Poka*, No. 61, File No. *Ka*.

38. The Indian Commander-in-Chief was very appreciative of the role of the *Maharaja's* son General Bahadur Shumsher. To quote the C-in-C "His ready made wit, energy and frankness was largely responsible in making the training program a success." For details see a letter from Robert Archibald Cassels to *Maharaja* Joodha. October 21, 1940, *Ibid*.

39. A secret letter from R.M.M. Lockhart to the Military Secretary of the General-Officer-in-Command of the Nepalese Contingent, July 5, 1940. E. No. 2, *Poka* 60, File No. 507, 1997/1940.

out the training period the Government of India took every step to make the Nepalese troops as comfortable as possible. Accordingly, the Government of India gave 50 horses as a gift to the Nepalese contingent and setup coffee shops for the regiments where the articles of every day necessity were sold at a fair price.⁴⁰

Problems of Adjustment of the Nepalese Contingent in India

The Nepalese contingent was given a more elaborate training in mountain warfare in the North West Frontier. The British Commander-in-Chief, Claude Auchinleck, was highly impressed by the sterling qualities and the physical fitness of the Nepalese contingent in the North West Frontier.⁴¹ However, the Nepalese contingent uprooted from its cultural environment could not escape the problems of adjustment. The prevalence of strange customs and semi-European laws drove the Nepalese minds on many occasions into bewilderment and perplexity. The problem of adjustment sprang partly from the hostile physical environment of the North West Frontier and partly from the delay in the decision making process in Nepal due to the presence of a single monolithic bureaucratic apparatus in Kathmandu.

The common tropical diseases against which the Nepalese contingent was always on the guard were cholera

40. The articles of day-to-day necessity kept in the Coffee Shops included items such as cigarettes, matches, sweets, boot-laces, all vests, tennis-shoes, towels and brushes. See a letter from Lieutenant Colonel W.G.H. Gough to *Bada Kazi* Marichi Man Singh, Feb. 4, 1940. E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 61, File No. *Ka*; also from R.M.M. Lockhart to the Military Secretary of the Nepalese G-O-IN-C of the Nepalese contingent, July 15, 1940. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 60, File No. 507, 1977/1940.

41. A letter from Claude Auchinleck, to *Maharaja* Joodha, June 22, 1941; from *Maharaja* to Claude Auchinleck, June 22, 1941; also interview with Major Brahma Shumsher and Sirdar Fate Bahadur Pandey (Lieutenant in the First Brigade), April 12, 1982, in the "Brahman Cottage" and Baneshwar Mahaveda Sthan, Kathmandu on May, 8, 1982.

and malaria. However, in spite of best precautions both the diseases managed to plague battalions of the Nepalese contingent. In September 1942 the Sher regiment was affected with the malaria fever. It caused a panic in the regiment and the Commander-in-Chief in India even discussed plans for the withdrawal of the regiment from the North West Frontier. But due to easing of the situation the contingency plan was not brought into operation.⁴²

A perfect illustration of how a lack of understanding of the cultural norms of a group of people can lead to an open violence is indicated by the "mutiny" of the Second Rifles of the Nepalese contingent in Khot in January 1941. An inherent cultural trait of the Nepalese is a total attachment to a person or thing. This quality if on the one hand was responsible for the accomplishment of the most difficult feat in the battle field, yet, could also incite them to an open violence as evidenced in Khot. This incident is significant enough to go into its origins, evolution and its consequences.

"Mutiny"* of the Second Rifles: Khot 1941

It was on the morning of January 2, 1941 the *Maharaja* was startled by a telegraphic message from New Delhi. The content was drafted in haste and General Bahadur pointed out that he was immediately leaving for Selne and would reach Khot next day. Though the details were, yet, to come it spoke of some grave trouble in the Second Rifles which had gone beyond control. The message in part ran.

Northern Command informs the Second Rifle men complained against officers and there has been a serious trouble

42. A letter from Minister G. L. Betham to *Maharaja Joodha*, Sep. 24, 1942, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 507, 1997/1940.

* Major General Brahma Shumsher, the General-Officer-in-Command of the Nepalese contingent in the North West Frontier Province, however, points out that "mutiny" is too serious a word to describe so simple an event. He further adds, that to label it as "mutiny" is to see "a tempest in a tea pot." Interview with Brahma Shumsher, April 12, 1982.

in the regiment. The commanding officers could not tackle the situation which may amount to mutiny necessitating disarming the whole regiment. My presence is needed.⁴³

i. The Origin and Evolution of the Incident

The day was January 1, 1941 and the timing was 15:30 hours when an orderly rushed to report that the men of the Second Rifle of the Nepalese contingent were rioting. The Senior Special Service Officer then immediately rushed to the spot where to his dismay and disgust discovered that a Nepalese officer was stoned in the lines. The ostensive cause for the trouble was the issuing of additional rations in lieu of cash amounting to one rupee and six annas. The conversion of this money to extra-ration allowances was the source of the trouble. The actual trouble arose when the men refused to drink the milk purchased from their increased messing allowance. They demanded their money instead. The men of the regiment represented their grievances through an undisciplined deputation. The Commanding Officer in a mood of shock and bewilderment ordered the arrest of the men. But in the heat of the temper of the regiment the order could not be carried out. The Senior Special Service Officer, Colonel Brierly then made up his mind to go to the lines himself but his Nepalese counterpart refused to go with him. The Colonel then went alone. The appearance of a white man drove the Second Rifle into a state of frenzy. A stone then struck the Colonel's head. The British records further assert that the British Officer was then trampled. But even if he was trampled it appears to have been more inadvertent than deliberate. Prior to the throwing of the stone a crowd was seen gathering and apparently it was even prepared to listen to him but the hurling of a stone from the rear changed the whole environment. As the stones began to fly in different directions the windowpanes were seen being smashed into bits. A little later Colonel Dawson, the District

43. A telegram from General Bahadur Shumsher to *Maharaja Joodhu*, Jan. 2, 1941. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 464, 1972/1941.

Commander, arrived in the scene. He together with Nepalese non-commissioned officers was able to disperse the unruly mob. This paved the way for the order of the District Commander to lock up all arms. Accordingly, the keys of the Bell's of Arms (*Kotes*) came into his possession. Thus, the unruly regiment was prevented from taking possession of the arms.

In the morning of January 2, the men were restless but sullen. They paraded without arms and the Nepalese officers attended. The other men paraded in the vicinity. In the mean time the two companies of the Suffolk regiment arrived. Then on January 3 reports were received that if the quarter guards were disarmed or the ringleaders arrested the men would come out with their *khukuris*. It was on this day that General Bahadur Shumsher arrived and his thoughtful presence put the matters right. In the beginning he thought of seeing the men then and there but later on he changed his mind and thought of seeing the parade next day. In the parade he asked them to hand over their *khukuris* and they obeyed. He also ordered the arrest of 20 (or 70) ringleaders. They were then handcuffed and placed in the quarter guard separate from the other men. The remaining men were then sent to the other lines. Both the parade and the grounding of the *khukuris* took place without any incident.⁴⁴

ii. Consequences of the Event

The Khot episode of the Second Rifles, whether one would like to call it a "revolt" or a "riot" led to much soulsearching behind, both among the Nepalese leadership and the British bureaucracy. The immediate British reaction is probably best illustrated in these words of General Hartwell.

44. See a telegram report on the Khot incident in the Second Rifle of the Nepalese contingent, from General Bahadur Shumsher to *Maharaja* Joodha, January 6, 1941; also a letter from Minister G. L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, Feb. 1, 1941, Feb. 22, 1941, Jan. 7, 14, 1941. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 464, 1997/1941.

I cannot, under these circumstances, keep the regiment under my command and they should thus be returned immediately to Nepal.⁴⁵

A few days later General Bahadur reported from Khot that the time afforded him the most unfortunate task of reporting the most shameful occurrence, which is unprecedented in the annals of Nepalese military history.⁴⁶ The Nepalese General took a moderate line as regard the methods to be adopted in dealing with the regiment. His suggestion to his father ran thus. Captain Lav Jang and Lieutenant Fateh Bahadur Pandey, who behaved well throughout the deplorable incident, should be taken to Hasanab Dal and be attached to the Second Rifle Training Company. But all the officers, who proved to be inefficient and weak should be sent back to Nepal.⁴⁷ The Commander-in-Chief of India, R.A. Cassels, however, asked the *Maharaja* not to take any decision on the incident but wait for the arrival of his suggestions, which were being drafted in consultation with General Bahadur.⁴⁸ The Nepalese Premier decided to wait for the arrival of the suggestions of the Indian Commander-in-Chief, which was not long in coming. The suggestions, which arrived as early as January 8, 1941 were as follows.

a. The Nepalese officers of the battalion (with the exception of perhaps four junior officers, who have done well and who would be selected by the Commanding General) should be returned to Nepal as soon as possible.

b. The B and C companies of the battalions, who were involved in the acts of indiscipline, could not be trusted with arms. Moreover, they should be punished for what they have done. Thus, they should be removed from their battalion and turned into two Labor Companies under

45. Statement by General Hartwell during all the heat and fire of the episode, Jan. 3, 1941. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 464, 1997/1941.

46. Report on the Khot incident from General Bahadur, Jan. 6, 1941. *Ibid.*

47. *Ibid.*

48. See an undated letter from the Indian Commander-in-Chief to *Maharaja* Joodha. *Poka* No. 61, File No. 464, 1941.

British officers; and employed for labor work in India for the time being.

c. The remaining companies A and D should also be removed from Khot to some stations in India, which he would decide later. They will then be amalgamated with the training company of the battalion, which is now in Hasan Abdal. This battalion will be reformed under Nepalese-British officers. They will be rearmed and it is hoped that within a few months they will again be efficient battalion ready to wipe off the disgrace they have incurred.

d. The reformed battalion and the two companies should be subjected to the same code of military law as applicable to the Indians.⁴⁹

General Bahadur Shumsher in his talks with the Indian Military Chief was in favor of disbanding the whole battalion by sending them in disgrace to Nepal. But General R.A. Cassels felt that "this would be too hard a punishment as it would fall upon the innocent and the guilty alike."⁵⁰ Two factors prompted the Indian military leadership to take such a decision. First, there were good materials in the battalion, which could be used to the best advantage in the then struggle. Secondly, the disbanding of the battalion would not only have adverse effects on the other Nepalese units, but would also be a source of embarrassment to the *Maharaja* himself. The *Maharaja* was deeply touched by the recommendations of the Indian Commander-in-Chief and expressed his sincere sentiments in these words.

Greatly disgraced as I am at this disgraceful occurrence I feel more than grateful for your Excellency's kind sympathy and thoughtful action. ⁵¹

49. A secret letter from the Commander-in-Chief of India to *Maharaja* Joodha, Jan. 8, 1941, also from *Maharaja* Joodha to G.L. Betham June 10, 1941. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 464, 1941.

50. *Ibid.*

51. A letter from *Maharaja*, Joodha to R.A. Cassels, the Indian Commander-in-Chief, Jan. 13, 1941; also a letter from *Maharaja* to General Baber Shumsher, Jan. 13, 1941. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61 File No. 464, 1941.

The Premier, though in full agreement with the clauses a,b, and c of the recommendations, yet, suggested a slight alteration in the clause d. As regards the clause the Nepalese Premier pointed out that the two companies and the reformed battalions may remain subjected to the Indian military law of India until they were reformed; but once they were reformed they should be kept under Nepalese officers and be subjected to the Nepalese military law. The *Maharaja* did give his consent to allow the Second Rifles to be placed under British officers till March 1,1942.⁵²

The role of the Government of India throughout the Khot episode was marked with moderation and clemency. The Khot incident could have been easily perceived as a "mutiny" but the Government of India sought explanations for it in cultural factors. Nowhere is this attitude of the Government of India is better manifested than in these words of the British Minister in Nepal.

The men many of whom are young were extremely ignorant and protected from by spending their time from childhood in Nepal. They must have been bewildered and greatly astonished by many things. This act could have been treated as a mutiny but on the other hand I feel convinced that an exercise of quiet attitude towards the matter tempered with clemency will have the best effect. To return them practically as criminals would deprive them of any opportunity of wiping out the black smirch on their character. Probably their hearts would be broken and the iron find a ready entry into their broken hearts..... I feel fully convinced that in a few months these young men, for probably most of them are young, will turn out to be splendid fellows. Time is a wonderful curer. ⁵³

As regards the ringleaders of the Second Rifles the Minister noted that the punishment inflicted upon them

52. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to R.A. Cassels, the Commander-in-Chief of India, Jan. 13, 1941, *Ibid.*, also a letter from G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, Dec. 14, 1941, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 60. File No. 507, 1997/1940.

53. A letter from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, Jan. 13, 1941. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 464, 1997/1941.

during wartime be not extended when the war came to a close. Then the slogan "peace on earth and good will to men" would envelop the entire surface of the earth.⁵⁴

Altogether 22 men of the Second Rifles were declared to be ringleaders in the Khot episode. Twenty of them arrived as prisoners under Nepalese escort to Raxaul by January 25, 1941.⁵⁵ A military tribunal that was held in Kathmandu found all of them guilty and had to perform the unfortunate task of passing the following sentences in the interest of discipline.

a. *Subedar* Megh Bahadur Thapa was declared to be the prime instigator in the crime. He was found guilty of not only inciting the men to revolt but also for his double dealing with the officers of the regiment. Thus was sentenced to death.

b. *Sepoy* Kamal Bahadur, another principal ringleader was found guilty of laying hands on Colonel Brierley. He was convicted to undergo imprisonment for life. His close associates Esbahadur and Sin Bahadur two other main leaders were sentenced for 18 years imprisonment.

c. The fifth principal ringleader, who due to illness could not come with the group was dealt accordingly.

d. The remaining 18 men were given 6 years of imprisonment.

e. The officers of the regiment were dismissed from their service in disgrace.⁵⁶

The trial of the 22 accused men in the Khot episode was held in a very inopportune moment for the underground anti-Rana movement had poisoned the political horizon in an hitherto unprecedented scale. It was then widely rumored that there were 18,000 congressmen in the Valley of Kathmandu; and the *Maharaja* decided to use the

54. *Ibid.*

55. See a telephonic telegram from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, Jan. 25, 1941, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 464, 1977/1941.

56. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to the Minister G.L. Batham, Feb. 19, 1941. *Ibid.*

occasion as a display of force on all rebels, whether political or military. Thus February 18, 1941 was chosen to be a day for a public demonstration of force. Accordingly, the ring leaders and the officers of the Second Rifles were presented publicly in the parade ground of Tundikhel to undergo the punishment for their deeds. The guilty officers were beaten publicly by Colonel Bhakta Bahadur and Major Kul Bikram Rana, while *Subedar* Megh Bahadur Thapa was hanged in the parade ground at the zero hour of twelve noon.⁵⁷

Nepalese and the Gurkha troops in Combat Operations **Preface**

The above analytical framework forms a perfect backdrop for the combat operations of the Nepalese contingent as well as the Gurkha battalions during the Second World War. It is an irony of history that the peace loving Nepalese were found face to face with the same enemy a little more than two decades later. By the close of 1941 the war was slowly changing its color. Russia had already become an ally in war. The frontier of India during the period of war had ceased to be land or the coast of the subcontinent, but had been extended afield in the Middle East, Iraq, Iran and Malaya. To protect this external bastion of the subcontinent the Allied army needed two types of cadets: highly trained soldiers and general troops to carry essential work of pioneering and non-technical nature. The work of the second category was just as important as that of the front line in the combat zone. It required skilled manpower with good leadership and adequate training in rifles, machine-guns and anti-aircraft batteries. The Government of India, thus, sought permission from the *Maharaja* to use the men of the Nepalese contingent in

57. *Ibid.*, also an eyewitness account of the day in Tundikhel, of Ram Babu Dhakal, a close attendant of the *Maharaja* Jodha, interviewed on Sept. 10, 1982. The *Maharaja* was often charged for the act of cowardice for hanging the four martyrs at midnight. So it is entirely possible the Premier, an effort to rid himself of this charge preferred to hang the principle ringleader of the Khot episode at noon.

Northern Persia, Iraq and the Middle East to perform the role of pioneering and nontechnical nature. To be more specific, the Nepalese contingent would be asked to maintain strong points by building roads and bridges, building anti-tank obstacles and keep their rifles and machine-guns and anti-aircraft batteries pointed sharply at the enemy targets. The Viceroy of India desired to use the Nepalese troops in non-technical engineering work, thus, send two battalions to the Middle East and African theater of the war immediately.⁵⁸

The whole question of sending the Nepalese contingent for a supportive role in the Afro-Asian theater of the war came up for a detailed discussion between the *Maharaja* and the Minister in the Simlta Camp on December 13, 1941.⁵⁹ The very idea of the Nepalese contingent playing a secondary role in the war came as a rude shock to Nepal and the *Maharaja* asked the Minister to communicate to the Viceroy how Nepal looked at the issue. The *Maharaja* further noted that since the proposal contained many items it was not possible to give an off-hand reply. More hectic discussions and secret exchange of letters took place on the issue. The conversation abruptly broke at this point. Two themes, namely, Nepal's secondary role and the concept of pollution involved in crossing the seas constituted the very core of the correspondences between British Minister and the Nepalese Premier. When these topics came up for scrutiny and analysis Geoffrey Betham presented the views of the Government of India on these two points. First, he noted that the proposed supportive role of the Nepalese contingent, was as important as the work in the front line; and

58. A letter from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, December 5, 1941. E.No. 2, *Poka* No. 60, File No. 507, 1997/1940. The British Minister further went on to say that the Nepalese contingent had already shown a remarkable aptitude for non-technical engineering work.



59. The *Maharaja* was accompanied by *Bada Kazi* Marichi Man Singh, and the Northern Commanding General,





Recruiting Certificate: post 1914 period



Recruiting certificate: Pre - 1914 Period





No. 2129, RIFLEMAN KULBIR THAPA.

3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles.



Awarded the Victoria Cross

For most conspicuous bravery during operations against the German trenches south of Mauquissart. When himself badly wounded, on September 25th, 1915, he found a badly-wounded Soldier of the 2nd Leicester Regiment behind the first line German trench, and though urged by the British Soldier to save himself, he remained with him all day and night. In the early morning of 26th September, in misty weather, he brought him out through the German wire, and leaving him in a place of comparative safety, returned and brought in two wounded Gurkhas, one after the other. He then went back in broad daylight for the British Soldier, and brought him in also, carrying him most of the way, and being at most points under the enemy's fire.

(London Gazette, Nov. 18, 1915)

No. 10119, Rifleman Tulbahadur Pun

6th. Gurkha Rifles



AWARDED THE VICTORIA CROSS

In Burma on the 23rd June 1944, a battalion of 6th Gurkha Rifles was ordered to attack a railway bridge at MOGAUNG. Immediately as the attack developed the enemy opened concentrated and sustained crossfire at close range from a position known as Red House and from a strongly placed position 200 yards to the left. So intense was the cross-fire that both leading platoons of "B" company, one of which was Rifleman Tulbahadur's were pinned to the ground and the whole of the section wiped out with the exception of himself, the section commander, and one other man. The section commander immediately led the remaining two men in a charge on the Red House but was at once badly wounded. Rifleman Tulbahadur and his remaining companion continued to charge but the latter too was immediately badly wounded. Rifleman Tulbahadur seized the Bren Gun and, firing from the hip as he went on, continued to charge on the heavily bunkered position alone in the face of the most shattering concentration of automatic fire directed straight at him. With the dawn coming up behind he presented a perfect target to the Japanese. He had to move 30 yards over open ground ankle deep in mud, through shell holes and over fallen trees. Despite overwhelming odds he reached the house and closed with the Japanese occupants. He killed 3, put five more to flight and captured 2 L.M. Gs and much ammunition. He then gave accurate supporting fire from the bunker to the remainder of the platoon, which enabled them to reach the objective. His outstanding courage and superb gallantry in the face of odds which meant almost certain death were inspiring to all ranks and were beyond praise. (London Gazette, August 10, 1944)

Nepalese Officers in the North West Frontier






General Krishna Shumsher, G.O.C. of the Nepalese Contingent in India with Members of the British Army in World War II.



Nepalese Minister, General Singha Shumsher, Shaking Hands with Mr. Hicks after Handing over Railings of the Embassy of Nepal in London for War Purpose in World War II.


GEN. AUCHINCLOSS, C.-IN-C. IN INDIA, HONOURED BY THE KING OF NEPAL IN THE COUNTRY OF THE GURKHAS.



THE KING OF NEPAL
AND HIS WIFE
RECEIVING
THE
GENERAL
AT
KATHMANDU
ON HIS VISIT TO NEPAL
IN 1914.

General Auchincloss, C.-in-C. in India, was honoured by the King of Nepal in the country of the Gurkhas.

RECEIVED BY THE KING OF NEPAL IN THE COUNTRY OF THE GURKHAS. THE KING OF NEPAL, WHOSE TERRITORY IS BOUND BY THE HIMALAYAN MOUNTAINS TO THE NORTH AND THE INDIAN OCEAN TO THE SOUTH, HAS BEEN VISITED BY THE GENERAL IN 1914. THE KING OF NEPAL, WHOSE TERRITORY IS BOUND BY THE HIMALAYAN MOUNTAINS TO THE NORTH AND THE INDIAN OCEAN TO THE SOUTH, HAS BEEN VISITED BY THE GENERAL IN 1914.




GEN. AUCHINCLOSS RECEIVING THE KING OF NEPAL, DURING THE VISIT OF THE KING OF NEPAL TO THE INDIA IN 1914. THE KING OF NEPAL WAS HONOURED BY THE KING OF NEPAL IN THE COUNTRY OF THE GURKHAS.



THE KING OF NEPAL
DURING HIS VISIT TO NEPAL
IN 1914.

THE KING OF NEPAL
DURING HIS VISIT TO NEPAL
IN 1914.



for which they would be earning the highest credit.⁶⁰ In addition, he pointed out that the credit, which the *Maharaja* would receive would even surpass that of Jang Bahadur and Chandra Shumsher during the "Mutiny" and the Great War. To be more precise, the help of his predecessors was limited to the frontiers of India; but the Government of Nepal would in the current war be going a step further by extending the theater of Nepalese operation overseas.⁶¹

Secondly, as regards the concept of pollution associated with the taking of the Nepalese contingent overseas the Minister was careful to note that India was connected with Iraq and Iran by land, thus, the question of Nepalese crossing overseas did not occur. At the most the Nepalese troops will have to travel by sea up to Basar and then railed to their respective destinations. It is to be noted that the Nepalese are used to traveling short distances by sea, when they go to Rameshwar or Dwarika. Further, they have been known to go to distant lands like Tibet and to Kashgar to buy ponies.⁶²

Nepal, however, rejected the idea of despatching her contingent overseas on religious grounds. The *Maharaja* politely pointed out that among all the knotty questions that demand a serious consideration, those which involve the religious scruples and beliefs of the people are the most difficult to deal with. He then went ahead to assert that the proposal of sending the contingent beyond the border of India came under that category. The religious issue cannot thus be ignored without impunity. It was the factor of religion that had confined the role of the Nepalese contingent within the borders of India during

60. See a letter from Geoffrey Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, Dec. 12, 1941; also a letter from General Krishna Shumsher to Nepalese Commander-in-Chief, Padma Shumsher, Poush 7, 1998 (December 1941), *Ibid.*

61. A reply by the British Minister to the note of the *Maharaja*, Dec. 14, 1941, *Ibid.*

62. *Ibid.*

the Great War; and same was the case then. He further noted that the Gurkhas at home were more orthodox than those who took service in India. Thus, anything that would affect their religious sentiments should be carefully avoided. The letter of the *Maharaja* in part ran

To tell you the truth to send the contingent beyond India would not only be very unpopular among the people and *bhardars*, not to speak of the priests in general, but it will also create an impression among the contingent that we have broken faith with them. So much so that it is likely to be attended with much unrest and dissatisfaction in the country. Your Excellency will allow me to express a hope that neither you nor my honoured and esteemed friend Most Hon'able The Marques of Linlithgow and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief would like to see me placed in such a serious predicament.⁶³

The Nepalese Premier, in addition, mentioned the fact that the question of the service of the Nepalese contingent was hotly debated when the terms and conditions relating to the offer of the Nepalese troops were being drafted. The opening paragraph of this important document rules out the use of the Nepalese contingent beyond the borders of India. To quote, "the contingent will be for service in India and the North West Frontier and will not be sent overseas." He also rejected the Minister's idea of giving the men of the Nepalese contingent a choice to go overseas⁶⁴ on the ground that the Nepalese troops move by command and not by choice.⁶⁵

By the middle of December 1941, the Minister came to the conclusion that it was useless to press the *Maharaja* on the point. Thus, he wrote to the Foreign Office, New Delhi, pointing out that due to a strong unanimous feeling of the people in the Valley, *bhardars* and the priests

63. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Minister G.L. Betham, *Ibid.*

64. A letter from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, Dec. 14, 1941, *op. cit.*, footnote No. 61.

65. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to G.L. Betham, December 14, 1941. *Ibid.*

the *Maharaja* has regretfully refused to send the Nepalese contingent overseas.⁶⁶ Apparently, the Nepalese Premier was very much irritated by the British proposal. Nowhere is his irritated mind better manifested than in these words contained in a letter to the Viceroy of India dated December 19, 1941.

Leaving aside other things it seems to me rather incomprehensible why a proposal should have come to send the contingent beyond the borders of India when there are so many of my able bodied countrymen serving in the Indian army, who supplemented by the recruits I have provided since the outbreak of the war number well over fifty thousands..... I earnestly hope that Your Excellency will see eye to eye with me in the matter and be pleased to relieve me of the worry and anxiety the proposal has put me in.⁶⁷

He, therefore, decided to send his trusted son General Bahadur Shumsher to deliver the letter to the Viceroy on his behalf.

It was on December 21, 1941 General Bahadur had an audience with the Viceroy of India, who was accompanied by his Commander-in-Chief. The conversation marked the climax of the dialogue between the Government of India and Nepal on the question of the use of Nepalese contingent overseas. The Viceroy opened the meeting with an apology for he had placed the *Maharaja* under great difficulty. He then softened his stand by seeking the permission of sending the Nepalese contingent to Burma. The shift was obvious for the entry of Japan in the war had given the conflict a new dimension. General Bahadur, however, pointed out that the new proposal was also equally problematic for it

66. See a telegram 2 P.S.V. from G.L. Betham to Foreign office Delhi, Dec. 14, 1941. E. No. 2 Poka No. 60, File No. 507, 1997/1940.

67. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Marquis of Linlithgow, Viceroy of India, December 19, 1941; also a letter from *Maharaja* to General Archibald Wavel, the Commander-in-Chief of India, Dec. 21, 1941. *Ibid.*

also involved the crossing of the Bay of Bengal. The Governor General being irritated by Nepal's adamant posture hinted at the possibility of Nepal being asked to pull out her troops from India due to the lack of a suitable role. The Nepalese General, though sad and dismayed, did politely pointed out that Nepal would go along with the mission of pulling her contingent out of India if there was no suitable role for her to perform. General Bahadur did immortalize the Nepalese sentiments in these lines.

I am constrained to say that that it is a very unkind remark of Your Excellency that there is no suitable role of the Nepalese Contingent in India. His Highness (the *Maharaja*) is ungrudgingly and without any consideration of our country is sending all the young mountain-manhood for your cause. Though knowing all this you still would like to return the Contingent we are helpless. We are quite prepared to accept such a proposal, though such an action would very much hurt our feelings. Furthermore, what will the whole world say about the 100 years old friendship between Nepal and Britain, if at a moment when the gates of India is threatened on two fronts the Nepalese Contingent is asked to return. Your Excellency can realize this.⁶⁸

In conclusion he also inserted a personal note, namely, the pull out would not only mean a failure of his mission but also would signal the end of his diplomatic career.

The statement of the General did have a catalytic effect in changing the mood of the Viceroy and the idea of sending the Nepalese contingent to support the *Raj* overseas was dropped out once and forever. In return Nepal showed her willingness to station her troops in the Assam front with a license to chase the enemy deep into the Burmese territory if necessity demanded. The *Maharaja* was delighted to see how his son had tactfully turned the tide of discussion to Nepal's favor and advantage. Thus,

68. See the conversation between General Bahadur Shumsher and the Viceroy of India, contained in a letter from Bahadur to *Maharaja*, Dec. 21, 1941. For details see Appendix H.

he took this occasion to congratulate his son.⁶⁹ He also thanked the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief of India for looking at the problem with an eye to eye with the Maharaja.

Nepal, though rejected the idea of sending the Nepalese contingent for supportive role in the Western Front, yet, did offer two auxiliary Labor Battalions to fulfil a secondary role in the Eastern Front, as early as February 1941. The Government of India was very grateful that the Maharaja could spare two battalions for auxiliary services. Accordingly, the First Jangi Jagannath Auxiliary Pioneer Battalion of the Nepal army left Kathmandu for the Eastern Front. They worked under most adverse conditions and made all the necessary valuable preparations for India's offences against the Japanese.⁷⁰

69. The Maharaja's note of congruatulation in part ran

You have represented our views well, with strength and firmness where national honour was at a stake and with softness and dexterity where the art of negotiation demanded. As regards the use of Nepalese troops in Burma you have spoken the language of my mind. The British Minister was happy to appreciate your stand, and I am happy that you have removed the anxiety of my mind.

See a letter from Maharaja Joodha to General Bahadur Shumsher, Poush 10, 1998 (December 1941). E. No. 2, Poka No. 61, File No. 507, 1997/1940.

70. See a letter from Maharaja Joodha to General Allan Fleming Hartly, Commander-in-Chief of India, Feb. 3, 1942; Minister G.L. Behtam to Maharaja Joodha, March 3, 1942; from Archibald Wavell to Maharaja Dec. 23, 1943; Maharaja to Archibald Wavell, Jan. 21, 1944. E. No. 2, Poka No. 61, File No. 538, 1998/1942. To facilitate the work of the pioneer battalion *koodalis*, instruments of mannual husbandary, were sent to them for use. See a letter from Minister Geoffary Betham to Maharaja, Jan. 12, 1942; also a letter from the First Gurkha Secretary of the British Mission to the Nepalese Officer attached to the British Legation, Dec. 3, 1942, E. No. 2, Poka No. 61, File No. 499, 1999/1941.

Nepalese Contingent in Combat Operations in the Eastern Front*

The entry of Japan in the war did give a new dimension to the conflict by the close of 1941. It was this new element that had turned the combat operations of the Nepalese contingent into a reality in the Eastern Front. But before the Nepalese combat operations took its final shape important changes were taking place in the leadership of South Asia. In India, the Marquis of Linlithgow was replaced by Viscount of Wavell and in Nepal *Maharaja* Joodha was thinking of retiring from active political life but the decision was postponed till the close of the war. General Bahadur Shumsher was replaced by General Krishna Shumsher as the Nepalese General attached to the Army Head Quarter in India and term of appointment of the Minister Geoffery Betham in Kathmandu had expired. It was against this background that Japan increased the momentum of her offences in South-East Asia.

To counteract the possible Japanese invasion of India the Nepalese contingent in India was put on the alert. The three battalions of the Nepalese contingent, Kali Bahadur, Sher and Mahindra Dal, were given special training in combat operations.⁷¹ By 1944 the Japanese had penetrated deep into Assam-Burma frontier and the Manipur region. The above three battalions of the Nepalese contingent, which were placed under the South-east Asia command of Louis Mountbatten, had come to a firm grip of the enemy.⁷² The role of the Nepalese contingent in the Eastern Front forms a glorious part of the heroic struggle the Allied forces put up against Japanese invasion in South-east Asia.

* The troops of the Nepalese contingent must not be confused with the regiments of the Indian army. They were paid by the Government of Nepal and formed much of the troops of the Independent Allied Power as the American or the Chinese.

71. A letter from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, Nov. 13, 1942; from *Maharaja* to Minister, Nov. 6, 1942. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 507, 1997/1940.

72. From *Maharaja* Joodha to Viscount of Wavell, the Viceroy of India, April 28, 1944. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 661, File No. 550, 2000/1943.

a. Kali Bahadur Battalion

During March 1944 there were two Kali Bahadur regiments in Imphal, while the remaining of the battalion was stationed in Sangshak area, situated just 1.27 miles away from it. Those in Sangshak played a significant role in the defensive operations from March 26, 1944, till orders were given to withdraw to Imphal.⁷³ A more detailed and a graphic picture of the Nepalese contingent in defensive operation emerges from the war diary of Kali Bahadur Battalion for the month of March. The battalion formed a part of the Parachute British Division in the East since March 15, 1944. The portion of the perimeter held by the Kali Bahadur battalion was heavily wooded—thus afforded a good cover for defensive positions which were carefully dug and concealed.⁷⁴

In March 20, the enemy was advancing and was within one perimeter of the defensive area held by Kali Bahadur. The Kali Bahadur was; thus, put on the alert. The Japanese advance continued throughout the day of March 21. The enemy probably got into Litan Shangshak region through Ukhrul. Some sporadic fighting took place that day, which ended in taking the life of Bil Bahadur, the mule leader of the Kali Bahadur, and wounding *Havildar* Khadga Bahadur. Three more "Gurkhas"* were the casualties of the next day. The defensive operations entered into hand-to-hand combat on March 23. Early in the morning five "Gurkhas" were ambushed by the Japanese and a Lance Naik was hit by a grenade. The Japanese also fell victim to an ambush laid by

73. A report from Louis Mountbatten, South-east Asia Command Head Quarters, to *Maharaja* Joodha, May 4, 1944. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 661, File No. 550, 2000/1943.

74. See the Comments by B.E. Abott, Colonel Offg. Bde. Commander 50 Parachute Division, in the East on the war diary, March (?) 1944, *Ibid.*

* The term "Gurkha" within inverted commas is used to denote the men of the Nepalese contingent; while the Gurkhas in the British army is written without the inverted commas.

Sepoy Budhi Man and his party. Budhi Man had to face hand-to-hand combat with the enemy and in the process killed three Japanese. The first Japanese, who appeared before him, was shot dead instantly. Then the second Japanese followed him to grab his rifle, whereupon he took his bayonet and inserted it into the enemy's belly. He then jumped on the third enemy and beheaded him with a *khukuri*. After this he withdraw from the conflict and rushed to report his deeds to the Head Quarter. He however, had bruises all over his face and looked fatigued, yet, cheerful.

An important development took place on March 24, when the enemy cut off the meager water supply of the Nepalese. Thus, drinking water had to be dropped by the air. Throughout the next day the enemy shelled the Nepalese position by 75 m.m. guns and 4 inch. mortars. As the enemy's pressure was increased on route "A" Coy one "Gurkha" was killed and 10 were wounded. The day of March 26 proved to be crucial. The enemy's advance had made two "Gurkha" guns inoperative. Thus, the "Gurkhas" of 153 Parachute battalion were ordered to counterattack. The attack was completely successful and the Japanese were driven to their previous old positions. But the enemy pressure mounted. A British Major, A. Baty, was killed when he made a byonet charge after the enemy had occupied the gun position. The enemy's harrassment continued throughout the day with an increasing momentum, with continious shelling. Again the "A" and "J" sectors came under heavy fire. The British Divisional Commander, thus, gave orders to retreat. To complete the retreating process all the heavy stuff had to be burried or rendered useless. Finally, at 2:30 hours that night the Kali Bahadur regiment left the defence area towards Yangyangpokpi. The first retreating party arrived at Imphal by March 29, 1944.⁷⁵

75. See a secret account prepared by Major Prakash Jung Thapa, Senior Supervising Officer, of Kali Bahadur in the defence zone (drawn more or less according to memory). Contained in the War Diary of Kali Bahadur, for the month of March 1944. E. No. 2, *Poka* No 61 File No. 650, 2000/1943.

By April the Kali Bahadur Battalion which was recouping in Imphal was ordered to advance towards Patel. Thus, when the month of May came to a close the Kali Bahadur Battalion had already killed 600 Japanese.⁷⁶ The battalion throughout the Allied operations in South-east Asia distinguished itself wherever it was placed. They suffered light casualties in comparison with the heavy loss they inflicted upon the enemy.⁷⁷ The Nepalese and the British Premiers were both delighted to hear about the achievements of the Kali Bahadur regiment for two reasons. First, the Kali Bahadur constituted the personal body guards of the *Maharaja* and secondly, this was the first occasion when the men of the Nepalese contingent fought against foreign troops as an ally of the British.

b. Sher Battalion and the Mahindra Dal

It was on April 4, 1944 two of its regiments were detailed for defence of Khomia in Assam. The Japanese offences took place in the beginning of April. In the battle of Khomia the Nepalese officers and men showed many single instances gallantry. An illustrious example was the defence of treasury put up by Sailendra Mahat. He along with the aid of a few riflemen, despite heavy shelling and deep infiltration of the enemy, held his position. For their acts of gallantry *Subedar* Sailendra Bahadur Mahat and Das Bahadur were both awarded the Military Cross.⁷⁸

76. See a report of Louis Mountbatten, May 4, 1944. *op. cit.*, footnote no. 73; a letter from Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief of India, to *Maharaja* Joodha, April 13, 1944; also a secret letter from Louis Mountbatten to *Maharaja* Joodha May 24, 1944, June (?) 1944; from General W.J. Slim, Head Quarters of the Fourteenth Army May 31, 1944 to *Maharaja* Joodha; from *Maharaja* to General Slim June (?), 1944. *Ibid.*

77. See a note handed to Gunja Man Singh, Nepalese Officer attached to the British Mission, April (?) 1944. *Ibid.*

78. A letter from General Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief of India, to *Maharaja* Joodha, May 12, 1944; from *Maharaja* Joodha to General W.J.Slim June (?) ,1944. *Ibid.*

However, the enemy's pressure was so heavy that the units of the Sher regiments in Khomia were compelled to withdraw in a piecemeal fashion to Dimapur in early April. On the whole, despite these individual records of heroism, the Sher regiment did not do so well as the other regiments of the Nepalese contingent, who defeated the Japanese army which had crossed Chindwin, with an intent to capture Khomia, Imphal and Dimapur. Several factors like the lack of the sophisticated training in modern warfare, the sheer physical distance coupled with their noviceness to the situation, were all responsible to the swift retreat of Sher regiment. The report submitted by General Krishna Shumsher on the actions of the Sher regiment also confirms the point. It further adds that the absence of British officers attached to them at the site also contributed to their hasty and premature decision.⁷⁹

After the Sher debacle the British began to insist on the need for more training for the men and officers of the Nepalese contingent.⁸⁰ But General Krishna aptly pointed out that he was helpless in the matter for the British had already trained them for four years. The Viceroy of India, Lord Wavell, also agreed with the Nepalese General. To quote the Governor General "the Sher regiment will no doubt settle down and prove itself worthy of the high traditions of the Nepalese army."⁸¹ The Viceroy was right. By the middle of May 1944, the Sher regiment was again mobilized for action against the Japanese; and they did well.⁸²

79. See a letter from General Krishna to *Maharaja Joodha*, May 23, 1944. *Ibid.*

80. A letter from General W. J. Slim to *Maharaja*, May 31, 1944. *Ibid.*

81. A Letter from Lord Wavell, the Viceroy of India, to *Maharaja Joodha* May 16, 1944. *Ibid.*

82. A letter from *Maharaja Joodha* to Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief of India, June 1, 1944; also from the Indian Commander-in-Chief to *Maharaja*, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 647, 2000/1943.

The contribution of Mahindra Dal was significant both for their offences and holding their defensive line. This battalion, which fought for the British in the Lucknow seize of 1857, and in the North West Frontier in the Great War, was one of the first units of the Fourteenth army to cross Chindwin in September and to enter into Central Burma. The most notable achievement of this battalion was the successful capture of the oil wells of Inlaw. The *Maharaja* took this occasion to congratulate the battalion.⁸³ As the pressure mounted on the Nepalese contingent the *Maharaja* even permitted the Jangi Jagan Nath Auxiliary Battalion to cross the Indo-Burmese Frontier as far as Shingbwyang.⁸⁴ This Pioneer Battalion, which was under the American command, helped in building roads and bridge heads, thus, setting up a strong defence line.⁸⁵

The Nepalese contingent, despite reverses, was able to pull herself together and frustrate enemy's bold determination to conquer Manipur, Assam and Imphal. In their defensive operation as well as in their hand-to-hand combat they proved themselves second to none and earned themselves the distinctive title of "the bravest of the brave." It is true that the Nepalese contingent was sent for only garrison duty in India but when Japan launched "the conquer India plan" the *Maharaja* of Nepal waved the condition. Thus, the Nepalese contingent was released to take a prominent part in the Burmese campaign both in Rangoon and Mandalay. In summary, military feats of considerable distinction were performed by the Nepalese regiments. The Mahindra Dal Battalion completed the 12,000 miles of active patrolling. The Kali Bahadur fought with courage and

83. See *The Times of India* "Nepalese Units in Burma", May 8, 1945. p. 3.

84. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief of India, June 1, 1944; also from the Commander-in-Chief of India to the *Maharaja*, June 10, 1944. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 647, 2000/1943.

85. A letter from General Krishna to *Maharaja* Joodha, May 23, 1944. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 650, 2000/1943.

determination at Imphal and the Sher Battalion took part in the vital Khomia seize. Again the Pioneer Battalion helped to construct the Ledo Road. The other regiments were also used in the North West Frontier and one in Tocchi Valley operation.⁸⁶

The Nepalese contingent had gone out of their way in their devotion to duty; and in the process they successfully drove the Japanese out of Burma. By June 1945 the war with Germany had come to a close and the war was ranging only in the Pacific. Thus talks of the withdrawal of the Nepalese contingent was receiving serious attention.

THE GURKHA TROOPS IN COMBAT OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II

The heroic performances of the Nepalese contingent in the Eastern Front, in fact, constituted only the periphery of the glory that was to be showered upon the Gurkha troops in the war. The fall of France in May 1940⁸⁷ and the British losses of 35,000 men in Belgium and 6,000 men in France⁸⁸ made the role of the Gurkhas more important than ever before. The fall of France came as a rude shock as well as a lesson for Britain. Britain, which was on the defensive till the middle of 1940 was compelled to form a comprehensive plan of both offence and defence. Nepal stood firmly by her when she needed her the most. The role of the Gurkhas during the World War II may be categorized into two parts the combat operations in the western Front and that of the East.

A. The Combat Operations in the Western Front

After the fall of France the ten regiments of the Gurkha were at once called for active service in the Wes-

86. See a notification issued by Public Relation Directorate, New Delhi, July, 28, 1945, with instructions not to be published or broadcasted till August 4, 1945. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. Ka 51, 2002/1945.

87. More on the fall of France see David Thompson, *Democracy in France Since 1870* (London : Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 211-236.

88. A letter from G.L. Betham to *Maharaja Joodha* July 1, 1940. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 54, File No. 437, *Ka*, Sept. 1939 to 1940.

tern Front. Though the immediate British aim was to restore the Freedom of France, yet, enemy advance in the Middle East and Africa had to be contained. The Gurkha regiments, thus, joined the Allied army in the Middle East. They, thus, joined the other nationalities like the Serbs, Greeks, Cypriots, Newzelanders, Australians and South Africans. The need of parachute units to fight a modern warfare cannot be overstressed, and the Gurkhas were the first Allied troops to receive training in parachute manoeuvres.⁸⁹ The six month training of the first 500 units of Gurkha Parachute Battalion was completed by September 22, 1942; and was placed under Colonel Loftus Tottenham.⁹⁰

i. African Front: The Western Deserts

By the summer of 1942, the Two Eighth Gurkha Rifles was already in action in the Western deserts of Africa and played a significant part in stemming the tide of the German advance. It was unfortunate that the regiment suffered heavy losses, yet, the casualties it inflicted upon the enemy was far greater. Among those Gurkhas, who were made the prisoners of war most of them had escaped by the close of the year. Major Yeates reported from the battlefield that the spirit of the battalion was always optimistic and was always waiting for a chance to meet the enemy.⁹¹ The *Fouji Akhabar* also reports the

89. See a speech of Louis Mountbatten in Kathmandu, in a party hosted by *Maharaja* Padma Shumsher, not dated, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 29, File No. 946, 203/1946.

90. The *Maharaja* was happy to consent the raising of Gurkha Parachute units. See a letter from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha Sept. 21, 28, 1941; also from *Maharaja* to Minister, October 2, 13, 1941, Nov. 11, 1942. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 560, File No. 500, 1998/1971.

91. For extracts on the report of Major Yeates of the Two Eighth Gurkha Rifles see a letter from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, May 11, 1943. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 55, File No. 498, 1998/1941.

regular Gurkha battalions taking a prominent part in pursuing the German General Rommel in Libya.⁹²

In the same period One Half Gurkha Rifles and the One Ninth Gurkha Rifles, which constituted a part of the Fourth Indian Division, were engaged in the decisive battles of Alame, in Mareth, Wadi Akarit and Enfidavile. The triumph at Wadi Akarit marked the climax of the Western Campaign. It was General Rommel's next line of defence after the Mareth line and the Fatnassa—"a highly pinnacled feature of extravagant contours". The task to conquer "the lap of the Gods" fell to One Half Gurkha Rifles. This conquest was immortalized by the extraordinary devotion to duty of the *Subedar* Lal Bahadur Thapa on 5/6 April and April 20, 1943. During the night of the attack on Ez Zquai feature the *Subedar* took two sections of his regiment with the objective to capture the outer ridge. The first contact with the enemy was made at the foot of the pathway winding down the narrow cleft. This cleft was held by a series of enemy posts the outer edge of which contained medium machine-guns and anti-tank gun. The crew of the anti-tank gun was killed in the first push by the *khukuri* and the enemy opened a very heavy fire down the pathway. *Subedar* Lal Bahadur Thapa led his men and fought his way up the narrow gully with no room to manoeuvre in the fury of machine-gun fire and the liberal use of grenades by the enemy. The *Subedar* himself knocked down the second enemy post by killing two enemy with his *khukuri*, his rifleman killed the third and the rest fled. The pathway was the only practicable route up the precipitous ridge. The objective was fulfilled—a bridgehead was established across the anti-tank ditch as the *Subedar* and his men forced their way up the bullet and the grenade swept gully. The outstanding leadership and gallantry, the complete disregard for his own safety and the ruthless deter-

92. See *Fouji Akhbar*, Nov. 1, 1942, p. 2; also a letter from Acting British Minister J.D. Ogilvy to *Maharaja* Joodha, Nov. 12, 1942. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 560, File No. 42, 1997/1940.

mination to fulfil the objective made the operation a success; and the *Subedar* received the award of the Victoria Cross from the King and Emperor himself in North Africa.⁹³ The One Ninth Gurkha Battalion was also in action but the breakthrough of the "Red Eagle" was negatived by the fact that the armor arrived late.

ii. The European Front

The Gurkha operations in France and Italy was staggering by any definition. In Italy the Forty Third Gurkha Brigade was in action. The One Fifth Gurkha Rifle was the first Gurkha regiment to reach Italy. An incident at Mozzagrogna typifies the remorseless Gurkha logic. A party of Gurkhas was detailed to burry nine German bodies: eight were dumped but the ninth corpse sprang to life and would have been burried but some one interrupted "we are asked to burry nine; surely You don't expect us to burry one alive."⁹⁴

In February 1944 three battalions, (One Seventh, One Ninth and Two Seventh Gurkha rifles) came close to over-running the famous Benedictine monastery the stronghold of Monte Cassino. The One Ninth clung like "limpets" on a rocky outer crap below the monastery known as the Hangman's Hill-an ordeal of nine days, which made the battalion best known in Italy. A giant boulder still bears the ninth Gurkha badge-crossed *khukuri* carved out of rocks Colonel Roche, who commanded the One Ninth Gurkha

93. *London Gazette*, June 15, 1943; Recommendation for the award Col. H.L. Showers, April 1940; a letter from Marquis of Linlithgow July 8, 1943. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 42; G.L. Betham to *Maharaja Joodha* June 14, Sept. 13, 1943; a letter from Major General Tucker the Commander of the Fourteenth Indian Division to the Battalion Commander Colonel Ian April 20, 1943, E. No. 4, *Poka* No. 155, File No. 615; a letter from the British Premier Winston Churchill to *Maharaja Joodha*, October 6, 1943, E. No. 4 *Poka* No. 162, File No. 318, 1995/1938.

94. S. Guru Deva, "Dynamite from the Hills", *The Statesman*, April 15, 1971, p. 10.

Rifles pays a glowing tribute to the men of the regiment. His feelings in short ran,

I am sure that no Commanding Officer has had the honour to command troops more staunch in battle and devoted to duty and determined to overthrow the enemy; and many German lads lie on the hills of Garci, Medjez Elbob as silent witness of the special prowess in hand-to-hand combat of men of 1/9th. Gurkha Rifles. The *Khukuris* wielded in such hands has proved to be a terrible weapon.⁹⁵

When the campaign of Monte was over the 2/7 Gurkha Rifles took part in the big thrust against the Gothic lines. Other Gurkha regiments like the Two Third Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles and Two Fourth Prince of Wales's Own Gurkha Rifles came to support this campaign. Besides, the lorried brigade of Two Sixth and Two Tenth Gurkha Rifles not only swelled their numbers but also their reputation. The Two Sixth Gurkha Rifles still were the Prussian Eagle badge of the Hussars to commemorate the famous victory. Again, at San Marino, towards the close of the Italian campaign Rifleman Sherbahadur Thapa kept a German machine-gun post at bay for two hours, but died in action in an effort to rescue an wounded comrade. He was bestowed the posthumous award of the Victoria Cross.⁹⁶ Equally pathetic is the story of the posthumous award of the Victoria Cross to Rifleman Thaman Gurung of the Fifth Gurkha Rifles.

In Italy on November 10, 1944 a company of Fifth Gurkha Rifles was ordered to send a fighting patrol to Monte San Bartola, with the objective to pave the way for future attack. In this patrol there were two scouts and one of them was Thaman Gurung. By skillful staking

95. The frank statement made by Colonel Roche is contained in a letter from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 155, File No. 617, 2000/1943.

96. See citation in respect to the award of the Victoria Cross to Rifleman Sher bahadur Thapa. E. No. 4, *Poka* No. 155, File No. 615, 2000/1943.

Rifleman Gurung reached the summit, where the Germans were about to open fire with their machine-guns. The firing would have inflicted a heavy casualty on the platoon but he leapt to his feet and charged upon them. Completely taken by surprise, the Germans surrendered, without opening fire. The Rifleman then crept forward to the summit of the position, from which he saw the Germans well dug in on the reverse slope preparing to throw grenades over the crest at the leading section. Although the interception line was devoid of cover and under accurate machine-gun fire at close range Thaman Gurung crossed it and fired at the German stations with his Tommy gun, thus, allowing the forward section to reach the summit. But due to heavy fire from the enemy gunners the platoon was asked to withdraw. The role of Thaman Gurung in the safe retreat of the platoon is a superb episode in the history of military annals. He again, completely ignoring a heavy fire at short range did cross the skyline alone and put a methodically successive burst of fire from his Tommy gun into the German slit trench till his ammunition ran out. He then threw two grenades he had with him, and rejoining his section collected two more grenades. He then crossed the ridge showered with enemy's bullets and hurled the explosives at the remaining Germans. This diversion of the enemy enabled the rear of the platoon to return to safety without further losses. Meanwhile, the remaining section remained behind to complete the withdrawal. The Rifleman then seized a brengun and a number of magazines and asking them to retreat went again to the summit in full view of the enemy. He knew fully well that his action meant almost death, yet, he stood firm as a rock on the bullet swept summit and opened fire on the nearest enemy positions. It was only when he had emptied two magazines the withdrawal of the platoon to a place of comparative safety was completed. It was at this point Thaman Gurung fell dead. One must admit that it was due to his superb gallantry and the sacrifice of his life that his platoon was able to withdraw from an extremely

difficult position without many more casualties than actually incurred. Again it was the store of information that was brought by the platoon that resulted in the capture of the Monte San Bartolo three days later; and the expression "Hurrah for the Gurkhas" became the slogan of the Allied troops in troubled times.⁹⁷

iii. The Eastern Front

The Gurkha operations in the Eastern Front was more impressive and touching. In one single operation the Gurkhas of the Two Fifth Gurkha Rifles received two Victoria Crosses⁹⁸; while in one campaign they were able to bag six such supreme awards. Both are unique records, which, perhaps, will remain unbeaten in the annals of military history. In the Eastern Front the Japanese had advanced up to Chin hills almost on the border of India. Here the Gurkhas did display their customary heroism and gave India a breathing space to formulate a comprehensive plan for the war.

A typical reflection of the fine fighting record of the Gurkha troops in the Burmese Front is the role of the Fourth Gurkha Rifle since January 1942. The Fourth Gurkha Rifles, which constituted a part of the Seventeenth Indian Light Division under Major General Tennant Cowau, landed in Rangoon by the close of January 1942. A few days later they moved to Mayagaon and then to Bilin. Here they first contacted the Japanese on February 17, 1942. But after four days of fighting the battalion was asked to withdraw. On February 24, it was after crossing the

97. See citation in respect of posthumous award of Victoria Cross to 55537 Rifleman Thaman Gurung of the First Battalion, Fifth Gurkha Rifle. *Ibid*; also a letter from Premier Winston Churchill to *Maharaja Joodha*, May, 15, 1944. E. No. 4, *Poka* No. 162, File No. 318, 1995/1938; from Acting British Minister to *Maharaja*, Feb. 22, 1945, E. No. 4, *Poka* No. 155, File No. 617, 1945.

98. The Victoria Cross (V.C.) in appearance is a simple bronze emblem with little or no intrinsic value of its own. But what it means in the world of heroism and valor is something beyond ones imagination.

river Sittang that it was heavily attacked from the air. This attack subsided when two Japanese planes were shot down by the light Gurkha machine-gun and rifles. On February 24, the regiment was in Pegu where on 1/2 April it fought heavily with the enemy and inflicted many casualties, before the withdrawal orders were given. Attacked from the ground they moved to Imphal and fortified that position. In March 1943 the battalion marched to China Hills and helped to construct the Tiddim road. They then marched to Fort White where they attacked the Japanese at Basha East in cooperation with another Gurkha battalion. The Gurkhas successfully concentrated their attack on 10,000 feet high Kenedy peak and Pimpi of 5,551 feet in elevation. For this gallant operation the battalion received the following medals: one India Order of Merit, one Military Cross, and four India's Distinguished Service Medals. The regiment took no rest and in February 1944 the Commando platoon of this regiment was making successful operations against the enemy at Mual Ben Ridge.⁹⁹

One of the legendary battles of the Eastern Front was the conquest of the bridgehead at Mogaung. The difficult task of attacking the bridgehead at Mogaung fell to the battalion of the Sixth Gurkha Rifles, where Rifleman Tulbhadur Pun distinguished himself as one of the distinguished heroes of all times. In June 1944 a D.B. plane air-dropped Tulbahadur Pun and his companions in the Burmese dense jungles of Bread Bye. The objective of this Commando Mission was to destroy a bridge under the control of the Japanese so as to check their further advance. How suicidal was this mission is indicated by the fact that the three separate groups of British, Chinese and African commandoes who had volunteered for this task had perished leaving no survivors. Besides about 500 Allied comrades had already perished in the enemy's assault.

99. See the War Notes relating to the operations of the Fourth Gurkha Rifles, October 3, 1944. E. No. 2, Poka No. 54, File No. Doo 7 Ga 1944.

Having landed in the thicket of Bread Bye, Tulbahadur Pun accompanied by two other sepoy's volunteered to discover the secrets of the bridgehead which had cost so many precious lives of the Allies. He toiled for three days to discover the secret. He found that the bridge to Mogaung was the only entrance to the city; and, thus, was heavily guarded by the Japanese. When a slight noise came from the bridge volley of shells and bullets flew from the trenches below, where the enemy was well grounded. It was at this point where the Allied commandoes had perished. Tulbahadur conducted this experiment from a position of comparative safety. At 10 p.m. he tapped at the bridge with a long stick and to his surprise shells and bullets fell on top of the bridge like rain. He again repeated the same experiment at 1 a.m. and all was calm and quite. He concluded that the Japanese slept at 1 a.m. and when he crossed the bridge at this dead hour he witnessed the Japanese sleeping with their brenguns and machine-guns. Tulbahadur and his companions, thus, chose the post-midnight hours to launch their attack on the bridge; and the bridge fell easily to them. After this heroic feat the Gurkha battalion moved forward towards the city of Mogaung that was well fortified by the Japanese. On June 23, 1944 a battalion of the Sixth Gurkha was ordered to attack a railwayhead at Mogaung. But just as the Gurkhas had commenced their offensive role the enemy opened concentrated and sustained cross-fire at a range from a position known as the Red House and a strongly fortified position 200 yards from the left. So intense was the crossfires that both the leading platoons of the "B" Company, one of which was that of Rifleman Tulbahadur, were pinned to the ground; and the whole of the section was wiped out with the exception of himself, the section commander and another man. The section commander then led the remaining two men and charged towards the Red House, but was at once badly wounded. The Rifleman Tulbahadur Pun and his sole surviving companion continued the charge; but the latter

was also badly wounded. At this critical juncture Tulbahadur seized his brengun and firing from the hip as he went on, continued to charge on the heavily bunkered position alone in the face of the most shattering concentration of automatic fire directed straight at him. With dawn coming up behind, he presented a perfect target to the Japanese. He still had to move 30 yards over open ground ankle deep in mud across shell holes and fallen trees. Despite such overwhelming odds, he reached the Red House and closed with the Japanese occupants. He killed three and put five more to flight and captured a store of ammunition. He then gave an accurate supporting fire from the bunker to enable the platoon to fulfil their objective which was the capture and the occupation of the city.¹⁰⁰ His outstanding courage and superb gallantry against all odds, which meant almost certain death, was inspiring to all ranks and beyond praise.

Perhaps, the most fascinating story of the war was the defence of the mortar Bluff on the side of the hill commanding the base of Bishenpur in Burma. It was on June 24, 1944 the hill was overrun by the strong enemy forces. *Subedar* Netrabahadur Thapa was commanding a garrison of forty one men of the Fifth Gurkha Rifles, at the side of the hill known as the Mortar Bluff whose security

100. Interview with Rifleman Tulbahadur Pun in Pokhara on April 2, 1982; citation in respect to the awarding of the Victoria Cross to No. 10119 Rifleman Tulbahadur Pun of the Sixth Gurkha Rifle. E. No. 4, *Poka* No. 155, File No. 617, 2000/1943. Tulbahadur Pun in his personal interview with the author also pointed out that his act of valor had, in fact, earned for him two Victoria Crosses: one for his successful operations in the conquest of the Bridge and the other for the victory over the city of Mogaung. But since it was against the convention to award two Victoria Crosses to an individual in a single campaign his name was proposed for only one Victoria Cross for his contribution at Mogaung. While Mr. Allen, an Englishman, who worked with him very closely was proposed for the second Victoria Cross award in the campaign. It was Lord Mountbatten, who decorated him with the supreme military honor.

was very vital to the other positions down the ridge, and in short, to Bishenpur itself. Next day, about seventy five Japanese poured their shells with their 75 m.m. guns at point blank range for ten minutes into the narrow confines of the isolated picquet. This was followed by the determined attacks by a company of the Japanese. A fierce fighting ensued in which Netrabahadur's men, exhorted by their leader, held their ground against all heavy odds, and drove the enemy with disproportionate loss. At this moment Netrabahadur, with tireless energy and contempt of danger moved from post to post encouraging and attending the wounded. But under the cover of pitch darkness and torrential rains, the enemy moved round the jungle and under the natural cover launched their fierce attack. Still in considerable strength and as determined and ferocious as ever, the enemy poured out from the jungle across the short space of open ground to the picquet defences, under the cover of small arms and 37 m.m gun fire from the flank. Due to reduced firepower one Gurkha section was unable to hold on and the enemy forced an entrance and overran that and another section killing and wounding 12 out of the 16 men comprising the two sections. Having no reserves, Netrabahadur himself went forward and prevented any further advance of the enemy by hurling grenades.

The situation was critical for the ammunition was low and the enemy had occupied a part of the perimeter. Netrabahadur would have been fully justified in withdrawing but so efficient were his plans of defence and such was the example of the gallant Gurkha officer that not a man moved from his trench and not an inch was gained by the enemy despite desperate attempts. In this way the night passed until 0400 hours; and a section of eight men with grenades and S.A.A. arrived. They immediately drew the enemy's fire and all eight were severely wounded. Netrabahadur, however, undismayed gathered their ammunition and took the offensive. He returned the enemy's fire until he had a few grenades and a *khukuri*. At this critical

pathetic juncture he received a bullet wound in his mouth and his heroic death followed shortly after. He fought for eight hours almost single handed against all overwhelming odds before he breathed his last with a *khukuri* in one hand and the cleft skull of a Japanese on the other. His fine example of personal bravery and high sense of duty inspired his men so much that a position was held beyond the limit of human endurance. In fact, his valor and devotion to duty constituted an epic in the history of the regiment.¹⁰¹ Others who distinguished themselves by receiving the most coveted award, of the Victoria Cross in the Eastern Front were: Rifleman Lachhiman Gurung (Eighth Gurkha Rifles), Rifleman Ganju Lama (Seventh Gurkha Rifles), *Havildar* Gaji Ghale (Fifth Gurkha Rifles), Riflemen Bhanubhagat Gurung (Second King Edward VIII's Own Gurkha Rifles) and Agan Singh Rai (Fifth Gurkha Rifles).

If the number of Victoria Crosses is to be used as the yardstick then the *Gurkhas* sewed it up in battles which will remain a classic of triumph and tragedy. The Gurkhas bagged ten Victoria Crosses in the World War II of which as many as seven were awarded in the Eastern Front. Other awards she received were no less than 2,734.¹⁰² A record that may stay inviolate in military annals. Whether in the hot deserts of Africa, the snowy grounds of Italy and France and the dense marshy jungles of Burma the Gurkhas lived by the dictum "kafar hunne bhandā marnu ramro (better die than be a coward)." It is their saga of sacrifice and heroism that has made the name Gurkha synonymous with fearlessness and unflinching devotion to duty. A countless number of headless Germans and Japanese bear mute testimony to this fact.

101. See citation in respect to the posthumous award of Victoria Cross to *Subedar* Netrabahadur Thapa of the Fifth Royal Gurkha Rifles of the Second Battalion, E. No. 4, *Poka* No. 155, File No. 615, 2000/1943; also from Minister G.A. Falconer, October 12, 1944, E.No. 4, *Poka* No. 155.

102. See the official list of awards received by the Gurkhas, *ibid.*

The Happy Arrival of Peace

Peace was long in coming. In fact, it was not till May 1945 the end of the tunnel of the war was in sight. But in the dawn of this World conflict a different picture was in the making. The rapid fall of France between May to July 1940 gave the Germans the most sanguine hope that the war would end to their advantage in a rapid series of victories. The first six German invasions that went as planned, made Adolf Hitler the arbiter of all Europe outside Russia. But by 1943 the tide of the war had begun to turn and Germany in almost all the fronts was on the defensive, which culminated in the fall of Berlin on May 2, 1945. It was on the same day Italy capitulated. On May 7 at Reims the German military forces by land, air and sea made an unconditional surrender to the Allied Commander, thus, ending the Nazi adventure once and for all times. By June 1945 plans for the despatch of the Nepalese contingent were already afoot. Two factors, namely, the clearing of the Japanese from the Burmese theater of the war and decision of the Nepalese Premier to retire from the active duties of state by mid-September hastened the return of the Nepalese contingent from India.¹⁰³

103. The decision of the *Maharaja* to retire from the defacto head of state at the climax of his political career is an enigma to historians and political analysts. Though this is not within the scope of this study, yet, the reasons given by the *Maharaja* himself in his letter to the Indian Commander-in-Chief, General Claude Auchinleck, is very pertinent. His letter in part ran "Do Please make the needful and timely arrangement treating the question of my retirement strictly confidential. In this I have to ask your Excellency to make it a point to see no one in the contingent get the last inkling of it from any source. The abnormal climate of Nepal has taken its toll on my heart. It has brought trouble on my throat for about four months. As I was recovering I had a relapse of diabetes thus making my state of health far from satisfactory. I am in my 71st. year, and I draw the satisfaction that I have left nothing undone to be of what help we could to our traditional friend Britain." Whatever may have been the intricacies associated with retirement of the Nepalese Premier the decision did have a catalytic effect on the quick return of the Nepalese contingent from the Eastern Theater of the war. See a strictly confidential letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to the Commander-in-Chief of India, June 3, 1945. E.No. 2, *Poka* No. 6061, 2002/1945; also from *Maharaja* to Lord Pethick Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, London, Oct. 8, 1945. E. No. 4, *Poka* No. 162, File No. 766, 2002/1945.

The Commander-in-Chief of India took immediate steps to fulfil the *Maharaja's* wish and by the end of August a detailed time schedule for the arrival of the Nepalese contingent was outlined after taking *pitri pakshya*¹⁰⁴ into consideration.¹⁰⁵ The first batch, accordingly, was to arrive in Nepal by the close of August; while the arrival of the third batch would be in mid September and the coming of the third be completed by the first week of October.¹⁰⁶ However, the arrival of the Nepalese contingent was ahead of the provisional schedule, thus, by August 15, the first batch of the Nepalese contingent was already in Raxaul. Apparently, history was seen repeating itself. Special trains were arriving bringing the Nepalese contingent like after the world War I. They brought with them home full war-scale equipments of a standard division.¹⁰⁷ It was on October 20, Kathmandu gave her warm reception to the Bhairab Nath Regiment, the last to arrive into the nation's capital. This completed the arrival of eight infantry regiments and two pioneer battalions to Kathmandu.¹⁰⁸ Then came a day to

104. The *dharmastras* of Nepal (religious canons) consider inauspicious to organize any religious and social ceremonies like birthdays, marriages, arrivals and departures during the *pitri pakshya*, that is the dark fortnight preceeding the Dushera or the Durga Puja.

105. See a top personal and secret letter from Claude Auchinleck to *Maharaja Joodha*, July 9, 1945. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 601, 2002/1945.

106. For a detailed account of the time schedule proposed by the GN and that accepted by the GI see a letter from *Maharaja Joodha* to Claude Auchinleck, July 17, 1945; also from the Commander-in-Chief of India to *Maharaja Joodha*, July 27, 1945. E. No. 2, *poka* No. *Ka* 51, 2002/1945.

107. See a Top Secret Note titled "Nepalese Contingent : Gift to Nepalese Government"; Conversation between *Maharaja Joodha* and Minister G.A. Falconer at Singha Durbar, July 19, 1945. E.No. 2, *Poka* No. 51, 2002/1945; also a letter from Secretary of State for India, London, to *Maharaja Joodha*, October 8, 1945. In his letter he points out that "Nepal now possesses a brigade equipped in as a modern a fashion as any in the world." E. No. 4, *Poka* No. 162, File No. 766, 2002/1945.

108. See notification issued by Public Relation Directorate, General Head Quarters, New Delhi, October 17, 1945. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 162.

remember. This special day was October 28, 1945—a day scheduled to celebrate the “Victory Diwali”. A parade of the Nepalese contingent was held on that day. The *Maharaja* received the Sher, Kali Bahadur and Mahindra Dal at Hanuman Dhoka and proceeded towards the Tundikhel. Here the Premier gave a short extempore speech in which he praised the troops for their gallant deeds against the Japanese and the Germans. Earlier in the parade the atmosphere rang with cheers and thirty one gun salutes for the British Monarch, King George VI. In the evening Kathmandu streets, temples, *bahals* (religious plazas) and public squares were lighted with electric bulbs and oil couses to mark the special “Victory Diwali”. The fireworks and special rockets were the highlights of the evening.¹⁰⁹

The last major act of the *Maharaja* before retirement was the bestowing of the awards and decorations for war to the “Gurkha” soldiers and the British officers attached to the regiments of the Nepalese contingent. The number of decorations awarded by the *Maharaja* were 135. Nepal took this occasion to honor in the nation’s capital Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief of India, who had commanded the eight regiments of the Nepalese army. He was honored with the title of Honorary General of the Nepalese Army and decorated with the Most Refulgent Order of the Star of Nepal (First Class), namely, *Supradipta Manyabar Nepal Tara*. A *Durbar* was held on the occasion, amidst scenes of dazzling splendor in which Claude Auchinleck presented to the King of Nepal fruits and flowers and a sword surrendered by the Japanese General Hamda, the former Chief of Army Staff of Japan,

109. See a notification issued by Public Relation Directorate General Headquarters, New Delhi, entitled “Nepal Celebrates Victory Diwali”, October 29, 1945. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 51, 2002/1945; also Ishwari Prasad. *The Life and Times of Maharaja J. d. Jha Shumsher Jung Bahadur Rana of Nepal* (New Delhi : Ashish Publications, 1975), p. 301.

to the Allied Forces, as a war trophy. A parade of 27,000 troops was also held in his honor in the Tundikhel.¹¹⁰

Another major decoration conferred to the British was the bestowing of the title of the Most Refulgent Order of the Star of Nepal, namely, *Supradipta Manyabar Nepal Tara* to Admiral Louis Mountbatten. He was in charge of the South-east Asia Command, which included the 22 Gurkha battalions and the three battalions of the Nepalese contingent who were out for garrison duty in India. The admiral arrived in Nepal on May 10, 1946.¹¹¹ Next day a full *Durbar* was held in Hanuman Dhoka, Kathmandu, during which King Tribhuvan invested him the insignia of *Supradipta Manyabar Nepal Tara* an old honor appertaining thereto. During the investiture ceremony the Nepalese Monarch also received from Louis Mountbatten the ancient Samurai sword surrendered by the Japanese to the Allied forces under his command in South-east Asia.¹¹²

On May 11, 1946, he also reviewed a parade of three battalions of the Nepalese contingent the Kali Bahadur, Mahindra Dal and Sher who were under his South-east Asian Command. He in his public address during the review asserted that their superb gallantry was more responsible for

110. An invitation from *Maharaja Joodha* to Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief of India, to visit Nepal, August 3, 1945; from the Commander-in-Chief, India, to *Maharaja*, October 25, 1945; also a letter from G.A. Falconer to General Bahadur, October 27, 1945. E. No. 7, *Poka* No. 765. See also a notification issued by Public Relation Directorate, General Headquarters, New Delhi, October 25, 1945; Ishwari Prasad, *op.cit.*, p. 310; *The Illustrated London News* December 1, 1945. p. 1014.

111. Louis Mountbatten had previously come to Bikna Thori in Nepal in connection with the hunting expedition of the Prince of Wales a quarter of a century ago. More on the Royal British visit to Nepal see a leather-bound Volume entitled *Shikar* (Hunting). Book No. 210, 1978/1921, pp. 478, well illustrated with photos. MAN.

112. See the speech of King Tribhuvan during the investiture ceremony. May 10, 1946; also speech of Louis Mountbatten May 10, 1946. E. No. 1. *Poka* No. 29, File No. 946, 2003/1946.

the fall of Japan than the atom bomb-the latter being only the excuse of the Emperor to surrender. His speech in part ran

No soldier under my command fought with greater gallantry than the Gurkhas. The fighting qualities of all the Gurkhas and the Nepalese regiments have been second to none. You men from the hills have enhanced your world wide reputation and have proved yourself the worthy sons of Nepal. You have gained ten Victoria Crosses the highest award for gallantry, which can be given by the King of England.¹¹³

The bestowing of the insignias to Claude Auchinleck and Louis Mountbatten constituted the happy ending of the ugly war that ranged with relentless fury for five full years.

IMPACT OF THE WAR ON NEPAL

The capture of Berlin in May 1945 marked the end of the Nazi adventure for world domination. But the victors found the task of reconstruction more difficult amidst the surge of decolonization movements and the loss of faith on a civilization grounded in the idea of secular progress. The prophets of doom like Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee and T. S. Eliot found wide appeal. In the subcontinent the war sounded a death knell to the British colonial rule in India and the autocratic Rana rule in Nepal.

A. The Physical Impact of War

The World War inflicted a heavy toll on the human resources of the tiny Himalayan state of Nepal. Approximately no less than 24,000 Gurkhas were killed, wounded or missing in action in the World War II. Many are also the tales the Nepalese people tell about the Gurkhas who were permanently blinded or paralyzed due to the war.¹¹⁴ The

113. Address by Louis Mountbatten in the Tundikhel during the review of the Nepalese contingent, May 11, 1946. *Ibid.*

114. See a letter from British Minister to *Maharaja* Joodha, July 5, 1945; A.H. Mortimer, Act. Captain, St. Dunstan Hostel for the Indian War Blind, to *Maharaja* Joodha, undated, E. No. 4, *Poka* No. 153, File No. 768, 2002/1945; also from the British Acting Minister Col. Oglivy to *Maharaja* Joodha, Feb. 20, 1943; from *Maharaja* to Minister, Feb. 25, 1943. E. No. 4, *Poka* No. 598, 1999/1943.

ten Victoria Crosses and 2,734 minor awards¹¹⁵ served little to compensate such colossal casualties in the Second World War. The loss in terms of men and material was particularly significant during the early phase of the war, when the Allies found themselves unprepared at the wake of the war. Nepal did lend a helping hand to the Allied cause from the very beginning but it could not avert the early disasters. The fall of France as well as the successful five other invasions of Germany left much soul-searching among the Rana leaders and Nepalese bureaucracy. Nepal had done every thing within her means and at the time could think of no other better plan than to offer prayers to Lord Shiva and Mother Goddess Kali, two guardian deities of Kathmandu Valley for the victory of the Allies.¹¹⁶ This show of Nepalese prowess was highly publicized both by the British Government and the Government of India. It was, thus, quite natural for the defeatist rumors to gain wide circulation in Nepal during the early phase of the war. Two instances have been well documented in this connection. First, a furloughman of the Second Gurkha Rifles of Dehra Dun reports the prevalence of a strong rumor in the Kuncha bazar of Lamjung, namely, that England was losing the war and the Gurkha pensioners would soon cease to receive their pensions. Secondly a letter from Khagendra Raj¹¹⁷ to his wife Priyushapriya Devi, narrated how England was losing the war. However, the damage that could be done by the circulation of the letter was mitigated by the fact that the letter was confiscated by British authorities in Kathmandu Mission.¹¹⁸

115. See a list of awards and medals, E.N.o 4, *Poka* No. 153, 2003/1946.

116. A message from *Mir Subba* Prakat Man Singh to Minister G.L. Betham May 25, 1940, also G. L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, May 26 1940. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 54, File No. 437, *Ki*, Sept. 1939- June 29, 1940.

117. Khagendra Raj was a clerk to the Nepalese Minister in London.

118. See a letter from British Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja*, December 15, 1940. Jan. 22, 1941; also a letter from *Maharaja* to Minister, Dec. 18, 1940, Jan. 29, 1941. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 54, File No. 437 *Gha*, Jan.1940 -May 1941.

The Government of India was very much annoyed by such defeatist letters and asked the Government of Nepal to suppress and nullify its impact for it would certainly have adverse effects on the whole process of recruitment. The British Minister did go at length to clarify this fact. His opinions were expressed in a few concise and carefully chosen sentences.

I would therefore suggest that if Your Highness sees no objections arrangements be made to inquire into the matter and to take such actions as Your Highness's Government may think necessary to put a stop to this sort of rumor, as such rumors unless suppressed are bound to effect recruiting adversely. Incidentally, the rumors are undue. Neither will Britain lose the war, nor the pensioners their pensions.¹¹⁹

The British Minister in Kathmandu, however, thought it prudent to issue a six point note of clarification explaining the actual Allied position in Europe in the conflict. The aim was to mitigate the fears in the minds of the Nepalese rulers and the people as regards the actual momentum and the direction of the war. The note in part ran

a. The solidarity and high morale of the British people is ever on the increase.

b. The readiness of the Allies and the instances of vigor of their actions is seen wherever they are required.

c. The recent events have not resulted in the weakening of their forces that are defending the Magent lines.

d. The allied forces and the people of all countries are prepared for eventualities in the war.

e. The formation of a great blockade of all free nations against Germany is taking shape.

f. Great additions are still being made in the military and the economic resources of the Allies.¹²⁰

119. A letter from G.L. Betham to *Maharaja Joodha*, Dec. 15, 1940, p. 1. *Ibid.*

120. A Letter from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja Joodha*, May 25, 1940, E. No. 2. *Poka* No. 54, File No. 437 *Ka*.

However, the above rumor did not have any significant impact on the path of recruitment, for by 1940, 15,000 recruits had been supplied.¹²¹ In an effort to build Nepal's confidence in British arms Nepal was supplied by Britain six reels of films relating to the war.¹²²

B. The War and Nepalese Economy

Those who were hardest hit by the war were the peasants of the hill. The Gurkha recruiters took from them no less than 200,000 sons to the war front as well as other auxiliary war services. This figure, however, does not include the recruits Nepal supplied for non-combatant roles and also in the police forces and private companies. As the pressure on recruitment mounted Nepal Government had to ban all recruitment for all other purposes except military.¹²³ Thus, as the war gathered momentum it became increasingly difficult to find recruits. But Nepal continued her previous pace at the expense of the manpower in agriculture. The *Maharaja* addressed to this factor in his letter to the Commander-in-Chief of India towards the close of the war. A part of the letter ran as follows.

The flow of the flower of youth who have joined the Gurkha regiments to fight for Britain continued to such an extent that only women and old men are left to look after the tilling of the soil.¹²⁴

The result was that there was an increase of fallow land in the country, particularly in the hills. Thus, the decline of production inevitably lead to nation wide shortages and inflation. The rise in prices was clearly felt by the

121. A letter from *Maharaja* to the Minister, Dec. 8, 1940. *Ibid.*

122. More on British war propoganda see a letter from British Minister to the Nepalese Officer attached to the British Mission, Jan. 20, 1940, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 606, File No. 270.

123. A letter from the Nepalese Officer attached to the British Legation to the British Minister, May 4, 1943, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 56, File No. 566, 1994/1942.

124. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief of India, Jan. 3, 1945. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61 2002/1945.

Gurkha soldiers returning home on leave. In the interior of Nepal the price of a non-vegetable meal soared up to three rupees, which was certainly a very high price for the time.¹²⁵ The inquiry made by the Commander-in-Chief of India into the food situation in Nepal indicated that high prices for food prevailed in at least eight locations in Nepal, which included Batauli, Gorkha, Gulmi, Garhung (West No. 4), Dhankuta, Batauli Doban, Sisnekhola and Riri Bazar.¹²⁶ The war not only resulted in the shortages of agricultural commodities but also in the goods imported from India. Thus, as early as 1942 the Government of India was compelled to fix a quota for goods exported to Kathmandu Valley and the Terai regions of Nepal.¹²⁷

The war also brought a shortage of precious metals in Nepal. Nepal's request for importing 4,000 *tolas* of gold for

125. A letter from Joh Gdes R. Swyane, the Commander-in-Chief of India to *Maharaja* Joodha, May 4, 1945; also *Maharaja* to the Commander-in Chief of India May 14, 1945. E. No. 4, *Poka* No. 153, File No. 160. 2002/1945.

126. See a report of inquire made by the Commander-in-Chief of India on the food situation in Nepal, contained in a letter from Claude Auchinleck to *Maharaja* Joodha, June (16 ?), 1945. E. No. 4, *Poka* No. 153.

127. The quota for Kathmandu, Valley consisted of salt* (13,000 maunds), kerosine (120,000 gallions), petrol (11,000 gallions), motor lubricants (2000 gallions), trye tubes, including for the terai (for 500 cars and 100 lorries), sugar and sugar candy (1,500 maunds), wire and nails (2 tons), iron pieces (one ton), corrugated sheets (five tons), block sheets (four tons), flat sheets (one ton), caustic soda (2.5 tons), potassum* (four tons), cement (20 tons).

The quota for Terai consisted of : salt* (300,000 maunds), kerosine (400,000 gallions), petrol (12,000 gallions), lubricants (20 gallions) and iron goods (10,000 maunds).

The figure with an asterisk mark represent the total import for the year, while the figure without the asterisk mark gives the import for the month. See a letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Minister G.L. Betham, Sept.10, 1942; also Minister to *Maharaja* October 28, 1942, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, 1999/1942.

she had prohibited all exports of gold and silver unless an equivalent amount was surrendered in dollars. However, upon Nepal's insistence the Government of India did relax a limited import of silver to Nepal for the purpose of minting coins.¹²⁸

The Government of India did help the men of Nepalese contingents to cope with the rise of inflation during and after the war. First, as early as 1942 the British Government decided to increase the compensatory allowances of the Nepalese contingent in India. The increase in compensatory allowances varied from three rupees in the case of *mehtar* (sweepers) to hundred rupees to lieutenant colonels and above.¹²⁹ Secondly, with the close of the war the Government of India decided to offer war gratuity to the men of the Nepalese contingent on the same scale as given to the Indian counterparts. A lump sum 11,80,000 was, thus, sent to the Government of Nepal to be distributed to the Nepalese contingent on the same scale as they were given to the men in India.¹³⁰ The *Maharaja* was more than happy to receive a sum of about twelve lakhs as war gratuity. But since the sum of seventy rupees allocated for the generals was so little the Premier asked the Government of India to drop the names of the generals from the list of the recipients of war gratuity. Thus, the sum they were to receive was to

128. See a letter from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, Sept. 5, Nov. 15, 1940; also from *Maharaja* to Minister, Sept. 8, Nov. 19, 1940.

129. For a detail account of the Compensatory Allowances paid to the Nepalese contingent in India during the World War II see a letter from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, Dec. 7, 1942. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 538, 1998/1942.

130. A letter from British Minister to *Maharaja* Joodha, June 30, September 17, 1945; from *Maharaja* Joodha to the British Minister July 5, 1945; from *Maharaja* Padma to the British Charge d' Affaires, Sept. 23, 1946; also a copy of letter from the Commander-in-Chief India to the Government of India, Feb. 22, 1948; from the Indian Ambassador to the *Maharaja*, Feb. 3, 1948. E. No. 2 *Poka* No. 61, File No. 910, 2001/1945.

be deducted from the final amount.¹³¹ Finally, another step taken by the Government of India to relieve the suffering of the men of the Nepalese contingent was the granting of the disability pension in a capitalized form.¹³²

c. The War and Political Awakening of Nepal

The label "political awakening" in Nepal can often be misleading. It could be easily construed to mean that politics in traditional Nepal was either latent or non-existent. But this is far from the truth. Traditional Nepal was not devoid of politics rather on many occasions it was more livelier and dramatic. It is, however, in its nature, style and objective the traditional politics of Nepal was different from that of the past forty years. To put in other words, the traditional politics in Nepal was not the agitational politics of the twentieth century, brought into focus by political parties equipped with modern tools like "mass-communication" and *satyagraha*¹³³

-
131. From British Minister to *Maharaja Joodha*, June 30, 1945; from *Maharaja Joodha* to the British Minister, July 30, 1945. *Ibid.*
132. A letter from British Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja Joodha*, August 13, 1942; from *Maharaja* to the Minister, August 21, 1942; Colonel Ogilvy to the Commander-in-Chief of Nepal, General Padma Shumsher, Jan. 7, 1944; from Minister G.A. Falconer to *Maharaja Joodha*, August 10, 1944; from *Maharaja* to Minister, August 15, 1944; from Indian Ambassador to *Maharaja Mohan*, March 24, 1949. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 672, *Ka*, 1942.
133. *Satyagraha* is a technique of action which operates within conflict of situation. It consists of adherence to stated truth by behavior which is not violent but which involves suffering. For more on *Satyagraha* as an applied social political action see M.K. Gandhi, *An Autobiography or the Story of My Experiments with Truth*, trans. Mahadeva Desi (Ahmedabad : Navajivan Publishing House, 1972 (reprint) pp. 239-240, 328-329, 332-333; Joan V. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence, The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict* (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1969), pp 15-105, 105-145; Krishna Lal Shridharani, *War Without Violence* (New York : Harcourt Brace, 1939), p. 316. Bondurant and Margaret Fisher, "The Concept of Change in Hindu Socialist and Neo-Gandhian Thought", in Donald E. Smith (ed.) *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1966) pp. 235-248.

Politics of Proscription Versus Political Awakening

The decade of 1940's constitutes an epoch in the sphere of political awakening in Nepal. The World War II which was fought by the Allies in defence of freedom versus Facism, gave rise to two elements in the national politics of Nepal: the rapid growth of literature against absolutism and arbitrary government and the surge of militant nationalist spirit. The vigilant Rana administration in Nepal was successful in preventing the emergence of any literature that had even a semblance of anti-Rana color within the boundaries of Nepal. To complete the process of news blackout during the war period the *Maharaja* did not even hesitate to seize all the radio sets of the private individuals within and outside Kathmandu Valley.¹³⁴ However, the political reforms India experienced with the dawn of twentieth century had brought the freedom of press and parliamentary institutions to British India. Accordingly, the westernized Nepalese elites, whether in India or Nepal demanded for the exercise of the same kind of freedom in their home country. Among other things, the Indian press became a convenient vehicle for the Nepalese militants and political agitators to launch their criticisms against the Government and demand for reform of Nepalese polity and society.

The 1940's was a prime period in the growth of Nepalese revolutionary literature. A meeting held in Darjeeling towards the close of 1941 led to the formation of a secret organization called *Akhil Nepal Barga Mahasabha*, whose chief aim was to incite the Nepalese mass to revolt through two steps: creation and dissemination of revolutionary lite-

134. Each radio set confiscated from the owner was kept in Singha Durbar till the close of the war. In total there were about 400 radio sets, with the tags of the owners sitting idle in the then residence of the Nepalese Premier. This information was supplied by Ram Babu Dhakal, a *bai:hake* of Singha Durbar, when interviewed on January 10, 1983.

ature and the formation of a militant organization called the *Raktapat Kommittee* (Bloodshed Committee).¹³⁵

Revolutionary Literature of the 1940's

None surpassed in volume and intensity than the revolutionary literature that poured forth from the *Raktapat Kommittee*. Neither the composition and structure of this organization can be detected for like all underground organizations it has left little records, and apparently even that has perished along with it. However, the meager literature it has left behind speaks of its intimate contacts with the politburo of Bolsheviks and *Kalong Samiti* of the Japanese. Three themes run parallel in the literature that has emerged from this militant group.

The first is the concept of the Republic. The *Raktapat Kommittee* lived by the slogan "Long Live the Republic of Nepal." It is, thus, quite natural for the members of this organization to yearn for the inauguration of the Himalayan Republic. Nowhere does this sentiment find a better expression than in these words.

It is high time that Cromwell should rise and give the nincompoos the example of Charles I then only this country can raise its heads in the fast changing times.¹³⁶

A second theme distinctly visible in the banned tracts and pamphlets is the exposition of the Rana rule in general and the personal life of Premier Jodha Shumsher, in particular. The most moving and emotional tract was the one entitled "Nepal Under the Ranas: Atrocities Over Nepalese", issued by the *Raktapat Kommittee* on September

135. Those who attended the meeting of Darjeeling were : Santabir Lama, Sirdar Nima, Krishna Prasad Koirala, Bisheswar Prasad Koirala, Hari Prasad Pradhan, Gajadhar Upadhyaya, Dilli Raman Joshi (Regmi), and Shanker Prasad Sharma. See the English trans. of deposition by Narendra Keshari Sharma, the son of Badri Nath Sharma. Chaitra 20, 1999 (April 1943). E. No. 6, *Poka* No. 11, File No. 11, 14 *Ga*, 1949.

136. See the Revolutionary Leaflet issued by the *Raktapat Kommittee* in the month of February. It is a direct challenge to all absolute monarchs and dictators as manifested by its very title "Long Live the Republic of Nepal". E. No. 6, *Poka* No. 11, File No. 11, 14 *Ga*. 1949.

7, 1940.¹⁸⁷ The pamphlet opens with a naked statement that in the twentieth century there are non so unfortunate than the Nepalese sisters. The reason is obvious: the ignoble Rana Premiers have sucked the life-fluid of the country. Thus while the world was moving on the path of progress and enlightenment every day and every minute Nepalese are rolling down the hill. The attack on *Maharaja Joodha* was most severe edging to virtual polemics. The following lines can be taken as the most illustrative.

Let me tell you one thing : You will not be blessed with peace and tranquility in this Hindu *Raj* as long as the reign of administration in this country is in the hand of this ignoble, outcasted and disrespected *Raja*, from whom according to the laws of *Dharma Shastras*, we should not even drink or dine. His private life is equally detestable. He is one who loves to have incestuous relation with his daughter-in-law; one who after making his daughter pregnant secretly handed over the unwanted issue to a poor Bengali; one who lives in a world of gambling, music, mirth and wine at the cost of thousands of his subjects; one who drives his own kith and kine through hills and jungles without any regards to religious canons; one who captures in his net the innocent budding beautiful Brahman damsels to quench his amorous thirst of sensual living. If a person like that is not inflicted with leprosy who will be ? You can imagine for yourself how can we be happy in the regime of this person.¹³⁸

137. The records of the *Munshi Khana* (Foreign Department) asserts that the *Raktapat Committee* had posted at least 41 copies of the pamphlet to different high placed persons of the country. One of them is now preserved in the Foreign Ministry of Nepal. It was the one posted to *Maharaja Joodha* himself that described him as *Joota* Shumsher. It was mailed to him from Cwarpore India in an open cover. The language used is Nepali but the script is Roman. More on the pamphlet see E. No. 6, *Poka* No. 11, File No. *Cha*, 1997/1940.

138. See a proscribed pamphlet entitled 'Nepal Under the Ranas :Atrocities Over the People'. The exact rendering of this pamphlet into English has been made very difficult because of several factors like the faulty sentences, faded and obscure letters, the absence of diacritical marks and the frequent shift of the words and phrases from Nepali to English and Hindi. E. No. 6, *Poka* No. 11, File No. *Cha*, 1997/1940.

A last major theme in the pamphlets pertained to the overthrow of the Rana regime in Nepal in a short span of time. This it hoped to bring about by increasing the membership of the *Kommittee* and the cooperation with Japan which was heading towards South and South-east Asia as liberator of her Asian brethren from the ugly bonds of Western colonialism. The peak of the zeal of the revolutionary *Kommittee* is immortalized in these sentimental lines.

The time is fast approaching when the high souled members of our *Kommittee* will be flying its republican flag in Singha Durbar, Lalitpur royal complex, Bhaktapur palace plaza and the streets of Kathmandu, in particular the streets of Indra Chowak square—the very hub of national life. Then we shall, with our heads raised, narrate the atrocities of the Rana rule to the whole public very openly and candidly from the housetops.¹³⁹

Another revolutionary literature of the period was a “book” titled *Jagruti* by Agni Prasad Sharma (Kharel) towards the close of 1942. The “book” never saw the light of the day. Apparently, it was confiscated and destroyed by the Government of Nepal. From a valuable source one gathers that the “book” was devoted to the process of establishing parliamentary democracy in Nepal by uprooting the Rana aristocracy.¹⁴⁰ The introduction was militant in style and content and saturated with socialist thoughts. It talked about the establishment of a secret organization called *Akhil Nepal Barga Mahasabha* to fulfil the objective stated in the work. The “book” was divided into ten chapters. The first two chapters, which served as the prelude, did set the tone for the entire “book”, by assessing the social, economic

139. *Ibid.*

140. See a deposition in Nepali by Narendra Keshari Sharma, the son of Badri Nath Sharma, a resident of Dilli Bazar, Chaitra 20, 1999 (April 1943). He had read the “Book” *Jagruti* and corrected it several times. He further narrates that the author had kept the book under lock and key and used to give him to read with occasional breaks. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 11, File No. A, 14 *Kha*, 1945.

and religious structure of the Nepalese society. The sixth and the seventh chapters constituted the very nucleus of the book as they gave a detailed outline of the secret organization and emphasized the need for military training of the members. The eighth chapter entitled "Politics" gave a bitter criticism of the Government at times even leaning to the side of polemics. The chapter nine was in reality a synopsis of the coming democratic rule in Nepal. The last chapter was the resume-a sum up of the writer.¹⁴¹

The articles, which appeared in *Keshari*, (Maharashtra) *Aja* (Banaras) and *National Herald* (Lucknow) between 1940 to 1941 severely attacked the Rana rule in Nepal.¹⁴² The tone of the *National Herald* may be taken as illustrative of the public opinion concerning Nepal in the Indian press at the time. It labeled Nepal as "a perfect specimen of medieval feudalism"; and while discussing the features of Nazism and Facism gave Nepal as a perfect illustration of both these doctrines. To quote

Here in our borders is an administration more archaic in its construction, more arbitrary in its methods and more reactionary in its ideals than any other we can think of.¹⁴³

The British, in their effort to oblige the Ranas so as to receive a continuous flow of men material and recruits during the war, warned the above newspapers for carrying such seditious themes. To please the Nepalese Government during the war, the Government of India even went to the extent of intercepting many letters from the Nepalese individuals and handing them over through the British Minister to the *Maharaja*. Many of these letters were in code languages, thus, their exact rendering becomes difficult if not im-

141. *Ibid.*

142. See *Keshari*, December 30, 1940 and May 5, 1941; *National Herald*, February 14, and November 20, 1940, *Aja* December 13, 1940; see also a letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Minister G.L. Betham, May 8, 1941, Register of Copy of Secret Letters Sent by the Premier of Nepal to the British Minister, from May 7, 1940- March 27, 1942.

143. *National Herald*, November 20, 1940, pp. 8-9

possible. An extract from a letter intercepted by the Government of the United Provinces on June 11, 1941 may be taken as the most illustrative.

My letter might have been miscarried otherwise you would have replied to it. A few days ago before I left Lucknow you had told me to get a fish from Madras. Now the fish must be with you, and you had promised to get that fish up to Raxaul for me. I have not heard about those fishes... What about that. If you are willing to arrange I will send my man to Raxaul.¹⁴⁴

However, there were many occasions when the letters intercepted by the British Government and handed over to the *Maharaja* of Nepal had a more direct bearing on the work of the Nepalese Freedom Fighters in their self-imposed exile in India. A letter from Baneras by Kul Nath Lohani to Dilli Raman Joshi (Regmi) in Naya Tola, Bankipore, Patna, may be taken as a perfect example. An excerpt ran

I have pleasure in imparting to you the following piece of news, which will be the cause of no little relief to you. This is the Jn. and a few others (above a dozen and a half) have been set free unconditionally. I was informed of it ten days ago. There is no other news except that things are coming back to normal and the apprehension have definitely abated. Meanwhile H keeps guarded reserved on all topics. I have not yet sought his advice on future course of action. He does not seem to volunteer any. I have been asked by V to resume the work, which I had to leave this time last year.¹⁴⁵

144. This is an extract of a letter from Colonel Khagendra Bikram Bahadur Rana, Oam Bahal, Kathmandu to Dr. A.P. Singh. The Nepalese Colonel had gone to Lucknow on March 1, 1941. The fish in letter is a code word. Dr. Ayodhya Prasad Singh was a man of extreme views, a staunch member of Manbendra Nath Roy's Radical Democratic people's Party. E. No. 6, *Poka* No. 11, File No. A 14 na. See also another letter confiscated by the British Mission in Kathmandu dated April 22, 1940. From Professor Ram Chanduta Vas, Trichandra College, to his communist friend in Karachi. Register of Secret Letters sent by the *Maharaja* to the British Minister, May 7, 1940 to March 27, 1942.

145. A letter from Kulnath Lohani, Baneras to Dilli Raman Joshi, Bankipore, Patna, Jan. 22, 1941. It was intercepted by the GI and handed to the GN. E. No. 6, *Poka* No. 11, File No. 14 na .

Specific Examples from Proscribed Literature

At this stage it would be useful to discuss some specific examples of proscribed literature that emerged from the *Raktapat Kommittee*. The *Raktapat Kommittee* is one of the little known organizations that sprouted in this period, with a specific objective of liberating Nepal from the Rana rule in the 1940's. The methods devised by the *Kommittee* were of twofolds. The scrutiny of these methods is best represented in the pamphlet No. 1 of the *Raktapat Kommittee*. In the domestic front the *Kommittee* aimed to incite people to revolt through revolutionary literature, as well as training a group of revolutionary conspirators. The call made by the pamphlet on the Nepalese revolutionary intelligentsia was a stirring one. To quote

Why shouldn't four persons sacrifice their lives for the deliverance of the whole nation ? Brother come and gird up your loins. If we can feed the vultures and jackals with his (Joodha Shumshere's) flesh the valor of their deeds will be sung by Nepalese ever after.¹⁴⁶

While in the international front the *Raktapat Kommittee* had developed an intimate relation with the *Kalong Samiti* of Japan, which had promised to help the people of Nepal in their struggle of liberation against the Ranas. The pamphlet goes on to say that a member of the *Kalong Samiti* broke into emotions when he said that "it hurts us to much

146. See a Revolutionary Pamphlet circulated by the *Raktapat Kommittee* September 7, 1940, *op. cit.*, footnote no. 135. This was the pamphlet No. 1 in the series of monthly bulletins issued by the *Kommittee*. How disturbed was the *Maharaja* by this pamphlet is seen in his conversation with the Minister on September 15, 1940, during the Indra Jatra festival. It was on this occasion the *Maharaja* gave to the Minister an edited version of the pamphlet, in English. The personal attack on the Premier was carefully deleted. He even urged the GI to take actions against the *Raktapat Kommittee* members according to the Fourth clause of the Treaty of 1923, which prohibited the use of each other's territory for purposes inimical for the security of each other. For more on the conversation between the Minister and the *Maharaja* see E. No. 6, *Poka* No. 11, File No. 4 *Cha*.

when we listen to the tales of suffering of the Nepalese people.”

Again a leaflet issued by the *Raktapat* Committee in February 1942 preached the slogan “Long Live the Republic of Nepal.” Thus, for the first time in the history of Nepal the concept of a republic was born. Though the leaflet does not detail the nature of the republic, yet, the very concept was revolutionary for the time. While advocating the process of establishing a republic in Nepal it even did not hesitate to point out that the Nepalese should follow the example of the Bolsheviks in Russia and Cromwell in England.¹⁴⁷

The appeal of the *Raktapat* members did not fall upon deaf ears. As early as the middle of 1940 a relatively firmly rooted movement to root out the Rana rule from Nepal, once and forever, was hatched in Kathmandu. The members who started this movement ranged from students, teachers, civil servants dressers and compounders and all of them belonged to an organizations known as the Praja Parisad. The specific objective of this movement is not clear but the general objective was to blow the bastion of Rana autocracy in Nepal with the explosives like dynamites. Apparently, Dharma Bhakta and his colleagues had brought a large quantity of dynamite to Kathmandu Valley for the purpose.¹⁴⁸ If this was their activity on the militant side than on the peaceful front the heart of Kathmandu like the Asan tole became the center of mass meeting where men like Shukra Raj Shastri, Ganga Lal and Dharma Bhakta roused the audiences with themes like political rights and civil liberties. But the move to unseat the Ranas, the details of which is still obscure, was nipped at the bud. One fine morning in the month

147. For more on the revolutionary leaflet see footnote No. 133.

148. See a letter titled “Supply of Dynamites to Dharma Bhakta”, from British Minister G.L. Betham to the *Maharaja* Joodha, Sept. 19, 1941; from *Maharaja* to the Minister, Sept. 19, 1941. E. No. 6, *Poka* No. 11, File No. A, 14 na.

of December 1940 a massive arrest of the freedom fighters took place in the Kathmandu Valley. A tribunal under Ananda Shumsher was set up, which passed judgments on those arrested. Accordingly, seven were given capital punishment,¹⁴⁹ eleven were imprisoned for life, three for eighteen years and 13 others for sentences from two months to twelve years. The epitaph for those who were sentenced to death ran "this is the penalty for the members of anti-national political organizations and revolutionary conspirators."¹⁵⁰

The world war was definitely plus factor in the political awakening of Nepal. If the Nepalese elites in and outside Nepal were imbibed with the concept of freedom and justice then the Gurkhas who had fought in the Eastern front and in the Indian National Army, when they came home joined the political movement to overthrow the Ranas, in the late 1940's, and in revolutionary movement of 1950-51.¹⁵¹

149. According to the Nepalese laws Brahmins and cows are exempted from being killed, thus Tanka Prasad Acharya and Ram Hari Sharma were exempted from capital punishment and had to go through a process of ostracization and life imprisonment. Again the *Maharaja* commuted the capital punishment of Purna Bahadur for 18 years.

150. See the judgement against the conspirators of the Praja Parishad and the propagandists of the *Zanta* paper of Patna. A note prepared by General Nara Shumsher, the Director General of Police, E. No. 6 *Poka* No. 11, File No. 14, *na*; also Chandra Bikram Budathoki "Sukra Raj Shastri ko den (Contributions of Shukra Raj Shastri) *Voice of History*, Vols. IV-VI, 1978-80, pp. 24-28.

151. The British had divided the Gurkha Prisoners of War—White, Grey and Black—in relation with the intensity they had imbibed the doctrines of the Indian National Army. The White category constituted those who were not affected by the propaganda of the INA. The Grey category were those molested while the Black was of the dangerous type, determined to uproot British rule from India. See a letter from Minister G.A. Falconer to *Maharaja* Joodha, Dec. 8. 1945. E. No. 4, *Poka* No 53, File No. 785., 2002/1945.

PART IV : B
ANGLO - NEPALESE COOPERATION IN
WORLD WAR II : WAR EFFORTS AT HOME

Nepal and the Second World War: Problems at Home

Nepalese war efforts at home, though less dramatic, was the most important aspect of the Nepalese contribution to the Allied cause in the war. It included two major areas: the maintenance of a steady flow recruits and liberal donations in cash and kind to strengthen the Allied cause in the war. One may even wonder how a small state like Nepal was drawn into the global conflict. She could have easily remained aloof from it but she did not. But her friendship with Britain and her commitment for peace and justice compelled her to plunge headlong into the conflict. The problems she faced at home in connection with her war efforts at home were in the form of the supply of recruits, offer of donations and the counteraction of the enemy intrigues in Nepal.

A. Supply of Recruits

The most difficult part of Nepalese war efforts was to maintain a steady supply of recruits for the war that ravaged over the earth for little more than half a decade. She accomplished this arduous task with remarkable courage and tenacity. As early as the middle of 1940 the Government of India made a formal request to increase six more Gurkha battalions in the British army and three more in the course of time or to put it in round figures the British sought permission to recruit 7,000 Gurkhas during the recruiting season 1940 to 41. To distribute the

pressure on recruitment they proposed to take 5,600 men from Western Nepal and 1,400 men from Eastern Nepal. This figure, however, did not include 3,500 men required annually to cover up for the normal wastage in the conflict.¹

The *Maharaja* not only gladly permitted the British to add six to nine battalions of Gurkha soldiers in the British army and also 3,500 more to cover up the annual war wastage; but also went a step forward and opened the Kathmandu Valley, which hitherto had been restricted for the purpose of recruitment. He further made it known that there were about 14,000 available recruits in the West and 6,000 in the East. Besides, he also permitted the Gurkha troops in the British army to cross overseas. The only condition he imposed upon them was that they were to observe their caste rules in ships, hospitals and in the front and upon their return had to go through a purification ceremony of *panipatya* in India before coming to Nepal.² The British Minister joyously reported to New Delhi that the *Maharaja* had graciously permitted to raise six extra battalions and nine more if required.³

The recruiting season for the year 1940 began in September. But before the advent of autumn some preparation had to be made. The first effort in this direction was the appointment of 11 assistant recruiting officers to be

-
1. An urgent letter from the Foreign Office Simla, to Minister G.L. Betham, June 14, 1940, from Minister Betham to the *Maharaja* Joodha, June 15, 1940. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 560, File No. 421 *Ka*, 1997/1940.
 2. See a note on conversation between *Maharaja* Joodha and the British Minister Betham at Gokarna, 11 a.m., June 16, 1940. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 560, File No, 421 *Ka*, 1997/1940.
 3. A letter from Minister Betham to Foreign Office, Simla, June 16, 1940; also a letter from Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, July 19, 1940; *Maharaja* to Minister, July 22, 1940. *Ibid.*

distributed as follows: six in the West and five in the East.⁴ The main duty of these officers was to coordinate the work of the recruiters of the Gorkha units. Besides they were to help the Government of Nepal in the movement of troops from Nepal to Kunraghat; and to their respective homes if found unfit after a detail medical examination in India.⁵ The Gurkha recruiting Officer in Gorakhpore, Major G. C. Strahan, had arranged 80 regular recruiters for every Gurkha battalion to collect recruits.⁶ The first batch of recruits began to arrive by October. Earlier, the *Maharaja* of Nepal had sent a *rokka* (circular) to the officers in the *Gaudas* of Illam, Dhankuta, East No. 4, and Bhojpur. The content of the circular revealed two important facts. First, the above territories had been opened for the purpose of recruitment during the war. Second, care must be taken to recruit only those who expressed their willingness to be recruited.⁷

The fall of France on May 1940 and British losses of over 40,000 in France and Belgium made Gurkha recruit-

-
4. A letter from G.C. Strahan, British Recruiting Officer for the Gurkhas in Gorakhpore, to British Minister G.L. Betham, August 2, 1940; from Minister to *Maharaja*, August 7, 1940. *Ibid.* The Recruiting centres were: Bandipur (for Tanhu and Rising Ghring), Pokhara (for Kaski), Nawakot (for West No. 4 and Dhor), Baglung (for Gulmi Tehsil), Khalanga (for Piuthan), Sallyan (for Sallyan), Ramechhap (for East No. 2) Okhaldhunga (for East No. 2), Bhojpur (for East No. 4), Dhankuta (for East No. 5), and Illam (for Illam district). See a letter from G.C. Strahan to Minister G.L. Betham, Jan. 10, 1940. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 566, File No. 461 *Ka* 1997/1940. The names of eight recruiting officers can be traced from the records. They were : *Subedar* Major Prithvi Bahadur Gurung, Lieutenant Ram Dhoj Gurung, *Subedar* Moti Man Thapa, *Subedar* Bhadra Gurung, *Subedar* Samu Rokka, *Subedar* Lal Bir Gharti, *Subedar* Phal Man Gurung and Lieutenant Gamarising Gurung for Nawakot, Baglung, Bandipur, Pokhara, Khalang, Sallyan, Nepalgang and Raxaul respectively. See a letter from G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, October 7, 1940., E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 566
 5. A letter from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, October 5, 1940; from *Maharaja* to Minister, October 11, 1940, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 566.
 6. A letter from G.C. Strahan to Minister G.L. Betham. August 2 1940, E. No. 2. *Poka* No. 560, File No. 42 *Ka*. 1997/1940.
 7. See *Rokkas* to Illam, Bhojpur, Dhankuta, East No.4, dated Shrawan, (?) 1997 or 1940; also a letter from G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, July 28, 1940. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 560, File No. 421 *Ka*, 1997/1940.

ment more important than ever before. Thus, by September 1940 the British Government sent a telegram labeled *immediate* to the Government of Nepal. The object was to seek permission to raise ten more Gurkha battalions by April 1941, which involved the recruitment of 10,000 more men.⁸ The *Maharaja* gave his approval to the new proposal and expressed his hope of collecting 5,000 to 6,000 recruits from the capital city itself. The year 1940 was highly successful from the point of view of recruitment. Colonel Strahan records the enlistment of 11,000 recruits in Kunraghat, 2,500 in Ghoom and 1,500 in Laheria Saharai.⁹ Such a massive recruitment was bound to have adverse effects in the pace of life of the nation. But the colonel was sure that the personal charisma of the *Maharaja* would go a long way in mitigating the negative effects. The British Recruiting Officer in Gorakhpore boils down his ideals in these graphic lines.

In recruitment there is just now a slight tendency to show the natural drying up of the well but with His Highness's magic wand I feel sure that sufficient water can be obtained from the well so that complete demands may be met by the 28th. February after which the weather really gets hot for recruits to come.¹⁰

The *Maharaja*, while using his "magic wand" even went to the extent of stopping all recruitment for the state army. The move did produce its magical ripples, thus, by February 21, 1941 the target of recruiting 20,000 men had been completed. In addition, the *Maharaja* also promised to make available 10,000 to 14,000 recruits for the recruiting season that commenced from September. Colonel Strahan outlined a rough program

8. See a letter from Minister Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, Sept. 15 1940. *Ibid.*

9. See an abstract of conversation between *Maharaja* and the Minister, recorded in Nepali, on September 15, 1940, *ibid.* Trans. is mine.

10. The opinion of Strahan is quoted in a letter from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, December 2, 1940, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 566, File No. 461, *Ka*, 1997/1930.

of recruiting 13,000 leaving 1,000 to be recruited in case of necessity. Accordingly, he hoped to receive 9,000 to Kunra-ghat from Western and Central Nepal; 2,000 to Ghoom from Eastern Nepal and 2,000 to Laheria Saharai from the Far East.¹¹ Within a short span of two months 1,400 recruits were collected from Kathmandu Valley and were sent to Raxaul. But before they were despatched they went through a process of rigorous examination of Colonel Ogilvy. The aim was to avoid the heavy turnout of the rejected recruits from Gorakhpore.¹² Thus, the process of comprehensive examination of the recruits (fifty for the day) commenced at 9:30 a.m. from November 18, 1941, at the British Mission hospital.¹³

The year 1942 opened with further reverses for the Allies. The losses were heavy both in terms of men and materials. Thus, more manpower was the need of the hour. Several circumstantial and technical factors like the decision to mobilize all the 40 battalions of the Gurkha Rifles, the increase in the training period from six to seven months and the loss of three Gurkha battalions in the combat operations of Singapore necessitated more recruits than ever before.¹⁴ The British Recruiting Officer at Gorakhpore therefore expressed his desire to send Extra Recruiting Officers to the district of Nepal, during the summer for reconnaissance work to facilitate the process of maximization of the volunteers for the recruiting season of 1942-43. They were to work in

11. A letter from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja Joodha*, June 21, 1941. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 560, File No. 421 *Cha*, 1997/1940; also from *Maharaja* to the Minister, June 22, 1941. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 560.

12. From *Maharaja Joodha* to Minister Betham. Nov. 16, 1941. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 56, File No. 511, 1998/1941.

13. A letter from Minister Betham to *Maharaja Joodha*, Nov. 17, 1941. *Ibid.*

14. See a letter from Minister Betham to *Maharaja Joodha*, May 5, 1942. It contained the reasons given by GI for the increase in the demand in the number of recruits for the year 1942-43. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 560, File No. 421 *Ka*, 1997/1940.

close association with the local officials; and review all aspects of recruiting for the then season, including tapping new areas and offering recruiting certificates to worthy recruiters.¹⁵

Nepal was, however, weary of recruitment for she had already offered anywhere between 34,000 to 40,000¹⁶ of her best sons of her soil to raise extra battalions to the existing Gurkha Rifles in India.¹⁷ This national mood was reflected in the reluctance of the *Maharaja* to accept the new proposal. His communication to the British Minister in part ran

I think that after an intensive recruiting that has been done it is both advisable and desirable to let the country have some little respite before moving towards future recruiting, with a view to avoid the result contrary to the one we have in view.¹⁸

The total demand for the number of recruits for the recruiting season of 1942-43 was 23,000. The *Maharaja* gave his full consent but cautioned Colonel Strahan that the recruiter should under no condition recruit from families which were left with only one son.¹⁹ It was the personal effort of the *Maharaja* that by February 1943 that Nepal was able to collect 23,000 "men of quality" as recruits for the British army. The Nepalese Premier, delighted by

-
15. A letter from G.C. Strahan to Minister G.L. Betham, Jan 25, 1942; from Strahan to *Bada Kazi* Marichi Man Singh, Jan. 5, 1942. *Ibid.*
 16. The early records give the figure as 34,000; while the later records have placed the figure to 40,000 mark. See a letter from *Maharaja* to the Commander-in-Chief India, General Allan Fleming Hartly, Jan. 3, 1942. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 507, 1997/1940.
 17. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to the Commander-in-Chief of India, Jan. 21, 1942. *Ibid.*
 18. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Minister Betham, Jan. 25, 1942. The above idea of the *Maharaja* was also communicated to G.C. Strahan by *Bada Kaji* Marichi Man Singh, March 2, 1941. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 50, File No. 421 *Ka*, 1997/1940.
 19. A letter from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, April 30, 1942, *Maharaja* to Minister, April 22, 1942. *Ibid.*

the magnitude of his achievement, expressed his satisfaction in his letter to the Indian Commander-in-Chief. The letter in part ran

Bent on putting up what help we can to our great friend and ally in time of need my sole endeavour have remained directed to see the demand of recruits to the Gurkha battalions of the Indian army in full. It is a matter of gratification that the endeavour has proved successful....

For a small hill country like ours the supply of 65,000 recruits in the course of last three years is certainly a notable achievement.²⁰

Such a remarkable success was possible only by opening new areas for recruitment, which had been hitherto prohibited.

By 1943 the Japanese army penetrated deep into Assam and Manipur, which were not far from the gates of Nepal. In an effort to prevent the enemy's advance deeper into the subcontinent the *Maharaja* offered the services two Auxiliary Battalions, namely, the Jangi and Jagantath battalions of the Nepalese army to be used as porters in Assam. Special permits were also given to the Gurkha Recruiting Officer at Gorakhpore to recruit 200 *dolays* (human carriers) and 1,000 for the Civil and Transport Corps from the non-fighting classes of Nepalese.²¹

The year 1944 opened with fresh hopes for the Allies. Thus, before the year closed they had won overwhelming victories in Europe, and in the Assam-Burma front. The Japanese had been defeated. Despite these new developments, the demands for the Nepalese recruits continued. The

20. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to General A.P. Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief of India, Feb. 25, 1943; from Commander-in-Chief to *Maharaja*, Feb. 15, 1943; Acting British Minister to *Maharaja* Feb. 17, 1943, File 17, 1943. These two letters contain the appreciation of GI to GN. *Ibid.*

21. A letter from Claude Auchinleck to *Maharaja*, August 26, 1943; a letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Minister Betham, Sept. 14, 1943; from Minister to *Maharaja*, Sept. 15, 1943. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 647, 2000/1943.

commander-in-Chief of India specified the target for Gurkha recruitment for the year 1944-45 to 12,000 and further went on to say that there should be "no relaxation in our effort until the final victory was won." The *Maharaja* in his reply took pains to note that no stone would be left unturned to fulfil the need of 12,000 recruits, but cautioned him that due to the heavy drain on the recruits of the last four years the quality of the recruits would be poorer.²² He then added that the recruiters will, thus, face the odious task of exploring even the remote corners of the hills. But in doing so "care must be taken (sic) not to recruit from families of old men and children where there is only one able bodied man." The latter if removed from the household none would be left to till the soil.²³

However, before the year 1944 came to a close Nepal was weary of war. The toll inflicted upon mountain population was incalculable. Thus, Nepal expressed her desire of pulling out her contingent from India, once the war with Germany was over.²⁴ But until the drums of war ceased to echo recruiting in Nepal went on though slowed in pace and extreme reluctance. The need for 12,000 troops for the year 1945-46 was fulfilled with great difficulty. The British demand for the recruiting season of 1945-46 fell to 2,000; and with this the curtain of war dropped and the wartime recruitment ended in a dramatic way.²⁵

Problems of Recruitment

The institution of wartime recruitment, despite incentives and rewards built into the system, ran into severe

22. A letter from Claude Auchinleck to *Maharaja* Joodha, Sept. 11, 1944; from *Maharaja* to Commander-in-Chief, Sept. 21, 1944, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 560, File No. 42 *Ka*, 1997/1940.

23. A letter from *Maharaja* to Commander-in-Chief, Sept. 21, 1944. *Ibid.*

24. A letter from *Maharaja* to Commander-in-Chief of India, Sept. 21, 1944; also from Commander-in-Chief to the *Maharaja*, Nov. 12, 1944. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 6 *Ga*, 1940.

25. A letter from Col. G. C. Strahan to *Maharaja* Joodha, Feb. 2, 1945; from *Maharaja* to Strahan, Feb. 5, 1945, Claude Auchinleck to *Maharaja* Joodha, Feb. 22, June 30, 1945. *Ibid.*

problems right from the start. This is seen in the increasing resistance of the local population to the concept of recruitment, as the war dragged on with full horror and ugliness for a little more than half a decade. The problems that sprang from the growing protest of the local inhabitants to the wartime recruitment stemmed from the human factor. The psychological problems associated with recruitment was further aggravated by the recruitment for non-military profession, decline in the quality of recruits, large scale rejections and other logistic factors.

a. Recruitment of Nepalese in Non-military Professions in India

The recruitment of Nepalese on non-military professions in India was a subject of endless correspondence between Nepal and the Government of India since the beginning of the twentieth century. Nepal had always adamantly refused to supply the Nepalese of the fighting population to civil employment in India. During the period of war this issue became more important than ever before. It was in October 1940 the Government of India made its position clear as regards the employment of Nepalese in civil posts in India. The announcement of the Government of India of October 14, 1940 ran as follows.

i. No Nepalese subjects of the fighting classes, namely those belonging to the tribes known as Thakuri, Chhetri, Maghar, Gurung, Rai, Limbu, Dura, Sunwar and Ranabhat, are to be given Government employment, except in the army and the regular police battalions; and even that only up to the existing strength sanctioned.

ii. Nepalese subjects of the classes mentioned, who were at the time of the issue of orders in other Government employments, need not be discharged, but their further recruitment be stopped.

iii. These orders do not apply to the Gurkhas of the British nationality and over only the Gurkhas of Nepalese nationality belonging to the fighting class. They do not

affect Nepalese of the other classes. Persons of Nepalese descent, who are British subjects by birth or naturalization are exactly in the same position under the law regulating the entry of civil service of the Crown in India, while those who are not British subjects can be rendered eligible for such services by means of the declaration under section 262 of the Government of India Act, in the individual cases provided they are considered suitable in all respects. Long residence in India, however, does not by itself confer eligibility for services in question and does not possibly waive the statutory provisions which regulate the matter.²⁶

It was easier for Nepal to maintain a clear cut and well defined policy towards recruitment in a period of peace and tranquility. For example, when the Government of Assam expressed its desire to recruit Nepalese born Gurkhas in Shillong for temporary employment for four months with Balipur Labor Corps, Nepal refused to abandon her principle. The reply of the *Maharaja*, though polite, yet, firm in part ran

As a rule the Government of Nepal are averse to the ideas of the Gurkhas of the martial class diverted to any other channel than the military line and they should like to stick to this principle as far as possible. In this instance, though the recruitment in Labour Corps for the purpose mentioned is to be for a limited period of four months, yet, the relaxation of the rule will have a far reaching effect in as much as it is likely to create a general impression which may reflect our policy of keeping off the Gurkhas of martial class from such avocations. As the exploration is said to be a small one it may not be requiring a large number of men to recruit for labour (sic) and our suggestion is that the needful number of men be obtained from some other source.²⁷

26. Government Notification on Nepalese Subjects : Eligibility for Employment in India, October 14, 1940. See *Hindustan Times*, October 16, 1940. p. 12.

27. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to British Minister, SF. Bayley, Feb. 19, 1938; from Ast. British Mister to *Maharaja* Joodha, Feb. 14 1938. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 56, ile No. 204, 1938-44.

But in the heat of a global conflict all principles and policies partially or wholly moulded itself to utility and pragmatism. In short, Nepal had to compromise her principles on recruitment so as to promote the objective of total victory for the Allies. Thus, as the war was on its mid-way the Government of Nepal agreed to provide 1,000 Nepalese for Assam Civil Transport Corps and 2,000 Dotiyals, constituting two battalions, from the vicinity of Kumaon hills as porters.²⁸ Major "Jim" Corbett, a personal friend of Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy of India, was assigned to the task of recruiting the Dotiyals.²⁹ The Dotiyal porters were to be used in works of non-combatant nature and their pay and allowances were to be same as for the troops of the Indian army.³⁰

The *Maharaja*, however, made it clear that the relaxation of the principle of recruitment was due to the exigencies of the time and should not be taken as a precedent. The views of the *Maharaja* in summary ran

Your Excellency will well remember that though the Government of Nepal was quite against allowing recruitment in the country for labour outside the country as intimated to you in the letter dated 17th. August 1942. I suppose that I had made it clear that in the view of exigencies created by the war in which I am bent to do whatever is practicable. I am ready to meet the request of 2,000 Dotiyals porters, and agree to allow the recruitment work through authorized Gurkha recruiters only.³¹

28. A letter from Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief of India to *Maharaja* Joodha, August 26, 1943; from *Maharaja* to the Commander-in-Chief, Sept. 5, 1943. *Ibid.*

29. A letter from Minister G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, August 12, 1942; from *Maharaja* to the Minister, August 17, 1942. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 56, File No. 566, 1999/1942.

30. A letter from Ast. British Minister F.G. Deather to *Maharaja*, Oct. 1, 1942. *Ibid.*

31. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Minister Betham, May 4, 1943; also from Minister to *Maharaja*, May 6, 1943. For more on Dotiyal recruits see a *purji* (notification) from *Munshi Khana* to Darchula Amini, Falgun 20, 1999(March 1943); *Munshi Khana* to Baitadi Gauda, Jestha (?) Shrawn (?) 2000/1943; also from *Munshi Khana* to *Jangi Adda* not dated. *Ibid.*

Besides, permitting the recruitment of Nepalese in non-combatant role he also permitted the Auxiliary battalions of Nepal to serve as porters in the Indo-Burma border.³²

It is true that the Government of Nepal did concede to certain specific requests of the Government of India to recruit porters; but the general norm even in the war period was to penalize any one recruiting for non-combatant roles. When a Nepalese subject, Man Bahadur Gurung, was reported to have recruited coolies for India, the Commander-in-Chief of Nepal was furious. Padma Shumsher, thus, wrote to the *Bada Hakims* of West, No 2, 3, and 4 to capture persons like Man Bahadur Gurung so as to prevent recruitment of Nepalese as coolies.³³

b. Decline in the Quality of Recruits

During the early days of the war the British insisted in the physical and the ethnic standards of the recruits, thus, accepting no Brahmans or thread wearing Chhetris in the Gurkha battalions. But as the war dragged on a heavy recruitment in the hills led to a deterioration in the quality of recruits. The decline in the quality of recruits was a cause of much concern to British bureaucracy and Nepalese leadership specially when the Nepalese countryside took a deserted look, studded with only old men and children. It, thus, became imperative for the Nepalese Government to prevent the recruitment from the families where there was only one able bodied person, even if he expressed his willingness to be recruited. The taking of these adults would turn their land into fallows for the want of hands to till them. So every precaution was taken not to recruit from families consisting of only the aged and children with only one working adult.³⁴

32. From *Maharaja Joodha* to Claude Auchinleck, Sept. 5, 1943. *Ibid.*

33. A letter from Padma Shumsher, Commander-in-Chief of Nepal to *Maharaja* of Nepal, Aswin 2, 2000 (September 1943).

34. A letter from *Maharaja Joodha* to Minister G.L. Betham, August 5, 1941; from *Maharaja Joodha* to Claude Auchinleck, Commander-

However, as the war rolled on with increasing momentum Nepal looked more towards fulfilling the number of recruits needed than examining its quality. The words of the Nepalese Premier in 1943 does highlight this fact.

After intensive recruiting that was done during the last year I am afraid that the quality of recruits now available has been gradually getting poorer. Here in our own army we are finding the quality of recruits available has been gradually getting poorer. All the same I feel confident that the quota of recruits will be made available.³⁵

As the war came to its closing years Nepal not only feared the decline in the quality of recruits but prayed for a day when the war with Germany would come to an end when she would no longer had to supply recruits for the war. She knew well that the close of the war in the Western Front would not only halt the chapter of wartime recruitment but would also provide her an excellent opportunity to pull out the Nepalese contingent from India. Nepal's intention was clear. She was not going to wait for the surrender of Japan to close down the process of wartime recruitment or to pull her contingent from India.⁸⁶

c. Communication Difficulties: Spatial and Human

The problem of communication was another major hurdle that impeded the processes of recruitment. The rough mountain terrain made the distance from the center of Kathmandu to the Western and Far Western districts not only one of immense magnitude but also staggering by any definition. It, thus, took a long time for an emergency order

in-Chief of India, Sept. 21, 1944; also from the Commander-in-Chief to *Maharaja* Nov. 12, 1944. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 566, File No. 421 *Ka*, 1997/1940.

35. See a letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief of India, Sept. 5, 1943. *Ibid*.

36. See a letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief of India, Nov. 12, December 12, 1944; also from the Commander-in-Chief, India to *Maharaja*, Sept. 21, 1944; E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 6, *Ga*, 1940.

or a decree to reach the outlying district or checkpoints. The fate of the usual *purjis*, *rokkas* and *urdis* pertaining to recruitment fared still worse. The gap in communication coupled with the high-handedness of the Nepalese officials aggravated the problem of wartime recruitment. The complaints launched by the British Gurkha Recruiters against the local Nepalese officials were very frequent. The report filed by the Gurkha Recruiter Bhim Lal Kharka Chetri³⁷ reads as follows. He had collected six recruits and was bringing them to Kunraghat Depot. Suddenly, his party including his wife was stopped at the checkpoint by the *Subedar*, who was the officer-in-charge. Bhim was not only told that he could not take recruits to India but was separated from his wife and kept in custody. Two sepoy's of the *Subedar* tied his hands and legs with a rope and kept him in a dark cell without food and water. He was then stripped of his recruiting certificate and 30 Indian rupees. But with the approach of dawn he was released only after being compelled to take an oath by touching his *yagnapavita* (sacred thread) that he would not report the story to anybody. He, however, hastened to Kunraghat to report his tragic episode to the British Officer. Nepal was shocked to hear the sorry tale and promised to hold a full inquiry into the matter and bring the guilty to the book.³⁸ Again, Man Singh, an authorized porter recruiter of the British reported wearily how a Nepalese *Ditha* had obstructed his work to recruit the Dotiyals by inducing the porters not to follow him. The *Ditha* further told him that he had received no instructions from Kathmandu to recruit the Dotiyals.³⁹ These are a few illustrations, among others, which indicate

37. Bhim Lal Kharka Chetri, a resident of Piuthan, was a former Rifleman of the Two Ninth Gurkha Rifles. He was then a pensioner with an authorized recruiting certificate.

38. See a report of Rifleman Bhim Lal Kharka Chetri of Two Ninth Gurkha Rifles, Feb. 6, 1942; from Acting Minister J.D. Ogilvy to *Maharaja Joodha*, Feb. 23, 1942; from *Maharaja* to Ogilvy, Feb. 23, 1942. *Ibid.*

39. A letter from Acting Minister Colonel J.D. Ogilvy to *Maharaja Joodha* March 1, 1942. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 256, 1999/1942.

how the spatial and the human factor hampered the process of recruitment in more than one way.

B. Munificent Donations

Nepal contributed to the Allied cause in the war not only by providing her precious manpower in the form of recruits but also through her liberal donations in cash, kind and armaments. The flow of donations from the national treasury and the private purse of the *Maharaja* and the *Maharani* were significant both in timing and content.

i. Economic Offer in Cash

The British losses both in terms of men and materials were incalculable during the early phase of the war. The fall of France which was the result of a sequence of events between May to July 1940 was a bitter pill for the Allies to swallow. But still then the wounded had to be attended; and the needy and the homeless be provided with food and shelter. Liberal donations from all was the need of the hour and small Nepal again opened her big heart. On May 31, 1940 Her Royal Highness *Bada Maharani Sahiba* contributed 100,000 rupees to the Viceroy's War Purpose Fund to be distributed between the Indian Red Cross Society, St. John Ambulance Association and British Red Cross Society.⁴⁰ On September 29, 1940, the Commanding General Bahadur Shumsher reported to the Viceroy of India that the *Maharaja* wished to make a donation of 1,00,000 rupees for the aid of the wounded and the sick. The Viceroy, Marquis of Linlithgow, was happy to receive the cheque for the amount and divided it between the British and the Indian Red Cross Societies.⁴¹

40. See a note prepared by the British Legation in Kathmandu, with the cooperation with the Government of Nepal during the world War II, in 1942. p. 4; also a speech by the British Minister G.L. Betham in the Nepalese Durbar held on October 4, 1940. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 55, File No. 397, 1996/1940.

41. A letter from Bahadur Shumsher to the Viceroy of India, Sept. 29, 1940; from Viceroy to Bahadur Shumsher, October 2, 1940. E. No 2, *Poka* No. 55, File No. 397, 1996/1940.

More unhappy news flowed from the continental war. The attack of East London and the news-photos of the bombed out, weary and homeless (but happily not foodless) victims touched the heart of the Nepalese Premier. Thus, as a token of sympathy he asked his Minister in London to donate to Lord Mayer's Fund for the relief of the East London sufferers, a sum of rupees 25,000 (1,875 pounds) on his behalf.⁴² The British Queen also received a cheque from the Nepalese minister in London to provide an additional unit of mobile canteen called "Queen's Messengers". Before the year closed, the Nepalese Premier offered a sum of 10,000 to the Silver Trinket Fund with the specific objective to buy ambulances. This fund was created in World War I for the relief of war victims.⁴³ The Viceroy did purchase two ambulances from the fund and had the plates of the ambulances inscribed as "Nepal 1" and "Nepal 2".⁴⁴

In the month of August 1943 the *Maharaja* donated a gift of 25,000 rupees to the Indian Red Cross to be used for the benefit of the Gurkha prisoners of war.⁴⁵ It was the radio reports that spoke of the great hardship suffered by the prisoners of war in Germany that moved the *Maharaja* to make that donation.⁴⁶ More donation came from the *Maharaja* for the Gurkha prisoners of war towards the close of the war. It was in July 1945 the Premier dona-

42. A letter from Minister Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, Nov. 30, 1940; from Lord Halifax, Foreign Office, London, Oct. 7, 1940. *Ibid.* *Statesman*, September 19, 1940. p. 8.

43. A letter from *Bada Kazi* to the Nepalese Officer attached to the British Legation, August 24, 1940; from Viceroy of India to *Maharaja*, Jan. 3, 1941. *Ibid.* More on the Trinket Fund see *Civil and Military Gazette*, Jan. 7, 1941, p. 8. *Amrit Bazar Patrika*. Jan. 7, 1941, p. 8. *Hindu*, Jan. 2, 1941, p. 4.

44. See a letter from Viceroy of India to *Maharaja*, Jan. 30, 1941. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 55, File No. 397, 1996/1940.

45. *Statesman*, August 21, 1943. p. 12; also a letter from Claude Auchinleck to *Maharaja* Joodha. *Ibid.*

46. See a letter from *Maharaja* to Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief of India, June 3, 1945. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 6, 2002/1945.

ted a sum of 75,000 rupees for the purpose.⁴⁷ Nepal's sincere efforts to ease the suffering of the war veterans is seen in September 1945. Accordingly, when the *Maharaja* heard of extreme suffering of the British people due to acute shortage of food he made a donation of 50,000 rupees to purchase food or for any other purpose. The money was handed over to the Duke of Gloucester's Red Cross Society. The chairman of the society went ahead to create an independent fund entitled "The *Maharaja* of Nepal's Fund for Relief of the Distress in Britain" to distribute the above 50,000 rupees.⁴⁸

The Nepalese Premier not only made his liberal donations to the relief societies in India and Britain but to other international organizations. On February 11, 1942 the *Maharaja* donated from the public purse a sum of 50,000 rupees, through Bahadur Shumsher in New Delhi, to Generalissimo Chankaishek. This money was to be used by the Chinese Red Cross Society.⁴⁹ Again, towards the close of the war the Premier offered a sum of 20,000 rupees to the Belgian Red Cross Society.⁵⁰ Throughout the war Nepal also made other minor cash donations to ease the distress of the war victims.

ii. Donations in Kind

It was in the early months of the war the Government of India asked Nepal to oblige her by supplying a high quality of timber of walnut, maple and bird cherry for the

47. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief of India, July 19, 1945. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 55, File No. 397, 1996/1940.

48. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary. London, Sept. 23, 1945; also from Foreign Secretary to *Maharaja* Oct. 20, 1945. *Ibid.*

49. For more on the donation of the *Maharaja* to the Chinese Red Cross Society see a revolutionary pamphlet issued by the *Raktapat Committee*. E. No. 6, *Poka* No. 11, File No. A, 14 Ga. 1944.

50. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to R.H. Gerald, Consular General of Belgium, Calcutta, August, 3, 1945; from Consular General to *Maharaja*, August 15, 1945. *Ibid.*

manufacture of the wooden parts of army rifle, at a reasonable price.⁵¹ India did attach significant importance to the supply of high quality timber during the World War II from the forests around Nepalese rivers of Kali and Gandak. The *Maharaja* readily concented to make available from the Government Forest reserves of the Kali river and her tributaries. In fact, D.S. Bista and Sons was permitted to extract 100 trees of the specified variety in the course of two years.⁵² The *Maharaja* was further delighted to hear that the Nepalese walnut matched in quality with the best walnut timber in the world and, thus, was highly suitable for the manufacture of rifle parts, aerservices and high class furniture.⁵³

Another major contribution of Nepal towards war effort was the supply of broad gauze sleepers from 1941 to 1945. Early in 1941, Nepal placed *sal* reserves of Jhapa, Morang, Hetauda, Bagamati, Chitawan and the Rapati Valley at the disposal of the Indian contractors. They could extract sleepers for the Eastern Railway in India within the time span of three to nine years.⁵⁴ The more the war rolled on to its concluding phase the more acute was the shortage of sleepers felt by the British Government. Thus, the export of Nepalese sleepers to India became a matter of prime concern to the Government of India. The serious attitude of the British bureaucracy towards the export of timber from Nepal is perhaps best expressed in these words of the British Minister Betham in Kathmandu. His words in part ran

The matter of maxiumum possbile supply of wooden sleepers—be they be of *Sal* or *Asna*—is one not only of primary

51. A letter from Minister Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, December 4, 1939. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 55, File No. 378, 1996/1939.

52. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Minister Betham, Dec. 9, 1939. *Ibid.*

53. See the report of V.D. Limaye (B.E.) on the test of Nepalese walnut. not dated. *Ibid.*

54. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Minister Betham, August 17, 1941; also from the Minister to *Maharaja*, August 8, 1941; See also notes on possible increase of sleepers compiled by the Army Department of the GI in 1942-43. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 55, File No. 446, 1998/1941

but vital importance. It is of such importance the matter is not one of next week or even of tomorrow but of today.⁵⁵

Nepal did make available to the Government of India as much *sal* timber as possible. Thus, for the year 1944-45 Nepal exported to India forty lots of 120,000 trees which was equivalent to 600,000 cubic feet of timber.⁵⁶

As a gesture of love the *Maharaja* also collected 45,000 pounds of tea to be sent to the Gurkhas of the Indian battalions in active service in Iraq, Malaya and other theaters of the wars. The tea was packed into 11,000 packets of one pound each. This together with one pound of sugar and one pound of biscuits along with a photograph of the *Maharaja* was despatched to the Gurkha soldiers in the front in 220 wooden chests.⁵⁷ Reports from the front indicate that the soldiers were very much moved by the generous gift of the *Maharaja*. They were specially happy to receive the photograph of their ruler, which soon became the treasured possession in their kits.⁵⁸

iii. Offer of Machine-guns Revolvers and Binoculars

As early as January 1940, the Government of India expressed its needs for binoculars, compasses and revolvers for the armed forces and asked the individuals to contribute to the war purposes. The *Maharaja* of Nepal was able to

55. See a letter from Minister Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, March 12, 1944; also from the Acting British Minister to General Padma Shumsher, the Commander-in-Chief of Nepal, Jan. 13, 1944. *Ibid*.

56. See a list titled "List of Current Timber Contracts in Nepal 1944-45; E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 55, File No. 496, 1998/1941.

57. A letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Bahadur Shumsher, Kartik 12, 1998 (Nov. 7, 1941); from *Subba* Siddhi Bhakta to *Maharaja*, May 6, 1998 (Nov. 1941); *Maharaja* to Minister Betham, Dec. 15, 1941. *Ibid*.

58. A letter from G.L. Betham to *Maharaja*, Joodha April 12, 1942 and May 11, 1943. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 55, File No. 498, 1998/1941.

pull together 192 service revolvers, 141 binoculars and three telescopes to be sent to the Allied cause.⁵⁹

In August 1940 the *Maharaja* decided to make a generous gift of 250.303 Vickers Machine-guns and 750.303 Lewis Guns from the scanty army stock of Nepal to be used either in the regular Indian army or in the new territorial formations that were being raised in India. The Government of India expressed its deep appreciation for the generous offer of machine-guns and Lewis guns; and promised to avail the offer when circumstance become more compelling.⁶⁰ It is not clear from the records whether the Government of India accepted the above donations.

C. The Intrigues of War

A modern war has varied and complex theaters of operations. It is fought not only in the field but also in the minds of men. The conflicts within the human mind can often be more dangerous and catastrophic than the physical combats that affect only the few. A war is not lost when an army is defeated or when the foe is pressing in all sides but it is lost when the morale of the people at home is dropped to all time low. Thus the intrigues of war, though less visible constitutes a fundamental aspect of modern warfare. The Japanese and the Germans did not lag behind in this mode of psychological conflict. Accordingly, the engine of propoganda was used meticulously and methodically through the radio, press and news letters to attain the objective. The Japanese were quick to use the human element

59. See a copy of information from the Commander-in-Chief of India to Minister Betham relating to binoculars, compasses and revolvers contained in a letter from Minister Betham to *Maharaja*, Jan. 16, 1941; from *Maharaja* to Minister, Feb. 13, 1941; from *Maharaja* Joodha to Cluade Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief of India, May 15, 1941; from Padma Shumsher, the *Maharaja* of Nepal, to Minister Betham, March 12, 1946; from British Minister to *Maharaja* Padma, June 20, 1946. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 55, File No 461, 1941.

60. See a letter from *Maharaja* Joodha to Minister Betham, August 11, 1940; also from Minister to *Maharaja*, Sept. (?) 1940. E. No. 2, *Poka* No.55, File No. 433, 1097/1940.

in communication. It is to be noted that human communication or the individual element in communication is the single most important phenomenon among the modes of communication in South Asia and the Japanese and the Germans used it to the best of their advantage.

i. Japanese Wartime Intrigues

The Japanese wartime intrigues constituted the most interesting aspect of the Axis propoganda in the war. These intrigues were engineered with twofold objectives: first, to weaken the fighting morale of the Gurkha troops in the front and secondly, to boost the anti-Rana activities of the Nepalese in exile in India.

a. Radio Broadcasts for the Gurkhas

The Japanese Government, in an effort to outmanoeuvre the Gurkha troops in the front, resorted to the skillfull use of the radio broadcasts. The short wave radio stations of Rangoon and Saigon were used for the purpose. At this stage it would be useful to discuss two specific examples of radio broadcasts from these radio stations. These broadcasts, in fact, constituted a part of the overall Japanese propoganda against British imperialism in Asia. Two closely related themes were interwoven into a delicate texture in these broadcasts.

The first, was the glorification of South Asian love of freedom that was eclipsed with the advent of the British rule in the subcontinent. Likewise, the pomp and splendor of ancient and medieval India was contrasted with the flow of misery and poverty of the British rule. It also recalled how the British treacherously fought with Nepal and in the end made peace with her on the condition of recruiting the Gurkhas. Further, the reward she received for fighting the Great War on the British side was only the increase in the enlistment of the Gurkhas by fourfold. With this appeal to South Asian vanity, the Gurkha brethern were asked to join the Japanese forces to liberate South Asia from the

ugly yoke of British colonialism. The broadcast of the **Radio Rangoon** of May 2, 1944 in part ran

Hello Gurkha brothers ! listen to how the British have spoiled the notion of freedom.... To champion the British cause now was to go on a suicide mission. However, there is yet time to acknowledge your foolish conduct. Like all free nations you should join your hand with the Indo-Japanese forces to combat the evils of British colonialism. A large portion of Manipur has fallen from British hand; and India will be free in a few days. Even now the Gurkhas have a chance to preserve their independence. But if you still insist in backing the British your future is, indeed, gloomy. Brothers and sisters ! What more shall I say.⁶¹

The second theme constituted an appeal to the spirit of freedom loving Nepalese to join the Indian National Army Movement-the forces of free India that was determined to uproot British rule from the subcontinent. The radio broadcast of Saigon of May 3, 1941 may be cited as a beautiful expression of this theme. The radio transmission in part ran

In Nepal even lads of fifteen years are being conscripted and its impact is seen in the fallow lands that is dominating the countryside. Forgetting their own independence, the Nepalese are fighting the forces of Free India. The forces of Free India have not up to now attacked the Indians or the Gurkhas. The Gurkhas, who have come to the side of Free India have been telling a lot about British oppression. They are given rations not fit for human consumption; while the White troops are given rations of superior quality. Brothers and sisters you must all combine and help in the war of your own freedom. Why do you attack the forces of Free India.⁶²

b. Alliance With Nepalese in Exile in India

The decade of 1940's opened with a period of high hopes for the Nepalese revolutionaries but it ended in

61. English trans. of a Radio broadcast in Nepalese from Rangoon, May 2, 1944. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 54, File No *Doo*, 7, *Ka*. The English trans. is mine.

62. English trans. of the Radio broadcasts in Nepali from Saigon May 2, 1944. *Ibid*. The trans. is mine.

chaos and confusion. The "Freedom Movement" of Nepal in the 1940's received a major setback due to the lack of organization and popular support. The then Nepalese revolutionary leaders like Dilli Raman Joshi (Regmi), Agni Prasad Sharma (Kharel) and Santa Bir Lama had sincerely banked upon Japanese cooperation in their struggle against the Ranas. The initial success of the Japanese victories in South-east Asia made the Nepalese leaders confident that with the Japanese liberation of South Asia from the British colonialism, Nepal would also be free from the autocratic rule of the Ranas, that had plagued the country for a century.⁶³ The then British records reflect the Nepalese students studying in the various Indian universities were filled with pro-German and pro-Japanese views and communistic ideologies.⁶⁴ The Nepalese leaders in exile like Agni Prasad Sharma and Surya Prasad Upadhyaya were engaged in a secret mission to incite the Gurkha units in Dibrugarh, Digobi, Manipur and Assam to revolt against the British Raj;⁶⁵ and if possible even help persuade the Gurkha commandoes and the parachutists of the Assam-Burma border to the cause of Free India.

ii. German Intrigues

The German intrigues in Nepal, though less distinct and illdefined, yet, nevertheless were clearly visible. The Germans, perhaps, left Nepal out of her active sphere of propoganda because of her closer proximity of Japanese

63. Interview with D.R. Regmi, May 8, 1982; also a revolutionary pamphlet circulated by the *Raktapat Committee*, Sept. 7, 1940. *op.cit.* footnote no. 49.

64. See a letter from Minister Betham to *Maharaja Joodha*, August 25, 1940. Register of Secret Letters from May 2, 1940 to March 27, 1942, also from Minister to *Maharaja*, May 10, 1940. E. No. 6, *Poka* No. 11, File No. 4, *Cha*.

65. See extracts from Supplementary Statements by Professor Jai Chand. who was detained as a security prisoner in Lahore jail in the Punjab. The then Nepalese revolutionary leaders had devised a code phrase "Pasupati Nath ki Jai" for ordinary talks and Guheswari Mai ki Jai" for secret talks, E. No. 6, *Poka* No. 11, File No. A 14 *Ga*.

sphere of influence. The first Nepalese contact with Hitler's Germany was the message of Adolf Hitler himself to the King of Nepal on his assumption to the high office of the President and Chancellor of Reich on August 3, 1934. The letter in short assured the Nepalese Monarch that his sincere endeavor would be directed to foster good relations between the two countries.⁶⁶

Throughout the war period the Government of Nepal kept a vigilant eye over the German nationals in Nepal. The activities of a German Mineral Survey team and that of Professor Filchner and Dr. Schuliet had to be closely monitored. In the World War I Dr. Filchner who was then also stationed in Kathmandu was prohibited to supply secret information to his homeland. But he did send secret information to Germany. The doctor, though old then, had a son-in-law who was a devoted Nazi, thus, his activities had to be watched.⁶⁷ Professor Filchner had left two wooden boxes when he had left Nepal. The British Government insisted in examining the contents of the two boxes but nothing of any significance was found.⁶⁸

In 1944 an information was received by the Government of India that three Germans had left Gartok in Tibet on July and could enter Nepal any moment. Nepal Government was, thus, asked to be on guard for they were secret German agents. Nepal did alert her officers at the Nepal-Tibet border. But they could not be located.⁶⁹

66. See the English trans. of a letter from Adolf Hitler, Chancellor of the German Reich to the King of Nepal. Nov. 23, 1934. E. No. 4, *Poka* No. 151, 1991/1935.

67. See the abstract trans. of conversation between the British Minister Betham and *Maharaja* Joodha, Sept. 4, 1939; from *Maharaja* to the Minister, August 16, 1942. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. *Ka*.

68. A letter from Minister to *Maharaja* Joodha, December 19, 31, 1944; also a letter from *Maharaja* to Minister, Dec. 19, 1944, March 20, 1945. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 60, File No. 458, 1996/1939.

69. A letter from Minister G.A. Falconer to *Maharaja* Joodha, August 24, Dec. 17, 1944; from *Maharaja* to Minister, Sept. 5, Dec. 17, 1944, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 59, File No. 713, 1944/12000

It is difficult to determine with precision and exactitude the extent of Japanese-German intrigues in Nepal. The silence of the records makes it impossible to go into the structure and organizations built by the Axis powers to carry on their intrigues in South Asia in general and Nepal in particular. But one thing is for sure: the *Maharaja* in his burning zeal for the Allied cause left no stone unturned to outmanoeuvre these foreign conspiracies and communicated them to the British Minister the last details of their intrigues in Nepal.

PART V
CRISIS IN SOUTH-ASIA AND NEPAL:1948-49

Nepalese Contingent in Post-British India

Preface

The cataclysmic event of partition, besides giving birth to two, "young nations"¹ brought problems of immense political and social dimension in the subcontinent, which had a direct bearing in the secularization of Nepalese polity and society. Two factors help to visualize the status of the subcontinent in this period. First, South Asia was in a greater state of political anarchy when the Britishers left her in 1947 than when they found her in the seventeenth century. To be more specific, the India Independence Act of 1947 had left the Princely states of India theoretically independent. But they were expected to join any one of the two unions; and Lord Mountbatten used his good office to convince them that their future was secure in any one of the two dominions. Three states, however, decided not to accede to the Indian union. They were Kashmir, in the North, Hyderabad in the South and Junagadh in the West. Junagadh and Hyderabad were brought within the Indian union without much difficulty but Kashmir presented a formidable problem. Matters moved towards a dramatic catastrophe when Kashmir was invaded by the Muslim tribesmen from Hazra and Peshwar. Pakistan was used as

1. More on the thesis of "two young nation" see W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India and Pakistan* (Harvard : Harvard University, 1967), pp. 1-19; also a paper presented to All India Inter-disciplinary Seminar on "Communal Nationalism in India and the Arya Samaj" by Prem Uprety on December 1981, Aligarh University, pp. 1-20.

their base of operation, which later supplied weapons and regular troops under General Akabar Khan."

Secondly, with partition the hydraheaded monster of communal violence swept over the subcontinent in a way unprecedented both in intensity and magnitude. The killings of the Sikhs and Hindus in West Punjab was retaliated by the murder of the Muslims in East Punjab. In parts of the United Provinces and Bengal the Hindus and Muslims killed each other. Peaceful, sleepy villages like Mano Majra in the Punjab arose from their deep slumber into hostile warring camps. One group was determined to exterminate the other at any cost.³

A corollary to violence was mass-migration. It was the fear-complex that compelled the Hindus and the Sikhs to leave Western Punjab and the Muslims East Punjab and the adjoining regions of the United Provinces. The conservative estimate has placed the total migrants both ways in all parts of the subcontinent to 12,000,000. But if statistics provided by both the governments are taken the figure runs much higher, to the 17 million mark; and the tragic fact is that the figure is still on the rise. This is certainly one of the greatest migrations in history, and is responsible for far reaching social and economic dislocations in South Asia.⁴

By the middle of 1948, there was a progressive increase of large participation of the regular Pakistani troops aga-

2. *Ibid.* pp. 180-203.

3. The cruel times during the hot muggy summer of 1947 is depicted by Kushwant Singh in these emotional words
The world has gone mad. Let it go mad. What does it matter if another is killed. We will get the bulldozer and burry them as we did the others. We may not need the bulldozer this time; it is going to be the river. Just throw corpse on the water.

See Kushwant Singh, *Train to Pakistan* (New York : Groove Press, 1965), p. 155.

4. W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India and Pakistan* op. cit. pp. 162-79.

inst that of India in Kashmir. India was then further plagued by the Hindu-Muslim massacres and migrations from both East and West Pakistan. It was at this critical hour the Indian Premier, Pandit Nehru, asked the Nepalese *Maharaja* to agree in principle of sending some battalions of the Nepalese contingent for garrison duty in India. This he argued would release some of India's regular troops to fulfil her commitments in Kashmir. The Indian Premier gave two reasons for his request. First, the Muslim raiders were using Pakistani artillery, arms and ammunitions against the Indian positions in Kashmir, and secondly, the direct share of Pakistan had been established by the identification of her troops in the Uri Front.⁵

Nepal was not only shocked to hear that Pakistan had bombed the Indian positions in Kashmir but was placed in a worse predicament for India had asked for Nepalese contingent for garrison duty in India. The *Maharaja* told the Indian Ambassador politely, yet, firmly that Nepal had always helped India in times of trouble. But as the request was of such grave importance that he had to seek the opinion of his Commander-in-chief, the generals and above all the Assembly of Notables.⁶ The Premier, Mohan Shumsher, took this matter with such grave urgency that he summoned the *Bharadari Sabha* (Assembly of Notables) at 3 p.m. the same day.⁷ The Assembly held closed door

5. See purport of an urgent message from the Premier Nehru to *Maharaja* Mohan, contained in a letter from Indian Ambassador Sardar Surjit Majithia, July, 1, 1948. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, *Kha*.

6. See the conversation between *Maharaja* Mohan and S.S. Majithia, July 1, 1948, 11 a.m. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61 *Kha*.

* The Assembly of Notables was attended by the Commander-in-Chief Baber Shumsher, *Niab Bada Guruju* (Deputy Chief Preceptor). Pandit Hema Raj Pandey and four Commanding Generals.

7. The origin of the *Bharadari Sabha* goes back to the days of the Premier Bhim Sen Thapa but it was Jang Bahadur who raised it to dignity and prominence. He first summoned the *Sabha* after his Tibetan adventure suffered serious reverses and he faced the difficulty of convincing the military that the war could not be ended in disgraceful terms.

deliberation for about three hours and communicated its proceedings to Surjit Majithia by 6 p.m. In short, Nepal raised three problems associated in the offer of the Nepalese contingent to India.

1. First, the offer of her contingent to India, which was in a state of undeclared war with Pakistan, would pose problems of national defence for Nepal. She, being only 25 miles from Pakistan, felt that the presence of her troops would provoke Pakistan to launch land and air attacks against her.
2. Secondly, the Nepalese Muslim population in the Terai would seriously object to the presence of the Nepalese troops in India at a time when India and Pakistan were virtually in a state of war against each other.
- 3 Thirdly, Nepal's independent political status would be opened to serious question in the eyes of the international community if she was to help India in an undeclared war between her two neighbors.⁸

Nepal, however, though it prudent to advise her next door neighbor that since she and Pakistan were both members of the United Nations and the British Commonwealth of Nations the issue should be brought by them to these two international bodies for mediation. Apparently, during the days that followed, Nepal came under such intense pressure of persuasion from India that the Nepalese Premier was compelled to give a very reluctant "conditional approval" to the principle of the loan of the Nepalese contingent to India. In his message Prime Minister Nehru thanked the *Maharaja* for his readiness to help India.⁹

In an effort to capitalize the mood of the Nepalese Premier, India quickly moved in two directions. First, Major General Shri Nagesh and M. J. Dayal, the financial

8. For more on the deliberations of the *Bharadwari Sabha* see E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, *Kha*.

9. For details on the message of Nehru see letter from Surjit S. Majithia, to *Maharaja Mohan*, July 5, 1948. E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 61, *Kha*.

adviser of the Defense Ministry, were despatched to Kathmandu to work out the details of the matter instantly. Secondly, the Indian Ambassador was instructed in Kathmandu to use his patience and skill with dexterity while working out the details of the negotiation. He was also specifically instructed to keep the negotiation in absolute secrecy and see that it did not collapse.* The Indian Ambassador, thus, had the delicate task of convincing the Nepalese Commander-in-Chief that India was only requesting the Nepalese contingent for garrison duty in India; and that even for a temporary period during which she would raise her own homeguards. He attempted to erase Nepal's apprehensions, doubts and fears with logic and assertiveness. The Indian Envoy reminded Nepal that it would be unfair for Nepal to speculate a conflict between her two neighbors-India and Pakistan-for both were the members of the United Nations and the Common Wealth of Nations. The then crisis only consisted of easing the domestic problem of India, that is, the driving of the raiders from Kashmir. But if a state of war prevailed between India and Pakistan, Nepal would reserve her right to pull out her troops from India.

The Government of India would, thus, keep Nepal informed on a day to day basis the developments in Kashmir. To make the position of the Government of Nepal more comfortable the Government of India would agree to the publication of a statement embodying the above points agreed upon by the two Governments relating to the circumstances necessitated to the loan of the troops.¹⁰

The Government of Nepal, after having given serious thought to the proposed loan of the Nepalese troops came forward with an important memorandum on July 12, 1948, which explained at length the difficulties she faced in accepting the proposal. The difficulties sprang both from national and international perspective. The basic thrust of the

* *Ibid.*

10. See a note prepared by Maharaja Mohan Shumsher, July 3, 1948.
Ibid.

memorandum was a discussion of national security and national interest under two broad headings.

i. External Perspective

Nepal felt that the loan of Nepalese troops had twofold bearing on her security and national interest. First, the loan, besides affecting her defence capabilities, could be a source of constant provocation to Pakistan to launch land and air attacks on Eastern Nepal and Kathmandu for she was only 25 miles away. Secondly, Nepal's status in the eyes of the international community might be compromised, if she was involved in an issue, which was of pure domestic concern to India. This she felt could have an adverse effect on Nepal's intended application for membership in the United Nations.¹¹ Again, she felt that there was the possibility of complaints arising against her help to India, similar to those India had herself made against Pakistan on Kashmir.

ii. Internal Repercussion

The presence of the Nepalese troops in India could have a serious repercussion in the domestic situation in the country. First, the press and even the radio stations in India were being used by the disaffected and disloyal elements for anti-Nepalese propaganda. The very knowledge of the fact that some of her finest troops were away would encourage such disturbed elements to launch subversive activities in Nepal. In addition the presence of the Nepalese contingent in India would provide the "mischievous elements" an excellent opportunity to spread unrest among the Nepalese troops—the very bastion of nation's support.

Secondly, the drainage of Nepal's manpower had an important bearing on her security. She had given the British Government the permission to raise

11. The memorandum further hints at the comment made in certain quarters in the United Nations regarding the inclusion of Nepal as an Associate Member in the United Nations' Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, at a meeting recently held at Ootacamud. It further adds that Nepal's admission to the United Nations would definitely be a positive factor in India's international relations.

seven extra Gurkha battalions, as a temporary measure, during the Second World War. But these battalions, far from being demobilized as planned, had rather been retained by the army of Independent India, due to the political crisis in the subcontinent. Nepal had also permitted the temporary retention of those units of the Gurkha rifles in the army who were earmarked for British service but did not wish to serve anymore. In addition, the Government of Nepal had also agreed to bring the then strength of the Gurkha battalions to 21 instead of 12 as laid by the Tripartite Agreement of 1947. All that had led to the shortage of manpower in Nepal which had prejudiced not only national security but had also dislocated the very engine of agricultural production in the country.

Thirdly, the large Muslim population in the Terai, specially Western Terai, could explode into violence if they were subjected to the propoganda that Nepal was helping India to fight against Pakistan. This would certainly adversely affect national security itself.

The memorandum, a free and candid expression of Nepal's psychological frame of mind, posed a sincere question: what would be the position of Nepalese troops in India if a situation arose in which they had to be used for other purposes than just garrison duty then intended.¹² An analysis of the Nepalese records show that Nepal was placed under severe stress and strain by the request of India for the loan of Nepalese troops. The *Maharaja*, first, thought it prudent to place the matter before the British minister. He, thus, deputed his trusted son, General Sarda Shumsher to communicate his predicament to G.A. Falconer. The British Minister could do little except to brush the whole issue away by wishfully thinking that the Kash-

12. See a note prepared by the Government of Nepal on "The Proposed Loan of Nepalese troops to India", July 12, 1948. It was also delivered to Indian Ambassador Surjit Singh. E.No. 1, *Poka* No. 61, *Kha*, pp. 1-3.

mir dispute between India and Pakistan would soon be settled through the mediation of the United Nations. Thus, the Nepalese contingent would not be required by India. However, this piece of advise brought little solace and comfort to the *Maharaja*. The British Minister did, however, take this occasion to express his moral support to the *Maharaja* in his private letter of July 1948, which in part ran

I appreciate the embarrassing situation in which you are placed. If this index is a guide it seems that India puts a high premium on her goodwill towards Nepal.¹³

The memorandum, though negative in structure and content, yet, provided the base for further negotiations on the subject. A meeting was held on July 13, 1948 between *Maharaja* Mohan and the Indian Ambassador.¹⁴ The doubts and fears raised by Nepal in the memorandum were clarified by Surjit Singh so as to safeguard Nepal's position vis-a-vis world opinion. The points raised in the memorandum came up for a detailed discussion. The gist of which is as follows.

a. External Security

With reference to the probability of the provocation of Pakistan, the Indian Ambassador noted that the hypothesis did not arise for the Nepalese troops were required only for the garrison duty of India, that is, the possible outbreak of disorders within the Indian territory—a pure domestic concern of India. They would of course release a part of the Indian army engaged in defending against the raiders in Kashmir. But this could not be even in the remotest sense be considered as an act of hostility

13. A private letter from Minister G.A. Falconer to *Maharaja* Mohan July 7, 1948. E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 61, *Kha*.

14. The meeting was attended by Commander-in-Chief Babar Shumsher, General Bahadur Shumsher, General Shanker Shumsher, General Mrigendra Shumsher, General Prachanda Shumsher, General Sarda Shumsher, and General Sridhar Shumsher. The Indian side was represented by two officers, Major General Shri Nagaesh and Shri J. Dayal, the Financial advisor to the Defence Ministry of India. Both of them were specially deputed for the purpose, by the Government of India.

against Pakistan for she herself has denied any involvement in Kashmir.

Even if one were to hypothetically assume that Nepal is invaded by Pakistan, the Ambassador continued it would mean a direct violation of India's territorial sovereignty. This would automatically bring India's armed forces to the defence of India, thus, indirectly of Nepal's boundaries. But to be more realistic air raids of Nepal by Pakistan can be ruled out for she does not have sufficient air power. However, to remove any doubts the Indian envoy assured that the Government of India would place anti-aircraft guns at the disposal of Nepal and train Nepalese in the use of such weapons. The *Maharaja* was moved by this explanation and dropped the question of the invasion of Pakistan that could be triggered by the loan of the Nepalese contingent to India. He was also comforted by the supposition that the actual hostilities between India and Pakistan could be averted by the mediation of the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Nations.

b. Internal Security

As regards the subversive activities, within the Nepalese territory by the disaffected elements, the Indian Envoy noted that the suppression of such activities was well within the capability of Nepal. While this point was being discussed the Nepalese Commander-in-Chief, Baber Shumsher, brought to notice that the regular broadcast of the Calcutta section of the All India Radio and the sporadic comments of the Indian press often incited the Nepalese people to open violence. This he continued was a violation of international etiquettes and manners. Surjit Majithia, though embarrassed by the sharp criticisms of the Nepalese army chief, took pains to elaborate that the press laws of India gave the Indian press the full scope of discussions and comments. But if there were specific instances of false and malicious propoganda against the Government of Nepal it could be brought to the notice of the Government

of India for warning and even proscription. Likewise the anti-Nepalese broadcasts should also be reported to the Government of India for appropriate action.

c. International Reaction

Surjit Majithia, commenting upon the international reaction Nepal feared could be generated by the emergency loan of the Nepalese troops to India, made the following pertinent observations. First, temporary aid to a friendly neighbor does not in any way compromise Nepal's independent status. The idea Nepal was involved in India's wars holds no water for the Nepalese troops were to be used only for garrison duty in India. Secondly, the very proposition that Nepal should join the United Nations came from India. In fact, it was Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, who sponsored Nepal's membership to the recent meeting of E.C.A.F.E. of Ootacamud. Thus, he believed that Nepal had the best chance of being admitted to U.N. if she was sponsored by India. Finally, the analogy of India's complaints against Pakistan does not arise for Nepal is coming to help India in maintaining India's internal peace, thus, helping her indirectly to defend Kashmir, which is India's territory.¹⁵

The intensive preliminary discussions helped significantly to erase Nepal's doubts and fears that were generated by the proposed loan of Nepalese contingent to India.¹⁶ Thus, the Nepalese Premier closed the discussion by saying that India could count on Nepal's help in the hour of need. This was followed by the discussion of the practical details relating to the scheme of the loan of the Nepalese contingent to India. Two factors, namely, the composition of the battalion and the time-schedule were taken up for discussion. The first was the composition of the battalions. Nepal agreed to provide ten battalions of approximately 850 each. However, the *Maharaja* candidly admitted that

15. See Minute of Discussion held on July 13, 1948 on the subject relating to the "Emergency loan of Gurkha Troops to India", E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 61 *Kha*, pp. 1-2.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

in the beginning he could provide only eight battalions and the remaining two would be sent when the soldiers returned from the planting season. Second, though the Indian Envoy insisted that the soldiers should take up their positions in India immediately, the Nepalese Premier asserted that since half of the troops were away for the planting season it would take some time to collect them.

The Indian Ambassador then proposed a three phase time-schedule for the movement of Nepalese troops to India. In the first phase "Recee" parties consisting of one Commanding Officer and a Quarter Master from each battalion could go to India immediately to meet the Eastern Command Head Quarters. Their duty was to inspect the spot and make arrangements for the arrival of their respective battalions. After a lapse of about a week of the departure of the "Recee" parties, 25 to 30 men from each battalion could be asked to join their barracks in India and make detailed arrangements for the reception of the final contingents as they came along. There after, about 200 men from each battalion could be detailed for duty in India and asked to takeover their respective positions. As regards the last phase Nepal expressed her inability to comply and was left open for further discussions.¹⁷

The terms and conditions relating to the loan of the Nepalese contingent became a subject of intense discussion in Kathmandu between July 13 to 14, 1948. The two day discussions were closed with a Memorandum of Agreement between the two countries. It was signed on July 18, 1948 by Mohan Shumsher and Surjit Majithia at Singha Durbar for their respective countries. The Memorandum,¹⁸ in short, had three clauses.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

18. The Memorandum, in fact, had five clauses but since two of the clauses deal just with the signing of the document, and the date of discussions they have been omitted. For details see the Appendix J.

1. In response to a request made by the Government of India for help in the maintenance of law and order in India and as the Government of Nepal deem it desirable to render all possible help in the cause of peace, the Government of Nepal has agreed in principle to the loan of a contingent of Nepalese troops consisting of ten battalions subject to the settlement of the terms and conditions on which they are to serve India.
2. If the circumstances should arise when the presence of foreign troops is considered improper by the Nepalese Government according to the international laws and usages or if the Nepalese troops are required at home to meet any unforeseen emergency, the Government of India would not consider it an unfriendly act if Nepal finds it necessary to withdraw the contingent.
3. The representatives of the two Governments desire to place on record that the discussions were conducted in an atmosphere of extreme cordiality and goodwill and are fully confident that the friendly relations between the two independent countries will further be cemented as a result of arrangement which has now been agreed upon in regard to the loan of the Nepalese troops in India.¹⁹

A close scrutiny and the analysis of the Memorandum reveals a number of pertinent facts. Nepal, in the first place, was very reluctant to offer her troops to India. She thus, felt the need to fortify her position by inserting the clause that enabled her to pull herself out of India in case of national emergency and international impropriety. Secondly, the terms and conditions of the service of the Nepalese contingent were basically the same as the three previous occasions she had come for the aid of British India: the Indian Revolt of 1857, World War I and World War II. The only

19. For the Memorandum of Agreement see Appendix J.

notable difference is that it did not have the clauses pertaining to active service and honors and awards. The absence of these two clauses is significant in the sense that they were not out for combat duties and were not to receive any awards. Thirdly, as the Nepalese National Movement in India against the Ranas had reached its crest, the Government of India had promised to take adequate measures to safeguard the Nepalese troops in India from a flood of anti-Rana propoganda in North India. Finally, to brush away the sullen mood of the *Maharaja* the Government of India decided to raise significantly the allowances paid to the Nepalese contingent in India, in comparasion to that of the World War II. For example the allowances were doubled in the higher ranks like colonel and quadrupled in lower ranks like *lance naiak* and rifleman. This may have given some comfort to the *Maharaja*. But even if it did it was at best temporary. The signing ceremony of the Agreement was followed by the reading of a prepared statement by the *Maharaja*, which in part ran

The agreement we have just signed is another link in the long chain of friendship between India and Nepal..... At this juncture the presence of the Nepalese troops we hope will not only prove to be of strategic value to India but also be a source of moral support to your able Prime Minister. May the action we have taken serve the cause of peace and tranquility so dearest to our two countries.²⁰

Within two weeks of the signing of the agreement Nepal had completed all preparations necessary for the despatch of ten battalions of her troops to India. The *Maharaja* deputed his trusted son Major General Sarda Shumsher as the General-Officer-in-Command (G.O.C-in-Chief) of the Nepalese Contingent and was to be attached with the Army Head Quarters, New Delhi.²¹ An advance party under Major General Surendra Shumsher left Nepal for the Eastern Command Head Quar ers on July 30, 1948;

20. Statement made by *Maharaja* Mohan, July 18, 1948, E, No. 1, *Poka* No. 61 *Kha*.

21. *Ibid*.

while *Maharaja's* own son left Kathmandu on August 4, 1948, with a personal letter to the Indian Premier. The content of the letter in part ran

I need not describe to you the deep gratification felt by my Government and myself in being able to offer our help to India. I should much like to take the opportunity to assure you that Nepal has ever been ready and willing to render any help desired by India to the best of her capacity and resources as has been shown on numerous occasions in the past; and she will be guided by the same feeling of cordiality, friendship and helpfulness in her relations with her great neighbour in future.²²

It is true that the Nepalese contingent was sent to India exclusively for the garrison duty yet some of its units did assume combat roles in the Hyderabad Action. Her role in making the Hyderabad operations a success was, thus, significant.²³ The Nepalese Premier was quick to congratulate the Indian Prime Minister for the success.²⁴ The Indian Premier also took this occasion to express his emotions in a carefully worded sentence.

The fact some Gurkha units took part in Hyderabad Operations makes Nepal a sharer in our success.²⁵

The duration of the Nepalese contingent in India, though shortlived, was very crucial. The reasons are not far to seek. As early as September 1948 the Nizam took a number of hectic decisions both in international and the domestic front. His twofold steps in the international scene is clearly discernable. First, he recalled the Hyderabad Delegation sent by Laik Ali Ministry to foreign

22. A letter from *Maharaja* Mohan to Premier Nehru, August 4, 1948. E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 61, *Kha*.

23. A letter from the Indian Envoy S.S. Majithia to *Maharaja* Mohan. Sept. (?) 1948. E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 61 *Kha*, File No. 67, 2005/1948.

24. From *Maharaja* Mohan to S.S. Majithia, Sept. 19, 1948. *Ibid*.

25. Message from Premier Nehru to *Maharaja* Mohan. See telegram dated Sept. 18, 1948. E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 61, *Kha*. File No. 67, 2005/1948.

countries. Secondly, he called on the United Nations to withdraw his country's complaints against India in the following strongly worded statement: "the Hyderabad Foreign Secretary Nabab Main Nawaz Jung has ceased to have any authority to represent me and my state;" while in the domestic front he denounced the eight month old "Terror Rule of Razakrs," that "had made him completely helpless."²⁶

The statement of the Nizam paved the way for the restoration of normalcy in Hyderabad; and the Hyderabad refugees began to arrive home in large numbers. Mutaz Ali Khan appealed to the Muslims to co-operate fully with the Indian military government and Gazi Serajuddin Munir, the founder of Ittihadul Muslim Un Movement, welcomed Hyderabad being a part of the Indian Union. To crown every thing the State Congress Committee for Hyderabad thanked the Governor General, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister and the Defence Minister for the success of "Police Action" in Hyderabad.²⁷

Thus, as early as November 1948 correspondences relating to the return of the Nepalese contingent from India had begun. But before the return of the Nepalese contingent Prime Minister Nehru in a message to the Nepalese Government thanked the people of Nepal for their timely help which served two purposes. First, it was the presence of the Nepalese troops that made possible for the Government of India to take the Indian troops away from internal security duties for the Hyderabad Action. Secondly, some units of the Nepalese contingent were directly involved in the Action.²⁸ In the letter the Premier also fixed June 1949 as the target for the complete

26. See All India Transmission Service N.D.C.Q. No. 44, Transmission 1, September 24, 1948, preserved in Foreign Ministry, Kathmandu. *Ibid.*

27. See All India Information Service, N.D.C.Q. 46, Transmission 1, September 25, 1948. *Ibid.*

28. A message from Premier Nehru to Maharaja Mohan, contained in a letter from J.J. Majithia to Maharaja, Feb. 5, 1949. *Ibid.*

and final withdrawal of the Nepalese contingent from India.

A timetable from March 6 to April 6 was finally fixed for the homecoming of the Nepalese contingent.²⁹ A public reception was held on April 3, 1949 in Tundikhel to honor the Nepalese contingent. The Indian Envoy addressing them took pains to point out that India would always treasure in her heart Nepal's friendly gesture for "gratefulness," which is typical for the oriental mind.³⁰ The Nepalese Premier while addressing the gathering exclaimed that the sons of Nepal had added "a chapter to the long history of friendship and cooperation between the two countries."³¹ It was on April 4, 1949 the Indian Ambassador gave a reception in honor of the Nepalese General-Officer-in-Command, Major General Sarda Shumsher.³²

One may conclude this portion of study by quoting the grateful acknowledgement of Prime Minister Nehru for Nepal's help in the hour of crisis.

We are deeply grateful to the Government of Nepal for so readily placing her contingent at the disposal of the Government of India at a time of need. This is still another index to that friendship we are anxious to maintain and develop.³³

29. See a Memo Prepared by the *Jangi Adda* on "The Return of the Nepalese Contingent". E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 61 *Kha*.

30. Speech of S.S. Majithia in the Tundikhel Chaitra 28, 2005 (April 1949). *Ibid*.

31. Welcome Speech by the *Maharaja* of Nepal, Chaitra 28, 2005 (April 1949) *Ibid*.

32. A conspicuous feature of the Nepalese role in Hyderabad Action was the lack of the awarding of medals and honors by the Government of India. The Government of India, however, thought it prudent to give a souvenir to each of the ten battalions in a ceremony organized in Tundikhel on October 22, 1949. The *Maharaja*, the Indian Envoy, C.P. Narayan and Major General Sarada spoke on the occasion. See E. 1, *Poka* No. 61, *Kha*.

33. A letter from Premier Nehru to *Maharaja* Mohan May 20, 1949. E. No. 1, *Poka* No. 61, *Kha*.

CONCLUSIONS

The greater majority of Nepalese historians even today sincerely believe that the job of historians is to set forth facts; and having done so their duty end. This Greeco-Roman tradition of history writing has been primarily responsible for the emergence of many edited works in Nepalese history during the past three decades. This traditional approach of history writing, despite its value, lagged behind a major significant trend in Nepalese historiography, namely, the development of history as a branch of philosophy like the other social sciences. However a breakthrough has been made; and this new development is showing its impact upon a new generation of Nepalese history writers. What man is history tells and Nepalese scholars are on their way to tell this.

The more I came to the close of this manuscript the more I came to realize its shortcomings and limitations. Had I known this earlier this study would have taken a different form or shape. The only consolation, if there is any, springs from the fact that all researchs are imperfect. I have, however, not attempted to hide these imperfections. Both merit and demerit flow freely throughout.

The experiences of Nepal during the first half of this century still awaits encapsulation, partly because of the lack of effort and partly because of the complex and even kaleidoscopic nature of her experience. Historians and political analysts have, thus, shied away from this field. Whether she liked it or not Nepal became increasingly involved in the international conflicts in the first half of the twentieth century. Her involvement may be grouped into two categories: global and regional conflicts.

It is true that volumes of interesting documented literature has been steadily accumulating on the role of the

major powers in interantional conflicts. But the role of small nations is the most neglected and the least understood aspect of modern historical studies. Small nations like Afghanistan, Nepal and Bhutan could have remained aloof from these conflicts; but they were drawn to its center like any other major power in the world. The aim of this research is to show how a small nation like Nepal plunged headlong into the vortex of international conflicts, which was quite contrary to her cherished ideals of peaceful coexistence and splendid isolation. This study addresses itself to a number of pertinent questions like

- a. The psychological factors that motivated Nepalese rulers to take their country through the dark tunnels of international conflicts.
- b. The problems faced by a hilly country like Nepal while mobilizing her resources, both in terms of men and materials, in the global conflicts.
- c. The direct and indirect impact of the wars on the national economy and the social life of the people.
- d. The impact of these conflicts in accelerating the path and momentum of the "freedom movement" against the Ranas.

The dawn of the twentieth century caught Nepal by surprise. It did not take her long to find out that Tibet was no longer a sleepy neighbor which could be manoeuvred to suit her national interests. In short, the Tibetan plateau had become the theater of Anglo-Russian rivalries where the two European superpowers competed for their commercial and political foothold. Nepal, though lost her monopoly in the Trans-Himalayan trade, yet, continued to remain a strong element in Tibetan affairs. Two instances can be taken as illustrative of this fact. Nepal not only played a significant role in sealing the Russian presence in Tibet; but also represented the Tibetan case before Fort William, Calcutta, and helped reduce the Tibetan war idemnity from 75,00,000 to 25,00,000; and the British occupation of Chumbi Valley to three years only.

Secondly, Nepal also played a mediatory role in Tibet-China conflict. It was the skillful efforts of Nepal that made the peaceful exit of General Chung Yi and his 1,000 Chinese troops from Tibet possible.

Nepal's role in the two world wars is almost identical. Her war aims, emergency wartime recruitment, the bestowing of honors and awards and the terms and conditions relating to the offer of the Nepalese contingent for garrison duty in British India were virtually the same. The only difference was that the impact of World War II on the political awakening of Nepal was more pronounced and fruitful. The revolutionary literature issued by secret organizations like the *Akhil Barga Mahsaabha* and the *Raktapat Kommittee* with their slogans like "Long Live the Republic of Nepal" gives us the spirit of the time. Their contacts with the Bolshevik politburo of the Soviet Union and the *Kalong Samiti* of Japan reveal something about their nature. The decade of the 1940's, though, it began with hopes for the militant revolutionaries of Nepal yet, ended in chaos and confusion. The defeat of Japan by the Allies in South-east Asia shattered their hopes of using Japan to liberate their country from the yoke of autocratic Rana rule.

The Afghan War and the Hyderabad Action, though might appear as tailpieces to World War I and World War II, yet, have a significant bearing of their own. The Afghan War was, in fact, a test of friendship under stress and strain. The war did come in the most inopportune moment, when the Nepalese troops had just returned from their duties in World War I. If they craved for anything at that time it was rest. But Nepal did not hesitate a bit to despatch her contingent to help an ally in war with courage and candor. Though her troops did not have to go into actual combat operations in Afghanistan, yet her presence and denial of support from Russia played a significant role in compelling the Amir of Afghanistan to sue for peace.

Then the exit of the British from South Asia in the month of August 1947, brought a crisis in South Asia, which lasted till 1950. South Asia was in a state of anarchy. The problem of the integration of the native states within the Indian Union was aggravated by the twin problems of mass-violence and mass-migrations, which is hitherto unpercedented in the history of nations. As the law and order situation in India was out of control the Indian Premier, Pandit Nehru, asked the Government of Nepal to loan a Nepalese contingent of 10 battalions for garrison duty in India. Nepal, though in the beginning was very reluctant to offer a contingent to India at a time when she was in a state of undeclared war with Pakistan, yet, as the pressure or persuasion mounted Nepal went along. But the offer was conditional. She reserved her right to recall her troops anytime if her presence in India became improper according to international laws and usages or if an unforeseen national emergency occurred at home. A characteristic feature of Nepal's help to "Independent India" was the absence of clauses in the terms of contract relating to gratuity, honors and rewards for they were not out on active service. But to Nepal's surprise some of the units of the Nepalese contingent found themselves in action in Hyderabad; and contributed significantly in making the Hyderabad action a success.

This is a study of a people at the center of World conflicts in the first half of the twentieth century. It is an irony of history that her involvement occurred at a time when her rulers were following a policy of peaceful coexistence and splendid isolation. Though isolation and involvement are two contradictory forces, yet, Nepal was able to weave a *modusvivendi* between them. The pangs and traumas associated with this process are the theme of this book. Nepal passed through this period of turmoil with courage and fortitude and in the process brought about a momentum to the process of secularization of her polity and society.

APPENDIXES

- Appendix A: Terms and Conditions Relating to the Offer of the Nepalese Contingent for Garrison Duty in World War I
- Appendix B: Steps Taken by the *Maharaja* to Help Families of the Gurkhas Fighting Abroad in World War I
- Appendix C: Comparative Statement Showing the Differences in the Rate of Allowances paid to the Officers in 1857 and that Proposed in World War I
- Appendix D: The German Propoganda Against the British in Nepal in World War I
- Appendix E: Cases of Indiscipline Among Nepalese Soldiers in Waziristan During World War I
- Appendix F: Terms and Conditions Relating to the Offer of the Nepalese Contingent in World War II
- Appendix G: The Annual Statement of Combatants Enrolled in Kunraghat and Ghoom in the Year 1942, 1944
- Appendix H: Abstract of Conversation Between the Viceroy of India, the Marques of Linlithgow and General Bahadur Shumsher J.B.R. December 29, 1941
- Appendix I: English Translation of Japanese Broadcasts in Nepali
- Appendix J: Memorandum of Agreement 1948

APPENDIX A*

The Terms & Conditions Relating to the Offer of the Nepalese Contingent for Garrison Duty in India During World War I

Duties

The contingent will be for general service in India and the North West Frontier and will not be sent overseas.¹

Composition

a. The Nepalese force will consist of three contingents constituting the total strength of 14,000. Each contingent was to be headed by a General Officer-in-Command. He was to be assisted by a Brigade Major serving as the Officer-in-Command and a military secretary.²

b. In addition each contingent will possess non-combatant units consisting of specific posts like drummers, buglers, writers, clerks, cooks, *kharidars* (accountants), physicians, *koteyas* and *pipas*.³

* The terms and conditions relating to the offer of the Nepalese Contingent to British India during World War I is suggestive rather than being comprehensive for the official text of the terms and conditions is not available for scrutiny and analysis either in the records of the National Archives, New Delhi or the Foreign Ministry of Kathmandu or the India Office Library, London. However, the terms and conditions can be fairly well reconstructed from the correspondence between the GI and GN, as well as the personal communications between the Nepalese Premier and the British Residents in Kathmandu. The terms and conditions for the World War I was similar to those framed between the two Governments in 1857, which is also not available.

1. See a letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to J. Manners Smith, June 26, 1915 entitled "The Nepalese Troops are to be used in India Not Overseas", E.No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 2 *Ka*, 1971/1915.
2. A Note Prepared by the Foreign Department of Nepal, Kathmandu. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 2 *Ka* 1971/1915.
3. See the list of the men of the Nepalese contingent going out to India, E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63 File No. 4, 1971/1915.

c. The contingent will possess the following six regiments : First Rifle Regiment, Purano Gorakha Regiment, Kali Bahadur Regiment, Pasupati Regiment, Sher Dal Regiment and Second Rifle Regiment.⁴

d. There will be senior officer of the Nepalese army attached to the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian army to advise the Government of India on matters relating to the Nepalese contingent.⁵

Pay and Other Expenses

a. The troops will retain their ordinary *jagirs* (salaries) during the period of service in India. The Government of India may give to them such *bata* as given to the Nepalese troops during the "Mutiny" of 1857.⁶ However, the *bata* for the rank and file members will be raised by the Government of India.

Pensions Honors and Awards

As regards family pensions, honors and awards and the grants to the injured the same procedure was to be followed as in 1857 and Nepal Government was to be consulted in each case.⁷

Discipline and Law

The officers and men of the Nepalese contingent committing military offences will be tried by their own code and by their own officers in the regiment; and in the cases in which the latter did not have sufficient jurisdiction (e.g. life imprisonment, death, etc. would be sent back to Nepal for trial. However, in case of offences committed by them on persons not being the members of the contingent they will be tried under the

4. The general practise followed in the formation of the regiments was to combine two regiments and give it the name of one of the regiment. See a letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith entitled "Simplification of the Names of the Regiments", Feb. 28, 1915. *Ibid.*
5. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, entitled "Appointment of Generals and Their Ranks" pp. 1-2. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 2 *Kha*, 1971/1915.
6. For the *batta* given by the GI to men of the Nepalese contingent in 1857 See E. No. 2, *poka* No. 61, File No. *Ka*.
7. A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith Feb. 26, 1915; also from Resident to *Maharaja*, March 26, 1915. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 68, File No. 1, 1971/1915.

Indian Code, but in the event of their conviction they would be sent back to Nepal to undergo punishment.⁸

Clothing

The men of the Nepalese contingent will be provided with two suits of clothing and the Government of India will arrange for renewals whenever required.

Tentage

The tentage will be supplied by the Government of India.

Arms

Men of the Contingent will carry with them Martini Henry rifles and ten rounds of ammunitions for each rifle.

Physician

There will be a *Vaidya* (native physician) attached to each battalion.⁹

8. See the letter No. 32, from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident J. Manners Smith, Feb (?), 1915; from Resident to *Maharaja*, Feb. 27, 1915. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 2, *Ka*, 1971/1915; also from *Maharaja* Chandra to Resident Manners Smith, July 20, 1915. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 2 *Ga*.

9. See notes on the conversation between *Maharaja* Chandra and the Resident J. Manners Smith, Jan. 25, 1915. E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 68.

APPENDIX B*

**Steps Taken by the *Maharaja* of Nepal to
Help the Families of the Gurkhas Fighting
Abroad During World War I**

Nepal
26th. October, 1914

My Dear Colonel Manners Smith,

For some time past I have been thinking of how I might further help the Gurkha soldiers in the British army who have their domiciles in Nepal by relieving them of some of their anxieties which they may possibly entertain with respect to their holdings and the care of their families during their enforced absence from their homes, owing to the present war. And it has occurred to me in the view of their inability now to look personally into their family affairs that if the following steps were taken they might to a great extent ease their mind regarding matters that concern them and their families, intimately-as lands forms the mainstay of their support at home-; and might besides being appreciated by them, enable them to devote their whole heart to their duty as soldier.

The steps intended to be taken are to issue orders to the effect:

1. That no legal disposition of or ejection from Government holdings and tenements in their occupation shall be enforced on them under the revenue laws of the country, for the non-payment of Government's rent dues including in the *Serma* and *Sawane Phagoo* for a period extending up to six months after their return to India from the seat of war; and in the case of those who are detailed with their regiment under war conditions to six months after the termination of the war.
2. That no civil and criminal suits in which any of the men mentioned above shall be parties and in which they do not appear by their lawfully constituted attorneys or agents shall be proceeded or decided during the period mentioned above; and the cases in which judgments have been pronounced but no appeals could be filed within the statutory period provided the same had not expired before the 4th. of August, 1914, the period of limitation of such

* Source : *Basta* No. 63, File No. *Ka.* 1914.

appeal, if any, shall also be extended to the time mentioned above, and also for all rights to sue.

3. That it is also intended to make some pecuniary (sic.) that the supply of food stuffs to such nearest members of the family and the immediate dependents as their wives, minor children and the aged parents, living jointly with them of such amongst those of the front who may be in need of the same. In order that this relief proposal may be carried out it is necessary that I should be provided with a list of men who have gone and may be going to to the front, together with the full address of their respective homes in Nepal including villages, *zillas thanas* and *tahasils* and the names of their nearest relatives at home and that of their father as far as may be available from the Regimental Department's records. This list will also enable me to issue instructions to the Nepalese officials concerned to take special care of the families of those listed men as far as possible.

The above consideration will apply to the reservists of the British Gurkha Regiment.

With Kind Regards
Your's Very Sincerely
Chandra Shumsher

APPENDIX C*

**Comparative Statement Showing the Differences in the Rate of Allowances Paid to Officers in 1857
And That Proposed in World War I**

Rank	No. of Officers	Rate in 1857 per month	Total per month	Rate proposed per month	Total per month	Short per month
Commanding Colonels	2	Rs 500	1,000	Rs. 150	300	700
Colonels	3	Rs. 270	810	Rs. 150	450	360
Lt. Colonels	2	180	360	150	300	60
Major Captains	9	120	1,080	100	900	180
Captains	23	60	1,380	70	1,610	230
Lieutenants	21	45	945	65	1,365	420
Major Adjutants and Adjutants	12	30	360	65	780	420
Ensigns	8	40	320	28	224	96
Majors <i>Subedars</i> and <i>Subedars</i>	136	30	4,080	22	2,992	1,088
Transport Officers, <i>Kharidars</i>	2	45	90	65	130	40
Physicians	6	40	240	35	210	30
Accountants	9	45	405	35	315	90
						Total Rs. 3,714
Balance in favour Rs. 1, 494 a month.						

* Source : E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 4, 1971/1915.

APPENDIX D*

The German Propoganda Against the British in Nepal During World War I**

Shri Pasupate Nama:

You must be aware of the fact that the Englishmen, besides being the eaters of cow's flesh, are also cowardly, tricky, dishonest and of very low stature. Above every thing, you should remember that they are your traditional enemies. If some calamity falls on your country the Britishers will not come for your aid or protection. If you are wise you will not be swayed by their cheap talks to give your regular troops to them. The German soldiers never have any intention to fight against the Gurkha troops. The Germans are not your enemies rather your enemies are: China, Tibet and Britain. The British, who have captured the whole of Hindustan have now their eyes on you. You must, thus, join the Freedom Movement of India and help overthrow the British yoke from the subcontinent. You must convince your mad King that he should not waste his precious army for the defeat of the *Ferangi* (English) by the Germans is a foregone conclusion.

Shri Pasupate Nama:

O Brave Nepalese ! you either know the British diplomacy nor can you even imagine the ugly means to which they can stoop to attain their objectives. You have been deceived by their sweet words and have lent your troops and arms to them. But you should never trust the British. The British had promised to give 24 lakhs to Afghanistan annually, but this money was never delivered. You are very foolish for you cannot distinguish between your enemy and friend. However, you must bare in your mind that if you send your troops to fight the Germans they will never return.

You should rather devote your energy in freeing India from the bondage of the British. Once the British *Raj* disappears from India you will be benefitted by an annual gift of 30 crores.

* Source : E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 63, File No. 1, *Kha*, 1914.

** The content of this letter is extracted from an address to the Commander-in-Chief of Nepal October 23, 1914. The trans. from Hindi to English is mine.

Another undated letter in Hindi has the following content.

Shri Pasupate Nama:

The English are your traditional enemies. They never care for your real development. Do not give your soldiers to a race which has no morals and scruples. China and Tibet are also your enemies. You should rather take the whole of Hindustan and annex it to Nepal. But if you send your troops to Europe they will not come alive. Remember that when chips are down the Englishmen are not going to come for your aid and protection. Tell your mad king that he should not ruin his soldiers by lending them to the British. To conclude, you should remember that the defect of the British by the Germans is inevitable.

APPENDIX E*

**Cases of Indiscipline Among the Nepalese Soldiers
In Wazirestan During World War I**

Private Letter (a)

Wazirestan Field Force
7th. June 1917

My dear General Shaib,

I find the unpleasant necessity of writing to you privately about the Sher Regiment. Since they left Kakool instead of showing what they considered it an honour to be on service they have behaved in a way I never thought would have been possible, for some quick and unexplained reason every one seemed to have forgotten the very simplest details of what I have taught them. Instead of being the excellent men, whom I knew them to be, they are slacked and undisciplined mob. There have been cases of men asleep on sentry. Three or four cases of rifles being fired through carelessness in camp. A very bad case of a man telling me a lie when the brigade staff officer was present and deliberate disobedience by both officers and men on several occasions. I am only giving you a few instances but there are many. In a Native Infantry Regiment some of the men would have been court-martialed for offences which are punishable with death. I know that this is a very serious charge for me to make about a regiment but it is a very necessary one and unless something is done it will lead to a grave disaster. I am writing to you quite privately about the matter and with your help things can I am sure improve very much. And now I will tell you the reason for all this. It is only the want of discipline. What I would like you to kindly do is to write to the officers through the Colonel in a serious manner. Every officer, with possibly few exceptions, have been slack and weak with his men. An order is given in a half-hearted sort of way and its obedience never enforced. There have been nothing new for them to do, but they have carried out their ordinary every day work in careless slack way and at present I am very much ashamed of them all.

* The two letters in this appendix constitutes the private correspondences between Major A.L. Molesworth and General Baber Shumsher. See *Jangi Bandobasta Grantha Ratna Mala* No. 4, pp. 95-100, MAN.

What I want you to insist is that the offenders should be really properly punished. I told Colonel Bhairab that if the men are going to behave like indisciplined followers they should be punished as such. I cannot think of a more degrading punishment for a soldier but can only suggest it if the men will not have sufficient pride in themselves to act as soldiers. You know what to say to the officers and what should be done to enforce this discipline. Something very drastic is necessary or the name of the Nepalese contingent will suffer through the Regiment. The officers must use their authority and carry out orders to the slightest degree or there is going to be a loud disaster. If it were possible I would very much like you to come down and see things for yourself. This letter is of course between you and I. It is my duty to see the good name of the regiment. I cannot do this if the officers do not help me, and they are not helping me. Our name has already suffered badly through the want of being able to enforce discipline.

Your's Sincerely
A. L. Molesworth
Major

Private Letter (b)

Camp Miran Shah
vai., Bannu
21 st. June, 1917

My dear General,

I find myself compelled to write to you with regards certain events that have happned since my last letter. The G. O. C.¹ has brought to my notice that the men of the Sher Regiment are allowed to go about in a slack and dirty condition. No attempt appears to have been made to keep belts and bandliers clean nor do the men wash their clothes. The result is that the regiment compares most unfavourably with the other regiments here and is giving a bad name to the contingent in consequence. This is entirely due to Company Officers not insisting on their being well trained. My orders on the subject are absolutely ignored. There was a case yesterday in which the G. O. C. has asked me to bring to your notice a guard of the second platoon under an officer was asked to proceed to the Seria for the night. The orders were that any one leaving the camp was to be loaded. The party was sent off in charge of a *subedar*, and all this they had ammunition to guard, not a man had his magazine charged.

1. G.O.C. is an abbreviation used for General Officer in Command.

The Sera is a very dangerous place liable to be attacked so the deliberate disobedience of orders might very easily have resulted in all the party being killed and their rifles and ammunition seized, at the same time loosing the post they have been ordered to hold.

An officer was ordered and a *subedar* sent. Another case brought to notice is that a Company Commander was answering back in parade when asked to halt. You will see how impossible it is for your British Officers to do their work if their orders are deliberately disregarded, and even insubordinate language used.

The whole trouble is that the officers of the regiment do not realize their responsibilities, which are very different to what they have been accustomed to in peace. The officers do not see that their orders are explicitly obeyed as they should. They give orders and do not insist being carried out. My own orders in consequence are not obeyed as they should be. There is no fit scale of punishment and it is absolutely necessary that there should be one, and I am doing my best for the regiment but I am not getting the help I should from the officers. If this continues there will be a very bad disaster and the Sher Regiment will not only loose a lot of men and equipment they will cause the other regiments to suffer. I again will ask you to try to come here in a visit of inspection. If possible I will go to G. O. C. to wire asking that you may come.

Your's Sincerely
A. L. Molesworth
Major

APPENDIX F*

The Terms and Conditions Relating to the Offer of the Nepalese Contingent for Garrison Duty in India During World War II**

Duties

The contingent will be for service in India or on the North West Frontier and will not be sent overseas.

Strength

1. The contingent will consist of two brigades each comprising of four battalions of 1,000 men.
2. In addition, each brigade will be accompanied by a band of thirty strong and two mounted *sowars*.
3. One brigade commander and three staff officers will accompany each brigade and will be attached to our staff.
4. In addition, one senior officer of the Nepalese Army will be attached for duty on the staff of H.E. the Commander-in-Chief in Delhi and Simla so that he can put forward the views of Nepalese Government and be in a position to advise on matters affecting the contingent. He would also be afforded facilities for paying frequent visits to the troops for the purpose of inspection.
5. The officers commanding the brigades of the contingent will be officially called Brigade Commander, unless he holds the rank of a Major General, Lieutenant General or General in the Nepalese army in which case they will be referred to colloquially as General.

Cost:

1. It is understood that the Nepalese government desires to bear the ordinary charges of troops at the rate these would cost if maintained in Nepal and the over and above these would be borne by the Government of India.

* This is extracted from the correspondences between the British Minister, G.L. Betham to *Maharaja* Joodha, Nov. 8, 1939, see E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. *Ka*, FMAN

** The terms and conditions relating to the offer of the Nepalese Contingent during the World War I was also very much similar.

2. The regular pay of the troops will be borne by the Nepal Government, but from the date of crossing of the frontier allowances will be paid by the Government of India at the rate shown in annexure "A".
3. The brigade commanders will be responsible for paying their men.
4. Good conduct pay will not be paid by the Government of India.

Pensions, etc.

1. Should the contingent proceed on active service disability and family pensions will be paid by the Government of India, at the rates and under the conditions applicable to similar ranks of the Indian army. The Nepalese Government will be consulted on each case before the payment is made. (Above that the adoption of the Chatfield Committee's report in respect to the Indian troops will also apply to Nepal)¹.
2. Under the present conditions gratuities as of the war of 1914-1918 are not admissible for the Indian army, but should gratuities be introduced, the personnel of the contingent will be eligible *pro rata* under the conditions applicable to similar ranks of the Indian army. Any pension or gratuity, if admissible, that becomes payable will be paid in the form of a lump sum to the Nepalese Government.

Honours and Awards

The Nepalese Government will be consulted in connection with any award the Government of India decided to make on their personnel, recommendations being submitted to the Senior Nepalese Officer attached to the staff of His Excellency Commander-in-Chief.

Rations

In 1915 regular troops in India purchased their own rations. This system is no longer present, and under the existing arrangements the regular army in India receives free rations and a small messing allowance for the purchase of extras. It would be convenient if the same system was adopted for the contingent, and it is proposed that the combatants should be issued with the same scale of free rations as for the combatants of the Indian army, as shown in the Annexure "B", and draw the same messing allowance. No rations will be issued for officers above the ranks corresponding Viceroy's commissioned officers in the Indian Army.

-
1. This clause in the proposal was deleted due to Nepal's insistence from the final agreement.

Followers Class I are not normally issued with free rations but draw in lieu a line allowance of Rs. 6/4 per mensem in addition to allowances shown in Annexure "A", and it is proposed that the same system should be applied to Class I Followers of the Contingent.

1. Forage and fodder for horses would be issued free at the scale shown in Annexure "B".
2. If the contingent proceeds on active service the men will get free rations at the same scales as for troops of the Indian Army as shown in Annexure "A".

Discipline and Law

Officers and men will be tried for military offences under their own code by their own officers. If the officers have no jurisdiction to deal with the case the offender will be sent back to Nepal to be dealt there. If an offence is committed against the Civil and Criminal Law of India the individual will be tried in Indian Courts under the Indian codes; but an offender if sentenced to punishment other than a fine will be sent back to Nepal to undergo the sentence.

Accommodation

The first brigade to arrive will be accommodated at Dehra Dun, and the second at Havelian near Abbotabad.

Training

1. The number of weapons in a battalion is now more diverse, and the training far more complex than was in the case of 1915. It will be convenient if each brigade is provided by a cadre of 24 officers and 120 non-commissioned officers for training in advance of the arrival of the remainder of the brigade, as shown in Annexure 'C'. This training will be carried out in or near Abbotabad for the cadre of both the brigades. It would be convenient if at least two armourers per battalion were to accompany the cadres, for training in repair and maintenance of weapons that will be issued to the contingent.
2. It is proposed to attach three officers of the regular Gurkha battalions to each battalion of the contingent, viz, one field officer and two junior officers. These officers will generally assist and advise, but they will have no power of command or disciplinary powers. It is also proposed to attach three British N. C. O.'s to each battalions to assist with further training if required.

Dates of Arrival of the Cadres and Contingent

It has been agreed that the whole contingent should be concentrated in India by the 20th March, 1940.

For administrative and other reasons it is absolutely essential that the actual arrival of troops in India should be as early as possible and consistent with the above.

The following dates have been agreed upon for the moves of the various portions of the contingent from Raxaul.

- a. Training of 24 officers and 120 N. C. O.'s of the First brigade to enter Raxaul on the 18th. December, 1939 for Abbotabad.
- b. Training of 24 officers and 120 N. C. O.'s of the 2nd. brigade to enter Raxaul on 22nd. January, 1940 for Abbotabad.
- c. The movement of the first and second brigade to be carried out as a continuous movement from Raxaul to the end on the 15th. March, 1940.
- d. One Nepalese officer will arrive in Abbotabad a few days in advance of the first training cadre in order to discuss the detailed arrangements.

It is understood that the Nepalese Government requires 10 days notice before any party is due to entrain in Raxaul.

Reception Arrangements

1. As it is proposed to issue arms and equipments on the arrival of the contingent, to its destination in India, it will not be necessary to establish a special depot at Raxaul for the issue of equipments.
2. The reception and transport arrangements will be similar to those in 1915. A railway transport officer, who will be an officer of a Gurkha battalion with a small staff of Gurkha N. C. O.'s. will be at Raxaul throughout the period, when movements are taking place, and there will be a similar staff at Lucknow. Two British officers of the Gurkha battalion will accompany each battalion of the contingent from Raxaul to its destination. These officers will arrive in Raxaul 24 hours before the party, they are to accompany, is due to entrain.

Your offer of Legation bungalow at Raxaul is gratefully accepted.

Rifles

Rifles and ammunitions will be issued to the contingent on arrival at destination in India and will not be brought by the contingent, except for an armed guard with each battalion.

Machine-guns

Machine-guns will be issued in India and it will be unnecessary for the contingent to bring their own.

Equipments

The men should bring their own leather belts, *khukuris*, haversacs, and water-bottles. After the arrival of the contingent they will be equipped by the Government of India. Unit equipment and animal transport as necessary will be issued in India.

Tentage

Tentage will be supplied by the Government of India.

Clothing

Men of the contingent will bring with them the following articles: One suit (field service uniform, *khaki* drill cloth for one suit to be made in India), one pair of boots, two blankets, two "chhaddars", one water-proof sheet, one Nepali blanket and one line bedding (for combatants only).

These items will be replaced as necessary by the Government of India, with the exception of "chaddars", which are not an issue item to the Indian troops.

Entranching Tools

Each battalion will bring with them 64 picks, 216 shovels, 2 crow bars, 12 axes, 20 spades, large and small, 2 hammers, 2 chisels, 1 *kodale* or *mamooti* and one billhook.

Sirhind pattern entranching tools will not be brought.

Charges and Transport

The following charges with their saddlery will be brought by the contingent:—

Per Brigade Headquarters:—

For Brigade Commander and Staff officers—3

Per Battalion:—

For Commanding officer, Second-in-Command and Adjutant-3.

No charges will be sent with the training cadres.

Additional charges and ponies to complete to scale for a regular Gurkha battalion of the Indian Army plus charges for two *sowars* at each brigade Headquarters and at the headquarter of the contingent at Delhi will be issued in India. Unit transport as necessary will be issued in India.

Signalling equipments

Battalions should bring their own signalling equipments, which will be supplemented as necessary by the Government of India.

Medical

In each battalion there will be one physician and one dresser with the following equipments:—

Painners No. 1	_____	1
Painners No. 2	_____	1
Field Medical Compounder	_____	1
Field Surgical Haversack	_____	1
First Field Dressing	_____	1000 Pieces

Other arrangements as necessary will be made by the Government of India.

Major N. Eustance, 2/6 th. Gurkha Rifles is arriving as training officer to escort the Nepalese contingent.

Dec. 4, 1939

Bahadur Shumsher
E. de Burgh

APPENDIX G*
**The Annual Statement of Combatant Gurkha Recruits Enrolled at Kunraghat and
 Ghoom During the Years 1942, 1944**

Name of Recruiting Depot	Jan.	Feb.	March	April	May	June	July	August	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
For the Year 1942												
Kunraghat	137	99	50	27	35	94	86	105	240	x	3,981	4,530
Ghoom	26	18	29	1,336	1,435	529	150	353	362	x	16	15
Laheria Saharai	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1,352	1,998
For the Year 1944												
Kunraghat	1,288	227	10	26	10	28	x	12	10	2,240	1,628	2,108
Ghoom	3	13	13	610	787	189	20	41	341	508	x	x
Laheria Saharai	614	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1,601	1,087

* This table is compiled from the monthly statements forwarded by G.C. Strahan, Recruiting Officer for the Gurkha to the British Minister, G.L. Betham in Kathmandu during the years, 1942, 1944. See E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 56, File No. 421 *Kha*, 1942, FMAN.

APPENDIX H*

Abstract of the Conversation between the Marques of Linlithgow, the Viceroy of India and General Bahadur Shumsher on December 19, 1941**

Viceroy: I regret that my proposal caused much difficulty to the *Maharaja*; but our only purpose was to find a suitable role for the Nepalese Contingent in India. The entry of Japan in the war has added a new dimension to this conflict. If there are objections to the sending of the Nepalese Contingent to the West, how about sending the Contingent to Burma?

Bahadur: This would pose the same problem. If on the one hand the Nepalese contingent had to cross the Persian Gulf, while on the other it had to cross the Bay of Bengal.

Viceroy: Then it is a very difficult matter.

Bahadur: It is true that religious scruples are not violated when the Nepalese Contingent go to Burma; yet the *Maharaja* would be falling back upon his word, for he had promised to his troops that they would not have to cross the frontier of India. In the World War I a proposal was made by His Britanic Majesty to send the Nepalese Contingent for services in Egypt; but when the proposal was referred back it was dropped. The Agreement signed between the two Governments has spelled out very clearly and specifically the terms and conditions relating to the service of the Nepalese Contingent in India. Now the government of India is disregarding the religious scruples of the Nepalese by insisting upon the change. This has put us in difficulty.

Viceroy: (After some moments of serious thoughts) The *Maharaja* has rendered to us very valuable help. But since there is no

* Source : E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 61, File No. 507, 1940. FMAN

** This appendix is a perfect illustration of the fact that the Nepalese diplomats were no appeasers; but could stand by their guns when attempts were made to deviate from the original text of the agreement.

other suitable role for the Nepalese Contingent in India, I am afraid that His Highness will have to agree to pull out the Nepalese contingent from India. There is no other alternative. (Turning to Archibald Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief of India—do you agree ?)

C-in-C: Yes.

Bahadur: I am very much surprised to hear that there is no role for the Nepalese contingent in India. In fact, I can correctly visualize all kinds of role for the Nepalese Contingent in India, specially in the garrison duty of the forts of the North West Frontier, prison war camps and for other internal security. I would also like to point out that our contingent is by no means less trained than the newly raised Gurkha battalions. Let me tell you one thing my country is doing her utmost to raise fresh recruits for the Gurkha battalions to serve overseas; and we would like the Nepalese Contingent to be kept in India. I am constrained to say that it is very unkind remark on the part of Your Excellency to assert that there is no suitable role for the Nepalese Contingent in India. His Highness, the *Maharaja*, is ungrudgingly and without any consideration of our own country is sending all the young mountain—manhood for your cause. Though knowing all this, you would still like to return our Contingent we are helpless. We are quite prepared to accept such a proposal, though such a action would definitely hurt our feelings, very much. To put this in another perspective, how would the whole world comment on the century old friendship between Nepal and Great Britain, if at a moment when the gates of India is threatened on two fronts, the Nepalese Contingent is asked to return? As regards my personal position, I shall consider my mission as a failure and perhaps it would lead to the end of my political career. The report of Colonel Betham must have acquainted you with the difficulties faced by the *Maharaja*.

Viceroy: Yes ! I feel what you say is right. Now, Commander-in-Chief, since you have heard General Bahadur's version, we must find a way out. (looking towards Bahadur Shumsher) Certainly I would not like to loose a friend like you.

C-in-C: In that case, I would like to consult my officers regarding the Contingent's role. I would like to take some of them, one or two battalions to the Assam side.

- Bahadur:** Our religion raises no objection for you to take the troops to Assam. You can take them to any place within the borders of India; and use them for any service you need.
- C-in-C:** Suppose an occasion arises for the Nepalese troops to cross the Indo-Burmese border while fighting with the enemy. If at this moment the troops would halt at the border it would be very risky to use such a troop.
- Bahadur:** The crossing of the Indian frontier by the Nepalese troops both in the Eastern and Western front would be a special case. When I went to Nepal 3/4 months ago I talked with the *Maharaja* confidentially about such a case. The *Maharaja* has permitted us to go outside the borders of India in such cases. Our men would, in fact, be only too glad to pursue the enemy.
- Viceroy:** Then every thing is right and settled now. I am sorry that you have been placed under great stress and strain.
- Bahadur:** *Maharaja* had been placed under great difficulty but Your Excellency has realized this-thus has been greatly relieved.

APPENDIX I•

English Translation of Japanese Broadcasts from Nepal**

A: From Rangoon, May 2, 1944

Hallo Gurkha brothers ! listen to how the British have spoiled your notion of freedom. Even when India was under the rule of the Muslim Emperors your country was flowing with wealth and youthful manhood. However, as the British set their foot in the Indian soil things began to deteriorate. At that time Nepal was the very bastion of freedom and happiness. Then came 1814, when the British waged a war against Nepal on a false pretext. The Gurkhas also accepted the challenge and having girded up their loins did come out victorious. War then broke a second time, and in this also they were successful. The Britions then took refuge to treachery and fought for a third time during which the Gurkhas were unfortunately defeated. As the war came to a close the British were deeply impressed by the heroism of the Gurkhas, thus, they decided to make peace and began to enlist the Gurkhas in their army. Such an arrangement has hurt the very concept of independence of which the word Gurkha is the embodiment. They, being apprehensive of the fact that such a brave nation would dominate the world, did not permit education to spread into the counry thus kept the Gurkhas illiterate.

In the year 1914 the Great War broke out during which the Gurkhas fought hard and maintained their good name. However, after the war, the British went on increasing the enlistment of the Gurkhas in their army by fourfold. This was the fruit the valliant Gurkhas reaped for their valuable cooperation.

To champion the British cause is going on a suicide mission. However, there is yet time. It is time for you to acknowledge the foolishness of your conduct and like all free countries join your hands with the Indo-Japanese forces in defence of freedom. Otherwise no trace of your country is going to be left. A large portion of Manipur has already

* These broadcasts are extracted from E. No. 2, *Poka* No. 54, File No. *Do*, 7 *Ka* March 1, 1941-May 31, 1941. FMAN

** The Translation from Nepali to English is mine.

been snatched from the British hands. India will also be freed from bondage within a few days. The Gurkhas still have a chance to preserve their independence. If you are still inclined to back the British I must say your future is extremely gloomy. Brothers and sisters ! what more shall I say ?

B. From Saigon, May 2, 1944

In Nepal even lads of 15 years are being conscripted. The lack of youths is being very much felt in the countryside. Forgetting their own independence, the Nepalese are fighting the forces of free India. However, the forces of Free India have not yet attacked any Indians or the Gurkhas. The Gurkhas, who have joined the side of Free India have been telling a lot about British oppression. They are given rations not at all fit for use, while the Whites are provided everything up to the mark of distinction. Brothers and sisters ! you must all combine and help in the war of your own freedom. Why do you attack the forces of Free Inida ?

In Palel, all the Indians except the Gurkhas have been removed to the rear because of the apprehension felt by the British of the desertion by the Indian troops. Palel will be in our hand any moment.

APPENDIX J*

Memorandum of Agreement, 1948

1. In response to a request made by the Government of India for help in the maintenance of law and order in India and as the Government of Nepal deem it desirable to render all possible help in the cause of peace, the Government of Nepal have agreed in principle to the loan to India of a Contingent of Nepalese troops consisting of ten battalions, subject to the settlement of the term and conditions on which they are to serve in India.

2. Should circumstances arise when the presence of foreign troops is considered improper by the Nepal Government according to international law and usage, or if Nepalese troops are required at home to meet any unforeseen emergency, the Government of India would not consider it an unfriendly act if Nepal finds it necessary to withdraw these troops, and does so.

3. The terms and conditions of service were the subject of discussion at Kathmandu on 13.7.48 and 14.7.48 between the representatives of the Government of India and Nepal and the agreement reached is embodied in Annexure I to this Memorandum.

4. The representatives of the two Governments desire to place on record that their discussions have been conducted in an atmosphere of extreme cordiality and good-will and are fully confident that the friendly relations which exist between the two independent countries will be further cemented as a result of the arrangements which have now been agreed upon in regard to the loan of the Nepalese troops to India.

5. Signed in duplicate at Kathmandu this 18th day of July One thousand nine hundred and forty-eight.

Sd/ Surjit Singh Majithia
for the Government of India.

Sd/ Mohan Shumsher
Jung Bahadur Rana.
for the Government of Nepal.

* Source E. No. 2 Poka No 61, Kha, File No. 67, 2005/1948

ANNEXURE I

Terms and conditions of service of the Contingent of Nepalese Troops Being Loaned to India

1. *Duties:* The Contingent will be employed in India on such duties as are referred to in the Memorandum and will, as far as possible, be located in territories adjacent to Nepal, that is, United Provinces, Bihar and West Bengal. While in India the Nepalese troops will be called to the aid of the civil authorities only when the conditions are so disturbed that the civil forces alone are unable to handle the situation.

2. *Strength:* The Contingent will consist of ten battalions. A senior officer of the Nepalese Army is to be designated as General Officer of the Nepalese Contingent, and will be attached for duty on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief in India, in order to be able to advise the latter on all matters affecting the Contingent. He will also make tours of inspection of Units when necessary and the Government of India will afford all necessary facilities for such tours. In addition a senior officer of the Nepalese Army of the rank of Major General will be attached to the staff of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Command, to represent to General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Nepalese Contingent, at the said Command.

3. *Organisation:* The battalions of the Nepalese Contingent will be organised broadly on the lines of an Indian Infantry Battalion. The details of the organisation are given in Annexure II.

4. *Discipline and Law:* Officers and men will be tried for military offences under their own court by their own officers. If the officers have no power or jurisdiction to deal with the case, the offender will be sent back to Nepal to be dealt with there.

If an offence is committed against the civil or criminal law of India, the individual will be tried in the Indian courts under the Indian law, but if an offender is sentenced to punishment other than fine he will be sent back to Nepal to undergo the sentence.

The Government of India will assure that the Regional Intelligence and Police Departments will help the Commanding Officers to take adequate measures to safeguard Nepalese troops from subversive propaganda.

5. *Pay and Allowances:* In addition to the rates of pay and allowances admissible under the Nepal Government Rules while serving in Nepal which will continue to be paid by the Nepal Government, the following special allowances will be given to officers and men of the Nepalese Contingent by the Government of India from the date of crossing the frontier:

	Rs.		Per month.
Colonel	300/-		"
Lieutenant Colonel	275/-		"
Major	200/-		"
Captain	145/-		"
Lieutenant	125/-		"
Subedar Major and Subedar	36/-		"
Jemadar	25/-		"
Havildar	17/-		"
Lance Naik	14/-		"
Riflemen, Bugler, etc. (Including mule driver)	13/-		"
Kharidars and Dithas (Civil Officers)	48/-		"
Pandit	48/-		"
Accountants and clerks	29/-		"
Cook	11/-		"
Kotay	20/-		"
Armourers and artificers (If non-combatants)	11/-		"
Pipa Jemadar	11/-		"
Pipa Havildar	10/-		"
Pipas and Regimental followers. (Including Syces)	9/-		"
Dolay	9/-		"
Mehter (Sweeper)	9/-		"

No other personal allowances will be admissible except hair cutting and washing allowances where the services of barbers and dhobies are not provided in kind. If any allowance other than those in force in the Indian Army at present is given to them in the future, the question of its granting to the personnel of the Nepalese Contingent will be considered on its merit.

6. *Rations:* Rations will be supplied by the Government of India on the same scale as is applicable to the Indian troops. Rations will also be

provided to non-combatants including Civil Officers but excluding private servants.

7. *Clothing*: Clothing will be provided by the Government of India according to the scale applicable to the Indian troops, unless such articles of clothing as are taken from Nepal.

8. *Medical Facilities*: These will be provided by the Government of India as for Indian troops.

9. *Gurkhas Hats*: Every effort will be made by the Government of India to provide Gurkha hats.

10. *Accommodations*: (A) No rent will be recovered from officers of the contingent occupying Government-owned, hired or appropriated bungalows or tents. The officers will, however, make their own arrangements for furniture and will pay for water and light.

(B) Accommodation together with furniture, water and light will be provided free of charge to all other ranks on the scale applicable to the corresponding ranks of the Indian Army.

11. *Travelling Allowance*: Personnel of the Contingent will be subject to the rules in the Passage Regulations, India, applicable to similar ranks of the Indian Army.

12. *Pensions and Gratuties*: While the Nepalese troops are serving in India, the grant of disability and family pensions will be regulated in accordance with the same rules and under the same conditions as applicable to Indian troops of corresponding rank.

13. *Arms, Ammunition and Equipments*: (A) These will be provided on loan by the Government of India on the same scale as for the Units of the Indian army.

(B) Opportunity will also be taken to train Nepalese Troops in the use of modern weapon techniques.

14. *Unit Allowances*: (as distinct from personal allowances) The battalions of the contingent will be entitled to such unit allowances as are admissible to units of the Indian Infantry.

15. *Incidence of Cost*: The Government of Nepal will bear the ordinary charges of these battations at the rate it would have cost the Nepal Government to maintain them in Nepal. All charges over and above this amount will be borne by the Government of India.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Unpublished Materials

Manuscripts and Government Documents

FOREIGN MINISTRY ARCHIVES, KATHMANDU

Manuscripts and Documents

The documents of the Foreign Ministry Archives in Kathmandu in this period of study bears two kinds of classification. The greater majority of the documents are labeled according to their position in the almirah. The numbers run from E. No.1. to 10, followed by the *Poka* (bundle number). A few bundles that were not in the almirah, however, are labeled as *Bastas*.

- a. *Basta No 6, Basta No. 42, Basta No. 63, Basta No. 64 Basta No. 75.*
- b. *Cha Poka No. 194*
- c. E. No. 1, *Poka No. 1, E. No. 1 Poka No. 2, E. No. 1 Poka No. 4, E. No. 1. Poka No. 24, E. No. 1 Poka No. 29, E. No. 1 Poka No. 30, E. No. 1, Poka No. 30 Ga, E. No. 1, Poka No. 35, E, No. 1 Poka No. 61 Kha.*
- d. E. No. 2, *Poka No. 51, E. No. 2. Poka No. Ka 51, E, No. 2, Poka No. 53, E. No. 2 Poka No. 54, E. No. 2. Poka No 55, E. No. 2, Poka No.60, E. No.2, Poka No. 68, E, No. 2. Poka No. 551, E. No. 2, Poka No.560, E, No. 2, Poka No 561, E. No. 2. Poka No. 606.*
- e. E. No. 4. *Poka No. 153, E. No. 4, Poka No. 155, E. No. 4, Poka No. 162.*
- f. E. No. 7, *Poka No. 765.*
- g. E. No. 10, *Poka No. 194.*
- h. *Poka No. 40, Poka No. 40 Kha, Poka No. 45 Ka.*
- i. *Poka* entitled "Membership in the United Nations".
- j. *Poka* entitled "Purano Meshilharu" (Old Files).
- k. Collection of radio broadcasts: German and Japanese short wave radio broadcasts and All India Information N. D. C. Q. No. 44 and 46, transmission 11.
- l. Register of Secret Letters in the 1940's that is the correspondences between the Nepalese Premier and the British Minister.

INDIA OFFICE LIBRARY, LONDON

Parliamentary Papers, Foreign Offices Letters and Miscellaneous Letters.

Military Archives, Kathmandu (The Army Head Quarters).

The documents and manuscripts in the Military Archives, Kathmandu, exclusively belongs to the Rana period (1846-1950). They are kept and classified as "books". These "books" range from ten to twelve pages to hundreds of pages. But these are not "books" in the sense we understand today. These "books" may be listed as follows.

Book No 82 (1960/1903), Book No 156 (1969/1912), Book No. 158 1969/1912, Book No. 159(1969/1912), Book No. 160 (1969/1912), Book No. 189, Book No. 190, Book No. 191 (1973/1916), Book No. 192 (1971/1914), Book No. 196. Book No. 201 (1975/1918), Book No. 210/1978 1921.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES, NEW DELHI

Government Documents

The Government documents may be categorized as follows: *Foreign Secret E. Proceedings*, *Foreign Secret E*, *Consultations*, *External Collections*, *Legislative Assembly Debates* and *Legislative Council Debates*.

Miscellaneous Unpublished Materials

Baskota, P. "Recruitment of the Gurkhas in the British Army, 1815-45, Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Delhi University, 1982.

Budathoki, Chandra Bikram. "History of Democratic Movement in Nepal : 1931-1953. Unpublished Ph. D. Disserataion Patna University, 1974.

Hamal, Tek Bahadur, "Yishwa Vijaya" (Conquest of the World) This is an eye witness account in verse from a Lieutenant of the Nepalese Contingent, who served in the Indo-Burma front during the second world war. It is without pagination.

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS IN ENGLISH

Albrecht-Carrie, Rene. *The Meaning of the First World War*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965.

Ballantine, Henry. *On India's Frontier or Nepal: The Gurkha's Mysterious Land*. New York: J. Selwin Tait and Sons. 1895.

Bondurant, Joan V. *Conquest of Violence, The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict*. Berkely: University of California Press, 1969.

Brown, Norman, *The United States and India and Pakistan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1965.

Burns, C. Delisle. 1918-1928 *A Short History of the World*. London: Victor Gollanez, 1928.

- Candler, Edmund. *The Sepoy*. London, : John Murry, 1919.
- Central Bureau of Statistics. *The Analysis of the Population of Nepal*. Kathmandu : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1977.
- Chaudhari, K. C. *Anglo-Nepalese Relations (From the Earliest Times of the British Rule in India Till the Gurkha War.)* Calcutta: Modern Book Agency, 1960.
- Chamberlain, William Henry. *The Russian Revolution 1917-1918 : From the Overthrow of the Czar to the Assumption of the Bolsheviks*. Vol. II. New York: The Universal Library, 1965.
- Chauhan, R. S. *The Political Development in Nepal, 1950-1970 (Conflict Between Tradition and Modernity)*. New Delhi : Associated Publishing House, 1971.
- Hart, B. H. Liddell. *History of the First World War*. London : William Claws & Sons, 1970.
- His Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council, *The Imperial Gazettes of India* Vol. IV (Administrative), Oxford : Henry Frowde, 1907.
- His Majesty's Stationery Service. *From East India (Disturbances in the Punjab, etc.) : Report of the Committee Appointed by the Government of India to Investigate Disturbances in the Punjab, etc. The Firing at Jallianwalla Bag (Parliamentary Papers c.m.d. 681 of 1920)*. London : His Majesty's Stationery Service, 1920.
- Husain, Asad. *British India's Relations with the Kingdom of Nepal, 1857-1947 : A Diplomatic History of Nepal*. London : Geroge Allen and Unwin, 1970.
- Johnson Stanley C. *The Medal Collector, A Guide to Naval, Military, Airforce and Civil Medals and Ribbons*. London : Herbert Jenkins, M.C. MXXI.
- Landon, Perceval. *Nepal*, Vol.II. Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak 1976 (reprint).
- McLane, John R. (ed.) *The Political Awakening of India*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970.
- Mojumdar, Kanchanmoy. *Nepal and the Indian National Movement*. Calcutta : K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, 1975.
- *Political Relations Between India and Nepal*. New Delhi : Munshi Ram Manohar Lal, 1975.
- Muni, S.D. *An Assertive Monarchy*. New Delhi: Chetana Publication, 1977.
- Northy, W. B. C. J. Morris. *The Gurkhas: Their Manners and Customs and Their Country*. Delhi:Cosmo Publications, 1974 (reprint).
- Churchill, Winston S. *The Great War*, Vol. I. II. London: n. d. publisher n. k.
- *The World in Crisis, 1916—1918*. Vol. I. New York: publisher n. k., 1927.
- Coupland, R. *Britain and India 1600-1941*. London: Longmans Green and Co., n.d.
- Cruttwell, C. R. M. F. *A History of the Great War : 1914-1918*. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1940.

- Dmytryshyan, Basil (ed.) *Imperial Russia: A Source Book. 1700-1917.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967.
- Dupree, L. *Afghanistan.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.
- Fay Sidney Bradshaw. *The Origins of the World War.* New Delhi: Eurasia Publishing House, 1965.
- Felelcher, Arnold. *Afghanistan: High Way of Conquest:* Cornell, Cornell University Press, 1965.
- Government of India, *Sedition Committee: 1918. Report.* Calcutta: Government of India, 1919.
- India War Memorial.* Simla: Government Central Press, 1919.
- Government of Nepal, *Jan Marako Muluki Ain (Legal Code on Murderer).* Kathmandu. Shri Naxal Bagawati Press, 1926.
- *Ain (Legal Code) Vol. III.* Kathmandu: Government of Nepal, 1927.
- Habberton, William. *Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan. 1837-1907.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1937.
- Hagen, Toni. *Nepal, The Kingdom in the Himalayas.* Berne: Kummerly and Frey, Geographical Publishers, 1961.
- O'Dwyer, Sir Michael. *India As I Knew It.* London.: Constable and Co., 1925.
- Polany, Karl. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times:* Boston; Beacon Press, 1971.
- Prasad, Ishwari. *The Life and Times of Maharaja Juddha Shumsher Jung Bahadur Rana of Nepal.* New Delhi: Ashis Publications, 1975.
- Pushkarev, Sergei. *The Emergence of Modern Russia, 1800-1917* trans. R. H. MacNeal, Tova Yedlin. London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967.
- Regimental Committee, *History of the 5th Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force), 1928-1958.* Wellington: Regimental Committee, n. d.
- Richardson, H. E. *A Short History of Tibet.* New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1962.
- Rose, Leo E. *Nepal Strategy for Survival.* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1973 (reprint).
- Schumacher, E. F. *Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as If People Mattered.* London: Blond and Briggs, 1975.
- Shakespear L. W. *History of the 2nd Queen Goorkhas Rifles Vol. II 1911-1921.* Wellington: Regimental Committee, 1937.
- Shepherd, Gary. *Life Among the Magars.* Kathmandu: Sahayogi Press, 1982.
- Shah Ikbal, *Nepal: The Home of the Gods.* London : Sampson Low, Marston & Co., n.d.
- Singh, Kushwant, *Train to Pakistan.* New York: Groove Press, 1956.
- Stewart, Colonel Rupert. *Roll of Valour,* London: Hutchinson & Co. 928.

- Stromberg, Ronald. *European Intellectual History, Since 1789*. New York: Meredith Corporation, 1968.
- Superintendent Government Printing. *Program of the Movement of Troops of the Nepalese Contingent, June 1919*. Calcutta; Superintendent Government Printing, 1919.
- *Assurances on the Subject Regarding the Caste of Gurkha Officers and Solidiers During the War of 1914-1915*. Delhi: Superintendent Government Printing, 1915.
- *Measures Taken to Ensure the Keeping of the Castes of Gurkha Soldiers in Active Service During the War of 1914-1915*. Delhi: Superintendent Government Printing, 1915.
- The Times. *The Times History of the Great War* (in 20 Vols) London: The Times, 1915-1919.
- Thomson, David. *Democracy in France Since 1870*. London: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Stiller, F. Ludwing. *The Silent Cry, The People of Nepal*. Kathmandu: Sahayogi Press, 1976.
- Toyanbee Arnold. *A Study of History*, Vol. II-X, abridged by D. C. Somerville. London: Oxford University press, 1957.
- *Civilization on Trial*. London : Oxford University Press, 1955.
- *War and Civilization*, (ed.) Albert V. Fowler. London: Oxford University Press, 1955.
- *Surviving the Future*. London : Oxford University Press, 1955.
- Tucker, Francis. *Gorkha : The Story of the Gurkhas of Nepal*. London: Constable and. Co., 1957.
- Uprety, Prem R. *Nepal-Tibet Relations, 1850-1930 : Years of Hopes Challenges and Frustrations*. Kathmandu : Puga Nara, 1980.
- *Religion and Politics in the Punjab in the 1920's*. New Delhi : Sterling Publishers, 1980.
- Ullah, Najib. "Afghanistan in Historical Perspective", in *Current Problems of Afghanistan*. Princeton : Princeton Universtiy Press, 1973.
- Vansittrat, Eden. *Notes on Gurkhas; Being a Short Account of Their Country, History, Character, Caste, Clans, etc.* Calcutta; 1906.
- Williams Raymond. *Culture and Society, 1780-1950*. New York : Harper and Row, 1958.
- Woodruff, Philip. *The Men Who Ruled India : The Guardians*, Vol. II. New York : Schoken Books, 1964 (reprint).
- Woodyatt, Nigel. "The Kingdom of Nepal" and "The Littel Men" *Under Ten Viceroy's : The Reminiscences of a Gurkha*. London: Herbert Jenkins, 1923.
- Younghusband, Francis. *India and Tibet*. London : John Murry, 1910

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS IN NEPLI

- Government of Nepal, *Jan Marako Muluki Ain* (Legal Code on Murderer). Kathmandu : Shri Naxal Bhagawati Press, 1926.
- Pandey, Bhim Bahadur. *Tes Bakhat ko Nepal* (The Then Nepal) Vol. I. Lalitpur : Research Center for Nepal and Asian Studies, 2039 (1982).
- Yogi, Nara Hari Nath. *Itihis Prakash ma Sandhi Patra Sangraha*, part I. (Nepal) Kathmandu : Dang Spritual conference, 2022 (1965).

ARTICLES IN ENGLISH

- Adams, A.E. "The Bolsheviks and the Ukarian Front, 1918-1919", *Slavic and East European Review* Vol. 6, No. 87, pp. 396-417.
- Betham, G.L. "In the Land of the Gurkhas", *The Indian Express*, July 28, 1940, p. 8.
- Kamranya, Nake M. "Afghanistan Under Soviet Occupation", *Current History* Vol. 81, May 1982, pp. 220-221.
- Laws, M.E.S. "Future of the Gurkhas", *The United States and Empire Review*, April 1948, pp. 5-6
- Wojkowitz, De Nebesk. "State Oracle in Tibet", *The Modern Review*, December 1950, pp. 479-80.

NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS**Western Newspapers and Periodicals**

- | | |
|---|---|
| <i>Adrill and Bootbridge Advertiser</i> | <i>New Castle Journal</i> |
| <i>Birmingham Post</i> | <i>Nottingham Guardian</i> |
| <i>Civil and Military Gazette</i> | <i>Russian Review</i> |
| <i>Contemporary Review</i> | <i>Scotsman</i> |
| <i>Current History</i> | <i>Slavic and East European Review</i> |
| <i>Daily Chronicle</i> | <i>Slavic Review</i> |
| <i>Daily Telegraph</i> | <i>The Broad Arrow : The Naval and Military Gazette</i> |
| <i>Evening Standard</i> | <i>The Daily Express</i> |
| <i>Foreign Affairs</i> | <i>The Daily Post</i> |
| <i>Glasgow Herald</i> | <i>The Graphic</i> |
| <i>Glasgow Recorder</i> | <i>The Hindu Outlook</i> |
| <i>Illustrated London News</i> | <i>The Modern Review</i> |
| <i>Liverpool Council</i> | <i>The People</i> |
| <i>Liverpool Post</i> | <i>The United States Service and Empire Review</i> |
| <i>London Times</i> | <i>Western Morning News</i> |
| <i>London Gazette</i> | <i>Westminister Gazette</i> |
| <i>Manchaster Guardian</i> | <i>The Navy and the Army</i> |
| <i>Morning Post</i> | |
| <i>National Herald</i> | |

Newspapers and Periodicals from South Asia (English otherwise specified)*Aja* (Hindi)*Amritbazar Patrika**Gorkhapatra* (Nepali)*Hindustan Times**Keshari* (Marathi)*The Englishman**The Gazette of India**The Indian Mutiny Recorder**The Modern Review**The Pioneer**The Prince and the Press**The Times of India*

Index

A

Abbotabad 61, 108 197
Afghanistan 168-180, 300-301
Afghan war 168-189
Afghan war medals 96
Akhil Nepal Barga Mahasabha
243,246, 301
Albania 185
Alexandra, H. M. Queen 78-79
Ali Laik 296
Almora 130
Amban 20-21, 25-27
Anglo-Nepalese war 115
Anglo-Russian rivalry 1, 7
Anglo-Tibetan Conflict 8-19
Anglo-Tibetan Convention 15, 17, 27
Arabian sea 73
Asan Tole 250
Asquith, H. H. 45
Assam 217-219, 261, 264
Auchinleck, Claude 199, 232-34, 263
Austria-Hungary 83, 161

B

Bada Maharani, Sahiba 269
Bait Aiess 81
Bagmati, river 272
Balipur 264,
Baneras 138, 248
Bannu 70,
Banu Brigade 67
Barrett, Arthur 66-67
Barilly 55, 57
Basar 209
Basha 227
Basnyat, Lal Bahadur 30

Batauli Doban 240
Batta 50, 133
Baty, A. Major 216
Belgium 220, 257, 271
Bengal 46, 125, 127
Benyon, General 66-67, 69, 179
Bergson Henry 42
Berlin 232, 236
Berwand 68
Bhairab, Colonel 64
Bhairab Nath Regiment 197
Bhakta Bahadur, Colonel 207
Bharadari Sabha 285
Bhutan 300
Bijaya Man Singh, Kharidar 98
Bil Bahadur, 215
Bilin 226
Birendra Nath Ghosh 100
Bishenpur 230
Bolsheviks 88, 97, 244, 301
Bombay 46, 91
Bread Bye 237
Brest-Litovsk 83
Brierly, Colonel 201, 206
Britain 25, 44-45, 47, 54, 73, 74,
96, 103, 114-115, 127, 131,
185-89, 195, 220, 237, 238, 302
British War medals 96
Buckingham palace 46, 155
Budhi Man 216
Buki gold 7
Bunbury, W. E. General 60
Bruce, R. I. 66
Burgh, E. Lee 194, 320
Burma 108, 211, 218-220, 226,
231, 261

C

Calcutta 99-100, 138, 155, 194, 300
 Caspian sea 73
 Capitalization of Annual Present
 120-125
 Cassels, Robert Archibald 198,
 203-204
 Central powers 82-83, 158, 161-62
 Chamberlain, Neville 185
 Chao-Ehrfeng Campaign 35
 Chanda Giri 83
 Chankaishek, Generalismo 271
 Champaran 117
 Chehl Duktaran 169
 Chetri, Bhim Lal Kharka 268
 Chidwin 218
 China 19-37, 73
 Chinese Emperor 20, 22, 27, 29
 Chin hills 226-227
 China-Tibet conflict 19-37, 301
 China Trade Marts 16, 18, 21
 Chitung Lopsu 28
 Chhamdo 22
 Chharong, Kazi 23
 Chhauwni 33
 Chow Ta-Yen 22
 Chumbi Valley 7, 18-19
 Chung Yi, General 35, 301
 Collins, Major 67
 Common Wealth of Nations 286
 Corbett, Jim "Major" 265
 Cowan, General Tennant 226
 Crew, Marquis 74
 Curzon, Lord 11-12, 66
 Cypriots 221
 Czar 8-9
 Czechezoslovakia 185

D

Dailekh 131
 Dalai Lama 8-9, 11, 23, 36-37
 Dardanell's campaign 79-82
 Darjeeling 14, 24, 129, 243

Dehra Dun 57, 61, 91, 106, 108,
 194, 197, 237
 Delhi 189, 210, 256
 Dejarat 67
 Dhankuta 129, 133, 257
 Dhulikhel 33
 Digarche or Sigatse 28
 Dimapur 218
 Dorjieff 8
 Doti 130
 Dotiyals 265, 268
 Durbanga 129
 Dwarika 209

E

East India Company 104
 Egypt 73
 Eighth Gurkha Rifles 73, 231
 Eliot, T. S. 236
 Enfidaville 222
 England 105, 108, 114
 Es Bahadur 206
 Eustance, N. Major 189
 Europe 42-43, 72-79, 114
 Ez Zauii 222

F

Fifth Gurkha Rifles 73, 231
 Filchner, Professor 278
 First Gurkha Rifles 66, 69, 73
 Flanders 73
 Forty Fifth Gurkha Brigade 66
 Forty Third Gurkha Brigade 66
 Fort William, Calcutta 19
 Fourth Gurkha Regiment 66, 73
 France 43, 73, 75-79, 82, 104,
 220-221, 232, 257
 Fyzabad 95

G

Gallipoli 79, 81
 Gandak river 117, 272
 Garhung 240
 Garci hills 224
 Gartok 16

Gauva, Kazi 28
 George V, King and Emperor 47,
 83, 155, 180
 George VI, King and Emperor 234
 Germany 75-79, 81, 83, 105, 137,
 157-164, 184-85, 220-21, 224,
 232, 267, 277-279
 Ghale, Gaze 231
 Ghoom 258-59, 303
 Giuenchy 76
 Gorakhpore 129-30, 140, 145,
 149, 258-59, 261
 Gorkha 129, 240
 Great War or First World War
 41-164
 Greeks 221
 Gorkha League 101
 Gurkha memorials 108-109
 Gulmi 240
 Gurkha soldiers 31, 42, 43, 47,
 72-88, 90, 220-231
 Gurung, Bhanubhagat 231
 Gurung, Ghane 76
 Gurung, Lachhiman 231
 Gurung, Man Bahadur 266
 Gurung, Ratna Barna 78
 Gurung, Shumsher 71-72
 Gurung, Sunman 59
 Gyantse 16, 28
 Guzranwala 171

H

Haidari Kach 67
 Hasan Abdal 55, 58, 203-04
 Halliday, Federick 100
 Hamda, General 234
 Harcourt, J. S. M., Major 145
 Hartwell, General 202-203
 Hazra 283
 Hetauda 272
 Hisi Gnawnig 28
 Hitler, Adolf 184-85, 278

Hodgson, Brian 128
 Bethmann, Holweg 102-03
 Hutchinson, H. D. 75, 78

I

Ilam 14, 129, 130
 Imphal 215, 217, 219
 Indian Revolt, 1857, 8, 118, 209
 Intrigues of War 157-164, 275-279
 Iran 207, 208
 Iraq 207, 208, 273
 Ispan Raghza 68-70
 Italy 185, 223-226

J

Jagriti, manuscript 246-247
 Jangi Jagan Nath Battalion 261
 Japan 43, 217, 234, 275-77, 301
 Jhapa 272
 Jhiakunchhe 22
 Jit Bahadur 16,
 Julahas 95
 Junagadh 283
 Jung, Nawab Main Nawaz 297

K

Kala Mohars 37
 Kalapani 74
 Kali Bahadur Regiment 197,
 215-217, 219, 234
 Kali river 272
 Kalong Samiti 244, 249, 301
 Kalons, Lahasa 24
 Kakool 62, 198
 Kamal Bahadur 206
 Kanigurams 70
 Kashmir 283, 285, 287-288, 292
 Kasyal Office 18, 20, 29
 Kathmandu 9, 14, 45, 59, 83, 95,
 97, 101, 107, 122, 130-35,
 140, 160, 170, 174, 186, 188,
 199, 206, 214, 233, 235, 237,
 243, 259, 267-68, 272, 278,
 287-88, 296

Kensian school 88
 Kerong 7, 33
 Kesang Bhote 26
 Khachchara 20
 Khadir Bend 82
 Khadga Bahadur 215
 Khagendra Raj 237
 Khaisar Valley 69, 209
 Khamba Jong 14
 Khambas 28
 Khan, Akabar 284
 Khan, Amanullah 168
 Khan, Habibulla 168
 Khan, Nasrullah 168
 Khekya, Mongrel 25
 Khomia 217-18, 220
 Khot 69, 200-207
 Khot riot 200-207
 Khyber Pass 179
 Kumeon hills 265
 Kuncha 237
 Kunraghat 257, 259, 268
 Kuseo, Lhasa 22
 Kuti 8, 33

L

Laheri Shari 129-30, 258-59
 Lama, Ganju 231
 Lama, Santa Bir 277
 Lau Dharin 27
 Lav Jang, Captain 203
 League of Nations 96
 Ledo road 220
 Lee Warner Plan 11
 Len, Amban 25-26
 Lhasa 1, 9-12, 16,-17,* 21-22,
 23-25, 35, 37
 Libia 222
 Linlithgow, Lord 187, 193, 211, 265
 269
 London 11, 83, 108, 124, 169 270
 Lowrie, J. W. 72,
 Lucknow 196, 219

Lyang Tarin, Amban 23
 Lyes 75

M

Macdonell, D. 28
 Madjez Elbob 224
 Mahat, Sailendra 217
 Mahendra Dal (regiment) 55, 66,
 68, 71, 197, 214, 219, 234
 Mahendra Pratap, *Raja* 160-61
 Mahottari 33
 Manipur 214, 219, 261
 Mano Majra 284
 Malaya 207, 273
 Mandalay 219,
 Manchu Dynasty 36
 Manchuria 10
 Mareth 222
 Masuds 4-8,
 Mathema, Dharma Bhakta 250
 Maud, General 82
 Mayggaon 226
 Mediterranean 73
 Mersailles 75
 Middle East 207-08, 221
 Mimi, Mongrel 26
 Miramshah 70
 Mogaung 227-228
 Molesworth, A. L. 62-63
 Mongolia 10
 Monte San Bartola 223-224
 Mortar Bluff 229
 Mountbatten, Louis 214, 235-36, 283
 Mozzagrogna 222
 Majithia, Surjit 285-87, 290-91,
 292, 293,
 Mukherjee, A. 121
 Munic Pact 185-186

N

Nanu 68
 Narai Razhza 68
 Naya Gorakh, regiment 58
 Nazis 88

Nehru, Pandit, J. L. 285-86, 296-98
 Nepalese Contingent 57-65, 65-72
 174-180, 188-220, 295-302
 Netby 77-78
 Nauve Chapelle 43-44
 Ninth Gurkha Rifles 73
 North West Frontier Province 49,
 54, 57, 59, 72, 172, 176, 177-179
 198-99, 210, 219
 Nowshera 178

O

O'Connor, W. F. T. 85, 170
 Ogilvy, Colonel 259
 One Half Gurkha Rifles 222
 One Ninth Gurkha Rifles 222-23
 One Seventh Gurkha Rifles 224
 Ootacamund 292
 Oracle Lama 11-12

P

Pakistan 284, 292, 302
 Pal, Bipin Chandra 121
 Palpa 129-130
 Pamirs 9-10, 169
 Panipatya 74, 90-91, 256
 Panpo 10
 Pasupati Regiment 180
 Patia 90-91
 Pegu 277
 Pemba, Bhotini 26
 Peshwar 198, 283
 Pimpi hill 227
 Politics of Size 1-3
 Potla Lama see Dalai Lama
 Poudel, Lekh Nath 197
 Pun, Tula Bahadur 227-229
 Puna Khambani 26
 Punjab 46, 66, 108, 171, 284

R

Rai, Agan Singh 231
 Raktapat Kommittee 244-46, 249-251
 Rai, Beni Dhoj 76
 Rapid Training Program 47-49

Ram Dal, Regiment 55
 Rana, Ananda Shumsher 251
 Rana, Baber Shumsher 54, 58, 71,
 86, 175, 180, 292
 Rana, Bahadur Shumsher 189, 200,
 202-03, 204, 211-213, 269, 271
 Rana Bhim Shumsher 44, 86
 Rana Brahma Shumsher 197
 Rana, Chandra Shumsher 9, 11,
 15-19, 24, 29, 31, 44-47,
 54, 64, 66, 72, 74, 99-103,
 106-107, 114-117, 122-125,
 129, 138-139, 144, 146-47,
 150-154, 162-164, 169-175, 209
 Rana, Ek Raj Shumsher 197
 Rana, Jagbir 59
 Rana Joodha Shumsher 186-188,
 203, 207-212, 214, 219, 232,
 234, 239, 241, 243, 244-249,
 258-267, 269-274, 279
 Rana, Jodh Jang Bahadur 77
 Rana, Kaiser Shumsher 56,
 Rana, Krishna Shumsher 218
 Rana Kul Bikram 207
 Rana, Padma Shumsher 54, 57,
 58-59, 116, 175, 180, 266
 Rana, Pratap Shumsher 146
 Rana, Sarda Shumsher 289, 295
 Rana Shere Shumsher 56, 64
 Rana Tej Shumsher 54, 87, 116
 Rangoon 226, 275-76
 Rasuwa 7, 33
 Raxaul 131, 189, 195, 206, 233, 259
 Recruitment 126-150, 255-269
 Ridgeway, Major 132
 Russia 7-11, 19, 36, 83, 89, 169,
 178, 207, 301
 Russo-Tibet Relations 8-19

S

Salyan 130
 Sanak Sing 71
 Sangshak 215
 San Marino 224
 Schuliet, Dr. 278

Second Gurkha Rifles 73, 127, 180
 197, 200-207, 239
 Scott, Licutenant 59
 Sethia Kazi 37
 Seventh Gurkha Rifles 231
 Shah Salim Mela 69
 Shai, Nardip 71
 Sharma, Agni Prasad 246-47
 Shastri, Shukra Raj 250
 Sher Dal, Regiment 64, 197, 217-218
 Shiva Puri 83
 Shrestha, Ganga Lal 250
 Shuddhi Ceremony 74, 90
 Shumsher Dal, Regiment 197
 Simla 36
 Simla Conference (Convention)
 36-37
 Singh, Teja 160-61
 Smith, J. Manners 42, 45
 Sri Nath Regiment 55, 197
 St. Petersburg 8--9

T

Tenth Gurkha Rifles 73
 Thapa, Kul Bir 77-78
 Thapa, Lal Bahadur 222-223
 Thapa, Megh Bahadur 206
 Thapa, Moti Lal 76
 Thapa, Netra Bahadur 229-230
 Thapa, Sher, Bahadur 224
 The Great Landing 79-82
 Third Gurkha Rifles 73, 127
 Third Anglo—Afghan war 168-180
 Tibet 8-37
 Tin, Chinese Commissioner 25
 Toche, Colonel 223
 Tottenhans, Loftus 221

Trans-Himalayan Politics 7-37
 Tripartite Agreement 291
 Turkey 79-82, 161
 Two Eighth Gurkha Rifles 221
 Two Sixth Gurkha Rifles 189, 224
 Two Tenth Gurkha Rifles 224
 Two Third Alexandra's Own
 Gurkha Rifles 77-78

U

United Kingdom, see Britain
 Utarin Amba 21

V

Victory Medals 69

W

Wadi Akarit 222
 Wallanchung Gola 14, 33
 Waspa Valley 69
 War Gratuity 109-110
 War time Intrigues, see Intrigues of
 war
 Wavell, Viceroy 218
 Waziristan 48, 66-72
 White, Carr 130
 Woodyatt, General 64, 108
 World War I 41-164
 World War II 183-279

Y

Yeats, Major 221
 Ypres 76
 Younghusband, Francis 12--13,
 14-15, 19

Z

Zhoab 198

THE BOOK

This work focuses on the role of a small nation in global and regional conflicts in the first half of the twentieth century. Two global and several regional conflicts have been taken for scrutiny and analysis. The picture that slowly, yet, dramatically unfolds is pathetically triumphant. The two world wars and the emergence of democratic India helped in more than one way to expose the obsolete nature of her Rana polity and administration; and thereby shake the conservative bastion of her Hindu social organization. Her traumatic experience during these physical conflicts, which is so neatly interwoven with the process of secularization, is told in this volume. It is an irony of history that her increasing involvement occurred at a time when her rulers desired to be left undisturbed to enjoy the fruits of peace and tranquility. Though isolation and involvement are two contradictory forces, yet, Nepal by her skillful dexterity was able to weave a *modus vivendi* between them. The pangs and traumas associated with such a state of mind are the central theme of this book. It was in this process Nepal had to abandon her cherished precepts of peaceful coexistence and splendid isolation. However, Nepal did pass through these tumultuous decades with courage and fortitude and in the process brought about an increasing secularization of her polity and society.

THE AUTHOR

Prem R. Uprety (b. 1944)

received his M.A. in Ancient History and Archaeology from Allahabad University and A.M. and Ph. D. Degrees from the University of Missouri, Columbia. He is Professor of History at Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu. He had been the recipient of several fellowships and awards, which include the Colombo Plan Scholarship, Stephen History Fellowship and the Fulbright Hays Fellowship to study in India, the United Kingdom and the United States. Dr. Uprety is the author of *Religion and Politics in the Punjab in the 1920's*, *Nepal-Tibet Relations, 1850-1930: Years of Hopes Challenges and Frustrations* and a forthcoming title *Political Awakening in Nepal: Search for a Secular Identity*. He has also contributed a chapter in the book entitled *Democracy, Pluralism and Nation-Building*. He has also written extensively in various historical and social science journals like *Journal of Foreign Affairs* and *The Panjab Past and Present*.

Rs. 200.00

\$16.00